Respondent owns and operates a chemical manufacturing facility that has an Acrylonitrile Manufacturing process. On or about December 1-3, 2015, an EPA inspector conducted an inspection of Respondent’s facility. A contractor was removing a six-inch blind and installing four-inch and three quarters inch blinds to prepare the Heads Column in the Acrylonitrile Unit for caustic cleaning. The contractor controlled the method and manner for removing and replacing the blinds. The contractor opened and removed the six-inch flange blank, inserted gaskets, closed the flange, and tightened the bolts. He opened and installed the four-inch flange blank, inserted gaskets, closed the flange, and tightened the bolts. During this work, the contractor was unexpectedly exposed to elevated concentrations of hydrogen cyanide that seeped through an “unseated” gate valve on the four inch line. The gate valve appeared to be fully closed and was confirmed to be locked with a chain.
After the incident, the gate valve was inspected. The inspection revealed a small piece of debris on the seat ledge on the bottom side of the gate valve. Unit personnel were unaware of the debris, and the debris did not prevent the gate valve from appearing to be fully closed. The presence of the debris prevented the valve from fully “seating” and allowed some hydrogen cyanide to seep through the valve. Therefore, Respondent violated 40 CFR 68.69(d) by failing to fully recognize potentially hazardous concentrations of hazardous chemicals in process piping and thus develop and implement safe work practices.
Count One- Failure to Develop and Implement Safe Work Practices
40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d) provides that the owner or operator shall develop and implement safe work practices to provide for the control of hazards during operations such as lockoutltagout; confined space entry; opening process equipment or piping; and control over entrance into a stationary source by maintenance, contractor, laboratory, or other support personnel.
Count Two -Failure to Maintain Offsite Consequence Analysis Documentation
40 C.F.R. § 68.38(e) provides that the owner or operator shall maintain documentation of data used to estimate population and environmental receptors potentially affected.
During the inspection on or about December 1-3 2015, the inspector requested the documentation for the offsite consequences analysis the facility is required to maintain. During the review, the inspector did not find documentation of the environmental receptors potentially affected by Respondent’s worst case toxic release. Therefore, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.38(e) by failing to maintain documentation of data used to estimate population and environmental receptors potentially affected.
Count Three – Failure to List Beginning Date of Investigation in Incident Report
40 C.F.R. 68.60 requires the owner or operator of a covered facility to investigate each incident that does or could reasonably result in a catastrophic release.
At the conclusion of the investigation a summary must be prepared and must include the date the investigation began.
During the review, the inspector found that the date the investigation began was not listed in the report concerning the June 10, 2015, incident. Therefore, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.60(c) by failing to list the date the incident investigation began.
CIVIL PENALTY
For the reasons set forth above, Respondent has agreed to pay a civil penalty of One Hundred Seventy-Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($174,250).
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