Let’ not fool ourselves or let the media attempt to fool us! As safety professionals, we all know that the LACK OF INSPECTION by either OSHA or EPA played NO ROLE in the tragic accident in West, TX. Just ask yourself this simple question: How many accident investigations have you conducted and determined that a causal factor in the accident was the lack of OSHA or EPA involvement? We know that a true “root cause” investigation looks INTERNALLY at our own failures that led to the situation, which allowed the accident to occur. Although the SFMO and ATF were a bit testy at their news conference last week, we have to understand it is NOT their job to play politics! They want ROOT CAUSE evidence of the fire’s cause and origin and whether the facility followed any safety protocols is NOT part of the cause and origin of the FIRE INVESTIGATION. This aspect will be left up to the Chemical Safety Board (CSB); however, this week we have learned of some “turf wars” stemming from this investigation! Let’s take a peek inside the investigation and see what could be brewing within…
- Buildings for the storage of bulk or bagged ammonium nitrate or blended fertilizers high in ammonium nitrate should be of noncombustible construction.
- The storage area should be dedicated to AN storage to minimize the possibility of contamination. Particularly avoid contamination with materials such as ignitable liquids, finely divided metals, greases, sulfur, carbons, acids, fibers, and most finely divided organic materials.
- Locate storage in noncombustible construction on floors with no open drains, traps, tunnels, pits or pockets where molten ammonium nitrate can collect and be confined in the event of fire.
Based on what little evidence the SFMO and ATF released last week, it looks as if storing the AN in “wooden bins” housed inside an unprotected wood framed structure may have played a tiny bit more of a CAUSAL FACTOR than the fact that OSHA and EPA did not inspect the facility for it’s AN storage. We need to be asking ourselves, how many other “distributors” of AN are using wooden bins in unprotected wood frame structures to store their AN. Communities need to IDENTIFY these businesses and basically put a DEFENSIVE RESPONSE plan in place as there will be little a FD will be capable of without placing the FF’s at UNDO RISK.
Code enforcement or NOT, communities can see 1st hand what happens when AN is exposed to a fire; a fire that can be started from dozens of potential causes (lighting strike, electrical. arson, vehicle, smoking, etc.). I am still amazed at the lack of response from the fire fighting community in regards to this accident! I have seen NO NATIONAL stand-down orders from fire fighting organizations, not even the AFL-CIO, to 1) review their response plans, 2) inspect AN storage/handling facilities in their jurisdiction, and 3) RETRAIN personnel on the hazards of AN in fire scenarios. Have we convinced ourselves that we have more pressing hazards in our communities and that “we do not need to make any knee jerk reactions before we have all the facts regarding West”. Let’s see…
We know the facility stored AN in wooden bins
We know the facility had no fixed fire protection
We know the facility was a wood framed structure
We know that 28-34 tons of AN detonated
We know that 12 emergency responders died
We know that AN has taken the lives of 45 FF’s in just three (3) fires:
1947 = 27 FF’s died in Texas City
1988 = 6 FF’s died in Kansas City
2013 = 12 FF’s died in West, TX
What other data could we obtain later on that would make the stand-down appear to be have been a silly waste of time? Even if we later determine this accident was caused by a FF using explosives, would it really change our need to inspect businesses handling AN, review our response plans, and RETRAIN our personnel? ALL good exercises to do after EVERY fatal accident!