Respondent was the “owner or operator” of the Facility. The Facility’s refrigeration system used approximately 5,913 pounds of anhydrous ammonia. Accordingly, at the time of the violations alleged herein, Respondent operated a stationary source that handled and stored anhydrous ammonia, listed at 40 C.F.R. § 68.130, and thus was subject to the General Duty Clause found in section 112(r)(1) of the CAA.
Because of the potential hazards posed by the mishandling of anhydrous ammonia, industry trade associations have issued standards outlining the recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices in the ammonia refrigeration industry to control the risks associated with the use of ammonia, specified in Appendix A. In collaboration with the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), the International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (IIAR) has issued (and updates) Standard 2: Standard for Safe Design of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigeration Systems (IIAR 2), Standard 4: Installation of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigeration Systems (IIAR 5) Standard 6: Standard for Testing, Inspection, and Maintenance of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems (IIAR 6), and Standard 9: American National Standard for Minimum System Safety Requirements for Existing Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems IIAR 9), along with other applicable standards and guidance.
On January 13, 2020, an authorized representative of the EPA conducted an inspection of the Facility to evaluate compliance with section 112(r) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1) (Inspection).
The Inspection and EPA’s review of information provided by Respondent revealed several potentially dangerous conditions relating to the Facility’s refrigeration system. The EPA communicated these findings with the Respondent after the Inspection and detailed these findings in the EPA’s Inspection Report provided to the Respondent on or about March 11, 2020.
The potentially dangerous conditions identified by EPA are listed in the chart attached to and made part of this Agreement as Appendix A. Appendix A also explains how each of the conditions could lead to a release or inhibit the Facility’s ability to minimize the consequences of any release that might occur and includes examples of recognized industry standards of care that could feasibly reduce or eliminate the hazard.
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW
COUNT I – FAILURE TO IDENTIFY HAZARDS
Pursuant to the General Duty Clause, section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1), owners and operators of stationary sources producing, processing, handling, or storing extremely hazardous substances have a general duty, in the same manner and to the same extent as section 654 of title 29, to, among other things, identify hazards which may result from accidental releases of a regulated substance or other extremely hazardous substance using appropriate hazard assessment techniques.
The recommended industry practice and standard of care for identifying, analyzing, and evaluating potential hazards associated with ammonia refrigeration systems of the same size and type as Respondent’s refrigeration system is, in other words, to use standard, industry-developed hazard identification checklists or more formalized techniques such as a “What If” analysis. IIAR has developed checklists for this purpose. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, Guidance for Implementation of the General Duty Clause Clean Air Act Section 112(r)(1) § 2.3.1 (2000), available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/gendutyclause-rpt.pdf; Ammonia Refrigeration Management Program § 10 (2005) and § 3 (2018) (provides streamline guidance to facilities like Respondent’s that have less than 10,000 pounds of ammonia).
At the time of the Inspection, Respondent failed to:
a. conduct a hazard assessment to identify the hazards that may result in accidental release of the anhydrous ammonia using recognized and appropriate hazard assessment techniques as described in “Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures” by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), or hazard review checklists developed by ammonia refrigeration industry organizations such as the Ammonia Refrigeration Management Program; and
b. document management of change procedures utilized prior to removing the old recirculatory from the machinery room and installing the new recirculatory outside the Facility, as described in Guidelines for Management of Change for Process Safety by the CCPS and in the Ammonia Refrigeration Management Program.
Accordingly, from at least January 13, 2020, through at least April 9, 2021, EPA alleges that Respondent failed to conduct a process hazard review of the refrigeration system using appropriate hazard assessment techniques, and as a result, failed to identify hazards that may result from accidental releases of ammonia, in violation of the General Duty Clause, section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1).
COUNT II – FAILURE TO DESIGN AND MAINTAIN A SAFE FACILITY
Pursuant to the General Duty Clause, section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1), owners and operators of stationary sources producing, processing, handling, or storing extremely hazardous substances have a general duty, in the same manner and to the same extent as section 654 of title 29, to, among other things, design and maintain a safe facility, taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases.
The recommended industry practice and standard of care for designing and maintaining a safe facility so as to prevent releases of extremely hazardous substances from ammonia refrigeration systems are found, among other places, in the industry standards referenced in Appendix A. They include basing design considerations upon applicable design codes, federal and state regulations, and industry guidelines to prevent releases or minimize their impacts, as well as to develop and implement standard operating procedures, maintenance programs, personnel training programs, management of change practices, incident investigation procedures, self-audits, and preventative maintenance programs. See EPA’s Guidance for Implementation of the General Duty Clause: Clean Air Act Section 112(r)(1) (May 2000).
The instances in which EPA alleges that Respondent failed in its general duty to design and maintain the Facility in a safe manner, taking such steps as are necessary to prevent a release of an extremely hazardous substance, are listed under Conditions 1-8 of Appendix A, which is incorporated by reference into this Agreement. They include, for example, the failures to adequately label all ammonia piping, provide an emergency ventilation switch, and install a functional emergency ventilation system.
Examples of industry standards associated with each instance in which Respondent failed in its general duty to design and maintain a safe facility, listed in Appendix A, demonstrate that the hazard is recognized by the ammonia refrigeration industry and that the industry has identified a feasible means by which Respondent could have eliminated or reduced the hazard. Further, Appendix A identifies, for each condition, how the failure to address the hazard could lead to or exacerbate a release of anhydrous ammonia and cause harm.
Accordingly, from at least January 13, 2020, through August 1, 2024, EPA alleges that Respondent failed to design and maintain a safe facility, taking such steps as were necessary to prevent a release of an extremely hazardous substance, in violation of the General Duty Clause, section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1).
COUNT III – FAILURE TO MINIMIZE THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTAL RELEASES
Pursuant to the General Duty Clause, section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1), owners and operators of stationary sources producing, processing, handling, or storing extremely hazardous substances (including anhydrous ammonia) have a general duty, in the same manner and to the same extent as section 654 of title 29, to, among other things, minimize the consequences of any accidental releases which do occur.
Industry standards and guidelines for minimizing the consequences of an accidental release from ammonia refrigeration systems are found, among other places, in the industry standards referenced in Appendix A. They include emergency planning and preparedness measures, as well as design and maintenance measures to minimize the severity and duration of releases that do occur.
The instances in which EPA alleges that Respondent failed in its general duty to minimize the consequences of a release should one occur are listed under Conditions 3-5, 9 and 10 of Appendix A, which is incorporated by reference into this Agreement. They include, for example, the failures to install an eyewash/shower station in the machinery room, and to provide ammonia detectors or alarms inside and outside of the machinery room.
Examples of industry standards associated with each instance in which Respondent failed in its general duty to minimize the consequences of a release, identified in Appendix A, demonstrate that the hazard is recognized by the ammonia refrigeration industry and that the industry has identified a standard means by which Respondent could have eliminated or reduced the hazard. Further, Appendix A identifies, for each condition, how the failure to address the hazard could lead to or exacerbate a release of anhydrous ammonia and cause harm.
Accordingly, from at least January 13, 2020, through August 1, 2024, EPA alleges Respondent failed to minimize the consequences of an accidental release of an extremely hazardous substance should one occur, in violation of the General Duty Clause, section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1).
TERMS OF CONSENT AGREEMENT
Based on the alleged violations of law, and after consideration of the statutory factors in paragraph 13 above, the EPA has determined a civil penalty of One Hundred Nineteen Thousand and Two Hundred Dollars ($119,200) (Assessed Penalty) is appropriate to settle this matter.
Respondent agrees for the purposes of settlement to:
a. pay the penalty; and
b. perform the Supplemental Environmental Project (SEP), as described in Section VII below and Appendix B.
Supplemental Environmental Project
In response to the alleged violations of the CAA and in settlement of this matter, although not required by the CAA or any other federal, state or local law, Respondent agrees to implement a SEP, as described in Appendix B.
Respondent shall complete a safety upgrades SEP, consisting of the installation and implementation of an advanced ammonia control system that contains the following:
(a) automated safety response and condition monitoring,
(b) remote monitoring, and
(c) automated alarms to supplement and enhance the current control and detection safety systems. Respondent also shall install a backup power generator for the advanced ammonia control system to ensure continuous operation of the refrigeration system. The SEP is more specifically described in Appendix B and incorporated herein by reference.
Respondent shall spend no less than $250,000 on implementing the SEP. Respondent shall include documentation of the expenditures made in connection with the SEP as part of the SEP Completion Report.
Respondent shall complete the SEP no later than 18 months after the Filing Date, and in accordance with the schedule described in Appendix B.
The SEP is consistent with applicable EPA policy and guidelines, specifically EPA’s 2015 Update to the 1998 Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy, (March 10, 2015). The SEP advances at least one of the chemical preparedness objectives of the CAA because it is intended to secure significant environmental and public health protection and benefits by helping prevent or mitigate the release of anhydrous ammonia from, and improve chemical safety at, the Facility. The SEP is not inconsistent with any provision of the CAA. The SEP relates to the alleged violations and is designed to reduce the overall risk to public health and/or the environment potentially affected by the alleged violations by helping prevent ammonia releases and enhancing the ability to minimize releases.
Respondent certifies the truth and accuracy of each of the following:
a. That all cost information provided to the EPA in connection with the EPA’s approval of the SEP is complete and accurate and that the Respondent in good faith estimates that the cost to implement the SEP, is $307,900;
| Alleged Hazards/Dangerous Condition | GDC Violation | How Condition Could Lead to or Exacerbate the Consequences of a Release, Causing Harm | Examples of Industry Standards of Care, Showing that (1) Hazard is Recognized by Owner/Operator’s Industry, and (2) There are Way(s) to Eliminate or Reduce the Hazard |
| Condition 1 Flammable and combustible materials such as cardboard boxes and wooden pallets stored in the machinery room that contains Compressor 4. | Failure to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases. | Exacerbates risk of fire or explosion. Ammonia is flammable at certain concentrations. | The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to store combustible materials outside of the machinery room unless they are contained in an approved fire-rated storage container. See, e.g., IIAR 2-2014 § 6.4 (Combustible Materials); IIAR 9-2020 § 7.3.4 (same). |
| Condition 2 The exit from the machinery room that contains Compressor 4 is a window served by a fixed ladder. This egress is not a self-closing door, not side-hinged to swing in the direction of egress, and is not equipped with panic hardware. | Failure to design and maintain a safe facility by taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases. | Workers must be able to quickly exit the machinery room in the event of a release. Failure to provide more than one exit in large machinery rooms may prevent egress during a release. | The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is that any ammonia machinery room exceeding 1,000 square feet will have two or more exit doors. It is permitted that the second door include a fixed ladder but must include panic hardware. See, e.g., IIAR 2-2014 § 6.10 (Entrance and Exits); IIAR 9-2020 § 7.3.9 (same); IIAR 2-2021 § 6.10 (same). |
| Condition 3 There was no emergency stop switch located outside and adjacent to the machinery room door. | Failure to design and maintain a safe facility, taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases. Failure to minimize the consequences of releases which do occur. | In the event of a release, workers and emergency responders need to be able to quickly identify and access emergency control switches without entering the room, which could contain dangerous levels of vapors. Timely use of these switches can reduce the duration and severity of an accidental re- lease. | The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to provide an emergency shut-off switch outside and adjacent to the principal machinery room door. See, e.g., IIAR 2-2014 § 6.12.1 (Emergency Stop Switch); IIAR 9-2020 § 7.3.11.1 (same); IIAR 2-2021 § 6.12.1 (same). |
| Condition 4 There was no emergency ventilation control switch and/or emergency ventilation system in the machinery room. | Failure to design and maintain a safe facility by taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases. Failure to minimize the consequences of releases that do occur. | In the event of a release, workers and emergency responders need to be able to quickly identify and access emergency control switches without entering the room, which could contain dangerous levels of vapors. Timely use of these switches can reduce the duration and severity of an accidental re- lease. | The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to provide and clearly label an emergency ventilation switch immediately outside the principal machinery room. See, e.g., IIAR 2-2014 § 6.12.2 (Emergency Ventilation Control Switch); IIAR 9-2020 § 7.3.11.2 (same); IIAR 2-2021 § 6.12.2 (same). The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to provide an emergency ventilation system that can be automatically activated by ammonia sensors and also controlled by remote switches. See, e.g., IIAR 2- 2014 § 6.14.7 (Emergency Ventilation); IIAR 2-2021 § 6.14.7 (same). |
| Condition 5 The exit from the machinery room lacked a National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 704 placard. | Failure to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases. Failure to minimize the consequences of releases which do occur, | A lack of signs about the hazards posed by chemicals in space increases the chance of inadvertent exposure to ammonia releases and could frustrate effort to react quickly and properly during an ammonia release. | The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to display NFPA 704 diamonds for ammonia hazard identification on each door to the machinery room. See, e.g., IIAR 2-2014, § 6.15.1 (NFPA 704 Placards); IIAR 9-2020 § 7.2.9.1 (same); IIAR 2-2021 § 6.15.1 (same); NFPA 1-2018, § 53.2.4.1; NFPA 704 (2017), §§ 4.3 and 9.1. |
| Condition 6 None of the refrigeration machinery, including the compressor, condenser, pressure vessels, evaporators, and refrigeration sumps at the Facility were labeled. | Failure to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases. | The lack of labeling makes it more difficult to properly maintain system, increases chance of accidental release of ammonia, and could frustrate efforts to respond quickly in the event of a release | The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to label refrigeration machinery/equipment. See, e.g., IIAR 2-2014 § 5.14.2 (Machinery La- bels); IIAR 9-2020 § 7.2.9.2 (Equipment Labels); IIAR 2-2021, § 5.14.3 (same). |
| Condition 7 None of the ammonia piping mains, headers and branches at the Facility were labeled. | Failure to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases. | The lack of proper pipe labeling makes it more difficult to properly maintain the system, increases the chance of accidental release of ammonia, and could frustrate efforts to respond quickly in the event of a release. | The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to label all piping with the identity, physical state, and relative pressure of the contents, as well as the direction of flow. See, e.g., IIAR 2-2014 § 5.14.5 (Pipe Marking); IIAR 9-2020 § 7.2.9.4 (same); IIAR 2-2021 § 5.14.6 (same). |
| Condition 8 There was uninsulated ammonia refrigeration piping located on the roof and in the ma- chinery room at the Facility. This piping was not painted, which provides a protective finish from external corrosion. | Failure to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases. | Insulation vapor barrier protects pipes and vessels from moisture, which causes corrosion. Breached insulation can hold moisture against the external pipe surface, furthering corrosion. Corroded pipes and vessels can break or succumb to pressure, causing ammonia release. Ice buildup can impact the functionality of shutoff valves. | The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration system is to paint and insulate ammonia piping to protect the piping from external corrosion. See, e.g., IIAR 6-2019 Chapter 11 (Piping -Inspections for protective coatings); IIAR 2-2014 § 5.10 (Insulation); IIAR 9-2020 § 7.26 (same); IIAR 2-2021 § 5.10 (same). And, the recommended industry practice and standard of care is to protect ammonia pip- ing from physical and environmental damage. See, e.g., IIAR 4- 2020 § 4.8 (Location of Components). |
| Condition 9 There was no eye-wash/safety shower station located inside the machinery room. | Failure to minimize the consequences of releases which do occur. | An inadequate or missing eyewash and shower station delays emergency responders and workers in washing off this corrosive, toxic chemical in the event of exposure. | The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to provide access to eye-wash/safety shower units inside the machinery room where the path of travel is unobstructed, and the path of travel is no more than 55 feet. See, e.g., IIAR 2-2014 § 6.7 (Eyewash/Safety Shower); IIAR 9-2020 § 7.3.7 (same); IIAR 2-2021 § 6.7 (same). |
| Condition 10 There were no ammonia detectors or alarms in the machinery room or at any other locations in the Facility. | Failure to minimize the consequences of releases which do occur. | Ammonia detectors and alarms provide early warning that a release is taking place, enabling quick response and protecting workers, emergency responders, and the public from a larger release. | The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems of this size is to provide well-la- beled audible and visual alarms inside and immediately outside each entrance to the machinery room. See, e.g., IIAR 2-2014 §§ 6.13.1 (Ammonia Detection and Alarms and Chapter 17); IIAR 9-2020 § 7.3.12.1.3 (Ammonia Detection and Alarms); IIAR 2- 2021 §§ 6.13.1 (Ammonia Detection and Alarm, and Chapter 17). |
APPENDIX B – SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECT
This Supplemental Environmental Project (SEP) requires installation of an advanced ammonia control, detection, and automatic shut-down system, and a backup generator, to ensure the system remains running in the event of a power outage to prevent pressure buildup in the ammonia refrigeration system, which could lead to a release of anhydrous ammonia.
The facility will expend no less than Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000) implementing the SEP, will order all the equipment described below within 120 days following
the date of the final order, ratifying the Consent Agreement, is filed by the Regional Hearing Clerk (Filing Date), and shall complete this SEP no later than 18 months after the Filing Date.
The International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (IIAR) standards do not have specific requirements on the automated operating controls of an ammonia refrigeration system. The facility is proposing the installation of an advanced control system that will monitor, alert, and respond to life safety events such as ammonia release or dangerous pressure conditions that could lead to an ammonia release. This control system will provide operators with enhanced system visibility and implement automated response to some conditions to mitigate the “human factor” for the start-up and shutdown of equipment. While a control system does not replace a qualified operator the advanced control system enhances operator capabilities and protections.
1. Advanced Control System
The facility is required to install an advanced control system to monitor and control the ammonia refrigeration system at its Facility that includes:
a. Automated Life Safety Response and Condition Monitoring – This advanced control system requires additional ammonia sensors in the engine room and refrigerated areas to monitor the release of ammonia. The control system will provide automated responses to the detection of ammonia to close valves, pump out coils and pipes, isolation of ammonia to a central location, and shutdown of equipment. In addition to the automated responses to mitigate a release, the continuous monitoring after a release provides valuable information to first responders and Superior Farms personnel about current conditions. Historical trending of release data provides additional information to estimate release amounts.
b. Remote Monitoring – This advanced control system will provide personnel and supporting contractors remote access to the ammonia system through an advanced touchscreen control system (also known as a Human Machine Interface), which will enable off-site personnel to monitor the full ammonia refrigeration system and ensure continuous oversight, including during non-operational evening hours. In the event of a critical condition, the ability to remotely access the system allows personnel and supporting contractors to properly respond and, in some circumstances, remotely respond to events. Remote access monitoring will provide critical information to guide operators through emergency procedures, minimizing response time and preventing further ammonia release because it allows an operator to quickly assess the situation, activate safety protocols, and shut down the system if necessary without requiring in-person access to the engine room to understand errors in the system.
c. Automated Alarming – This advanced control system will automatically notify operators and management in the event of specified conditions. This automated notification, in addition to remote monitoring, allows remote operators to take immediate action if required to prevent or mitigate ammonia release. If any abnormal conditions arise, the control system will promptly alert operators and on-site workers. This early detection allows for timely intervention to prevent or mitigate ammonia releases to protect on-site workers and nearby communities. This automated alarm will provide text or email notifications for specific detailed ammonia system problems that enable operators to observe critical parameters such as pressure temperature and system status.
d. Testing and Training – Following installation of this advanced control system, the facility shall train staff on how to use said system. Respondent will also document and implement procedures to inspect the new system in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations, both substantive and regarding the frequency of such inspections. If the manufacturer does not provide such instructions, they shall be established by Respondents in accordance with
industry standards of care.
2. Backup Power Generator
The facility is required to install a backup power generator for the ammonia refrigeration system. Backup Power Generators for ammonia systems ensure continuous operation, preventing disruptions in critical processes such as emergency ventilation and ammonia detection. A sudden power loss would compromise safety features like ventilation, ammonia detection alarms, or the controlled shutdown of the ammonia system. During the restart of an ammonia refrigeration system following a power outage, there is a risk of a phenomenon called “hydraulic shock.” This abnormal transient condition can result in a sharp pressure change within the system, potentially causing catastrophic failure of piping, valves, and other components. In August of 2010, there was a catastrophic failure at the Millard Refrigerated Services facility in Theodore, Alabama, which resulted in the release of 32,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia after a 7-hour power outage.
3. Nexus to section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act (CAA):
This SEP has an adequate nexus to the alleged General Duty Clause, section 112(r), violations because the objective of the regulations and programs authorized under section 112(r) is to prevent the accidental release of anhydrous ammonia and to minimize the consequences of any such
release that does occur. The advanced control system, which has automated and remote monitoring and alarms, helps accomplish these objectives. Specifically, this system will prevent unplanned shutdowns, which in turn prevents pressure buildup in the ammonia refrigeration system that could lead to a release. Finally, the addition of a backup generator will ensure continued operation of the Facility’s safety features in the event of a power loss, which could lead to a release.
4. Nexus to Communities with Environmental Justice Concerns:
The EPA has identified northeast Denver, including the Globeville neighborhood, as a community with environmental justice concerns. The facility is located in a community that is located next to major highways, large numbers of regulated facilities, and areas burdened by legacy pollution, which has led community members to express continued concerns about their health and environment. The EPA utilizes EJ Screen as a screening tool to identify when violations potentially impact EJ communities of concern. EJ Screen considers both environmental (e.g., particulate matter, ozone, air toxics, lead, and hazardous waste proximity) and demographic (e.g., income, employment, education, life expectancy) indicators. The EJ Screen for the community surrounding the Facility determined that all of the environmental indicators are at or above the 90th percentile for the impacted community. This SEP will mitigate potential damage or reduce potential risks to local communities with environmental justice concerns.
5. Planned Purchases: The following chart lists the estimated costs of purchasing the advanced control system:
Description – Total
Materials for advanced control system – $124,965
Labor to build and install advanced control system – $78,035
Electrical wiring and landing to equipment for advanced control system – $50,000
Advanced Touchscreen Control Panel (also known as Human Machine Interface (HMI)) – $3500
Backup Generator – $51,400
GRAND TOTAL SEP EQUIPMENT COST (EXCLUDING TAX): $307,900.
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