Respondent owns and operates a liquefied petroleum gas manufacturing and storage facility. On January 26, 2005 Respondent submitted to U.S. EPA a Risk Management Plan (RMP) for its Facility. On July 5, 2012, U.S. EPA conducted an inspection at Respondent’s Facility to determine its compliance with 40 C.F.R. Part 68. Respondent held 10,000 lbs. or more of butane and propane for use in its operations at its Facility and, thus, exceeded the applicability threshold established by 40 C.F.R. § 68.130, and became subject to 40 C.F.R. Part 68. Respondent acknowledged in its RMP, that its Facility was required to meet Program 3 eligibility requirements. Based on U.S. EPA’s inspection of Respondent’s Facility conducted on June 5, 2012, and a review of Respondent’s additional information received by U.S. EPA subsequent to that date, U.S. EPA alleged that Respondent violated the Hazard Assessment and Program 3 Prevention Program regulations as follows:
- Failing to analyze and report the worst-case release scenario that is estimated to create the greatest distance in any direction to an endpoint as defined in § 68.22 (a) resulting from an accidental release of a regulated flammable substance from the covered process under worst-case conditions defined in § 68.22(a), as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.25(a)(2)(ii);
- Failing to determine the worst-case release quantity that is, for substances in a vessel, the greatest amount held in a single vessel, taking into account administrative controls that limit the maximum quantity, as required under 40 C.F .R. § 68.25(b)(1);
- Failing to compile written process safety information including information pertaining to the technology of the process that includes maximum intended inventories, as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(c)(1)(iii);
- Failing to compile written process safety information including information that documents that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices, as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2);
- Failing to perform a process hazard analysis that addresses the hazards of the process, including those relating to flares, the identification of any previous incident which had a likely potential for catastrophic consequences, stationary source siting, and human factors as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c);
- Failing to correct deficiencies in equipment that are outside acceptable limits before further use or in a safe and timely manner when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation, as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(e); and
- Failing to promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audit and document that deficiencies have been corrected, as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(d)
Based on an analysis of the factors specified in Section 113(e) of the Act, the facts of this case, and other factors such as cooperation and prompt compliance, Complainant has determined that an appropriate civil penalty to settle this action is $74,000.
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