To quote the IFC committee, “the purpose of performance-based design criteria is to promote innovative, flexible and responsive solutions that optimize the expenditure and consumption of resources while preserving social and economic value.” Section 5001.3 Performance-based design alternative is intended to be compatible with EPA’s RMP and OSHA’s PSM requirements, so it would reduce the burden on businesses in having to comply with duplicative or conflicting local and federal regulations. Based on the fact that “performance-based approaches” are already in widespread use in chemical storage and handling facilities, the topic of hazardous materials regulation stands out as an excellent place to start phasing performance-based concepts into the code. While a casual glance through the text of Section 5001.3 might lead one to conclude that the proposed section represents a massive loophole for the industry to jump through to avoid compliance with the code’s prescriptive requirements, a closer investigation will reveal that this is not the case.
5001.3 Performance-based design alternative.
Where approved by the fire code official, buildings, and facilities where hazardous materials are stored, used or handled shall be permitted to comply with this section as an alternative to compliance with the other requirements set forth in this chapter and Chapters 51 through 67.
The model codes have traditionally incorporated alternative materials, designs, and methods of construction provisions, such as those found in Section 104.9. Section 5001.3 Performance-based design alternative provides a framework and opportunity to use new materials and techniques when design EQUIVALENCE to the prescriptive requirements of the code is demonstrated to AND approved by the fire code official. Facilities for storing/processing large quantities of flammable liquids are typically required to comply with OSHA’s Process Safety Management (PSM) standard, which generally exceeds current HAZMAT code requirements.
5001.3.1 Objective.
The objective of Section 5001.3 is to protect people AND property from the consequences of unauthorized DISCHARGE, FIRES or EXPLOSIONS involving hazardous materials.
The intent and scope of section 5001.3.1 is to protect
- the occupants of the building,
- people in the surrounding area,
- emergency response personnel and
- property
From ACUTE CONSEQUENCES associated with Loss of Primary Containment (LOPC) incidents involving hazardous materials. These performance-based design requirements encourage the use of BOTH accident PREVENTION and CONTROL measures to reduce risk. It is NOT the intent of this section or the prescriptive requirements of the code to regulate ALL hazardous materials. Within the scopes of building and fire codes, hazardous materials are generally defined as those materials that are ACUTELY DANGEROUS to people or property. When developing a performance-based design involving hazardous materials concerns, consideration should be given not only to the hazardous materials categories in Section 5001.2.2 Hazard Categories but also to the quantity, state, situation (storage/use), arrangement and location of materials and processes.
5001.3.2 Functional statements.
Performance-based design alternatives are based on the following functional statements:
- Provide safeguards to minimize the risk of unwanted releases, fires or explosions involving hazardous materials.
- Provide safeguards to minimize the consequences of an unsafe condition involving hazardous materials during normal operations and in the event of an abnormal condition.
This section includes two (2) functional statements that serve the overall objective of Section 5001.3 Performance-based design alternative. These two statements focus on REDUCING THE PROBABILITY of unsafe conditions involving hazardous materials and MINIMIZING THE CONSEQUENCES of a dangerous condition if one occurs. The concepts can be summarized as PREVENTION and CONTROL. Specific means by which these functional statements can be accommodated are listed in Section 5001.3.3 Performance requirements.
5001.3.3 Performance requirements.
Where safeguards, systems, documentation, written plans or procedures, audits, process hazards analysis, mitigation measures, engineering controls or construction features are required by Sections 5001.3.3.1 through 5001.3.3.18, the DETAILS of the design alternative shall be subject to APPROVAL by the fire code official. The details of actions granting the use of the design alternatives shall be recorded and entered in the files of the jurisdiction.
Section 5001.3 Performance-based design alternative is based on the approval of the fire code official; however, the specifics of the design alternatives selected by designers, evaluators and operators “should” also be subject to review by a THIRD PARTY representing the public. The AHJ has the responsibility to VERIFY that the performance alternatives will protect from conditions hazardous to life, property or public welfare, as required by Section 101.2. When acceptance for the use of the design is granted, a record of the approval should be made in the public record to document acceptance of the design alternative.
5001.3.3.1 Properties of hazardous materials.
The physical-and health-hazard properties of hazardous materials on site SHALL BE KNOWN and shall be made READILY AVAILABLE to employees, neighbors and the fire code official.
Section 5001.3.3.1 correlates with the reporting requirements set forth in EPA’s SARA Title III and to some degree with the prescriptive reporting requirements set forth in the code. Compliance with these reporting requirements can be accomplished through the use of SDS; inventory reports; SARA Title III reporting documents, which are typically mandatory under federal law; and Section 5001.5.2. This section ensures that interested parties will have access to information about the characteristics of hazardous materials that are located on site.
5001.3.3.2 Reliability of equipment and operations.
Equipment and operations involving hazardous materials shall be designed, installed, AND maintained to ensure that they reliably operate as intended.
Equipment and operations at facilities regulated by OSHA’s PSM standard should have little difficulty demonstrating compliance with the requirements of this section. In addition, equipment manuals and operational protocols need to be developed and followed, as applicable.
5001.3.3.3 Prevention of unintentional reaction or release.
Safeguards shall be provided to minimize the risk of an UNINTENTIONAL REACTION or RELEASE that could endanger people or property.
5001.3.3.4 Spill mitigation.
Spill containment systems or means to render a spill harmless to people or property shall be provided where a spill is determined to be a PLAUSIBLE EVENT and where such an event would ENDANGER PEOPLE OR PROPERTY.
As a general rule, code officials view storage facilities as less likely candidates for dangerous spills than facilities that involve dispensing or processing operations. In addition, dangerous spill conditions are probably more likely to occur in facilities with large quantity vessels or systems than those with only small containers. Information that may be useful in determining whether a spill is PLAUSIBLE AND WHETHER DANGEROUS CONDITIONS would result includes the following:
- Specific material and process hazards involved
- A block flow diagram for the facility (BFD)
- Piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID)
- A list of all safety devices showing their location, design basis and capacity, date of installation, etc.
- Equipment manufacturers’ operational instructions, including safe operating limits for the equipment
- Equipment drawings and specifications that reflect built and installed equipment
5001.3.3.5 Ignition hazards.
Safeguards shall be provided to minimize the risk of exposing combustible hazardous materials to unintended sources of ignition.
The primary design and operating intent are to ensure that flammable and combustible materials are ALWAYS COMPLETELY CONTROLLED, in accordance with process design parameters; however, where flammable and combustible hazardous materials are present, a degree of redundancy is necessary to provide an additional level of safety. Where there is a plausible risk of spills or leaks, such as in LOADING AND UNLOADING or packaging operations, additional measures, such as ignition source controls, are prudent.
To that end, process design and operation should ensure to the highest degree possible that ignition sources are kept away from areas where flammable or combustible hazardous materials are present. Where separation is not feasible, ignition source controls are warranted. Such controls may involve the following:
- ELECTRICAL CLASSIFICATION of areas where flammable hazardous materials might be present.
- Classification of MOBILE EQUIPMENT that might operate in areas where flammable hazardous materials might be present.
- The use of grounding systems and equipment to MINIMIZE THE POTENTIAL FOR SPARKING in areas where flammable hazardous materials might be present.
5001.3.3.6 Protection of hazardous materials.
Safeguards shall be provided to minimize the risk of exposing hazardous materials to a fire OR physical damage whereby such exposure could endanger or lead to the endangerment of people or property.
This section requires a review to ensure that vessels or systems containing hazardous materials are NOT exposed to or are PROTECTED from damage by EXTERNAL FIRE. The design should focus,
- FIRST, on reducing the possibility for fire or other hazards, such as vehicular impact, and,
- SECOND, on isolating hazardous materials from exposure to unsafe conditions, such as a fire.
ALL storage areas and systems MUSTbe formally reviewed to find AND correct any sources of exposure to fire, including the following:
- Nearby storage of combustibles
- Nearby hot work operation
- Nearby vehicular operation
ALL systems subject to fire exposure must be formally reviewed to ensure adequate protection, including the following:
- Sprinkler installation
- Insulation of equipment
- Fire-resistance-rated barriers
5001.3.3.7 Exposure hazards.
Safeguards shall be provided to minimize the risk of AND limit damage from a fire or explosion involving explosive hazardous materials whereby such fire or explosion could endanger or lead to the endangerment of people or property.
This section requires a review to ensure that vessels or systems containing hazardous materials are NOT subject to damage from internal fire, chemical reaction or explosion. The design criteria should be,
- FIRST, to reduce the risk of an internal fire or explosion and,
- SECOND, where the first is NOT FEASIBLE, to design vessels and systems in such a manner that loss of integrity will not occur in an overpressure situation.
ALL systems must be formally reviewed to identify AND correct any sources of internal fire, explosion or overpressure. The review should include the following:
- The potential for inadvertent or improper mixing of reactive components.
- The potential for overheating of unstable materials.
- The potential for inadequate venting of unstable reaction byproducts.
- The potential for inadequate diluted material supply.
Where overpressure OR explosion conditions cannot be reasonably ruled out, the design must consider
- overpressure protection,
- containment, and
- explosion control systems
5001.3.3.8 Detection of gas or vapor release.
Where a release of hazardous materials gas or vapor would cause immediate harm to persons or property, means of MITIGATING the dangerous effects of a release shall be provided.
This section increases the likelihood that hazardous vapor releases are detected AND mitigated BEFORE they can harm individuals or property. In occupied areas, detection of a vapor release may be by sight, smell or an automatic detection system.
For many hazardous materials, such as chlorine or ammonia, vapor releases are readily evident before concentrations are truly hazardous based on the presence of vapor fog or a noxious odor. Where this is not the case, AUTOMATIC DETECTION SYSTEMS AND ALARMS are necessary.
Sensors can take the form of ambient sampling devices at strategic area locations, sampling devices in key vent streams, or specially designed leak-detection systems, such as acoustic emission systems. The performance measurement is based on the ability of the sensing equipment or operators to provide adequate warning so that safety precautions can be taken before unsafe conditions are present.
Mitigation-based solutions can range from special process equipment designs to elaborate ventilation and air-scrubbing systems. Where practical, the simplest mitigation consists of overdesign of the processing system so that the likelihood of release is extremely low. The performance measurement of a ventilation or treatment system is based on the reduction of the concentration of the hazardous materials in the workplace and nearby environment to levels that are not acutely hazardous.
5001.3.3.9 Reliable power source.
Where a power supply is relied upon to prevent or control an emergency condition that could endanger people or property, the power supply shall be from a reliable source.
It is essential to ensure that a reliable power supply is provided for systems that are critical to safety. Some examples of systems that require a reliable power supply include:
- mechanical ventilation systems,
- treatment systems,
- gas detection and alarm systems,
- emergency shutdown systems
The reliability needs of the system are related to the POTENTIAL RISKS associated with system failure.
A reliable power source does NOT necessarily equate to a generator or battery system. The type of system to be used depends on the relative level of hazard that might result in the event of a power failure. In some cases, such as those where hazardous processes shut down upon loss of power, a connection ahead of the building’s main disconnect switch may be adequate to qualify as a reliable source. Guidance on the selection AND performance requirements for power supply systems providing an alternative source of electrical power can be found in NFPA 110.
5001.3.3.10 Ventilation.
Where ventilation is necessary to limit the risk of creating an emergency condition resulting from normal or abnormal operations, means of ventilation shall be provided.
In many cases involving hazardous materials, ventilation must be provided to limit the risk of creating an emergency condition. Ventilation might be necessary during BOTH normal and abnormal operating conditions.
Some examples of operations that may require ventilation are:
- storage or processing of flammable and combustible liquids or gases inside buildings;
- drum-filling operations inside buildings;
- laboratory use of chemicals and
- dust-handling systems
Ventilation may also be used as a means for reducing vapor concentrations below lower flammable limits (LFL) in areas where ignition sources are present or for pressurization of areas to isolate hazardous vapors.
Guidance on the performance requirements for ventilation systems can be found in a number of sources, including:
- NFPA 30;
- NFPA 45;
- NFPA 69; and
- NFPA 497
5001.3.3.11 Process hazard analyses.
Process hazard analyses shall be conducted to ensure reasonably the protection of people and property from dangerous conditions involving hazardous materials.
This section establishes an administrative safety control plan addressing process hazard analysis. Guidance on process hazard analysis techniques can be found in the OSHA’s 29 CFR 1910.119. The process hazard analysis must be appropriate to the complexity of the process and must identify, evaluate and control the hazards involved in the process. The analysis can be accomplished through various methods. Some of these are “what-if” scenarios, process hazard analysis, fault tree, etc. A person trained in these and other hazard evaluation techniques should be employed to complete this analysis.
5001.3.3.12 Pre-startup safety review.
Written documentation of pre-startup safety review procedures shall be developed and enforced to ensure that operations are initiated safely. The process of developing and updating such procedures shall involve the participation of affected employees.
This section establishes an administrative safety control plan addressing pre-startup safety review procedures. Guidance on techniques for written documentation of pre-startup safety review procedures can be found in the OSHA PSM regulation, 29 CFR, Part 1910.119. Prestartup safety reviews are typically necessary when new facilities are prepared for operation and where existing facilities are modified to the degree that is significant enough to require a change in the process safety information. A pre-startup safety review should confirm that, prior to the introduction of highly hazardous chemicals to a process, the following verifications have been accomplished at a minimum:
- Construction and equipment are in accordance with design specifications.
- Safety, operating, maintenance and emergency procedures are in place and are adequate.
- For new facilities, a process hazard analysis has been performed, and recommendations have been resolved or implemented before startup; for modified facilities, requirements contained in management of change documents have been met.
- Training of each employee involved in operating a process has been completed.
5001.3.3.13 Operating and emergency procedures.
WRITTEN DOCUMENTATION of operating procedures and procedures for emergency shut down shall be developed AND enforced to ensure that operations are conducted safely. The process of developing and updating such procedures shall involve the participation of affected employees.
This section establishes an administrative safety control plan addressing written documentation of operating and emergency shutdown procedures. Guidance on developing written documentation for operating procedures and emergency shutdown techniques can be found in OSHA’s PSM regulation, 29 CFR Part 1910.119. Overall, there are 14 elements that employers covered by PSM are required to complete. Two elements that relate to this section are as follows:
- 29 CFR Part 1910.119(c): This element requires that employees and their representatives be consulted on the development and conduct of hazard assessments and the development of chemical accident prevention plans, and provide access to these and other records required under the federal law.
- 29 CFR Part 1910.119(f): This element requires that written operating procedures for the chemical process, including procedures for each operating phase, operating limitations, and safety and health considerations, must be developed and implemented.
5001.3.3.14 Management of change.
A written plan for management of change shall be developed AND enforced. The process of developing and updating the plan shall involve the participation of affected employees.
This section establishes an administrative safety control plan addressing management of change. Guidance on developing written documentation for management of change can be found in the OSHA’s PSM, 29 CFR 1910.119. The PSM element that relates to this section is 29 CFR, Part 1910.119 (l), which states that this element requires a review of
- the technical basis for the proposed change;
- the impact of change on safety and health;
- possible modifications to operating procedures and process safety information;
- the necessary period for the change; and
- authorization requirements for the proposed change
Employees involved in operating a process, and maintenance and contract employees whose job tasks will be affected by a change in the process, should be informed of and trained in the change prior to startup of the process or the affected part of the process.
5001.3.3.15 Emergency plan.
A written emergency plan shall be developed to ensure that proper actions are taken in the event of an emergency, and the plan shall be followed if an emergency condition occurs. The process of developing and updating the plan shall involve the participation of affected employees.
This section establishes an administrative safety control plan addressing emergency response planning. Such procedures may include identification of actions to be taken by employees in the event of an emergency and the assignment of a staff liaison who can assist emergency response personnel.
5001.3.3.16 Accident procedures.
Written procedures for investigation and documentation of accidents shall be developed, and accidents shall be investigated and documented in accordance with these procedures.
This section establishes an administrative safety control plan addressing accident investigation and reporting. Some of the guidelines specified in the federal regulations include the following:
- The need for an incident investigation team to be established, consisting of at least one person knowledgeable in the process involved, a contract employee if the incident involved contractor work and other persons with appropriate knowledge and experience to investigate and analyze the incident thoroughly.
- The need for a report to be prepared at the conclusion of each investigation, including, at a minimum, the date of the incident and when the investigation began; description of the incident; factors that contributed to the incident and recommendations resulting from the investigation.
- The need for the establishment of a system to promptly address and resolve the incident report findings and recommendations, and to document resolutions and corrective actions.
- The need for accident investigation reports being reviewed by all affected persons whose job tasks are relevant to the incident findings, including contract employees, where applicable.
5001.3.3.17 Consequence analysis.
Where an accidental release of hazardous materials could endanger people or property, either on or off-site, an analysis of the expected consequences of a plausible release shall be performed and utilized in the analysis and selection of active and passive hazard mitigation controls.
This section establishes an administrative safety control plan addressing an analysis of off-site consequences. EPA’s RMP rules are an excellent source of examples for alternative release scenarios for a particular site, and, through the identification and analysis of plausible release scenarios, changes can be implemented to minimize the probability and consequences of a release. A plausible release is one that has occurred in the past or could occur under reasonable single system failures.
Devices that normally use some motion or energy to prevent or minimize the release represent ACTIVE mitigation controls. Active mitigation controls might include
- valves,
- switches,
- pumps, and
- blowers.
PASSIVE mitigation controls include devices that are permanently in place and have an INHERENTLY SAFE DESIGN that allows them to be used AT ALL TIMES. Passive mitigation controls might include:
- dikes,
- walls,
- ponds, and
- sumps
The off-site consequence analysis can be accomplished through various methods. Those methods include “what-if” scenarios, process hazard analysis, Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) and fault tree. A person trained in these and other hazard evaluation techniques should be used to complete this analysis.
5001.3.3.18 Safety audits.
Safety audits shall be conducted on a periodic basis to verify compliance with the requirements of this section.
This section establishes an administrative safety control plan addressing safety compliance audits. On a routine basis, each facility must review its continuing compliance with each of the subsections in Section 5001.3 and other related provisions of the code. The word “periodic” reflects a need for an adequate frequency to check that safety programs, features and systems will perform as intended. Recognizing that many code sections contain issues that change very little over time, compliance audit frequencies will not be the same for all programs, features, and systems. Depending on the particular safety element, the audit frequency may range from as much as 5-year intervals under the PSM regulations.