The Facility is a colloidal and polymer blend manufacturing facility. The Facility has used Epichlorohydrin and Dimethylamine to manufacture chemicals on site since at least 1999. The Facility maintains a maximum inventory of 235,000 pounds of the regulated toxic substance Epichlorohydrin, as determined under 40 C.F.R. § 68.115, which exceeds the threshold quantity of 20,000 pounds of Epichlorohydrin as set forth at Table 1 to 40 C.F.R. § 68.130. The Facility maintains a maximum inventory of 52,000 pounds of the regulated flammable substance Dimethylamine in an aqueous solution, as determined under 40 C.F.R. § 68.115, which exceeds the threshold quantity of 10,000 pounds of Dimethylamine as set forth at Table 3 to 40 C.F.R. § 68.130.
At the Facility, NC offloads the regulated substances Epichlorohydrin and Dimethylamine from trucks into one of two storage tanks, then routes them to two reactors for batch production of chemicals. The Respondents’ process for chemical manufacturing that use Epichlorohydrin and Dimethylamine at the Facility was and is a “Covered Process,” and as that term is defined at 40 C.F.R. § 68.3.
On October 25 and 26, 2021, EPA conducted an announced inspection at the Facility (October 2021 inspection). During the October 2021 inspection, EPA inspectors reviewed numerous documents provided by the Respondents. The documents included aspects of the Facility’s RMP involving the management system, PHA, operating procedures, training, mechanical integrity, management of change, hot work, and contractors. Information gathered during the inspection EPA conducted, identified the following violations of CAPP requirements:
Hazard Assessment
The Respondents failed to report a worst-case release scenario that reflects the greatest amount held in a single vessel, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.25(b)(1). The Respondents did not use the maximum capacity for the largest vessel within the Epichlorohydrin and Dimethylamine processes.
Process Safety Information
The Respondents failed to include in the Facility’s process safety information the maximum intended inventory of the Facility’s Program 3 process, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(c)(1)(iii).
The Respondents failed to include in the Facility’s process safety information the P&IDs for the Facility’s Program 3 process, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(ii).
The Respondents failed to include in the Facility’s process safety information the relief system design and design basis for the Facility’s Program 3 process, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(iv).
The Respondents failed to include in the Facility’s process safety information the ventilation system design for the Facility’s Program 3 process, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(v).
The Respondents failed to include in the Facility’s process safety information the design codes and standards employed by the Facility for its Program 3 process, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(vi).
The Respondents failed to document that equipment at the Facility complies with RAGAGEP, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2).
Process Hazard Analysis
The Respondents failed to establish a system to promptly address the findings and recommendations of the team that performed the PHA at the Facility; assure that the recommendations are resolved in a timely manner and that the resolution is documented; document what actions are to be taken; complete actions as soon as possible; and develop a written schedule of when these actions are to be completed; communicate the actions to operating, maintenance and other employees whose work assignments are in the process and who may be affected by the recommendations or actions, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e). Specifically, there were fourteen recommendations for tank 106, twelve recommendations for tank 539, fourteen recommendations for Reactor 195 and two recommendations for Reactor 155 from the 2013 PHA and 2018 PHA that NALCO had not addressed by the time of the October 2021 Inspection.
The Respondents failed to retain process hazards analyses and updates or revalidations for each process at the Facility, and the documented resolution of the recommendations of the team that performed the PHA for the life of the process, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(g). The Respondents were unable to provide a copy of the 2013 PHA for the Reactor 155 system.
Operating Procedures
The Respondents failed to develop and implement written operating procedures for the Facility that addressed steps for the following operating phase: emergency shutdown including the conditions under which emergency shutdown is required, and the assignment of shutdown responsibility to qualified operators to ensure that emergency shutdown is executed in a safe and timely manner, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1)(iv).
The Respondents failed to develop and implement written operating procedures for the Facility that address the consequences of deviation from operating limits, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(2)(i).
The Respondents failed to develop and implement written operating procedures for the Facility that address the steps required to correct or avoid deviation from operating limits, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(2)(ii).
The Respondents failed to develop and implement written operating procedures for the Facility that address the following safety and health consideration: precautions necessary to prevent exposure, including engineering controls, administrative controls, and personal protective equipment, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(3)(ii).
The Respondents failed to develop and implement written operating procedures for the Facility that address safety systems and their functions, in violation of 40 C.F.R § 68.69(a)(4).
The Respondents failed to certify annually that the operating procedures at the Facility are current and accurate, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(c).
Mechanical Integrity
The Respondents failed to establish and implement written procedures to maintain the ongoing integrity of process equipment listed in 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(a) at the Facility, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b).
The Respondents failed to train each employee involved in maintaining the ongoing integrity of process equipment at the Facility in an overview of that process equipment and its hazards and in the procedures applicable to the employee’s job tasks to assure that the employee can perform the job tasks in a safe manner, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(c).
The Respondents failed to perform inspections and tests on process equipment (e.g., covered process pipelines, tank 106 internally, sensors, and the Epichlorohydrin weigh-tank) at the Facility, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(1).
The Respondents’ procedures for inspection and testing at the Facility failed to follow RAGAGEP, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(2).
The Respondents failed to conduct inspections and tests at the Facility at a frequency that is consistent with applicable manufacturers’ recommendations, good engineering practices, and prior operating experience, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(3).
The Respondents failed to include a description of the inspection or test performed and the results of the inspection or test at the Facility in documentation of inspections and tests performed on covered process equipment, including pipelines, tank 106 internally, sensors, and the Epichlorohydrin weigh-tank, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(4).
The Respondents failed to correct deficiencies in equipment at the Facility, specifically Reactor 195, that was outside acceptable limits, before further use or in a safe and timely manner when necessary means are taken to assure safe operations, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(e). At the time of the October 2021 inspection, Reactor 195 remained in use but information Nalco provided EPA indicated that there were deficiencies in Reactor 195 found in January 26, 2017 that had not been corrected. The Respondents provided records on February 13, 2023 and November 3, 2023, about the repairs to Reactor 195 that were conducted later, in the fall of 2022.
Incident Investigation
The Respondents failed to initiate incident investigations no later than 48 hours following an incident at the Facility which resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.81(b). The Facility’s Project Safety Management (PSM) equipment incident summary indicated that the Respondents allowed 5 days to elapse before initiating investigation of a February 5, 2021 incident involving elevated pressure on tank 539 caused by a faulty nitrogen regulator, where an area was evacuated and barricaded; this incident could have resulted in over pressurization of tank 539 and release of a regulated substance. The Facility’s PSM equipment incident summary also indicated that the Respondents allowed 13 days to elapse before initiating investigation of a July 17, 2020 incident where an employee performing an instrument calibration on tank 106 removed a plug and felt a burning sensation on their hand; this incident could have resulted in an injury if it had been a larger uncontrolled release.
Contractors
The Respondents failed to periodically evaluate the performance of the contract owner or operator in fulfilling their obligations at the Facility, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.87(b)(5).
Risk Management Plan
The Respondents failed to include in the RMP registration form for the Facility the maximum quantity of each regulated substance or mixture in process (in pounds) to two significant digits for its covered process, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.160(b)(7).
In response to the FOV, the Respondents performed the following:
a. Hazard Assessment: resubmitted their RMP on October 26, 2021 with the correct worst-case scenario;
b. Process Safety Information: initiated review of Original Equipment Manufacturer documents and rerated tank 106;
c. Process hazard analysis: Completed the 41 recommendations from the June 2018 PHA by September 1, 2023;
d. Operating Procedures: Created emergency shutdown procedures, added consequences of deviations to operating procedures, determined that respirator are not required PPE for the “PRD-SOP-2024 Bulk Unloading of Epichlorohydrin (R-384) from Tank Trucks REV 7” operating procedure, provided operating procedures that include safety systems, provided a complete list of safety systems, added steps to correct or avoid deviations to operating procedures, created a recurring action to ETQ system and VelocityEHS to annually certify operating procedures, and recertified all operating procedures by November 2, 2023;
e. Mechanical Integrity: Calibrated sensors, performed inspections of pipelines by December 14, 2021, performed an inspection on the epichlorohydrin weigh-tank by March 31, 2022, performed an inspection on tank 106 as part of the vessel rerate by December 6, 2021, replaced the pressure relief valves on tank 539 and tank 549, inititated a review of the facility preventative maintenance program, completed repairs to deficiencies identified in 2017 on reactor 195 by November 29, 2022, and on October 17, 2022 completed internal and external inspections on reactor 195;
f. Risk Management Plan: Resubmitted the RMP on October 26, 2021.
Civil Penalty
Based on analysis of the factors specified in Section 113(e) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e), and the facts of this case, Complainant has determined that an appropriate civil penalty to settle this action is $401,300