OSHA has cited a refinery for 11 safety violations, with proposed penalties totaling $43,400, mainly for exposing workers to chemical hazards. The inspection, which began in July 2013 after a referral from the Environmental Protection Agency, focused on the refinery’s process safety management program for handling flammable liquids in excess of 10,000 pounds. The majority of violations relate to potential fire and explosion hazards stemming from the distillation of sweet crude oil into products, such as naphtha, kerosene and diesel fuels. The 10 serious process safety management violations cited include failing to compile pPSI for piping, vessels and other equipment properly; update and complete a thorough PHA; resolve previous PHA action items; update SOPs; compile and implement written maintenance procedures; and implement a MOC program. The other-than-serious violation involves failing to initiate and maintain record keeping of the OSHA 300 injury and illness logs for the 2012 calendar year.
Here is a breakdown of the citations:
PLEASE NOTE: these citations are NOT the final settlement and some are BEFORE the employer’s informal conference. They are shared as a learning tool to show what types of issues OSHA and EPA are finding in their PSM/RMP inspections. I have scrubbed all company information from these postings as this is NOT about any one company, but rather a trend of issues that continue to be found by OSHA and EPA.
Citation 1 Item 1
Type of Violation: Serious; $4,900
29 CFR 1910.119(d)(2)(i)(C): Process safety information pertaining to the technology of the process did not include the maximum intended quantity.
On or about 15 July 2013, and at times prior thereto, the employer did not know the maximum intended quantity currently in the refinery production unit, which included piping, distillation tower, overhead accumulator, and various other process equipment. The refinery was taking in crude oil and producing naphtha, diesel, kerosene, liquid petroleum gases, and other types of hydrocarbons. At the time of the inspection, the refinery was operating at 50% capacity, which placed the overhead accumulator above the threshold quantity for Process Safety Management. Without knowing the quantities on hand and in the processing unit, employees working within the refinery are exposed to explosion effects, toxic atmosphere, fire and projectile hazards.
Citation 1 Item 2a
Type of Violation: Serious; $4,900
29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(i)(A): Information pertaining to the equipment in the process did not include materials of construction.
On or about 15 July 2013, and at times prior thereto, the employer did not have any information relevant to the materials of construction for the Naphtha Overhead Accumulator used in the distillation processing unit, exposing the employees working within the unit to explosion effects, toxic atmosphere, fire and projectile hazards due to a catastrophic failure and rupture of the vessel under pressure.
Citation 1 Item 2b
Type of Violation: Serious; Grouped
29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(i)(D): The employer did not include, in the process safety information compilation, the relief system design and the design basis for the flare.
On or about 15 July 2013, and at times prior thereto, the employer did not have any information relevant to the Naphtha flare analysis determining the flare’s adequacy to handle a major release from the distillation processing unit, exposing the employees working within the unit to explosion effects, toxic atmosphere, fire and projectile hazards due to a catastrophic failure and rupture of the piping for the flare within the unit.
Citation 1 Item 2c
Type of Violation: Serious; Grouped
29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(i)(G): The Process Safety Information did not address material and energy balances for processes built after May 26, 1992.
On or about 15 July 2013, and at times prior thereto, the employer did not have any information relevant to the current material and energy balances for the process that was running under an API gravity of 47 for the Distillation Unit, exposing the employees working within the unit to explosion effects, toxic atmosphere, fire and projectile hazards due to a runaway reaction from the improper balance of temperatures, pressures, and flow rates from the chemical processes occurring within the refinery.
Citation 1 Item 3
Type of Violation: Serious; $2,800
29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3)(iii): The process hazard analysis did not address engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and their interrelationships such as appropriate application of detection methodologies to provide early warning of releases.
On or about 15 July 2013, and at times prior thereto, the employer did not address engineering and administrative controls within the Process Hazard Analysis (PHA), specific to early detection methods or systems such as fixed or personal H2S gas detectors. Without addressing the consequences and recommendations for these controls, the employer cannot recognize the hazards associated with them and be proactive to ensure the safety of the employees. Without fixed detectors or personal detectors that are checked daily to confinn their ability to respond to gas, the employees are exposed to H2S gas inhalation.
Citation 1 Item 4
Type of Violation: Serious; $4,900
29 CPR 1910.119(e)(3)(v): The process hazard analysis did not address facility siting for the Control Room.
On or about 15 July 2013, and at times prior thereto, the employer’s Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) did not consider facility siting for the Control Room, which was located approximately 150 feet away from the processing area, exposing the employees working within the Control Room to explosion effects, toxic atmosphere, fire and projectile hazards. The Control Room was constructed in 1974, is a sheet metal fabricated building, and has approximate dimensions of 12 feet 4 inches by 44 feet 5 inches.
Citation 1 Item 5a
Type of Violation: Serious; $4,900
29 CFR 1910.119(e)(5): The employer did not establish a system to promptly address the team’s findings and recommendations; assure that the recommendations are resolved in a timely manner and that the resolution is documented; document what actions are to be taken; complete actions as soon as possible; develop a written schedule of when these actions are to be completed; communicate the actions to operating, maintenance and other employees whose work assignments are in the process and who may be affected by the recommendations or actions.
On or about 15 July 2013, and at times prior thereto, the employer did not implement an effective system to address Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) action items. The latest PHA performed was titled Crude Unit Initial HAZOP, and was conducted during the months of August and September 2007. The PHA team created a listing of all the recommendations/action items with assigned responsible parties; however, the employer had not completed the list as of the day of the inspection, and still had more than half of the items still not addressed, with one of them being to check the sizing of the knock-out drum. The employer failed to establish priority items.or due dates for completion of such items, exposing the employees working within the processing area to explosion effects, toxic atmosphere, fire and projectile hazards.
Citation 1 Item 5b
Type of Violation: Serious; Grouped
29 CPR 1910.119(e)(6): The employer did not update and revalidate by a team meeting the requirements in paragraph (e)(4) of this section, to assure that the process hazard analysis is consistent with the current process, at least every five (5) years after the completion of the initial process hazard analysis.
On or about 15 July 2013, and at times prior thereto, the employer failed to either revalidate the existing Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) or initiate a new PHA at least every 5 years from the completion of the last analysis. The previous PHA was a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study that was dated August 6, 2007.
Citation 1 Item 6a
Type of Violation: Serious; $3,500
29 CPR 1910.119(f)(l)(i)(G): The employer did not develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information and did not address the startup following a turnaround, or after an emergency shutdown.
On or about 15 July 2013, and at times prior thereto, the employer did not address a Startup following a Turnaround or after an Emergency Shutdown with written procedures for controlling situations where safety mechanisms and processing equipment need to be activated in sequence, exposing the employees working within the processing area to explosion and overpressure effects, toxic atmosphere, fire and projectile hazards.
Citation 1 Item 6b
Type of Violation: Serious; Grouped
29 CFR 1910.119(f)(3): The operating procedures were not reviewed as often as necessary to assure that they reflect current operating practice, including changes that result from changes in process chemicals, technology, and equipment, and changes to facilities.
The employer did not certify annually that these operating procedures were current and accurate. On or about 15 July 2013, and at times prior thereto, the employer did not review as often as necessary and certify annually the operating procedures for the refinery, especially after equipment modifications were made, exposing the employees working within the processing area to explosion effects, toxic atmosphere, fire and projectile hazards.
Citation 1 Item 7
Type of Violation: Serious; $3,500
29 CPR 1910.119(j)(2): The employer did not establish or implement written procedures to maintain the on-going integrity of process equipment.
On or about 15 July 2013, and at times prior thereto, the employer did not establish or implement written procedures to maintain the on-going mechanical integrity of process equipment, exposing the employees working within the processing area and refinery to explosion effects, toxic atmosphere, fire and projectile hazards. Due to the lack of a working mechanical integrity procedure, the Naphtha Overhead Accumulator, Vessel D203, was identified in 2008 as having a corrosion point below the replacement thickness; yet, had not been retested since, and was later determined to be below the minimum thickness requiring the vessel to operate at a lower pressure.
Citation 1 Item 8
Type of Violation: Serious; $4,900
29 CFR 1910.119(j)(4)(iii): The frequency of inspections and tests of process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity, was not consistent with applicable manufacturer’s recommendations and good engineering practices, or more frequently if determnined to be necessary by prior operating experience.
On or about 15 July 2013, and at times prior thereto, the employer did not increase the frequency of inspections and testing, specific to D-203 Naphtha Overhead Accumulator, to maintain the mechanical integrity of the process equipment, and as necessary based on prior operating experience. In 2008, EN Global Inspection Services identified a corrosion point on the vessel that was below the calculated replacement thickness. Yet, the employer continued to utilize the vessel from January 2012 to present without having the vessel inspected and tested, exposing the employees working within the processing area and refinery to explosion effects, toxic atmosphere, fire and projectile hazards.
Citation 1 Item 9
Type of Violation: Serious; $4,900
29 CFR 1910.119(l)(1): The employer did not establish or implement written procedures to manage changes to process chemicals, technology, equipment, and procedures, and changes to facilities that affect a covered process.
On or about 15 July 2013, and at times prior thereto, the employer failed to establish and implement a written procedure to manage changes to process chemicals, technology, equipment, and procedures, and changes to facilities that affect a covered process, exposing the employees working within the processing area and refinery to explosion effects, toxic atmosphere, fire and projectile hazards. Instances include changes or upgrades that were documented:
1) Install level signal with alarm for high water level in the Control Room;
2) Add new relief – outlet tube side E-208B; and
3) Installed new larger piping on Naphtha line to the thin fins;
4) New schedule 80 4 inch piping installed November 2011;
5) Pennanent bypassing of diesel lines; and 6) Replaced seals with steam quenched seals.
Citation 1 Item 10
Type of Violation: Serious; $3,500
29 CFR 1910.1200(f)(6): Except as provided in paragraphs (f)(7) and (f)(8) of this section, the employer did not ensure that each container of hazardous chemicals in the workplace was labeled, tagged or marked with either the information specified under paragraphs (f)(1)(i) through (v) of this section for labels on shipped containers or with the product identifier and pictures, symbols or combination thereof which provide at least general information regarding the hazards of the chemicals, and which, in conjunction with the other information immediately available to employees under the hazard communication program, will provide employees with the specific information regarding the physical and health hazards of the hazardous chemical.
On or about 15 July 2013, and at times prior thereto, the employer failed to identify the contents of vessels and piping with labels and flow direction within the processing area, exposing the employees working within the processing area and refinery to explosion effects, toxic atmosphere, fire and projectile hazards.
Citation 2 Item 1
Type of Violation: Other-than-Serious; $700
29 CFR 1904.29(a): 29 CFR 1904.29(a): The employer did not use OSHA 300, 300-A, and 301 forms, or equivalent forms, for recordable injuries and illnesses.
The OSHA 300 form is called the Log of Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses, the 300-A is the Summary of Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses, and the OSHA 301 form is called the Injury and Illness Incident Report. At the inspection site, for calendar year 2012, the employer did not utilize OSHA 300 Log or an OSHA 300A Summary, or equivalent fonns for Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses.
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