Respondent has an “All Other Basic Organic Chemical Manufacturing” process at the Facility, meeting the definition of “process” as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 68.3. Respondent has greater than a threshold quantity of Vinyl Acetate, Ethylene oxide, Ammonia, Methane, Propylene, Acetaldehyde, and a Flammable Mixture (” the Regulated Substances”) in a process at the Facility, meeting the definition of “covered process” as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 68.3. EPA conducted an on-site partial compliance evaluation inspection of the Facility from July 21-23, 2021, to determine Respondent’s compliance with 40 C.F.R. Part 68 (the “Inspection”).
EPA Findings of Violation
Count 1 – Alternative Release Scenario Analysis
Respondent failed to develop a revised flammable alternative scenario at the time the CO- Propylene unit shut down in relation to a release in the unit. This unit was acquired around February 2019 and taken out of service around February 2020. While it is out of service and not storing a regulated chemical above threshold quantity, the CO – Propylene unit did not meet the criteria for being an RMP-regulated process. The flammable alternative scenarios were revised shortly after the issue was identified by EPA in September 2021, in order to come into compliance.
Respondent’s failure to promptly consider, review, and update alternative release scenarios pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.28(b)(1)(i) and 68.36(6), within six (6) months of the CO Propylene unit shut down is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.
Count 2 – Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
Respondent failed to establish a system to promptly address the team’s findings and recommendations contained in the 2019 Vinyl Acetate PHA. The PHA was published on 09/05/2019, but not uploaded to the iCAP database until 03/13/2020.
Respondent also failed to provide required communications to affected employees and contractors for the findings of the 2017 Shipping PHA and the 2017 Utilities PHA until December 2019.
Respondent’ s failure to implement the prevention requirements in 40 C. F.R. § 68.67(e), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), by establishing a system to promptly track and address the team’s findings and recommendations contained in the 2019 Vinyl Acetate PHA, and to timely communicate to affected employees and contractors the findings of the 2017 Shipping PHA and the 2017 Utilities PHA is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.
Count 3 – Operating Procedures Certification
Respondent failed to ensure that the page for certification signature by a responsible official was duly signed and executed for EO unit operating procedures in 2019. The company provided an email that approved the recommendations from the audit, which does not meet the certification requirement stated in the rule language.
Count 4 – Refresher Training
Respondent failed to locate and provide the required records to verify that refresher training was complete in 2016 and 2019 for one EO employee involved in operating the covered process. Although the employee completed the refresher training in 2021, bringing Respondent into compliance, there was an interval in which the facility could not verify completion of the employee’s refresher training in 2016 and 2019.
Respondent’s failure to furnish the required records to verify providing and completing refresher training for one EO employee in 2016 and 2019 pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(b), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3) , is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.
Count 5 – Mechanical Integrity (Written Procedures and Equipment Deficiencies)
Respondent’s failure under 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(6), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), to implement its written procedures to maintain the ongoing integrity of process equipment when it did not complete inspection of thirteen (13) Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) and two (2) oxygen monitors from January 2020 to April 2021 is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.
Respondent failed to assure that thirteen (13) LEL and two (2) oxygen detection monitors located in the Vinyl Acetate Unit were operational from May to October 2021.
Respondent’s failure to correct deficiencies in multiple pieces of equipment in a safe and timely manner and in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(e), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.
Count 6 – Mechanical Integrity (Inspection and Testing Schedule)
The facility failed to enter a correct due date in the SAP maintenance database for performing the next ultrasonic (UT) testing of the V-0226 shell east CML 5 pressure vessel, in accordance with API 510 Pressure Vessel Inspection Code: In-service Inspection, Rating, Repair, and Alteration. The UT testing was actually due by 9/30/21, and was actually completed 9/20/21, but the SAP database showed the inspection was due 8 months earlier by 1/28/21. The error was corrected when the inspection was completed.
Respondent’s failure to ensure that the frequency, schedule and deadlines for performing inspections and tests of process equipment are consistent with applicable manufacturers’ recommendations and good engineering practices, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(3), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.
Count 7 – Management of Change (MOC)
Respondent failed to implement the written procedures for the work order of a leak repair associated with an MOC for the installation of a pipe clamp on an 8-inch line. The On-Stream Leak Repair Check list SMP 12.02 did not include the basic chemistry and percentage composition of the service that was leak ing and did not include the necessary time period for the installation of the pipe clamp.
Respondent’s failure to establish and implement written procedures to manage change in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(a) and (b)(4) by not including the basic chemistry, percentage composition of the service associated with a leak repair, and the necessary time period for the installation of the pipe clamp is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.
CONSENT AGREEMENT
Respondent agrees that, in settlement of the claims alleged here in, Respondent shall pay a final civil penalty of Thirty-Six Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-Five Dollars ($36,955).
Respondent shall implement an emergency planning and preparedness supplemental environmental project (“SEP”), which the parties agree is intended to secure significant environmental or public health protection and improvement. Respondent worked with two entities that respond to local emergencies to develop the SEP. The SEP requires Respondent to purchase emergency response equipment it has selected for donation to organizations as defined herein as well as for Respondent’s own use:
(a) purchase and donate two (2) Matrice 30T (NA) SP Plus drones equipped with a LPI 2 Searchlight and speaker along with twelve (12) MATRICE 30 S ER.IE S -P ART08-TB30 Intelligent Flight batteries for the Channel Industries Mutual Aid (CIMA); and
(b) purchase and donate two (2) Matrice 30T (NA) SP Plus drones equipped with a LPI 2 Searchlight and speaker along with twelve ( 12) MATR.IC E 30 SER IES-P ART08-TB30 Intelligent Flight batteries for the Southeast Regional LEPC (SER.LEPC); and
(c) purchase and retain one (1) Matrice 300RTK drone equipped with a search light and a Zenmuse H20T camera/thermal camera to monitor conditions in areas of the Clear Lake Plant used to store and handle chemicals regulated under 40 CFR Part 68 for purposes of accident prevention and emergency response.
The foregoing list of equipment will be referred herein, collectively as the ” Emergency Response Equipment.” Respondent’ s costs of performing the SEP are described in more detail in Attachment A to this Consent Agreement and Final Order.
The Respondent is responsible for the satisfactory completion of the SEP and Attachment A. The total expenditure for the SEP shall be no less than $99,953.
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