This is my second and probably the last post regarding this incident. This post will cover the Boston Fire Department’s (BFD) activities that took place at the facility AFTER the fatality. As you can see, these guys are true pro’s and they know hazardous materials as well as did a nice job using IIAR-2, American National Standard for Safe Design of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems as their basis for this inspection. One observation that I was able to make regarding this incident is that [the company] did not receive any citations related to the state of MA’s HAZMAT code, formerly called 527 CMR 33.00: Hazardous Material Process or Processing which became effective in 2013. [The company] was required to have their “Permit to Process Hazardous Material” by January 1, 2014, which is shown in these documents did NOT happen. I have submitted one last question via FOIA request as to why this 2012 state code was not enforced in this fatal 2016 accident. We will never know if this code could have prevented this fatal accident, but we do know that it was intended to! The state wrote this code in 2012 as a response to a Chemical Safety Board Recommendation stemming from the CAI / Arnel Chemical Plant Explosion. However, it appears that this code is a “toothless” code! I hope I am wrong and that [the company] was cited for not obtaining their “Permit to Process Hazardous Material” nor maintaining their process per 527 CMR 33.00: Hazardous Material Process or Processing.
Here are the activities that took place along with their timeline and a list of code violations discovered by the BFD after the fatality: