SAFTENG NOTES: Interesting citations… GDC on “Opening process equipment” and GDC on LEL detector(s) locations
The Respondent operates plastics material and resin manufacturing processes at the Facility that produces polymers used in various applications and products, meeting the definition of “process “as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 68.3. The Respondent produces, processes, handles, and stores 1,3-Butadiene, Chlorine, Propylene oxide, and Acrylonitrile at the Facility.
On February 2, 2022, an incident at the Facility resulted in an accidental release of 770 lbs of 1,3-Butadiene. On May 7, 2022, another incident at the Facility resulted in an accidental release of approximately 60 lbs of 1,3-Butadiene.
EPA Findings of Violation
Count 1 – Process Hazard Analysis
The Respondent failed to complete twenty-eight (28) items of its 2020 Process Hazard Analysis for MA I /2 and MA 3 by the recommended due dates. MA I /2 had two (2) overdue items, and MA 3 had twenty-six (26) overdue items.
The Respondent’s failure to assure that the recommendations of its Process Hazard Analysis are resolved in a timely manner pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.
Count 2 – Operating Procedures
The Respondent failed to implement its written normal operations – operating procedures regarding the manual closure of two valves during an HQ replacement.
The Respondent’s failure to implement its written normal operations – operating procedures pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1)(ii), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), along with the normal activation of the safety system is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.
Count 3 – Operating Procedures (process equipment)
The Respondent failed to follow the established Job Safety Analysis (“JSA”) procedure (N-0-SH-OP-06 Non-Routine Work Job Safety Analysis JSA) when performing non-routine work. The JSA procedure outlines a technique to identify job task-related hazards before they occur. By directing that jet valve testing continues without a JSA, the Respondent did not fully understand potential hazards or effectively mitigate said hazards. Furthermore, the Respondent did not follow the operating procedure requiring the minimization of activities in manual mode and the entry of manual mode activities into the Manual Intervention Logbook.
The Respondent’s failure to implement safe work practices to provide for the control of hazards during operations, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.
Count 4 – Management of Change
The Respondent failed to complete a Management of Change addressing discontinuing the practice of using a Manual Intervention Logbook for any activity involving manual intervention, although the use of manual mode and manual interventions continued.
The Respondent’s failure to perform a Management of Change for discontinuing the practice of using a Manual Intervention Logbook for any activity involving manual intervention, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(e), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.
Count 5 – Emergency Response Coordination
The Respondent failed to document emergency coordination activities with local emergency responders adequately.
The Respondent’s failure to maintain emergency coordination records pursuant to 40 C.F .R. § 68.93(c) , as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(5), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.
Count 6 – Emergency Response Program
The Respondent failed to implement its emergency response program, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a)(1)(i) , when it did not utilize the Emerge system to inform the community of the toxic release that occurred May 7, 2022. Pursuant to 40 C.F .R. § 68.95(a)(1)(ii), the Respondent failed to develop its emergency response program by not covering specific hazards associated with chemicals present at the facility, including exposure to 1, 3-Butadiene, Chlorine, Propylene oxide, Acrylonitrile, or burn treatment in the event of a fire and explosion.
Lastly, the Respondent failed to develop and implement its emergency response program, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a)(l)( iii), by not including procedures for responding to an emergency while only wearing standard PPE, failing to trigger the plant alarm upon awareness of a hazardous chemical release, failing to provide medical attention following exposure to hazardous chemicals, and by facility employees failing to promptly inform safety personnel of the hazardous chemical release of I, 3-Butadiene.
The Respondent’s failure to develop and implement multiple components of its emergency response program pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a)(1), as required by 40 C.F.R. §68.12(d)(5), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.
Count 7 – Emergency Response Program
The Respondent failed to include procedures for the use, inspection, testing, and maintenance of emergency response equipment kept on site.
The Respondent’s failure to develop its emergency response program with the inclusion of procedures for the use, inspection, testing, and maintenance of emergency response equipment pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a)(2), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(5), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.
Count 8 – General Duty Clause (identify hazards)
The Clean Air Act Section 112(r)(1) imposes a general duty on the owners and operators of stationary sources producing, processing, handling or storing a chemical in 40 C.F.R. Part 68 or any other extremely hazardous substance to identify hazards which may result from (such) releases using appropriate hazard assessment techniques.
One of the hazards associated with opening process equipment is the potential for residual flammable substances to be present in the equipment. Thus, the Respondent has a duty to identify and control potential ignition sources to reduce or eliminate the risk of fire or exposure.
The Respondent failed to meet the general duty clause because the facility could not detect the 1, 3-Butadiene concentration that was present in the manway, absent an employee haphazardly smelling the chemical or already knowing about its presence. The Respondent did not have any detection equipment to adequately identify and control the potential ignition source that arose from the release of 1, 3-Butadiene.
The Respondent’s failure to identify and control hazards, such as a potential ignition source, which may result from such releases using appropriate hazard assessment techniques is a violation of Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA.
Count 9 – General Duty Clause (design and maintain)
Pursuant to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 17.8.3.2.1, when placing lower explosive limit (LEL) detectors at a facility, an evaluation is required to ensure that the placement is tailored to the specific facility and the chemical(s) used in its processes.
The Respondent failed to meet the general duty clause because at the time of both incidents. The Respondent never completed an evaluation for the optimal placement of LEL detectors at its facility. Furthermore, during both incidents, no LEL detectors were activated, although significant quantities of 1, 3-Butadiene (770 lbs and 60 lbs, respectively) were released into the environment.
The Respondent’s failure to design and maintain a safe facility by taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases, by failing to perform an evaluation of LEL detector placement, and failing to design the facility to adequately detect the specific chemicals utilized in its processes is a violation of Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA.
Count 10 – General Duty Clause (minimize consequences)
The Respondent failed to meet the general duty clause because the Respondent lacked adequate guidance for responding to accidental releases that occur at the facility, including how to respond when an operator is not in the proper PPE, when and how to trigger the plant alarms, when and how to evacuate the area, and procedures for controlling the source of an accidental release when it does occur.
The Respondent’s failure to minimize the consequences of accidental releases which do occur by failing to provide clear direction to the Respondent’s employees on how to respond to an accidental release of 1, 3- Butadiene (or any other hazardous chemical) resulted in additional exposure to employees and is a violation of Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA.
CONSENT AGREEMENT
The Respondent agrees that, in settlement of the claims alleged herein, the Respondent shall pay a civil penalty of One Hundred Eighteen-Thousand Two-Hundred Seventy-Seven Dollars ($118,277).
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECT
The Respondent shall implement a Supplemental Environmental Project (“SEP”), which the parties agree is intended to secure significant environmental or public health protection and improvement. The SEP involves purchasing and installing Portable Emissions Monitors, Fixed IR Perimeter Monitors, and a Thermal Imaging Camera to be integrated into the facility’s emissions management system within the property boundaries. The equipment to be purchased and installed and the Respondent’s costs of performing the SEP are described in more detail in Attachment A to this Consent Agreement and Final Order. All equipment shall be installed no later than eighteen (18) months from the effective date of this agreement.
The Respondent is responsible for the satisfactory completion of the SEP described. The total expenditure for the SEP shall be no less than Three Hundred Eighty-Six Thousand Dollars ($386 ,000).
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