Respondent operated a facility (the “Facility”) to manufacture chlorine, bleach, and hydrochloric acid. Respondent produced, used, or stored more than 2,500 pounds of chlorine at the Facility and was subject to the requirements of CAA § 112(r)(7). Respondent produced, used, or stored hydrogen at the Facility and was subject to the requirements of CAA § 112(r)(1). Respondent was subject to Program 3 requirements because it had public receptors near the endpoint for the worst-case release and was subject to the OSHA process safety management standard set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119.
Based upon the information gathered during the Investigation, EPA determined that Respondent violated certain provisions of the CAA.
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
Count 1 – Failure to Comply with Management System Requirement; 40 C.F.R. § 68.15(c)
Based upon the Investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to document the names of multiple persons responsible for the development, implementation, and integration of the risk management program elements at the Facility and appropriately define the lines of authority in an organization chart or similar document from 2020 to 2022.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated the management system requirements set forth at CAA § 112(r) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(c) from 2020 to 2022.
Count 2 – Failure to Comply with Process Safety Information Requirement; 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(ii)
During the Inspection, EPA observed process equipment that were not consistent with the P&IDs for the Facility and determined that Respondent failed to compile adequate information for the Facility relating to the P&ID in 2021.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated the process safety information requirements set forth at CAA § 112(r) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(ii) in 2021.
Count 3 – Failure to Comply with Process Safety Information Requirement; 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(iv)
Based upon the Investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to compile adequate information for the Facility relating to the relief system design and design basis from 2020 to 2022.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated the process safety information requirements set forth at CAA § 112(r) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(iv) from 2020 to 2022.
Count 4 – Failure to Comply with Process Safety Information Requirement; 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2)
Based upon the Investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to document that pressure relief devices and chlorine expansion chambers at the Facility complied with RAGAGEP from 2021 to 2023.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated the process safety information requirements set forth at CAA § 112(r) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2) from 2021 to 2023.
Count 5 – Failure to Comply with Process Hazard Analysis Requirement; 40 C.F.R. § 69.67(e)
Based upon the Investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to establish a system to promptly address the findings and recommendations for electrolyzers as recommended in a PHA performed at the Facility in 2013, and for chlorine gas and liquid systems as recommended in a PHA performed at the Facility in 2014.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated CAA § 112(r) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e) by failing to establish a system to promptly address the findings and recommendations of PHAs from March 2019 until March 2022.
Count 6 – Failure to Comply with Process Hazard Analysis Requirement; 40 C.F.R. § 69.67(f)
Based upon the Investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to update and revalidate the 2013 PHA for electrolyzers at the Facility and the 2014 PHA for chlorine gas and liquid systems at the Facility until March 2022.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated CAA § 112(r) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(f) by failing to update and revalidate PHAs at least every five years.
Count 7 – Failure to Develop and Implement Adequate Operating Procedures; 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)
Based on the Investigation, EPA determined that the facility’s written operating procedures contained incorrect process and instrument diagrams and incomplete or inconsistent operating procedures from 2020 to 2022.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated CAA § 112(r) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a), by failing to adequately develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information from 2020 to 2022.
Count 8 – Failure to Document Refresher Training; 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(b), (c)
Based upon the Investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to adequately document refresher training of employees who work on or near covered processes at least every three years from 2020 to 2022.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated CAA § 112(r) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(b) and (c), by failing to adequately document refresher training of employees who work on or near covered processes at least every three years from 2020 to 2022.
Count 9 – Failure to Conduct Adequate Inspections and Tests; 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)
Based upon the Investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to conduct adequate inspection and tests consistent with RAGAGEP related to fiberglass reinforced polymer piping, interlocks and critical instruments, pressure vessels and other fixed equipment from 2021 to 2022.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated CAA § 112(r) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(1), by failing to perform inspections and tests on process equipment consistent with RAGAGEP from 2021 to 2022.
Count 10 – Failure to Correct Deficient Equipment; 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(e)
Based upon the Investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to address corroded piping at the Facility that were outside acceptable limits in 2021.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated CAA § 112(r) and 40 C.F.R.§ 68.73(e), by failing to correct deficient equipment that are outside acceptable limits before further use, or in a safe and timely manner when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation in 2021.
Count 11 – Failure to Comply with the Management of Change Requirement; 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(a), (b)
Based upon the Investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to document the technical basis for and impact on safety and health associated with temporary repairs to flanges and other piping at the Facility in 2019 and 2020.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated CAA § 112(r) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(a) and (b), by failing to document the technical basis for and impact on safety and health associated with changes to certain process equipment in 2019 and 2020.
Count 12 – Failure to Comply with the Compliance Audit Requirement; 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(d)
Based upon the Investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to determine and document responses to each finding of the 2016 and 2018 compliance audits of the Facility, and document that deficiencies identified in the 2016 and 2018 compliance audits were corrected.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated CAA § 112(r) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(d), by failing to determine and document responses to the findings of the 2016 and 2018 compliance audits of the Facility, and document that deficiencies identified in the 2016 and 2018 compliance audits were corrected.
Count 13 – Failure to Comply with the Emergency Response Requirement; 40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a)
Based upon the Investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to implement its emergency response plan as written and lacked adequate procedures for the inspection and testing of self-contained breathing apparatuses at the Facility in 2021.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated CAA § 112(r) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a), by failing to implement its emergency response plan, and develop and implement procedures for the inspection and testing of emergency response equipment in 2021.
Count 14 – Failure to Comply with the Offsite Consequence Analysis Requirement; 40 C.F.R. § 68.165(b)(12)
Based upon the Investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to identify public and environmental receptors within the distance to endpoint in the alternative release scenario in its June 29, 2021 RMP submittal to EPA.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated CAA § 112(r) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.165(b)(12), by failing to identify public and environmental receptors within the distance to the endpoint in the alternative release scenario on or about June 29, 2021.
Count 15 – Failure to Correct the RMP; 40 C.F.R. § 68.195(a)
Based upon the Investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to submit until June 29, 2021, information regarding an accidental October 26, 2017 release at the Facility that triggered the five-year accident history reporting criteria of 40 C.F.R. § 68.42.
Accordingly, EPA alleges that Respondent violated CAA § 112(r) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.195(a), by failing to timely submit information regarding an accidental release triggering the five-year accident history reporting criteria of 40 C.F.R. § 68.42 within six months of the release or by the time the RMP is updated, whichever is earlier.
Count 16 – Failure to Comply with the General Duty Clause; CAA § 112(r)(1)
An owner or operator breaches its general duty under CAA Section 112(r)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1), if the owner or operator does not maintain a safe facility to prevent accidental releases.
A recognized hazard within the chlorine industry is when basic safety information is not maintained for the hydrogen and natural gas process equipment. The failure or malfunction of hydrogen and/or natural gas process equipment is likely to cause harm, as it can result in a catastrophic release of hydrogen or natural gas.
Based upon the Investigation, EPA determined that from 2020 to 2023, Respondent failed to develop and maintain accurate electrical classification drawings for the hydrogen and natural gas process equipment at the Facility. Electrical classification drawings are intended to prevent electrical equipment from igniting any flammable mixture.
Respondent breached its general duty under CAA Section 112(r)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1), by failing to maintain a safe facility to prevent accidental releases from 2020 to 2023.
CIVIL ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTY
Respondent agrees to the assessment of a civil penalty of EIGHTY-FIVE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE DOLLARS ($85,189) for the claims set forth herein as final settlement of the civil claims against Respondent as alleged in Section I.D of the CAFO.
Respondent is responsible for the satisfactory completion of the conditions described below.
Within 90 days of the Effective Date of this CAFO, Respondent shall replace the instruments listed in Appendix A to conform with the electrical classifications set forth in the Electrical Hazardous Area Classification Plan and Elevations Drawing 3E-2-E1-02 Rev 0. For each instrument listed in Appendix A, Respondent shall submit to EPA the invoice and work order to document the replacement.
By December 31, 2024, Respondent shall submit to EPA a copy of the Relief System Design and Design Basis for the Facility.
- Respondent shall comply with the following requirements for pressure safety valves (“PSVs”) at the Facility:
Within 180 days of the Effective Date of this CAFO, Respondent shall retain an EPA- approved engineering consulting firm to complete a safety study of the discharge locations for the PSVs listed in Appendix B consistent with RAGAGEP specified in American Petroleum Institute standards 521 and RP754. - Within 270 days of the Effective Date of this CAFO, Respondent shall submit to EPA a schedule for implementation of any recommendations contained in the safety study required under Paragraph 101.a of this CAFO.
- Within one year of the Effective Date of this CAFO, Respondent shall relocate the atmospheric discharge vent from PSV #3137 for the Suction Chiller (S-3103) to safe discharge locations consistent with American Petroleum Institute standards 521 and RP754.
- Within 24 months of the Effective Date of this CAFO, Respondent shall certify that all PSVs listed in Appendix B discharge to safe locations consistent with the study conducted pursuant to Paragraph 101.a of this CAFO.
By December 31, 2024, Respondent shall provide a tracking summary, including the date when recommendations were addressed and type of action taken, and a certification that all PHA items have been addressed for the recommendations identified in the following PHAs:
- 2021 Chlorine Gas PHA;
- 2021 Human Factors and Facility Siting PHA;
- 2021 Electrolyzer PHA; and
- 2021 Chlorine Liquid PHA
Within 90 days of the Effective Date of this CAFO, Respondent shall update “On-Stream Leak Repairs of Piping Components Procedure (SOP-QAQC-002)” to include: (1) all tables and figures referenced therein; and (2) corrections to section 10.1.
Within 180 days of the Effective Date of this CAFO, Respondent shall submit to EPA a copy of the Management of Change documentation for the revisions to SOP-QAQC-002 required under Paragraph 103 of this CAFO.
Within 180 days of the Effective Date of this CAFO, Respondent shall certify that all critical interlock testing is current and provide documentation showing all interlock and critical instruments testing is current.
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS
The SEPs shall consist of the following projects:
a. Respondent shall provide the emergency response equipment specified in Appendix C to Contra Costa Health Services (“CCHS”) to assist it in responding to emergencies in the community where Respondent operates and where chemical processes are undertaken that are regulated by the CAA § 112(r). Respondent is obligated to expend no less than TWO HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINETY DOLLARS ($264,990) associated with implementing this SEP.
b. Respondent shall fund emergency response training through the Chlorine Institute (i.e., CHLOREP Team Training) for the identified response personnel and other hazardous materials responders in the Contra Costa County, California, as specified in Appendix D. This training shall focus on effective public communications and response actions in the event of an accidental release of chlorine. Respondent is obligated to expend no less than NINETY-EIGHT THOUSAND FORTY-ONE DOLLARS ($98,041) associated with implementing this SEP.
Respondent shall spend no less than THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-THREE THOUSAND THIRTY- ONE DOLLARS ($363,031) on implementing the SEPs.
Respondent proposes to expend $264,990 toward the purchase of emergency response equipment for the CCHS. Specifically, Respondent would fund the purchase of the field-deployable identification devices listed below for the detection, identification, and quantification of toxic industrial chemicals, as well as related costs for device licenses, warranties, accessories, and cellular communication equipment. This equipment would continuously detect gas/vapor hazards in low concentrations with minimal user intervention. The devices’ data would be capable of being remotely accessed, which makes them suitable instruments for uncontrolled, unknown, chemical releases.
Item Unit Price Quantity Total Price
QRae (4 gas w/ Cl2 capability) (PGM-2560-BASE) $2,700 8 $21,600
MultiRae Pro (Multi gas meter w/ Cl2 capability) (PGM-6248-BASE) $11,00 (3) $33,000
Device Licenses (Safety Suite Responder) $540 (11) $5,940
Calibration Gas (Cl2) $350
Griffin G510 Person-Portable GC-MS $60,000
Cl2 sensors for AreaRae Pro $800 (5) $4,000
Guaranteed Cost of Ownership for Rae Devices (Warranty) $1,600 (11) $17,600
Accusense $44,750 (2) $89,500
Accessory Platform (PID, IMS, etc.) $2,500 (2) $5,000
Extra Libraries $2,500 (8) $20,000
Communications $1,500 2() $3,000
cellular Extended Warranty $2,500 (2) $5,000
Grand Total $264,990
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