Hot Work’s 35′ Fire Safe Area

One of the more common issues we come across in regards to Hot Work is the encroachment of combustible/flammable hazards within the REQUIRED 35′ Fire Safety Zone.

1910.252(a)(2)(vii) Relocation of combustibles. Where practicable, all combustibles shall be relocated at least 35 feet (10.7 m) from the work site. Where relocation is impracticable, combustibles shall be protected with flameproofed covers or otherwise shielded with metal or asbestos guards or curtains.

But this requirement has more meaning than just ordinary combustibles. In areas where we have contained flammables, we need to monitor the area for these flammable gases and/or vapors.

1910.252(a)(2)(vi) Prohibited areas. Cutting or welding shall not be permitted in the following situations:
1910.252(a)(2)(vi)(A) In areas not authorized by management.
1910.252(a)(2)(vi)(B) In sprinklered buildings while such protection is impaired.
1910.252(a)(2)(vi)(C) In the presence of explosive atmospheres (mixtures of flammable gases, vapors, liquids, or dusts with air), or explosive atmospheres that may develop inside uncleaned or improperly prepared tanks or equipment which have previously contained such materials, or that may develop in areas with an accumulation of combustible dusts.
1910.252(a)(2)(vi)(D) In areas near the storage of large quantities of exposed, readily ignitible materials such as bulk sulfur, baled paper, or cotton.

On May 23, 2006, Employee #1 and two coworkers were working at a facility, a manufacturer of urethane and other foam products. Employee #1 was an employee. The coworkers were working for a contractor. The contractors were performing pipefitting work seven (7) feet away from a pour line foam process tunnel. They were using a torch, and a byproduct of their work was hot slag.

Acetone fumes were leaking from the pour line foam processing unit. The fumes seeped beyond a booth in which they were originating, and when they came into contact with the hot slag, they were ignited. The flame front propagated back to the source inside the tunnel, causing an explosion inside the tunnel.

Employee #1 was working inside the booth at a location where rewinding was done. He sustained second and third-degree burns to 40 percent of his body. He was taken to High Point Regional Hospital and then transferred to the Wake Forest Burn Center at Baptist Hospital in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, where he was admitted in critical condition. He died at approximately 1:30 p.m. on June 7, 2006.

The contractors were also taken to High Point Regional Hospital. One was admitted for hospitalization overnight, and the other was examined and released.

Violations/PenaltiesSeriousWillfulRepeatOtherTotal
Initial Violations22
Current Violations22
Initial Penalty$4,550$0$0$0$4,550
Current Penalty$3,500$0$0$0$3,500
FTA Penalty$0$0$0$0$0
#Citation IDCitaton TypeStandard CitedIssuance DateAbatement Due DateCurrent PenaltyInitial PenaltyContestLatest EventNote
1.01001ASerious19100252 A02 IV11/17/200601/08/2007$0$3,50011/21/2006F – Formal SettlementCitation has been deleted.
2.01001BSerious19100252 A02 XIIIA11/17/200601/08/2007$3,500$011/21/2006F – Formal Settlement 
3.01001CSerious19100252 A02 VIC11/17/200611/22/2006$0$011/21/2006F – Formal SettlementCitation has been deleted.
4.01001DSerious19100252 A02 XIIID11/17/200601/08/2007$0$011/21/2006F – Formal SettlementCitation has been deleted.
5.01002Serious19101200 E0211/17/200601/08/2007$0$1,05011/21/2006F – Formal Settlement 

Source: https://www.osha.gov/ords/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=309516045

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