Respondent operates a granular monoammonium phosphate (GMAP) process and a diammonium phosphate (DAP) process at the Facility, meeting the definition of “process” as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 68.3. A different Respondent operates an anhydrous ammonia process at the Facility, meeting the definition of “process” as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 68.3. The GMAP and DAP processes are located on contiguous property adjacent to the anhydrous ammonia process. Further, the respondent operating the NH3 process is under the control of or common control of the fertilizer business.
The Facility containing the GMAP, DAP, and anhydrous ammonia plants is a “stationary source” pursuant to Section 112(r)(2)(C) of the CAA and the regulation at 40 C.F.R. § 68.3. From the time Respondents first had on-site greater than a threshold quantity of the Regulated Substance in a process, Respondents were required to submit an RMP pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(a) and to comply with the Program 3 prevention requirements because pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.10(i), the covered processes at the Facility did not meet the eligibility requirements of Program 1 or Program 2, are subject to OSHA requirements for Process Safety Management pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 1910.119, and the GMAP and DAP processes are in North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code 325312 and the anhydrous ammonia process is in NAICS code 325311.
EPA Findings of Violation
Count 1 – Process Safety Information
Respondents failed to document that an American Petroleum Institute (API) 580-certified inspector performed the Risk-Based Inspection assessment for the ammonia piping.
Respondent’s failure to document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA
Count 2 – Process Hazard Analysis & Mechanical Integrity
Respondents failed to promptly address the team’s findings and recommendations, assure that the recommendations were resolved in a timely manner, or complete actions as soon as possible. Specifically, as of 2/25/2022, the 2016 Ammonia Plant PHA had 12 open findings, with several dated to be complete by 12/31/2025. As of 2/25/2022, there were an additional 14 open PHA findings from the 2018, 2019, and 2020 PHAs. The 2019 compliance audit identified that the 2016 Ammonia Plant PHA did not track 62 of 169 action items. Of the 107 that were tracked, 83 were not completed over 2.5 years after the PHA meetings were completed. Several open findings had a residual risk ranking of red marked in the PHAs. Additionally, Respondents failed to timely correct deficiencies in the RV- 100-146 relief valve when an engineering firm deemed that it was not sized properly as part of the 2021 PHA.
Respondent’s failure to promptly address the team’s findings and recommendations, assure that the recommendations were resolved in a timely manner, and complete actions as soon as possible pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e), and Respondents’ failure to correct deficiencies in equipment that are outside acceptable limits before further use or, if not before further use, in a safe and timely manner when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation pursuant to 40 C.F.R § 68.73(e), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.
Count 3 – Operating Procedures
Respondents failed to document annual certifications for the Dry Products / Granulation operating procedures between 2014 and 2018.
Respondents’ failure to certify annually that operating procedures are current and accurate pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(c), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.
Count 4 – Training
Respondents failed to conduct initial training for a board operator in the Ammonia plant before being involved in the operation of a newly assigned process. Additionally, Respondents did not document that employees were consulted on the appropriate frequency of refresher training.
Respondents’ failure to train each employee before being involved in operating a newly assigned process in an overview of the process and in the operating procedures, and Respondents’ failure to consult with employees involved in operating the process on the appropriate frequency of refresher training pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(a) and (b), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.
Count 5 – Mechanical Integrity
Respondents failed to establish and implement written procedures to maintain the on-going integrity of the following covered process equipment:
(1) Emergency shutdown devices (ESD) – A procedure had not been established or implemented for certain ESDs. Function testing was being performed as part of safety instrumented system proof testing; however, this testing was not outlined in any procedure.
(2) Safety instrumented systems (SIS) – Proof/function testing and calibration was being performed for selected SISs; however, there was no procedure established that assigned this testing to interlocks and related components (e.g., transmitters, gauges, controls). A procedure had not been established or implemented for the maintenance of certain SISs.
Respondents’ failure to implement its written procedures to maintain the ongoing integrity of process equipment pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.
Count 6 – Mechanical Integrity
Respondents failed to train I&E technicians in specific maintenance operating procedures to maintain the on-going integrity of process equipment.
Respondent’s failure to train each employee involved in maintaining the on-going integrity of process equipment in an overview of that process and its hazards and in the procedures applicable to the employee’s job tasks to assure that the employee can perform the job tasks in a safe manner pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(c), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.
Count 7 – Mechanical Integrity
Respondents failed to conduct inspections and tests on the following process equipment at a frequency consistent with applicable manufacturers’ recommendations and good engineering practices:
(1) Seventy-four piping circuits;
(2) Nineteen pieces of equipment were overdue for external visual inspections;
(3) Twenty-seven pieces of equipment were overdue for internal inspections;
(4) Pumps P1 and P2;
(5) Pumps P109J and P109JA;
(6) Vessel H1
(7) Vessel H2;
(8) Condition monitoring locations on vessel 104-D;
(9) Vessel 121-C Ammonia converter feed effluent exchanger; and
(10) SIS testing for NH3 I-01; I-02A and B; I-04; I-05; I-10; I-11; and I-16.
Respondents’ failure to conduct inspections and tests on process equipment at a frequency consistent with applicable manufacturers’ recommendations and good engineering practices pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(3), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.
Count 8 – Mechanical Integrity
Respondents failed to completely document each inspection and test that had been performed on process equipment. Specifically, the previous inspections, including both external visual and thickness measurements, for ammonia piping were not found or provided to inspectors on-site. Inspection history could not be matched with the new circuits created by Respondents. Vessel 105-D appeared to have an external inspection performed in 2018 in PCMS by Respondents’ inspectors; however, the inspection report could not be found.
Respondents’ failure to document each inspection and test that had been performed on process equipment pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(4), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.
Count 9 – Compliance Audit
Respondents failed to promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audit, and document that deficiencies have been corrected. Specifically, for the 2019 compliance audit, 6 of 20 findings were still open as of 2/25/2022, and several findings were closed late.
Respondents’ failure to promptly determine and document an appropriate response to the 2019 compliance audit findings pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(d), as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(d)(3), is a violation of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA.
Penalty Payment
Respondents agree that, in settlement of the claims alleged herein, Respondents shall pay a civil penalty of Two Hundred Seventeen Thousand Eighty-Five Dollars ($217,085.00) and shall perform two Supplemental Environmental Projects (“SEPs”) as set forth herein. The projected cost of the SEPs is One Hundred Thousand dollars ($100,000.00).
Respondents shall complete the following SEPs:
(i) Installation of Area Ammonia Gas Detection System and Monitoring for a Term of Two Years (the “Detection System and Monitoring SEP”) and
(ii) Donation of Equipment to the St. James Parish Department of Emergency Preparedness (the “Equipment Donation SEP”)
The SEPs are more specifically described in Appendix A and incorporated herein by reference.
Respondents shall spend no less than One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) on implementing the SEPs.
APPENDIX A
“Respondents” propose to resolve EPA’s proposed civil penalty of Two Hundred Ninety-Seven Thousand Eighty-Five Dollars ($297,085.00) through payment of Two Hundred Seventeen Thousand Eighty-Five Dollars ($217,085.00) in cash and performance of the following two Supplemental Environmental Projects valued at a total of $100,000.00:
1. SEP No. 1 – Installation of Area Ammonia Gas Detection System and Monitoring for a Term of Two Years
Currently the ammonia plant maintains ammonia detection monitors at select areas within the facility. Area monitors are present at storage tank, truck loading station area and loading dock area on the Mississippi River. There are no monitors at other locations around the facility. The proposed project is to install eleven ammonia detectors primarily along the perimeter of active operations that will be actively monitored and alarmed on the distributed control system (DCS) in the ammonia control room. Eleven monitors will be installed at select locations along the southern side of the plant towards the facility’s neighbor on the eastern side of the facility in an area that parallels Hwy 18 and on the northern side of operations between the site and commercial and residential areas along Highway 70.
The primary benefit of this project is early and more reliable detection of ammonia releases. Early detection may lead to more effective mitigation and reduced risk to plant personnel, the local community, and the environment. Additionally, the monitors could assist with the quantification of releases and more effective emergency response decision making and actions.
A proposal for purchase and installation of the equipment indicates the monitoring system for eleven monitors would cost approximately $54,000. Additionally, there would be a cost of approximately $6,000 for a contractor to assist in integrating the monitor network to the DCS to add graphics and data to the existing displays. Respondents have not included any cost for annual operation and maintenance.
Respondents commit to operating the monitoring network for a period of two years from installation. After such period, Respondents may voluntarily continue operations, but such would not be a part of the SEP.
Respondents will initiate purchase of the monitoring network within sixty (60) days of the effective date of the Consent Agreement and Final Order and will complete installation within one-hundred eighty (180) days of the effective date of the Consent Agreement and Final Order. The monitoring results would be used to identify potential releases of ammonia from process equipment in the TPS Faustina ammonia plant.
2. SEP No. 2 Donation of Equipment to the Local Department of Emergency Preparedness
Respondents have consulted with the Department of Emergency Preparedness (“DEP”) and intend to donate equipment to assist the DEP’s emergency operations center. The equipment selected by the DEP is two (2) 20kw towable Generac generators (MDG25IF4). This equipment will be purchased and donated within one-hundred eighty (180) days after the effective date of the Consent Agreement and Final Order.
The DEP’s main function is to safely and effectively manage response to technological and natural disasters that may affect the public. This is done by effectively managing the mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery phases of any incident. Respondents will donate equipment selected by SJDEP in order to assist the Emergency Preparedness Department in performing those duties.
It is anticipated that the cost of this equipment will be at least forty thousand dollars ($40,000.00).
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