Respondent operates a pork processing plant with the following two (2) covered anhydrous ammonia refrigeration systems at the stationary source:
- Main System; and
- Auxiliary System
Respondent has exceeded the threshold quantity for ammonia (anhydrous) at the Main System and the Auxiliary System. On or about August 19, 2014, and March 30, 2015, EPA conducted an inspection of the Respondent’s facility. This facility had three (3) Reportable Releases of NH3 from 2014-2016
- February 26, 2014 = 425 pounds via a broken .25″ male threaded purge valve – failing to properly implement certain operating procedures for the Ross Accumulator
- May 2, 2014 = 5,140 pounds via a 1″, schedule 40 seamed nipple broke off – failed to follow PSI pipe specs regarding the piping schedules
- April 25, 2016 = 667 pounds from Valve Alley (CS-41) suction valve – Over-torquing of the bolts on the valve at the time the valve was replaced, which resulted in differential pressure on the gasket and eventual failure of the gasket
VIOLATIONS
Count One – Failure to Timely Determine and Document Responses to Deficiencies in 2014 and 2015 Compliance Audits
40 C.P.R. § 68.79 provides the following:
(a) The owner or operator shall certify that they have evaluated compliance with the provisions of this subpart at least every three years to verify that procedures and practices developed under this subpart are adequate and are being followed.
…
(c) A report of the findings of the audit shall be developed.
(d) The owner or operator shall promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audit, and document that deficiencies have been corrected.
On or about January 13, 2014, the Respondent conducted a compliance audit for the covered processes at the facility. The Respondent failed to timely determine and document an appropriate response to certain findings for the compliance audit.
On or about May 26-27, 2015, the Respondent conducted a compliance audit for the covered processes at the facility. 33. The Respondent failed to timely determine and document an appropriate response to certain findings for the compliance audit.
Therefore, the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(d) by failing to timely determine and document appropriate responses to certain findings of two compliance audits.
Count Two- Failure to Follow Operating Procedures- February 26, 2014, Incident
40 C.F.R.§ 68.69(a) provides that the owner or operator shall develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with process safety information and shall address at least the following elements:
- Steps for each operating phase:
- Initial startup;
- Normal operations;
- Temporary operations;
- Emergency shutdown including the conditions under which emergency shutdown is required, and the assigmnent of shutdown responsibility to qualified operators to ensure that emergency shutdown is executed in a timely manner;
- Emergency operations;
- Normal shutdown; and
- Startup following a turnaround, or after an emergency shutdown.
- Operating Limits.
The Ross Tunnel and Ross Accumulator are part of the Auxilary System covered process. On or about February 26, 2014, a release of approximately 425 pounds of anhydrous ammonia occurred at the facility. The cause of the release was a broken 1\4″ male threaded purge valve.
The Respondent’s incident investigation conducted after the February 26, 2014, ammonia release stated the following:
- The 1/4″ purge valve was partially broken from either a factory defect or over torquing when installing during the expansion in 2013.
- The Hand Expansion Valve feeding the Ross Accumulator was also found at four turns open. The normal is only two turns open. The Hand Expansion Valve feeding the coils on the Ross Tunnel was open seven turns. This is normally only 2.5 turns open.
- Some conditions which contributed to the cause of the incident include a transfer solenoid valve was in the fully open in the manual condition which would energize the transfer solenoid valve. The Ross Accumulator was in a high-level condition which would energize the transfer solenoid value to be open. The Ross liquid pump was on which allows liquid flow through the transfer solenoid valve. The Ross Tunnel freezer was in the defrost/clean up mode which allowed hot gas to exit the freezer unit until its defrost relief line which ties into the same suction header at the transfer line.
The Ross Accumulator (GCS) Operating Procedure requires the following:
- The Hand Expansion Valve feeding the Ross Accumulator to be opened two (2) turns.
- The Hand Expansion Valve feeding the coils on the Ross Tunnel to be opened 2.5 turns.
Therefore, the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a) by failing to properly implement certain operating procedures for the Ross Accumulator.
Count Three -Failure to Maintain Process Safety Information
40 C.F.R. § 68.65(a) and (d)(l)(i) provide that in accordance with the schedule set forth in§ 68.67, the owner or operator shall complete a compilation of written process safety information before conducting any process hazard analysis required by the rule. The compilation of written process safety information is to enable the owner or operator and the employees involved in operating the process to identify and understand the hazards posed by those processes involving regulated substances. This process safety information shall include information pertaining to the hazards of the regulated substances used or produced by the process, information pertaining to the technology of the process, and information pertaining to the equipment in the process. Information pertaining to the equipment in the process shall include materials of construction.
On or about May 2, 2014, a release of approximately 5,140 pounds of anhydrous ammonia occurred at the facility. The release occurred when a 1″, schedule 40 seamed nipple which was under insulation, had broken off at the threads at the CS-216 evaporator unit. Two other pipes were later discovered to be constructed of schedule 40 steel.
The Respondent’s process safety information requires that pipe 1.5″ diameter or smaller be schedule 80 steel.
On or about February 10, 2016, EPA issued a Clean Air Act Section 114 Information Request Letter (Request) to the Respondent pursuant to Section 114 of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7414.
Question 14 of the Request stated the following:
Provide a copy of the process safety information relating to the materials of construction for the three lines of piping that were schedule 40 steel (as referenced in your December 19, 2014 Letter to EPA). This information includes, but is not limited to:
A. Line identification number;
B. Engineering documents;
C. Purchase orders;
D. Manufacturer’s specification;
E. Work orders; and
F. As-built drawings.
In its Response, the Respondent stated that “[w]e have searched all storage locations where we would expect relevant records to be kept and are unable to locate the process safety information from the original construction of the plant in 1996.”
Therefore, the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1) by failing to compile information regarding the materials of construction of the three pipes identified above.
Count Four- Failure to Ensure Equipment is Installed Properly – April 26, 2016, Incident
40 C.F.R. § 68.73(f)(2) provides that appropriate checks and inspections shall be performed to ensure that equipment is installed properly and consistent with design specifications and manufacturer’s instructions.
On or about April 25, 2016, a release of approximately 667 pounds of anhydrous ammonia from Valve Alley (CS-41) suction valve occurred at the facility. Over-torquing of the bolts on the valve at the time the valve was replaced, which resulted in differential pressure on the gasket and eventual failure of the gasket, contributed to the release.
Therefore, the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(f)(2) by failing to ensure that the valve was installed properly and consistent with design specifications and manufacturer’s instructions.
PENALTY
For the reasons set forth above, the Respondent has agreed to pay a civil penalty of Forty-Nine Thousand, One Hundred Seventy-Six Dollars ($49,176).
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECT
The Respondent shall purchase and donate to the local Fire Department a High Pressure Breathing Air Compressor for filling breathing air cylinders in emergency response activities. The equipment to be donated is described in more detail in Attachment A to this CAFO. The equipment shall be donated no later than six months from the effective date of this CAFO.
The Respondent is responsible for the satisfactory completion of the SEPs. The total expenditure for the SEPs described in Paragraph 60 shall be no less than $62,000. The Respondent hereby certifies that the cost information provided to EPA in connection with EPA’s approval of the SEP is complete and accurate, and that the Respondent in good faith estimates that the cost to implement the SEP is $62,684.
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