EPA issues RMP & EPCRA citations after 300 pound NH3 release (NH3 & $108K)

The CAFO resolves the following CAA and CERCLA violations that EPA alleges occurred in conjunction with Respondent’s handling of ammonia at its cold storage warehouse:

Failure to Comply with RMP emergency contact requirements, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.160(b)(6);
Failure to comply with Program 3 safety information requirements, in violation of 40 C.F.R. 68.65;
Failure to comply with Program 3 training documentation requirements, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(c);
Failure to comply with Program 3 hot work permit requirements, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.85(a);
Failure to comply with Program 3 compliance audit requirements, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.79;
Failure to comply with Program 3 revalidation requirements for the process hazard analysis, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.67; and
Failure to failure to timely report a March 27, 2015, release of ammonia to the National Response Center, in violation of Section 103(a) of CERCLA.

The company owns and operates a blueberry processing plant and controlled temperature storage warehouse in the state of Maine. The company also owns a recently constructed dry storage building and an old house on the property. The Facility is located near a main road in a mixed business-residential area and approximately 1.5 miles from a Hospital.

At all times relevant to the violations alleged herein, Respondent was the “owner or operator” of the Facility, which uses anhydrous ammonia in three refrigeration processes. At the time of EPA’s October 31, 2012 inspection, the Cold Storage System (“Main System” or “CS”) had a maximum intended capacity of 5,736 pounds of ammonia (associated with the high condenser on the northwest wall of the building by the parking lot); the Flow Freeze System (“FF”) had a maximum intended capacity of 4,854 pounds of ammonia (associated with the low condenser on the northwest wall of the building by the parking lot); and the York Tunnel System (“YT”) had a maximum intended capacity of 6,909 pounds of ammonia (associated with the low condenser on the southeast side of the building) (collectively, “Processes”). Only the CS and the FF processes are interconnected. As of July 16, 2014, the company Process Safety Manual (PSM) was changed to reflect the maximum intended capacity in the CS of 7,000 pounds, FF of 3,000 pounds, and the YT of 9,000 pounds. Only the CS operated year round; the FF and YT operate generally from the end of July to the first of September.

In August 2009, Respondent filed a Program 3 RMP for the Blast Freezers and reported it utilizes 19,654 pounds of anhydrous ammonia.

In August 2014, Respondent filed a Program 3 RMP for the Tunnel Freezers and reported it utilizes 19,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia.

A Process Hazard Analysis (“PHA”) was first developed by the parent company for the facility in March 1999. The report was dated April 19, 1999. According to the August 31, 2009 RMP electronic filing, a Safety Review was performed on July 20, 2009.

Additionally, an incident investigation by the company occurred on May 4, 2004. As a result of the incident investigation the facility reviewed or revised the maintenance procedures and reviewed the pre-startup procedures, which were completed on July 4, 2004.

On March 27 and 28, 2012, the facility performed an update and revalidation of the PHA resulting in a report dated June 13, 2012. According to the August 29, 2014 RMP electronic filing, a Process Hazard Analysis update was performed on March 28, 2012 and a Safety Review was performed on June 1, 2014.

Additionally, an incident investigation occurred by the company on August 1, 2012. As a result of the incident investigation management reviewed and revised the maintenance procedures on June 1, 2014 and the pre-startup procedures on August 1, 2013.

At the time of EPA’s October 31, 2012 inspection, the interconnected and co-located processes in the Machinery Room in the Maintenance Department (the “Machinery Room”) were a “covered process” subject to the RMP provisions of Part 68 because Respondent “uses,” “stores,” and “handles” the RMP chemical anhydrous ammonia at the Facility in an amount greater than 10,000 pounds.

According to the RMP, the endpoint for a worst case release of the amount of anhydrous ammonia used in the Processes is greater than the distance to a public receptor. Additionally, at the time of EPA’s October 31, 2012 inspection, the Processes were subject to OSHA’s PSM requirements at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119 because they use anhydrous ammonia in an amount over the threshold quantity of 10,000 pounds. Therefore, in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.10(a)-(d), Respondent’s use, storage, and handling of anhydrous ammonia by the processes at the facility is subject to the requirements of RMP Program 3.

Additionally, at the time of EPA’s October 31, 2012 inspection, Respondent was subject to the General Duty Clause due to the Respondent processing, handling, or storing substances listed pursuant to Section 112(r)(3) of the CAA, such as anhydrous ammonia. Ammonia presents a significant health hazard because it is corrosive to the skin, eyes, and lungs. Exposure to 300 parts per million is immediately dangerous to life and health. Ammonia is also flammable at concentrations of approximately 15% to 28% by volume in air. It can explode if released in an enclosed space with a source of ignition present, or if a vessel containing anhydrous ammonia is exposed to fire. In light of the potential hazards posed by the mishandling of anhydrous ammonia, industry trade associations have issued standards outlining the recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices in the ammonia refrigeration industry. In collaboration with the American National Standards Institute, the International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (“IIAR”) has issued (and updates) “Standard 2: Equipment, Design, and Installation of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems,” along with other applicable standards and guidance. Also, in collaboration with the American National Standards Institute, the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (“ASHRAE”) has issued (and updates) “Standard 15: Safety Standard for Refrigeration Systems.” These standards are consistently relied upon by refrigeration experts and are sometimes incorporated into state building and mechanical codes. IIAR also issues bulletins and guidance for the ammonia refrigeration industry, including Int’l Inst. of Ammonia Refrigeration, Bulletin No. 109: Minimum Safety Criteria for a Safe Ammonia Refrigeration System (1997) [hereinafter “IIAR Bull. 109”] and IIAR Bull. 114 (1991), among others. The industry standards, bulletins and guidance cited in this document are those that were in effect on the date of Respondent’s PHA update in 2012.

On October 31, 2012, EPA inspectors visited the facility to inspect and assess Respondent’s compliance with Section 112(r) of the CAA and with Sections 302-312 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. The inspection occurred after a release of ammonia from the Facility.

The Processes are “closed-loop” refrigeration systems.

Only the CS and the FF processes are interconnected. For the two interconnected Processes, the main interconnected area is in the Machinery Room where pumps and other refrigeration equipment reside.
The YT system chills the Blast Freezer in the Blueberry processing area.
The condenser and receiver for the YT system are located outside the York Compressor Room by the Processing Room on the southeast side of the building.
Other processing equipment is located in the York Compressor Room for the YT system.
The FF tunnel system chills the Flo Freeze Tunnel system and the CS system chills Cold Storage Rooms #1 through 5.
The condensers and receivers for both systems (FF and CS) are located immediately adjacent to each other along the northwest wall outside the building.
Other processing equipment for the FF and CS systems is located in the Machinery Room.

During the Inspection of the Facility, EPA requested and received certain documentation pertaining to the Processes, including but limited to:

the Facility’s OSHA Compliance PHA Report dated April 19, 1999 (Section 3 of the RMP),
PSM Compliance Audit dated May 21, 1999,
PSM Compliance Audit Report dated February 6, 2012,
PSM Ammonia Safety Training attendance list dated June 15, 2012,
the SOP of the York Tunnel Ammonia Refrigeration System dated June 2012 and
PHA Audit/Revalidation Report dated June 13, 2012.

The Inspection and EPA’ s review of submitted information revealed some potentially dangerous conditions relating to the Processes and storage of ammonia, including the following:

Ammonia was being stored in the basement of the old house without proper labeling and near combustibles.
The RMP listed the Fire Chief for the Town of Ellsworth, Maine, as the emergency facility contact, but he did not work for the company.
On the day of EPA’s inspection, the facility representative provided the inspectors with an attendance record dated June 15, 2012 for PSM Ammonia Safety Training. However, there was no record attached or available as to the content of the training or the testing to determine participants’ understanding.
The piping and vapor barriers (insulation) on the roof were in disrepair and ice had built up on the doorway entrance and equipment located in the penthouse of Cold Storage Room #5.
Regular maintenance activities occurred in the Machinery Room, such as the use of spark generating power tools, where the Maintenance Department is located.
Vehicle traffic, such as forklifts, existed in the Cold Storage Room #1 and the Processing Room where operating refrigeration equipment and piping were unprotected from the forklifts.
The king valve to the YT receiver was missing its handle, not labeled, and inaccessible.
No Hot Work Permit existed for the maintenance activities occurring near the YT system observed during the inspection including the use of a grinding power tool that created sparks.
Pipes throughout the facility were missing labels or incorrectly labeled.
No sign or audiovisual alarm existed in the York Compressor Room.
No emergency shutoff switch existed outside the York Compressor Room for the YT system.
A shutoff switch may have existed outside the Maintenance Department/Machinery Room for the CS and FF system. However, the switch was unlabeled, and the facility representative conveyed during the inspection that he did not understand the function of the switch.
No ventilation inlet existed for the York Compressor Room or Machinery Room.
The lower ventilation exhaust for the York Compressor Room was blocked by an electric panel from the inside and covered by plywood from the outside.
The York Compressor Room and the Machinery Room lacked intrinsically safe electrical wiring, outlets and motors.
The exit door from the York Compressor Room, which opens into the building, was not self-closing and did not form a tight fit when closed.
The king valve to the CS receiver and the FF receiver were not labeled and difficult to access.
Oil stored in a tank and a yellow locker used to store flammable material was located in the Machinery Room.
On January 25 and 26, 2012, a Process Safety Management Compliance Audit that reviewed the RMP was performed by a 3rd party along with six facility employees. The audit report, dated February 6, 2012, detailed specific regulatory requirements missing or needing to be updated in the RMP including:
1. Obtaining employee participation,
2. Developing detailed process safety information,
3. Conducting a formal process safety analysis,
4. Developing written operating procedures;
5. Providing and document employee training,
6. Developing and implement a contractor safety program,
7. Performing a pre-startup safety review,
8. Developing a formal mechanical integrity program,
9. Developing and implementing a hot work permit system,
10. Developing and implementing a management of change process, and
11. Developing and implementing an incident investigation process.
On March 27 and 28, 2012, a PHA Update/Revalidation was performed by the same 3rd party that did the 2012 Audit and seven facility employees. During the inspection the facility representative admitted to the inspectors that the PHA Update/Revalidation was the first since the initial PHA. The PHA Update/Revitalization Report dated June 13, 2012, detailed specific regulatory requirements missing or needing to be updated including:
1. Updating ammonia sensors including installing ammonia sensors at YT and in the manifold,
2. Implementing standard operating procedures (“SOPs”) with personal protection equipment requirements,
3. Calibrating temperature, pressure and ammonia sensors annually,
4. Developing standard operating procedures (“SOPs”) for compressor “jump out” or bypass,
5. Prohibiting vehicles in Processing Room, the Cold Storage Room #1 and the Machinery Room or providing proper protection,
6. Conducting a daily ammonia system walk-through,
7. Developing a training and qualification program for ammonia system employees,
8. Repiping pressure relief valves to atmosphere that went to the compressor suction,
9. Evaluating access to upper hand valves on condenser, and
10. Updating the emergency plan to address power loss.

On May 20, 2014, EPA issued a draft Notice of Violation and Administrative Order (“NOV/AO”) to Respondent. Upon receiving Respondent’s comments, EPA issued a final NOV/AO on September 30, 2014.

On Friday, March 27, 2015, the facility experienced an ammonia leak from a compressor in the main compressor room due to a mechanical failure. On Saturday, March 28, 2015 and on Monday morning, March 30, 2015, the company added ammonia to the system, revealing that the system had lost more than 100 pounds during the incident. Later on Monday, March 30, 2015 at 3:01 pm, the facility called the National Response Center.

VIOLATIONS

I. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RMP EMERGENCY CONTACT REQUIREMENTS

At the time of Inspection, Respondent listed the Fire Chief for the Town as the facility’s emergency contact. An emergency contact must be from the facility and “keeping emergency contact information current [is] valuable to ensuring a timely response to and an accidental release, and [is]
particularly critical to emergency planning and response.” See 69 Fed. Reg. 18823 (2004). Accordingly, from at least July 30, 2009 (the date of the RMP Update) until August 29, 2014, the facility violated the RMP requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.160 by failing to list an emergency contact from the facility.

II. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SAFETY INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

Respondent failed to show the equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices nor determined and documented that the equipment is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operated in a safe manner including:

Inspectors observed that the piping and vapor barriers (insulation) on the roof were in disrepair and ice had built up on the door and equipment located in the penthouse of Cold Storage Room #5. The recommended industry practice and standard of care for piping and vapor barriers in disrepair is that insulated piping showing signs of vapor barrier failure should have the insulation removed and the pipe inspected. For example, see, IIAR Bulletin No. 109: Minimum Safety Criteria for a Safe Ammonia Refrigeration System (1997) [hereinafter “IIAR Bull. 109″] § 4.7.5. Additionally, ice formations that could endanger refrigerant piping or other components should be removed and the condition(s) that caused the ice buildup corrected. For example, see, IIAR Bull. 109 § 4.10.7.
Inspectors observed regular facility maintenance activities other than repairs and maintenance to the refrigeration equipment occurring in the Machinery Room with operating ammonia-containing refrigeration piping and equipment. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to restrict access to the refrigerating machinery room to authorized personnel. Doors shall be clearly marked and permanent signs shall be posted at each entrance to indicate this restriction. For example, see American National Standards Institute/International IIAR 2, 2008 (2010 ed.) (hereinafter “ANSI/IIAR 2-2008”] §13.1.2.4.
Inspectors observed vehicle traffic, such as forklifts, in the Cold Storage Room #1 and Processing Room near refrigeration piping. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is that no refrigerant piping should be exposed to possible physical damage through traffic hazards such as forklifts. For example, see, IIAR Bull. 109 § 4.7.3.
Inspectors observed that the king valve to the YT receiver was missing its handle, not labeled and inaccessible. Furthermore, the king valve to the CS receiver and the FF receiver were not labeled and difficult to access. The recommended industry practice and standard of care for the main shut-off valve (a.k.a. the king valve) of the ammonia system is that the king valve should be readily accessible and identified with a prominent sign having letters sufficiently large to be easily read. For example, see IIAR Bull. 109 § 4.10.3.
Inspectors observed that piping and equipment throughout the facility were missing labels and had incorrect labels. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to establish uniform guidelines for identifying piping in a closed circuit ammonia refrigeration system and the related refrigeration system components. For example, see IIAR Bull. 114 (1991).
Inspectors observed that no sign or audiovisual alarm existed at the entrances to the York Compressor Room. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to equip the detectors to activate visual and audible alarms inside the Machinery Room and at each of its entrances. See, ASHRAE, Standard 15-2007: Safety Standard for Refrigeration Systems § 8.11.2.1 (2007) [hereinafter “ASHRAE 15-2007”] and ASHRAE 15-2010 (and addenda of 2012).
Inspectors observed that no emergency shutoff switches existed outside York Compressor Room for the YT system and outside of the Machinery Room for the FF and CS systems. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is that a remote emergency shutdown control for refrigeration compressors, refrigerant pumps, and normally closed automatic refrigerant valves within the machinery room, shall be provided immediately outside the designated principle exterior machinery room door. Doors communicating with the building shall be approved, self-closing, tight-fitting, fire doors equipped with panic-type hardware. See,for example, ANSI/IIAR 2-2008 (2010 ed.) § 13.1.13.2.
Inspectors observed that no ventilation inlet existed for the York Compressor Room or Machinery Room, and the ventilation exhaust from York Compressor Room was blocked by refrigeration equipment. No ventilation inlet existed for the York Compressor Room or Machinery Room. Nor was there explosion proof electrical wiring. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to provide a well-designed emergency ventilation system in an ammonia refrigeration machinery room in case of a release to avoid explosive levels of ammonia in air. Where a mechanical ventilation system is not provided, the machinery room would be considered a room with the potential for a hazardous condition to exist that requires intrinsically safe electrical wiring (explosion proof). See ANSI/IIAR 2-2008 § 13.1.7.3. Additionally, provisions shall be made for inlet air to replace that being exhausted. Inlet air makeup shall be designed to provide negative pressure in the machinery room. For example, see ANSI/IIAR 2-2008 § 13.3 and ANSI/ASHRAE 15-2007 § 8.11.4.
Inspectors observed that the exit door from the York Compressor Room opens into the building. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is for each refrigerating machinery room to have a tight-fitting door or doors opening outward, self-closing if they open into the building, and adequate in number to ensure freedom for persons to escape in an emergency. For example, see ANSI/IIAR 2-2008(2010 ed.) § 13.1.10.1.
Inspectors observed oil being stored in a tank and a yellow locker used to store flammable material located in the Machinery Room. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is that flammable and combustible materials shall not be stored in machinery rooms. See ANSI/IIAR 2-2008 (2010 ed.)§ 13.1.3.1. From at least the date of EPA’s inspection, October 31, 2012, to July 24, 2014, Respondent violated the requirements of 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.65(d)(2) and (3).

On July 24, 2014, Respondent submitted documentation that it had corrected many, but not all, of these items.

III. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH TRAINING DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS

On the day of EPA’s Inspection, the facility representative provided the inspectors with an attendance record dated June 15, 2012 for PSM Ammonia Safety Training. However, there was no record attached or available as to the content of the training or the means used to determine participants’ understanding as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(c). Accordingly, the facility violated the training documentation requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(c) from June 15, 2012 to July 24, 2014.

On July 24, 2014, Respondent submitted documentation that it had recently trained its employees.

IV. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH HOT WORK PERMIT REQUIREMENTS

On the day of EPA’s Inspection, the inspectors asked employees near the YT system if a Hot Permit existed for the grinding activities that created sparks. The workers immediately stopped work and later admitted that no Hot Work Permit existed. Accordingly, the facility violated the Hot Work Permit requirements of 40C.F.R. § 68.85(a) at the time of EPA’s inspection on October 31, 2012. On July 24, 2014, Respondent submitted documentation that it had developed a hot work permit program.

V. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH COMPLIANCE AUDIT REQUIREMENTS

On the day of EPA’s Inspection, the inspectors received a copy of a Process Safety Management Compliance Audit dated February 6, 2012. The audit report detailed specific regulatory requirements missing or needing to be updated in the RMP. No document was available documenting that the deficiencies were being or had been corrected. Accordingly, immediately following the February 6, 2012 audit report, the facility violated the compliance audit requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(d) by failing to document that the deficiencies had been corrected.

VI. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REVALIDATION REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS

On the day of EPA’ s inspection, the inspectors received a copy of a PHA Update/Revalidation report dated June 13, 2012, which detailed specific regulatory requirements missing or needing to be updated. No previous update/revalidation reports were available, although Respondent has had an RMP since 1999. Additionally, no documentation was available establishing a system to promptly address the team’s findings and recommendations in the PHA Update/Revalidation report. Accordingly, from 2004 to June 13, 2012, Hancock Foods violated the updating and revalidation requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.67 by failing to updated and revalidated the PHA at least every five (5) years after the completion of the initial process hazard analysis and to establish a system to promptly address the team’s findings and recommendations.

VII. FAILURE TO NOTIFY THE NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER OF A RELEASE IN VIOLATION OF CERCLA

The Release on Friday, March 27, 2015 was a “release” into the environment, as defined at Section 101(22) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22), and 40 C.F.R. § 302.3. The Release of approximately 300 pounds of anhydrous ammonia from the Facility during the Release exceeded the reportable quantity. Accordingly, Respondent was required to immediately notify the National Response Center as soon as Respondent knew that the amount of anhydrous ammonia released exceeded the reportable quantity. Respondents knew or should have known that the Release exceeded the reportable quantity no later than Monday morning, March 30, 2015, when the System was recharged with an additional 200 pounds of anhydrous ammonia. Ammonia was also added to the System on Saturday, March 28, 2016. Respondents did not notify the National Response Center of the Release until 3:01 pm on Monday, March 30, 2015, after being urged to do so. Accordingly, Respondents’ failure to immediately notify the National Response Center as soon as it had knowledge that the Release at the Facility exceeded the reportable quantity violated Section 103(a) of CERCLA and 40 C.F.R. § 302.6(a).

TERMS OF SETTLEMENT

Respondent certifies that it is currently operating this Facility in compliance with Section 112(r)(7) of CAA and 40 C.F.R. Part 68.

Pursuant to Section 113(e) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e), and taking into account the relevant statutory penalty criteria, the facts alleged in this CAFO, and such other circumstances as justice may require, EPA has determined that it is fair and proper to assess a civil penalty of $108,723 for the violations alleged in this matter.

Respondent shall pay the CERCLA penalty by submitting a company, bank, cashier’s, or certified check, payable to the order of the “EPA Hazardous Substance Superfund,” in the amount of $5,110.

Respondent shall pay the CAA penalty by submitting a company, bank, cash.ier’s, or certified check, payable to the order of the “Treasurer, United States of America,” in the amount of $103,613.

CLICK HERE for the CAFO

Related Posts