Respondent owns and operates a wastewater treatment plant that uses chlorine, stored as liquified gas under pressure, to disinfect wastewater. In its October 2020 risk management plan, the plant indicated that it stored up to 12,000 pounds of chlorine on-site in one-ton cylinders. On November 3, 2022, EPA performed an inspection of the plant to evaluate the Respondent’s implementation of and compliance with the requirements of Section 112(r) of the CAA, Sections 304-12 of EPCRA, and Section 103 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act.
VIOLATIONS
COUNT 1: Tier II Inventory Forms
At the time of the inspection, Respondent had not submitted Tier II inventory forms to any state or local emergency planning authority in the last five years.
Respondent’s failure to submit Tier II inventory forms constitutes a violation of EPCRA Section 312, 42 U.S.C. § 11022.
COUNT 2: Management
The respondent’s documentation was not consistent with the organizational structure or position that had been assigned the overall responsibility for the development, implementation, and integration of the risk management program elements.
Respondent’s failure to document organizational structure or position of RMP responsibility constitutes a violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.15.
COUNT 3: Process Safety Information
Respondent did not have documentation of all necessary information pertaining to the technology of the chlorine process. In addition, pipes containing chlorine gas were not labeled, and the plant had no documentation for the ventilation system in the chlorine storage room. Also, the one-ton chlorine containers located outside were not well protected against heat exposure, vehicle strikes, or access from unauthorized personnel.
Respondent’s failure to provide adequate process safety information constitutes a violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d).
COUNT 4: Process Hazard Analysis
Respondent did not have documentation of necessary information pertaining to the hazards of the chlorine process, stationary source siting, and human factors . The plant did not have a system for tracking recommendations identified in the process hazard analysis. In addition, the plant had failed to revalidate its PHA.
Respondent’s failure to document its process hazard analysis constitutes a violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.67.
COUNT 5: Operating Procedures
The posted standard operating procedure for handling chlorine did not match the written standard operating procedures. The instructions for testing the chlorine sensors did not specify personal protective equipment. Respondent did not annually certify that the operating procedures are current and accurate.
Respondent’s failure to ensure that standard operating procedures reflect current operating procedures constitutes a violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.69.
COUNT 6: Training
Respondent failed to adequately document that an operator had been provided initial or refresher training on operating procedures. The plant also failed to document operator refresher training every three years.
Respondent’s failure to document employee training violates 40 C.F.R. § 68.71.
COUNT 7: Mechanical Integrity
Sensor testing records were inconsistent, and it took over a year for a faulty sensor to be repaired. Respondent failed to provide adequate documentation for inspection and testing of process equipment. The wall inside the chlorine storage room was damaged, indicating that the room was not tightly sealed.
Respondent’s failure to conduct testing and promptly correct deficiencies in equipment that were outside acceptable limits before further use or in a safe and timely manner constitutes a violation of 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.73(d) and (e).
COUNT 8: Management of Change
Respondent failed to document written management of change as it related to taking chlorinators out of operation and changing chlorine sensors.
Respondent’s failure to document management of change constitutes a violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.75.
COUNT 9: Pre-Startup Safety Review
Respondent failed to document the completion of pre-startup safety review forms for a significant operational change in the chlorine process.
Respondent’s failure to complete a pre-startup safety review violates 40 C.F.R. § 68.77.
COUNT 10: Compliance Audits
Respondent had not completed a compliance audit for its chlorine system within the last three years, nor was it able to produce compliance audits since its compliance audit guidelines were written in 1999.
Respondent’s failure to complete compliance audits violates 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(d).
COUNT 11: Employee Participation
The Respondent’s employee participation responsibilities table did not match the management systems chart.
Respondent’s failure to consult with employees about process hazard analysis and process safety constitutes a violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.83.
COUNT 12: Contractors
Respondent did not adequately obtain and evaluate information regarding contractors’ safety performance before selecting contractors, and it did not maintain documentation showing that it periodically evaluated the performance of contractors in fulfilling their safety obligations.
Respondent’s failure to maintain documentation showing that it periodically evaluated the performance of the contract owner or operator in fulfilling their safety and training obligations constitutes a violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.87(b)(S).
COUNT 13: Emergency Response
The respondent failed to coordinate emergency response activities with the local fire department. The emergency response plan did not include the phone numbers for local, state, or National Response Center contacts in the event of a release.
The respondent’s failure to coordinate with emergency responders and include the required information constitutes a violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.180.
CIVIL PENALTY
Upon consideration of the entire record herein, including the Respondent’s demonstrated willingness to take measures to prevent a recurrence of the above-described conduct, and upon consideration of the size of the municipality, the economic impact of the penalty, Respondent’s compliance history, the duration of the violation, the economic benefit of noncompliance, the seriousness of the violation, specific facts and equities, litigation risks, and other factors as justice may require, including Respondent’s agreement to perform the Supplemental Environmental Projects (” SEPs” ) set forth below, EPA proposes that Respondent be assessed, and Respondent agrees to pay FORTY-SEVEN THOUSAND SIXTY-EIGHT DOLLARS ($47,068}, as the civil penalty for the violations alleged herein.
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS
In response to the alleged violations of the CAA and EPCRA and in settlement of this matter, although not required by the CAA or EPCRA or any other federal, state, or local law, Respondent agrees to implement two SEPs, as described below. Respondent shall complete two separate SEPs, consisting of
(1) the installation of a new chlorine dosing and detection system (“SEP 1”),
and
(2) a disinfection alternatives study (“SEP 2”).
SEP 1 comprises the installation of a new chlorine dosing and detection system that also provides operators with the ability to remotely isolate chlorine cylinders, in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions and planning documents that have previously been submitted to EPA. This SEP will increase safety and public health protection at the plant by improving its dosing capabilities, improving the ease of maintaining the chlorine detection system, and allowing the remote isolation of chlorine cylinders, which could prevent or minimize the effects of an accidental release.
SEP 1 includes the installation of two chlorine gas ejectors, two secondary check valves, four vacuum regulators, four shutoff actuator isolation valves, a chlorine gas detector, a pacing valve with remote monitor, and an emergency shutoff actuator. The cost of SEP 1 is estimated at $73,182.
SEP 2 is a disinfection alternatives study. SEP 2 will study the characteristics of wastewater effluent and utilize bench or pilot testing to recommend alternative disinfection methods in accordance with study planning documents that have previously been submitted to EPA. SEP 2 could lead to the elimination of the storage and use of chlorine at the plant. The alternatives studied will include, at a minimum, sodium hypochlorite and peracetic acid.
Respondent has committed to performing the disinfection alternatives study in three phases described in a scope of work document prepared by its consultant and submitted to EPA. Phase 100, project initiation, is estimated to cost at least $65,000. Phase 200, Alternative Analysis, is estimated to cost $83,000. Phase 300, Preliminary Design, is estimated to cost $31,000. The study also budgets $16,000 for allowances, bringing the total cost of the disinfection alternative study to $195,000.
The respondent shall spend at least $250,000 on implementing the SEPs. The expenditures made in connection with the SEPs shall be documented in the SEP Completion Reports. The respondent shall complete the SEPs by June 30, 2025.
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