What it’s like to have a 14″ NH3 pipe suffer a 24″ long stress fracture on your roof

UPDATED 2/16/2021 with OSHA Case File

A couple of KEY POINTS in this EMA’s report out to the County Supervisors:

1. Two weeks before this incident the County had conducted a drill at another NH3 facility that involved a rooftop NH3 leak (PREPAREDNESS)
2. The release came from a 14″ diameter suction line on the roof of the facility.  The pipe failure is said to have been caused by a “stress fracture” that was 2′ long, along this 14″ pipe on the roof.
3. It is stated that this ruptured pipe contained around 48,000 pounds of ammonia (NOTE: the process is reported to hold ~64K pounds per the RMP, so we are not sure where this 48K number comes from.  Here is a link to the facility’s RMPs – not sure which of the two facilities in the town this incident occurred – seems to be the larger one based on media video footage from the scene:  CLICK HERE for the RMP
   1. The NRC report states:  CALLER IS REPORTING A FACILITY AMMONIA SUCTION PIPE CRACKED, RESULTING IN A RELEASE OF ANHYDROUS AMMONIA.
   2. The NRC report does not provide the amount released and has not been updated to reflect this as of this posting. 
   3. http://www.nrc.uscg.mil/

1. It all started around 7 pm and around.
2. The leak involved both liquid and vapor.  The liquid was thought to have gone into a storm drain and then into a creek.  (NOTE: The Department of Natural Resources determined the ammonia leak did not cause any water contamination – media reporting)
3. The facility maintains a HAZMAT team
4. At 7:15 pm the first 911 call was received for a medical call with the possible leak of NH3
5. Upon arrival, FD could see multiple people in the parking lot under respiratory distress, the NH3 plume, and could smell NH3
6. At 7:40 pm, it is said the compressor “feeding the pipeline was turned off.”  (NOTE:  this is most likely phrased incorrectly, as this 14″ pipe was most likely a suction header.  The compressor was left running in an attempt to keep the process under vacuum conditions to lessen the release amounts)
7. At 7:42 pm the IC requested more aid and ordered a 1-mile evacuation around the facility.
8. At 7:53 pm the County activated its Mass Communications System for those in the evacuation zone.  The message was received by 207 residents, with 25 confirmations.
9. At 8:25 a team made up of the Country HAZMAT, facility responders, and a Contractor was able to reach an isolation valve on the ruptured pipe and close it.
10. A “nursing home” is just west of the facility’s parking lot.
11. At 9:38 pm, the local hospital informed the IC they could not handle any more patients.  (NOTE: the report out did not break down the number of personnel treated or who the treated personnel were.  Some media reports state 17-18 people were transported for medical issues, with one of those treated being an FF, but does not state why he/she was treated.
12. Around 9:45 pm, with the valve closed, no more leak and scene stability was obtained.
13. At 9:49 pm, DNR arrives on the scene and plans to assess and deal with the polluted waterways/ponds.
14. At 1:16 am, most units were released with air monitoring continuing.
15. At 4:56 am, the incident was terminated.
16. The following morning the EMA conducted a “critique.”  The critique identified the need to improve communications across all the different agencies involved.
    1. The EMA director speaks to the County ERP and Hazard Assessment.
     

CLICK HERE to see the Country Supervisor meeting “report out.”  A MUST WATCH if you’re a responder or a facility with a hazardous material!  Notice how, after a serious event like this, the EMA director was COMPLIMENTARY of the facility and their ability to respond to their problem by having an in-house HAZMAT team.  Ask yourself…

“What would my EMA director say about my facility should I have such a significant event?” 

Does your EMA director even know about your HAZMATs on-site? 

Do they know you and your management on a first-name basis? 

Have they ever participated in a drill or even a discussion about your HAZMATs, their hazards, their ability to impact the community, and their ability to aid in your response?

While looking into this incident and trying to obtain this information I came across this contractor’s website.  It appears they built the refrigeration systems (1,535-ton ammonia refrigeration plant in phase 1 and 836-ton ammonia refrigeration plant in phase II) and new building in 2013.  https://miron-construction.com/project/abbyland-foods-distribution-center/

Here is an aerial view showing the new building and NH3 refrigeration system and the proximity of the nursing home (yellow box) mentioned in the report out:

CASE FILE