I have finally received the investigation information regarding the anhydrous ammonia fatality at a refrigerated seafood warehouse in Boston in March 2016. Sadly these reports do not indicate the cause of the accident and it does not appear that the AHJ used the state’s 527 CMR 33.00: Hazardous Material Process or Processing to enforce the PSM type requirements on this process. The process contained around 6,000 pounds of NH3 at the time of the accident. Below is a “behind the scenes” description of what went on that night and how the first-in engine and ladder companies attempted to rescue the deceased worker using only their bunker gear and SCBA(s). The rescue team could not reach the worker due to the levels of NH3 and the fact that bunker gear is NOT the proper chemical protective clothing for NH3. The BFD ended up utilizing a refrigeration contractor who worked on the process (there was no indication he was not working on the process at the time of the release) to escort them on their 3rd entry in the hopes that he could aid them in finding the valves to isolate the leak. There is a lot of learnings to take from this…