Respondent owned and operated a primary metal products manufacturing facility that produces annually over 300,000 tons of powdered metal which is used in the production of automotive parts. Hydrogen is handled in the production of powdered metal, and hydrogen is a regulated flammable substance listed under 40 C.F.R. § 68.130.
The Facility receives scrap iron and steel that is melted and poured into a machine called an atomizer which uses high pressure to cool the molten metal turning it into a wet metal powder or slurry. From the atomizer, the metal slurry is dewatered and dried in rotary driers or kilns. After drying, the powder is screened by an electric shaker, to remove unwanted larger particles and conveyed to storage bins prior to being annealed. The powdered metal is placed on 100-foot long conveyor belts or bands which run through one of 12 annealing band furnaces at the Facility. After passing through the annealing furnaces, the metal powder is transferred to the blending line where additives are mixed with the powder and then the powder is packaged and stored in the warehouse for shipment. The process of annealing uses a hydrogen atmosphere to reduce the iron by removing the oxides and preventing oxidation. Hydrogen is conveyed to the annealing furnaces via pipes in a trench under the floor and after annealing, the hydrogen is vented through a separate hydrogen vent pipe.
On May 27, 2011, a hydrogen explosion occurred while an employee was attempting to remove a metal plate covering the hydrogen vent and supply pipes in the floor trench to identify the source of a hissing sound of leaking gas. The floor trench contained water which was in contact with the hydrogen vent and supply pipes.
Prior to the May 27, 2011 hydrogen explosion, Respondent had no program for inspecting, testing, and maintaining the mechanical integrity of its hydrogen vent and supply piping. At the time of the May 27, 2011 explosion, the hydrogen vent pipe had corroded, resulting in a leak that caused the hissing sound.
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
Failure to Identify Hazards Which Result from Accidental Releases of Hydrogen Pursuant to the General Duty Clause, Section 112(r)(l) of the Act
Respondent had a duty to identify hazards which may result from accidental releases of any substance listed under 40 C.F.R. §68.130 or any other extremely hazardous substance such as hydrogen, using appropriate hazard assessment techniques.
Respondent prepared a Hazard and Operability Plan (HAZOP) dated September 16, 1998, for the piping in hydrogen service at the Facility, which identified corrosion/erosion, service failure and lack of maintenance as potential problems. However, the HAZOP failed to identify any hazards associated with hydrogen vent pipes.
Respondent’s failure to identify hazards associated with hydrogen vent pipes is a violation of the General Duty Clause under Section 112(r)(l) of the Act
Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility Taking Necessary Steps to Prevent Accidental Releases of Hydrogen Pursuant to the General Duty Clause, Section 112(r)(l) of the Act, Respondent had a duty to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases.
Respondent failed to provide any records of inspections or any inspection schedules of the hydrogen piping. The condition of the hydrogen vent pipe after the May 27, 2011 explosion, including the presence, post-explosion, of a 3 by 8 inch hole in the vent pipe, indicates that the vent pipe had been corroded and not inspected for some time.
Respondent failed to design and maintain a safe facility by failing to have preventative maintenance and a mechanical integrity program for the hydrogen piping.
Respondent failed to design and maintain a safe facility by failing to have written procedures for leak detection and testing of its hydrogen piping; failing to maintain written records of repairs and maintenance; and, by failing to perform inspections of its hydrogen vent piping.
Respondent’s failure to design and maintain a safe facility by not conducting inspections and testing, performing maintenance, and by failing to have a mechanical integrity program for the hydrogen piping is a violation of the General Duty of Care under Section l 12(r)(1) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §7412(r)(1).
Steps Taken by Respondent to Achieve Compliance During negotiations
Respondent provided information showing the alleged violations were corrected, including among other things, documents that showed the piping associated with the hydrogen explosion had been replaced, that systems for monitoring hydrogen were installed and that employees were trained to safely handle hydrogen.
TERMS OF PAYMENT
Respondent consents to the payment of a civil penalty in the amount of $160,000.
CLICK HERE for the CAFO