Respondent is the “owner or operator” of a plastics and resins manufacturing facility. On May 15, 2014, EPA inspectors visited the Facility to assess Respondent’s compliance with Section 112(r) of the CAA and with Sections 302-312 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (“EPCRA”). Respondent uses vinyl acetate monomer in one or more “processes” at the Facility, as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 68.3, in its production of certain chemical products. The vinyl acetate monomer arrives at the Facility via rail car or tanker truck. Vinyl acetate monomer, among other chemicals, is unloaded from railcars at the Railcar Unloading Station. During unloading, the vinyl acetate monomer is pumped into a vinyl acetate monomer bulk storage tank (VAM Tank), where it is stored until used in the production process (“VAM Process”).
Historically, both Departments used vinyl acetate monomer from the VAM Tank in their operations, but following the shut-down of the Adhesives Department, only the other Department continued to use the vinyl acetate monomer. The VAM Tank was installed in 1955 and has a capacity of 200,000 gallons. The VAM Tank sits on a short pedestal within a large containment pit.
In 2010, Respondent filed a Program 3 RMP and reported that it used vinyl acetate monomer in three processes at the Facility: the one process used 1,000,000 pounds, the Adhesives process used 1,300,000 pounds, and the Building 89 process used 34,000 pounds. After the Adhesives Department was formally shut down in October of 2014, Respondent submitted an updated RMP in August of 2015 reflecting this change: it reported only the one process, containing 2,300,000 pounds of vinyl acetate monomer (including the vinyl acetate monomer in up to five railcars). Likewise, EPCRA chemical inventory reports submitted by Respondent for reporting years 2013, 2014, and 2015 also each indicate that Respondent stored vinyl acetate monomer in amounts greater than 15,000 pounds at the Facility in each of these years.
During the Inspection of the Facility, EPA requested and received certain documentation pertaining to the VAM Process and the Facility, including a RMP eSubmit form dated January 5, 2014 and a hardcopy of a procedure titled .. [XXXXXXX] Vinyl Acetate Railcar Unloading. The Inspection and EPA’s review of subsequently submitted information revealed some potentially dangerous conditions relating to the VAM Process at the time of Inspection, including that Respondent:
- Had not properly labeled several aspects of the VAM Process, in that much of the piping associated with the VAM Tank was not sufficiently labeled, the emergency shut-off switch (“kill button”) for the chemical unloading control system at the Railcar Unloading Station was not labeled, and the informational nameplate on the VAM Tank had been painted over and was difficult to read;
- Had not adequately addressed hazards in its Process Hazard Analyses (PHA) that exist at the Facility due to possible earthquakes, floods, tornadoes, and hurricanes, which are all credible threats at the Facility;
- Had inadequate standard operating procedures (SOPs), in that the SOPs associated with the unloading of vinyl acetate monomer (Vinyl Acetate Rail car Unloading, Tank Pit 5 General Safety, and Tank Pit 5 Unloading Computer Operations #1 -3) did not have clear cross-references between them, were not updated to reflect all changes in operations (like the idling of the short stop tanks), and were not annually certified to be current and accurate for at least the years 2012 and 2013; and
- Had not implemented an adequate mechanical integrity program to ensure proper maintenance and safe functioning of the V AM Process, including by not fixing the chemical unloading hose, which was leaking.
VIOLATIONS
Count 1: Failure to Comply with Safety Information Requirements
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.65 , the owner or operator of a Program 3 process is required, among other things, to compile written process safety information before completing the PHA, in order to perform an adequate PHA and to enable proper maintenance of process equipment.
This requirement includes documenting information pertaining to the hazards of the RMP chemical in the process; information pertaining to the technology and equipment of the process, including that the equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP); and information showing that any equipment that was designed according to outdated standards is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operated in a safe manner.
This compilation enables appropriate identification and understanding of hazards posed by regulated substances in the process and the technology and equipment of the process.
Respondent failed to document that the VAM Process complied with RAGAGEP, in that Respondent had not adequately labeled various pipes and components of the VAM Process. For piping, the recommended industry practice and standard of care is to employ a standard identification system, to identify all piping as to contents, direction of the flow, and pressure and temperature (as necessary), and to place labels close to valves, flanges, changes in direction, branches, and at sufficient intervals on straight piping runs to readily allow for identification. See, e.g., ASME Standard A13.1-2007: Scheme for the Identification of Piping Systems.
Likewise, the recommended industry practice and standard of care is to label the main/emergency shut-off valve of a chemical system, like the “kill” button of the Railcar Unloading Station. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §1910.303(f)(1) (OSHA PSM standard requiring “disconnecting means and circuits” be “legibly marked to indicate its purpose”).
SAFTENG Comment – using 1910.303 for not labeling an emergency shutdown button is quite the stretch and can not believe the company was not able to negotiate this out of the findings!
Finally, the nameplate on the VAM Tank had been painted over and was difficult to read. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to identify tanks with a nameplate with information about the tank’s manufacturer and specifications. See ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Sec. VIII, Div. I; National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors, Nat’l Bd. Inspection Code, Pt. 2 (concerning procedures to follow when nameplates are missing).
By failing to compile the necessary information about the technology and equipment of the VAM Process, including by documenting that the YAM Process complied with RAGAGEP, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65 and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA, 42 U .S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E).
Count 2: Failure to Adequately Identify, Evaluate, and Control Hazards
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.67, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process is required, among other things, to perform an initial PHA on each covered process. The PHA must identify, evaluate, and control the hazards involved in the process. The owner or operator must update the PHA every five years and when a major change in the process occurs. Additionally, the owner or operator must establish a system for addressing the recommendations identified in the PHA, including by defining a schedule for completing the action items, taking the actions as soon as possible, and documenting the resolution of the recommendations.
Respondent’s PHA did not adequately identify or address hazards that exist at the Facility due to possible earthquakes, floods, tornadoes, and hurricanes, which are all credible threats at the Facility. Facility is located in a Federal Emergency Management Agency moderate intensity earthquake zone, the state is a coastal state, rendering it vulnerable to hurricanes, the Facility is located along a River, resulting in the potential for flooding, and the City of Springfield suffered significant tornado damage as recently as 2011.
By failing to adequately identify, evaluate, and control hazards, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e) and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E).
Count 3: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Operating Procedures Requirements
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.69, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process is required to develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instruction for safely conducting activities in the covered process, to review and update those procedures as often as necessary to reflect current operating practice, and to annually certify that such operating procedures are current and accurate.
Respondent did not have adequate written RMP operating procedures, in that the operating procedures included unclear internal cross-references, were not updated to reflect current practices, and were not annually certified.
By failing to comply with the operating procedures requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69 and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E).
Count 4: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Mechanical Integrity Requirements
Pursuant to 40 C.F .R. § 68. 73, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process must establish and implement written procedures to maintain the ongoing integrity of certain process equipment and train employees accordingly. The owner or operator must inspect and test the equipment either in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations and good engineering practices, or more frequently if needed based on prior operating experience. The owner or operator must also document the inspections or tests on process equipment, correct deficiencies, assure that any new equipment is suitable for the process application, perform checks to ensure that equipment is installed properly, and assure that maintenance materials and spare parts are suitable for the process application.
Respondent had not maintained the mechanical integrity of the VAM Process, given that the vinyl acetate monomer withdrawal hose at the Railcar Unloading Station was leaking its contents, reflecting a failure to properly maintain this piece of equipment and to ensure its proper installation.
By failing to establish and implement a sufficient mechanical integrity program and by not correcting equipment deficiencies before further use or in a safe and timely manner, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73 and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E).
TERMS OF SETTLEMENT
Respondent consents to the issuance of this CAFO and consents for purposes of settlement to the performance of the Supplemental Environmental Project (“SEP”) described below. Respondent shall satisfactorily complete the Emergency Planning and Preparedness SEP described below and described in the Scope of Work attached to this CAFO as Exhibit A, which is incorporated herein by reference and which is enforceable by this CAFO. Respondent has selected the Fire Department for the City of Springfield to receive emergency response equipment under the SEP. The Parties agree that the SEP is intended to secure significant environmental and public health protection and benefits by enhancing the emergency planning and chemical spill response capabilities of the Springfield Fire Department.
The SEP is anticipated to cost approximately $59,779. “Satisfactory completion” of the SEP shall mean:
- providing the Springfield Fire Department with emergency response equipment, according to the requirements and deadlines described in Exhibit A;
- ensuring that the Fire Department is trained to use such equipment; and
- spending approximately $59,779 to carry out the SEP
Respondent shall purchase and deliver, or shall ensure the purchase and delivery of, the following emergency response equipment to the Springfield Fire Department, the response agency that operates in the vicinity of the Facility, by May 31, 2017:
- One (1) Wireless transportable area detector, at an approximate cost of $13,890;
- One (1) Mobile Command Center and Device Fleet Manager Software system, at an approximate cost of $1,000;
- One (1) Multi-function Modem with GPS, at an approximate cost of $2,550;
- Two (2) Calibration Gas (116 Liter), at an approximate cost of $878 ($439 each);
- Three (3) UV Handheld Sanitizers, at an approximate cost of $1,785 ($595 each);
- Four (4) UV Room/Vehicle Sanitizers, at an approximate cost of $2,380 ($595 each);
- One (1) First Responder Robot, at an approximate cost of $19,933;
- One (1) First Responder Drone, at an approximate cost of $14,099; and
- Three (3) Portable Drones, at an approximate cost of $3,264 ($1,088 each).
The equipment will enhance local responses to emergencies involving releases of chemicals that are regulated pursuant to Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act, including vinyl acetate monomer. The equipment will help keep public safety personnel from coming into contact with dangerous toxic and flammable materials. The wireless transportable area monitor and associated equipment can detect toxic and combustible gases, volatile organic compounds, radiation, and meteorological factors for enhanced situational awareness during response activities. Ultraviolet sanitizers provide rapid decontamination of surfaces and equipment. The first responder robot is capable of investigating dangerous and hazardous materials while keeping a responder out of harm’s way. The first responder drone is an emergency response assessment tool with visual and thermal imaging capabilities to assess emergency situations. The portable drones are capable of investigating inside buildings during response activities while avoiding walls and other obstacles. Respondent shall also ensure that the Springfield Fire Department is trained to use the equipment. The total cost of this SEP is approximately $59,779. Taking into account the relevant statutory penalty criteria, the facts alleged above, and such other circumstances as justice may require, EPA has compromised the maximum civil penalty. Accordingly, EPA has determined that it is appropriate to assess a civil penalty of $15,222 for the violations alleged in this CAFO, and Respondent consents to payment of this penalty.
CLICK HERE for the CAFO