Respondent operated a facility to provide pre-cooling and short term storage for fresh vegetables harvested by local growers, including lettuce, cabbage, and brussels sprouts. Respondent produced, used, or stored more than 10,000 pounds of ammonia (anhydrous) at the Facility and was subject to the requirements of CAA§ 112(r)(7). Respondent was subject to Program 3 requirements because it had public receptors within the distance to the endpoint for the worst-case release and was subject to the OSHA process safety management standard set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119.
On November 19, 2019, EPA performed an inspection of the Facility pursuant to Section 112(r) of CAA, Sections 304-12 of EPCRA, and Section 103 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act. Based upon the information gathered during the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that the Respondent violated specific provisions of the CAA and EPCRA.
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
Count 1 (Failure to Comply with Process Safety Information Requirements)
Based upon the Inspection and follow-up investigation, EPA determined that the Respondent failed to compile adequate information for the Facility relating to the P&ID for the high pressure receiver in 2019 and the relief system design and design basis from 2018 to 2022.
Based upon the Inspection and follow-up investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to document that certain process piping and equipment, an emergency shut-off valve on a portable unit for ammonia storage, and a self-closing valve connected to process piping at the Facility complied with RAGAGEP in 2019.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated the process safety information requirements set forth at 40 C.F.R. § 68.65 from 2018 to 2022.
Count2 (Failure to Comply with Process Hazard Analysis Requirements)
Based upon the Inspection and follow-up investigation, EPA determined that the PHA performed by Respondent for the Facility in 2016 and 2021 failed to adequately address process hazards during high ambient temperatures and identify engineering and administrative controls to address process hazards for multiple scenarios.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c) by failing to perform a PHA that addresses the hazards of the process as well as any engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and their interrelationships in 2021.
Count3 (Failure to Develop and Implement Adequate Operating Procedures)
Based upon the Inspection and follow-up investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to develop adequate operating procedures for oil drainage for its leased portable ammonia equipment in 2019.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a), by failing to adequately develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information in 2019.
Count 4 (Failure to Conduct Adequate Inspections and Tests, and Correct Deficient Equipment)
Based upon the Inspection and follow-up investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to conduct adequate inspection and tests related to the Critical Items Checklists for process equipment from 2018 to 2022.
Based upon the Inspection and follow-up investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to address several pieces of equipment with deficiencies that were outside acceptable limits (collectively, “Deficient Equipment”) in 2018 and 2019.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(1) and (e), by failing to perform inspections and tests on process equipment from 2018 to 2022, and correct deficiencies in equipment that are outside acceptable limits before further use, or in a safe and timely manner when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation in 2018 and 2019.
Count 5 (Failure to Comply with Pre-Startup Safety Review Requirements)
Based upon the Inspection and follow-up investigation, EPA determined that the Respondent failed to complete the PSSR for four projects at the Facility in 2019.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated 40 C.F.R.§ 68.77(b) by failing to complete an adequate PSSR pre-startup safety review for the Facility in 2019.
Count 6 (Failure to Comply with Contractor Requirements)
Based upon the Inspection and follow-up investigation, EPA determined that the Respondent failed to fulfill owner or operator responsibilities related to a periodic performance review for three contractors working on or around the covered processes at the Facility in 2019.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.87(b) by failing to fulfill owner or operator responsibilities regarding contractors performing maintenance or repair, turnaround, major renovation, or specialty work on or adjacent to a covered process in 2019.
Count 7 (Failure to Comply with the Emergency Response Requirements)
Based upon the Inspection and follow-up investigation, EPA determined that the Respondent failed to perform annual emergency response coordination activities with the local emergency planning and response organizations in 2018, 2020, and 2021.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.93(b), by failing to coordinate response needs with local emergency planning and response organizations on an annual basis in 2018, 2020, and 2021.
Count 8 (Failure to Comply with the General Duty Clause)
An owner or operator breaches its general duty under CAA Section 112(r)(1) if the owner or operator does not maintain a safe facility to prevent accidental releases.
A recognized hazard within the ammonia industry is when inspection and basic safety information is not maintained for ammonia equipment. One way to address this hazard is to have a qualified person inspect ammonia equipment on a regular basis and to take appropriate remedial action based on the results of the inspection. The failure or malfunction of ammonia equipment is likely to cause harm, as it can result in a catastrophic release of ammonia.
Based upon the Inspection and follow-up investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to maintain inspection and basic safety information regarding nurse tanks used for off-season storage of ammonia (May through October of each year) consistent with industry practice and the standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems in 2019.
A recognized hazard within the ammonia industry is when ammonia equipment is not properly labeled. Inadequately labeled ammonia equipment is likely to cause harm, as it can undermine effective response in the event of a catastrophic release of ammonia.
Based upon the Inspection and follow-up investigation, Respondent failed to properly maintain labels on the nurse tanks used for off-season storage of ammonia (May through October of each year) consistent with industry practice and the standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems in 2019.
Respondent breached its general duty under CAA Section 112(r)(1), by failing to maintain a safe facility to prevent accidental releases in 2019.
Count 9 (Failure to Submit Correct Tier II Reports)
For reporting years 2017 and 2018, Respondent managed and/or stored anhydrous ammonia at the Facility in quantities exceeding the applicable TPQ for purposes of the Section 312 Tier II inventory reporting requirements of EPCRA.
For reporting years 2017 and 2018, Respondent failed to provide accurate information regarding off-season storage of anhydrous ammonia present at the Facility in its Inventory Forms.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated EPCRA § 312 and 40 C.F.R. § 370.42(s) by failing to provide accurate information regarding off-season storage of anhydrous ammonia at the Facility in 2017 and 2018.
Respondent agrees to the assessment of a civil penalty of SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY-THREE DOLLARS ($75,373) for the claims set forth herein as final settlement of the civil claims.
SUPPLEMENT AL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECT
Respondent has agreed to undertake a Supplemental Environmental Project (SEP) as part of the settlement of this matter, in accordance with all provisions of this Consent Agreement and the schedule set forth in Appendix A.
In implementing the SEP, Respondent shall provide the emergency response equipment specified in Appendix A to the identified emergency response organization to assist it in responding to emergencies in the community where Respondent operates and where chemical processes are undertaken that are regulated by the CAA§ 112(r) and EPCRA. Respondent is obligated to expend no less than Ninety-Three Thousand dollars ($93,000) associated with implementing the SEP.
APPENDIX A SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECT
Project Description – Overview
This Supplemental Environmental Project (” SEP”) consists of emergency response equipment to be purchased by ACS, LLC (” ACS”) for the Yuma Fire Department in Arizona to own and use. ACS will provide funding to the City of Yuma, Arizona, for the equipment described below within sixty (60) days following the Effective Date. Subsequently, the City of Yuma (on behalf of the Yuma Fire Department) will issue a purchase order and take delivery of the equipment described below. The SEP will be considered complete when each piece of equipment described below, or substantially similar equipment in the event the equipment listed below is not available, is delivered to the Yuma Fire Department. If necessary due to product availability or supply chain issues , substantially similar equipment will be purchased by the City of Yuma after consultation with the Yuma Fire Department. ACS shall complete this SEP no later than eight (8) months after the Effective Date.
Respondent proposes to expend $93,000 toward the purchase of emergency response equipment for the Yuma Fire Department. Specifically , Respondent would purchase twenty-five (25) P25 compliant handheld radios to replace antiquated radios previously purchased in 2003. P25 was developed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy to standardize digital radio communications amongst public safety agencies nationally and internationally. Accordingly , P25 standardizes interfaces between the various components of the land mobile radio systems used by emergency responders.
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