Respondent owns and operates a chemical manufacturing plant that produces oleum, anhydrous sulfur dioxide, sulfuric acid, and ammonium thiosulfate. Respondent re-submitted an RMP for the Facility on February 11, 2022 (2022 RMP) that identifies the following three covered processes that are subject to the Program 3 requirements of the CAPP:
a. Oleum Process, which contains the regulated toxic substance oleum at a quantity of 968,400 pounds;
b. Sulfur Dioxide Process, which contains the regulated toxic substance anhydrous sulfur dioxide at a quantity of 1,614,000 pounds; and
c. Ammonia Thiosulfate Production Process (ATS Process), which contains the regulated toxic substance anhydrous ammonia at a quantity of 907,440 pounds.
Allegations
Count 1: Failure to Evaluate Hazards of Open-Ended Valves or Lines in Sulfur Dioxide Process
During an inspection on October 26 and 27, 2023 (Inspection), the EPA observed open-ended valves or lines within the Sulfur Dioxide Process that relied on a single closed valve with no lock to contain regulated and other extremely hazardous substances.
Respondent conducted a 5-year revalidation of a PHA covering both the Oleum and Sulfur Dioxide Processes in 2019 (2019 PHA). Loss of containment through an unlocked and open-ended valve or line is a recognized hazard, but Respondent did not evaluate the hazard of loss containment through the open-ended valves or lines in the Sulfur Dioxide Process during the 2019 PHA or at any other time prior to the EPA’s inspection.
Respondent failed to conduct a PHA that evaluated the hazard of loss of containment through the open-ended valves or lines in the Sulfur Dioxide Process during the 2019 PHA or any other time prior to the Inspection, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c).
Count 2: Failure to Control Hazards of Open-Ended Valves or Lines in ATS Process
During the Inspection, the EPA observed an open-ended valve on the anhydrous ammonia feed piping to the Gassing Tank within the ATS Process that was in the open position. The open valve relied on a single closed upstream valve with no lock to contain anhydrous ammonia.
During the Inspection, the EPA observed an open-ended line with two closed valves downstream of a pressure gauge located between the Digest Ammonia Throttling Valve and the Digest Ammonia Block Valve within the ATS Process. The “Normal Operations- Digest Tank Batch” procedure provided by Respondent at the time of the Inspection shows closed piping downstream of the pressure gauge, not an open-ended valve or line.
Respondent failed to implement safe work practices to provide for the control of hazards during opening process equipment by failing to close an open-ended valve on the anhydrous ammonia feed line to the Gassing Tank and failing to provide closed piping on the anhydrous ammonia feed line to the Digest Tank, as observed within the ATS Process at the time of the Inspection on October 27, 2023, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d).
Count 3: Failure to Design and Maintain Toxic Gas Detection Alarms in Accordance with RAGAGEP
Respondent has installed gas detectors at the Facility for ambient and/or fence line monitoring of sulfur dioxide and ammonia. The gas detectors at the Facility are alarmed in the control room to notify Respondent’s operators of a toxic gas detection event. The gas detectors and their associated alarms (toxic gas detection alarms) are safety systems for the Program 3 processes at the Facility because they provide for the detection of releases of regulated substances.
Toxic gas detection alarms at the Facility are equipment in a Program 3 process and therefore must be designed and maintained in compliance with RAGAGEP, as set forth at 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2).
Sources of RAGAGEP for safety alarms in the process industries include, but are not limited to, standards published by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and the International Society of Automation (ISA). IEC 62682, Management of Alarm Systems for the Process Industries, is a consensus standard that addresses the development, design, installation, and management of alarm systems in the process industries and requires an alarm philosophy document to be developed to cover each alarm system.
By failing to develop an alarm philosophy in accordance with IEC 62682 or any equivalent standard at any time, Respondent failed to ensure and document that the toxic gas detection alarms at the Facility are designed and maintained in compliance with RAGAGEP, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2).
Count 4: Failure to Evaluate Human Factors for Toxic Gas Detection Alarms
During the 2019 PHA, Respondent evaluated process control systems and alarms as part of a human factors checklist. The human factors checklist provides a series of guiding questions and the PHA team’s responses related to alarms, including:
a. Q: “Are alarms displayed by priority and is the system designed to avoid alarm flood in an emergency?”
A: “No. Alarms are displayed by time, this is [adequate].”
b. Q: “Are critical alarms distinct and does the [standard operating procedure] have instructions on what the required operator response is to critical alarms?”
A: “No. Not an issue.”
c. Q: “Is there an alarm review program in place which ensures that alarms levels are appropriate to the risk and which takes action to eliminate nuisance alarms?”
A: “No. Not an issue.”
The 2019 PHA does not document what information was reviewed by the PHA team when completing the human factors checklist and does not reference any RAGAGEP used to determine that the lack of an alarm prioritization system, lack of distinct critical alarms, and lack of an alarm review program was not an issue.
Respondent failed to conduct a PHA that adequately addresses human factors related to toxic gas detection alarms during the 2019 PHA or any other time through at least the Inspection, in violation 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c)(6).
Count 5: Failure to Perform Inspections and Tests on Sulfur Dioxide Detection Alarms
Gas detection alarms at the Facility are subject to the mechanical integrity requirements for equipment in Program 3 processes, including the requirement to perform inspections and tests using procedures that follow RAGAGEP, as set forth at 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(1) and (d)(2).
ANSI/ISA-84.91.01, Identification and Mechanical Integrity of Process Safety Controls, Alarms, and Interlocks in the Process Industry Sector, is a consensus standard that addresses the instruments that are classified as process safety safeguards by the authority having jurisdiction and establishes requirements for their mechanical integrity, including inspection/testing and documenting the inspection/test results.
ANSI/ISA-84.91.01-2021 states that process safety controls, alarms, and interlocks shall be included in a mechanical integrity program that uses periodic inspection/testing and preventive maintenance to maintain their integrity in the operating environment.
As a result of an information request issued by Complainant to Respondent on April 9, 2024 pursuant to Section 114(a) of the CAA (April 2024 Request), Respondent discovered that its sulfur dioxide alarms were erroneously configured to provide “high” and “high high” alarms at lower concentrations than intended by the alarm design.
Respondent failed to conduct inspections and tests on the sulfur dioxide detection alarms at the Facility to ensure that the alarms were properly installed and maintained at any time prior to the April 2024 Request, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d).
Count 6: Failure to Develop and Implement Operating Procedures for Sulfur Dioxide Detection Alarms
Neither the Oleum Process nor the Sulfur Dioxide Process operating procedures provided by Respondent at the time of the Inspection address the sulfur dioxide detection alarms at the Facility and do not provide the information set forth at Paragraphs 29 through 31, above:
a. Procedures for sulfur dioxide detector alarm response are not provided;
b. Sulfur dioxide detection levels under which emergency shutdown is required are not specified;
c. The safe operating limits for the sulfur dioxide detectors are not specified; and
d. The alarm levels for the sulfur dioxide detector alarms are not specified.
Respondent failed to develop and implement written operating procedures for the Sulfur Dioxide and Oleum Processes that provide clear instructions for safely responding to sulfur dioxide detector alarms at all relevant times, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a).
Count 7: Failure to Develop and Implement Operating Procedures for Ammonia Detection Alarms
While the operating procedure for the ATS Process provided by the Respondent at the time of the Inspection titled “Emergency Operations – Anhydrous Ammonia Leak Shutdown” states that the detection of ammonia will trigger an alarm status to the programmable logic controller (PLC) to notify Respondent’s operators of a leak, the ATS Process operating procedures do not provide the information set forth at Paragraphs 29 through 31, above:
a. Procedures for ammonia detector alarm response are not provided;
b. Ammonia detection levels under which emergency shutdown is required are not specified;
c. The safe operating limits for the ammonia detectors are not specified; and
d. The alarm levels for the ammonia detector alarms are not specified.
Respondent failed to develop and implement written operating procedures for the ATS Process that specify ammonia detection levels under which emergency shutdown is required, safe operating limits for the ammonia detectors, and the alarm levels for the ammonia detector alarms at all relevant times, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a).
Count 8: Failure to Establish and Implement Mechanical Integrity Procedures for Piping Systems
The Oleum, Sulfur Dioxide, and ATS Processes each contain piping systems subject to the mechanical integrity requirements for equipment in Program 3 processes at 40 C.F.R. § 68.73. Respondent provided an internal document titled EHS-500, Process Safety Management/Risk Management Plan Management Program during the Inspection and as part of its response to the April 2024 Request.
The narrative provided by Respondent in response to the April 2024 Request states that Section 12.3 of EHS-500 details the procedures that Respondent follows at the Facility to ensure the on-going integrity of the covered processes in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b), including the piping systems for those processes.
Section 12.3 of EHS-500 does not provide written procedures specific to maintaining the on-going integrity of in-service process piping for the covered processes at the Facility, such as a description of the inspections or tests that should be performed on piping systems or the frequency at which such inspections or tests should be performed.
Respondent failed to establish and implement written procedures to maintain the on-going integrity of piping systems for the Program 3 processes at the Facility at all relevant times, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b).
Count 9: Failure to Conduct Inspections and Tests on Piping Systems
Sources of RAGAGEP for inspecting and testing process piping include, but are not limited to, standards published by the American Petroleum Institute (API). API 570, Piping Inspection Code: In-service Inspection, Rating, Repair, and Alteration of Piping Systems, is an industry consensus standard that covers the inspection, rating, repair, and alteration procedures for metallic piping systems and their associated pressure-relieving devices that have been placed in-service.
API 570 applies to all piping systems for process fluids that are hazardous to personnel, such as hydrocarbons, and similar flammable or toxic fluid services and processes, unless specifically designated as optional by the code. Respondent sets forth general inspection criteria for maintaining the on-going integrity of process equipment at the Facility in Section 12.3.3 of EHS-500 as follows [emphasis added]:
“Inspection criteria must follow [RAGAGEP]. Examples include, but are not limited to: PVS standards, manufacturer instructions and ASTM/API standards…”
API 570 generally requires external visual inspections to be performed on piping systems at least every five years and thickness measurements to be performed on piping systems at least every ten years (or at least every five years for fluid services that have the highest potential of resulting in an immediate emergency if a leak were to occur). See Table 1 of API 570. Section 12.3.4 of EHS-500 states: “The results of inspections must be documented including the following information: Date, inspector, equipment name, item number, description of test, result of test and corrective actions taken. Inspection records must be retained for the life of the equipment. The [computerized maintenance management system] software will be used to assure the inspections have occurred while hard copies of the records will be kept in the
equipment files.”
In response to the April 2024 Request, Respondent did not provide evidence that it had performed inspections or tests on in-service process piping in response to Complainant’s request for documentation of all inspections and tests that Respondent has performed on the piping systems of covered processes at the Facility from April 1, 2019 through the April 2024 Request.
Respondent failed to conduct inspections and tests on Oleum and Sulfur Dioxide Process piping systems in accordance with RAGAGEP at any time since at least April 1, 2019, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d).
Count 10: Failure to Include Rail Tank Car Storage in RMP
Respondent stores rail tank cars containing oleum and anhydrous sulfur dioxide at the Facility after the rail tank cars are disconnected from the Oleum or Sulfur Dioxide Processes and before the rail tank cars are connected to the motive power (i.e., locomotive) that will transport the cars out of the Facility.
Rail tank car storage of oleum and anhydrous sulfur dioxide is part of Respondent’s stationary source because the transportation containers are used for storage not incident to transportation.
In response to the April 2024 Request, Respondent provided a plot plan showing the locations at the Facility where rail tank cars may be stored. Certain rail tank car storage locations that Respondent identified on the plot plan are neither interconnected nor co-located with the Oleum or Sulfur Dioxide Processes, including Tracks 1, 2, 9, and 10.
EHS-500 provides the basis for the maximum intended inventories of oleum and anhydrous sulfur dioxide listed in the 2022 RMP as follows:
a. The maximum intended oleum inventory listed for the Oleum Process does not include any amount stored in rail tank cars; and
b. The maximum intended anhydrous sulfur dioxide inventory listed for the Sulfur Dioxide Process includes three rail tank cars containing 180,000 pounds of anhydrous sulfur dioxide each, or 540,000 pounds combined rail tank car
storage.
Records of rail tank car storage at the Facility since April 1, 2021 provided in response to the April 2024 Request demonstrate that:
a. Respondent stores a maximum of two oleum rail tank cars at the Facility with a total oleum inventory of 404,800 pounds; and
b. Respondent stores a maximum of five sulfur dioxide rail tank cars at the Facility with a total anhydrous sulfur dioxide inventory of 891,800 pounds.
Rail tank car storage at the Facility is a covered process because it contains regulated toxic substances above the threshold quantities listed in Table 1 to 40 C.F.R. § 68.130. The 2022 RMP does not include rail tank car storage of oleum as a covered process and does not include rail tank car storage of more than three anhydrous sulfur dioxide rail tank cars as a covered process.
By failing to include rail tank car storage of oleum and anhydrous sulfur dioxide as a covered process in its RMP filing, Respondent failed to submit a single RMP, as provided in 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.150 to 68.185, that includes a registration that reflects all covered processes, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(a).
Terms of Consent Agreement
Based on analysis of the factors specified in Section 113(e) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e), the facts of this case, and Respondent’s cooperation, the EPA has determined that an appropriate civil penalty to settle this action is $174,000.
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