This is not just another RMP General Duty Clause case. This case centers around a “critical utility” and how its FAILURE led to the release of a flammable gas and explosion. And the critical utility was the plant air system and the critical component was air dryer. The facility had recognized these systems as critical AND had the air dryer on an inspection schedule. Each shift, facility employees inspected the desiccant crystals in the air dryer system to ensure that the desiccant crystals are blue in color, which indicates that the air is dry. Employees then record the results on a checklist. The review of these records revealed that during the time period from January 22, 2014 until the time of the incident, area operators had noted the desiccant’s LACK OF blue color on the inspection checklist, but no actions were taken to address this condition. The presence of moisture in the lines in extremely cold temperatures led to the failure of the west flare stack’s valve to open due to a frozen air-line.
Respondent is the owner and/or operator of a by-product coke production facility which manufactures high performance foundry coke. Coke is the non-volatile carbonaceous residue of coal. Foundry coke is produced by baking coal in coke ovens at elevated temperatures in an oxygen free environment. The coking process creates coke oven gas (“COG”), which is recycled through the system and used as fuel. According to information provided by Respondent, the constituents of their COG primarily include, on a percentage basis, hydrogen (59%), methane (19%), nitrogen (11 %), carbon monoxide (5%), ethylene (2%), carbon dioxide (2%), and small volume percentages of other constituents. Hydrogen sulfide, ammonia, sulfur dioxide, ethane, acetylene, propane, propylene, propadiene, butane, butene, and naphthalene are also present in COG. At approximately 11:51 a.m. on January 31, 2014, there was an incident at the Facility involving an explosion and fire (the “Incident”). The Incident occurred in the counterweight area, which is a basement- like area located under the coke oven battery. A rupture disc on a manifold ruptured because of the build-up of COG pressure. The manifold is a COG supply main providing fuel for combustion within the coke oven walls. Respondent reported the explosion and fire to the National Response Center on January 31 , 2014 at 6:05 p.m.
Respondent prepared a root cause analysis and a supplemental root cause analysis of the Incident (the “Root Cause Analyses”) and submitted them to EPA with cover letters dated February 4, 2014 and February 6, 2014. EPA conducted an inspection of the Facility on February 10, 2014.
As a result of the Incident, the walls of the counterweight area were severely damaged, and three employees were impacted. One employee was blown to the ground, another experienced dust inhalation and a possible first degree burn on this face, and a third was sent off site to Health Work’s WNY’s facility for X-rays of his shoulder and to have debris removed from his eyes. It is alleged that during the Incident, more than one pound of coke oven emissions were released from the Facility.
Respondent’s conclusions, as set forth in the Root Cause Analyses described above included the following: that a causal factor leading to the fire and explosion was a COG pressure build-up; the failure of the west flare stack’s valve to open due to a frozen air-line; and the failure of the east flare stack to release the gas due to a blockage in the COG line. During the Inspection, monitoring records for the plant’s air dryer system were reviewed. During each shift, Facility employees inspect the desiccant crystals in the Facility’s air dryer system to ensure that the desiccant crystals are blue in color, which indicates that the air is dry. Employees then record the results on a checklist. The review of these records revealed that during the time period from January 22, 2014 until the time of the Incident, byproduct area operators had noted the desiccant’s lack of blue color on a Facility check list, but no actions were taken to address this condition. The presence of moisture in the lines in extremely cold temperatures can lead to frozen lines and blockages.
According to information provided by Respondent, because of the extreme and consistent cold temperatures, the counterweight area was sealed tightly, with no openings to the outside. Rupture disks are manufactured for the express purpose of rupturing and relieving pressure in pipelines or vessels to prevent the whole pipeline or vessel from undergoing a pressure explosion. However, rupture disks are not intended to rupture within a closed space.
At its Facility, Respondent stores, processes, handles, and/or produces substances listed pursuant to Section 112(r)(3) of the CAA, including hydrogen sulfide, methane, ammonia, sulfur dioxide, butane, butene, ethylene, ethane, acetylene, propane, propylene, and propadiene. Pursuant to Section 112(r)(l) of the Act, Respondent has a general duty, in the same manner and to the same extent as 29 U.S.C. § 654, to (a) identify hazards which may result from accidental releases of a regulated substance or other extremely hazardous substance, using appropriate hazard assessment techniques, (b) design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases, and ( c) minimize the consequences of accidental releases which do occur. As described above, Respondent failed to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases regarding the Facility. Respondent’s failure to design and maintain a safe facility by taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases regarding the Facility constitute violations of Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA.
Coke oven emissions are a “hazardous substance,” as defined in Section 101(14) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). The reportable quantity for coke oven emissions is 1 pound, as specified in 40 C.F.R. Section 302.4. Respondent failed to immediately notify the NRC of the January 31, 2014 alleged release of coke oven emissions from the Facility. Respondent violated the notification requirements of Section 103(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a), and is therefore subject to the assessment of penalties under Section 109 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9609.
Respondent agrees to pay a civil penalty in the total amount of fifty thousand eight hundred and twelve dollars ($50,812.00), as described below. This penalty includes a CERCLA portion in the amount of eleven thousand nine hundred dollars ($11,900. 00), and a CAA portion in the amount of thirty eight thousand nine hundred and twelve dollars ($38,912.00).
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