The respondent is the owner and operator of the water treatment plant, which treats and chlorinates water. The Facility maintains a maximum inventory of 32,000 pounds of chlorine as liquefied compressed gas. The Facility’s chlorine process is subject to the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) process safety management (PSM) standard, 29 C.F.R § 1910.119 because it contains greater than the threshold quantity of chlorine, listed at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119 Appendix A as 1,500 pounds of chlorine. On June 20, 2019, EPA conducted an announced inspection of the Facility.
At the time of the inspection…
- the Facility Manager was assigned responsibility for all risk management program elements except hot work. Following the inspection, the respondent submitted a revised management system chart titled “RMP/PSM Program Organization” which reassigns responsibilities for six elements to the Safety Director and two elements to the Loss Control Specialist.
- the names or positions of the persons responsible for implementing individual requirements of the risk management program and the lines of authority were not updated and documented in an organization chart or similar document. Also the person responsible for hot work permits was not indicated in the document. These are violations of 40 C.F.R § 68.1S(c).
C) Hazard Assessment
- the respondent provided three worst-case release scenarios with total releases of 8,000, 4,000, and 2,000 pounds. IAWC provided release modeling using RMP*Comp for the 8,000- and 4,000-pound release cases, whereas the largest vessel used at the Facility is a 2,000-pound cylinder.
- the respondent had failed to calculate and model the worst-case release scenario using a release quantity that is the greatest amount held in a single vessel, which is 2,000 pounds of chlorine held in a 1-ton chlorine cylinder, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.25(b)(1).
- the respondent had failed to model the alternate case release scenario using RMP*Comp.
- the respondent had failed to maintain records for the offsite consequence analyses for the worst-case scenarios and the alternative release scenarios required by 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.39(a)-(b), which include the following: a description of the vessel or pipeline and substance selected, assumptions and parameters used, the rationale for the selection, and the anticipated effect of the controls and mitigation on the release quantity and rate.
D) Process Safety Information
- the respondent had failed to include in the PSI the ventilation system design for the chlorination system, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(l)(v).
E) Process Hazard Analysis
- the Facility’s most recent PHA, dated September 8, 2011, did not address: the identification of any previous incident that had a likely potential for catastrophic consequences; engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and their interrelationships such as appropriate application of detection methodologies to provide early warning of releases; consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls; and a qualitative evaluation of a range of the possible safety and health effects of failure of controls. The PHA documentation provided may not be specific to the Alton, IL Facility as several sections of the PHA note conditions inconsistent with the inspection of the Facility. Further, the PHA did not evaluate the operation of the scrubber. The above described deficiencies are violations of 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.67(c)(2)-(4), (7).
- the September 8, 2011 PHA did not document the PHA team and their qualifications, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(d), as the PHA needs to be performed by a team with the required expertise.
- the Facility’s most recent hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP) PHA dated September 8, 2011 stated that the recommended action items would be completed by October 2011. The September 8, 2011 “Risk Reduction/Mitigation Recommendations Disposition Record” states that the action items were completed on September 18, 2013, almost two years later than committed. The closure of recommended action items was not documented for the What-If Checklist for the cylinders. These are in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e).
- the September 8, 2011 PHA failed to address numerous elements required in a PHA, including the following elements: promptly address the team’s PHA findings and recommendations; resolve and document the resolution of recommendations in a timely manner; document actions to be taken; complete actions as soon as possible; develop a written schedule of when these actions are to be completed; and, communicate the actions to operating, maintenance and other employees whose work assignments are in the process and who may be affected by the recommendations or actions. These are violations of 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e).
- the respondent had not updated and revalidated at least every five (5) years to assure consistency with the current process the Facility’s September 8, 2011 PHA, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(f).
F) Operating Procedures
- the respondent had failed to develop written operating procedures for the Facility for the following procedures: safely handling, storing, and receiving chlorine cylinders; checking on the hydrotest dates on the chlorine cylinders as the cylinders are received; and safe operation of the scrubber and the chlorine sensors. The above-described deficiencies are violations of 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.69(a)-(c).
G) Training
- the respondent had not provided refresher training at least every three years, and more often if necessary, to each employee involved in operating a process to assure that the employee understands and adheres to the current operating procedures of the process, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(b).
- the on-the-job training/proficiency record that was reviewed did not document the means used to verify that employees understood the training, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(c).
H) Mechanical Integrity
- the respondent had failed to establish and implement written procedures to maintain the ongoing integrity of process equipment at the Facility, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b).
- the Facility’s inspections and tests were not performed on the scrubber and documented, nor performed according to recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices at a frequency consistent with applicable manufacturers’ recommendations and good engineering practices. These are violations of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d).
I) Compliance Audits
- the first complete compliance audit for the Facility is dated June 17, 2019. At the time of the inspection, IAWC failed to certify that they had evaluated the Facility’s compliance with the provisions of the Program 3 Prevention Program at least every three years to verify that procedures and practices developed under the Program 3 Prevention Program are adequate and are being followed, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(a).
J) Contractors
- the respondent failed to provide information regarding the evaluation of the contract owner or operator’s safety performance and programs, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.87(b)(l).
- the respondent failed to provide information that IAWC had explained to contract owners or operators the applicable provisions of subpart E, Emergency Response, of CAPP, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.87(b)(3).
- the respondent failed to provide documentation regarding the periodic evaluation of the performance of the contract owner or operator in fulfilling their obligations as specified in 40 C.F.R. § 68.87(c), in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.87(b)(5).
K) Emergency Response
- the Facility’s Emergency Response Plan states that the Facility is a first responder, but many elements required for a first responder Emergency Response Plan are not included in the plan; further, the narrative description provided at the inspection indicated that the Facility was not prepared as a first responder organization. As a first responder, the facility had failed to develop, implement, and maintain: procedures for informing the public and local emergency response agencies about accidental releases; documentation of proper first-aid and emergency medical treatment necessary to treat accidental human exposures; procedures for the use of emergency response equipment and for its inspection, testing, and maintenance; and training, and documentation of such training, for all employees in relevant procedures. These are violations of 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.90(a), 68.95(a)(l)(i)-(ii), and 68.95(a)(2)-(3).
Civil Penalty
The respondent must pay a $59,427 civil penalty.
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