You may remember the 2019 event where the worker left home for the facility to check on an alarm in a pump house. He did not return, so the wife put their children in their child seats and went to the facility to check on her husband. She arrived and found him unconscious inside a shack. She entered to check on him, and she too was overcome by Hydrogen Sulfide. The children were too young to get out of the car seat, and this saved their lives.
An oilfield executive and a service company entered guilty pleas and were sentenced yesterday to criminal worker safety and federal clean air and safe drinking water violations. According to court documents, the oilfield company owns and operates oil wells in and near Odessa, Texas. Odessa is in the Permian basin, where oil reserves are “sour,” meaning they have high hydrogen sulfide content. Hydrogen sulfide gas can be deadly at high concentrations.
The case leading to these pleas is the result of an investigation of the Oct. 26, 2019, death of an employee and his wife. Both were overcome by hydrogen sulfide at a facility in Odessa.
The oilfield company VP agreed to plead guilty to a Clean Air Act (CAA) negligent endangerment charge and serve five months in prison. The company also pleaded guilty to an Occupational Safety and Health Act willful violation count for the death.
The service company pleaded guilty to a felony violation of the Safe Drinking Water Act for falsifying oil well integrity tests.
From the Chemical Safety Board investigation report…
The waterflood station was equipped with an H2S detection and alarm system, which the company stated to the CSB was designed to initiate an alarm when the system detected H2S above a specific concentration. To detect the gas, the waterflood station used eight point detectors: six around the perimeter of the tanks and buildings, and two inside the pump house. When any one or more detectors sensed a concentration of H2S gas above a specified level, the system was designed to send a signal to the H2S control panel in the control room. The control panel would then activate two separate alarms:
(1) an alarm connected to the phone system, which would call the pumper on duty and alert him or her to the dangerous atmosphere at the facility, and
(2) a rotating red beacon light at the top of the pump house to provide a visual cue that there was a dangerous atmosphere at the facility.
The alarm system did not incorporate an auditory alert. CSB investigators asked emergency responders and company personnel who responded to the incident if they heard or saw any alarms, such as an illuminated light on top of the pump house. None of the emergency responders or company personnel told the CSB that they saw the light illuminated during the emergency response. When activated, the beacon light is designed to continuously rotate 360 degrees and display an unblinking red light. The CSB tested the H2S alarm system after the incident. Results showed that none of the working detectors communicated with the alarm’s control panel located in the control room. Some of the facility’s detectors were set to a testing mode, which prevented them from sending an alarm signal. For the other sensors that were set to the correct mode, no signal was received by the control panel. Results also indicated that, with a properly configured H2S detection and alarm system, a test signal from the control panel was successful in illuminating the beacon light on the top of the building. Had the sensors and sensor element of the system been operational, the alarm element of the system would have been successful. The CSB requested from the company all maintenance and calibration records for the H2S detection and alarm system. The company responded to the CSB stating that it did not locate any responsive documents.
The oilfield company will pay a $1 million criminal fine and the service company will pay a $400,000 criminal fine. These pleas were made under agreements the defendants entered into with the United States. Under the agreements, other pending charges will be dismissed. Yesterday, the court accepted the defendants’ guilty pleas and sentenced them in accordance with their plea agreements.
According to a factual statement accepted by the VP and oilfield company, the deceased worker responded to a call to check a pump. There, he encountered deadly hydrogen sulfide gas, was overcome, and died. His wife knew where her husband had gone and started calling him when he did not return in a timely manner. When those calls went unanswered, she drove to the facility. When she arrived at the facility, she was also overcome while looking for her husband and died.
The oilfield company VP admitted that he should have controlled hydrogen sulfide emissions as part of his duties and that, because he did not, he placed others in imminent danger of death. The oilfield company admitted the same criminal negligence and to a separate charge that it willfully violated the Occupational Safety and Health Act regulations requiring companies to implement respiratory protection programs to address hazards like those at the facility. In addition to paying a $1 million fine, the company will maintain a set of improvements it made after the tragedy during its period of probation.
The investigation also uncovered false statements by a services company about injection well testing related to oil operations. The mechanical integrity of an injection well must be evaluated by conducting pressure tests. These tests are part of programs under the Safe Drinking Water Act to prevent leaks from those wells. Such leaks could, under some circumstances, contaminate groundwater. In its plea agreement, the services company admitted that it sent forms and charts to the Texas Railroad Commission, claiming they were tests for specific wells when it knew they were not actual records of tests of those wells. The services company, in addition to its $400,000 fine, will guarantee that at least 33 tests conducted during its year of probation are witnessed or conducted by a third party.
The EPA’s Criminal Investigation Division investigated the case. The Justice Department and EPA would like to thank the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, the Texas Railroad Commission, Ector County Environmental, and the Odessa Fire Department for their support of the investigation.
| Violations/Penalties | Serious | Willful | Repeat | Other | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Initial Violations | 4 | 1 | 5 | ||
| Current Violations | 5 | 5 | |||
| Initial Penalty | $37,784 | $67,469 | $0 | $0 | $105,253 |
| Current Penalty | $75,000 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $75,000 |
| FTA Penalty | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| # | Citation ID | Citaton Type | Standard Cited | Issuance Date | Abatement Due Date | Current Penalty | Initial Penalty | Contest | Latest Event | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | 01001A | Serious | 19100134 C01 | 04/23/2020 | 05/19/2020 | $6,000 | $9,446 | 05/13/2020 | F – Formal Settlement | |
| 2. | 01001B | Serious | 19100134 E01 | 04/23/2020 | 05/19/2020 | $0 | $0 | 05/13/2020 | F – Formal Settlement | Citation has been deleted. |
| 3. | 01001C | Serious | 19100134 F01 | 04/23/2020 | 05/19/2020 | $0 | $0 | 05/13/2020 | F – Formal Settlement | Citation has been deleted. |
| 4. | 01001D | Serious | 19100134 K | 04/23/2020 | 05/19/2020 | $0 | $0 | 05/13/2020 | F – Formal Settlement | Citation has been deleted. |
| 5. | 01002 | Serious | 19100134 D01 II | 04/23/2020 | 05/19/2020 | $6,000 | $9,446 | 05/13/2020 | F – Formal Settlement | |
| 6. | 01003 | Serious | 19101000 E | 04/23/2020 | 05/19/2020 | $6,000 | $9,446 | 05/13/2020 | F – Formal Settlement | |
| 7. | 01004 | Serious | 19101200 E01 | 04/23/2020 | 05/19/2020 | $6,000 | $9,446 | 05/13/2020 | F – Formal Settlement | |
| 8. | 02001 | Serious | 19101000 B02 | 04/23/2020 | 05/19/2020 | $51,000 | $67,469 | 05/13/2020 | F – Formal Settlement |
Source: https://www.osha.gov/ords/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=1440890.015
Source: https://www.csb.gov/aghorn-operating-waterflood-station-hydrogen-sulfide-release-/