Chemical Process Safety (PSM/RMP)

Anhydrous Ammonia Tank Failure – South Africa 1973, Detailed report on a major disaster in a fertilizer plant

On July 13, 1973, at a fertilizer plant, one of four 50-ton (metric) pressure-storage tanks (horizontal bullet type) failed. The failure resulted from brittle fracture of a dished end. No specific source of cracking, or a “triggering incident” was identified. An estimated 30 ton of anhydrous ammonia was released, plus another 8 ton from a…...

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A 3rd Catastrophic Failure of a NH3 Refrigeration pressure vessel

I am trying to get the details behind this one.  I do know it was a vertical vessel inside an engine room.  it failed, catastrophically, and did considerable damage inside the engine room as well as off-site.  No off-site injuries or damage (other than the grass in the median of the road where it came…...

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Line Break gone BAD (Phosgene)

At 2:30 p.m. on September 13, 2010, Employee #1, Employee #2, and Employee #3 were tasked with the dismantling of a scaffold level within a phosgene containment dome. During their dismantling work, at approximately 80 feet above the ground, alarms specific to phosgene gas were triggered. The process within this Dome was the manufacturing and…...

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What RMP information will be available to the public under the new RMP Reconsideration Final Rule

Under the final RMP Reconsideration rule, members of the public can continue to obtain access to RMPs through three different means: Read-only access to the full version of facility RMPs at reading rooms by appearing in person at a Federal reading room; Read-only RMP access directly from the local emergency planning committee in the location…...

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RMP Reconsideration Final Rule is FINAL as of November 20, 2019

On November 20, 2019, EPA finalized changes to the Risk Management Program (RMP) Reconsideration final rule to better address potential security risks, regulatory consistency and reasonable consideration of costs. The changes are intended to promote better emergency planning and public information about accidents and maintain the trend of fewer significant accidents involving chemicals regulated under…...

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Another CATASTROPHIC FAILURE of a Ammonia Refrigeration vessel (150-gallon Vessel @ chicken slaughterhouse)

We have had another catastrophic failure of a pressure vessel used in an ammonia refrigeration process and this time we caught it on camera.  The event occurred last week and unfortunately, I have not heard of any causes or if anything special was happening within the process when this failure occurred.  This picture shows us…...

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A PSSR is NOT an Initial Start-Up Procedure

I am not sure where or quite when this vicious rumor began, but let’s make this clear: A Pre-startup Safety Review (PSSR) is an ENTIRELY separate exercise AND MUST be completed BEFORE the Initial Start-Up procedures are implemented. Granted it may be the same personnel doing both tasks, but the PSSR is FULLY COMPLETED BEFORE…...

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When a Nitrogen (N2) Purge makes an A_s out of U and Me (Assume)

Earlier this year I was asked to participate in an incident review involving a flashfire/explosion in a tote-filling process. (NOTE: the official term is an Intermediate Bulk Container or IBC) As I have written about many times, the #1 cause of these flash fires/explosions inside a container/vessel is the generation of static electricity; but this…...

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Anhydrous Ammonia exposure leads to a tracheotomy (OSHA)

This past May an employee was filling a nurse tank with anhydrous ammonia and noticed a small leak at the hose coupling.  He attempted to tighten the coupling and while doing so the coupling popped off and he was exposed to NH3 vapors. … Membership Required You must be a member to access this content.View Membership...

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Why was the Intercontinental Terminal Company (ITC) Tank Fire not a PSM accident?

This past week we got a “Factual Update” from the CSB on the Storage Tank Fire at Intercontinental Terminals Company (ITC) Terminal. After reading this update I was puzzled as to why the facts as we know them to date did not drive OSHA to open a NEP PSM inspection of the facility. Granted their…...

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Car Seal program and NFPA 496 Type Z Pressurized Cabinet

One means of controlling ignition sources in Hazardous Locations (HAZLOC) is to “pressurize” the enclosure/cabinet.  This is not usually a primary means of protection but is a fallback when a facility realizes that an electrical enclosure/cabinet is sitting in their newly recognized Class 1, Div 2 HAZLOC.  So I get a panic e-mail about this…...

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Car Seal program and NFPA 496 Type Z Pressurized Cabinet

One means of controlling ignition sources in Hazardous Locations (HAZLOC) is to “pressurize” the enclosure/cabinet.  This is not usually a primary means of protection but is a fallback when a facility realizes that an electrical enclosure/cabinet is sitting in their newly recognized Class 1, Div 2 HAZLOC.  So I get a panic e-mail about this…...

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