Respondent is the owner and/or operator of a meat processing facility that uses, handles, and/or stores more than a threshold quantity of anhydrous ammonia, which is a regulated substance, listed under 40 C.F.R. § 68.130. Respondent meets the Program 3 eligibility requirements under 40 C.F.R. § 68.10. On December 12, 2016, EPA conducted an inspection of the Facility, with the consent of Respondent, to determine compliance with CAA section 112(r)(7). During that inspection, the EPA representative observed alleged violations of the CAA section 112(r)(7).
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW
40 C.F.R. § 68.25(b)(1) provides that the worst-case release quantity shall be the greater of the following:
For substances in a vessel, the greatest amount held in a single vessel, taking into account administrative controls that limit the maximum quantity; or for substances in pipes, the greatest amount in a pipe, taking into account administrative controls that limit the maximum quantity.
Respondent failed to use the greatest amount of ammonia held in a single vessel for the worst-case scenario submitted in the June 19, 2014 RMP re-submission.
Respondent indicated the quantity as 3000 pounds. The largest vessel is the Controlled Pressure Recirculator, which has a maximum capacity of 12,350 pounds. By under-reporting that amount, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.25(b)(1).
40 C.F.R. § 68.39 provides that the owner or operator shall maintain records on the offsite consequence analysis.
Respondent failed to maintain the following records on the offsite consequence analysis reviewed and updated for the June 19, 2014 RMP re-submission: a description of the vessel selected as worst-case, assumptions and parameters used, and the rationale for selection; the assumptions and parameters used, and the rationale for the selection of the scenario for the alternate release scenario of transfer hose failure; documentation supporting how the estimated quantity released, release rate and duration of release were determined for the alternate release scenario; and data used to estimate population and environmental receptors potentially affected.
By failing to maintain the offsite consequence analysis records identified above, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.39.
40 C.F.R. § 68.65(c)(1) provides that the process safety information shall include information pertaining to the technology of the process.
Respondent failed to have maximum intended inventory and, prior to December 9, 2016, failed to have a block flow diagram or simplified process flow diagram concerning the technology of the ammonia refrigeration process.
By failing to include information pertaining to the technology of the process in its process safety information, Respondent violated 40 C.F .R. § 68.65(c)(1).
40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(iv) provides that the process safety information shall include information pertaining to the equipment in the process including relief system design and design basis.
Respondent failed to have specific information pertaining to the relief system design and design basis.
By failing to have specific information pertaining to the relief system design and design basis, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(iv).
40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2) provides that the owner or operator shall document that equipment complies with RAGAGEP.
The manual king valve on the Controlled Pressure Receiver was not labeled in accordance with Section 5.14.3 of IIAR 2 2014, Standard for Safe Design of Closed Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems.
By failing to properly label the manual king valve and not complying with RAGAGEP, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2).
40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2) provides that the owner or operator shall document that equipment complies with RAGAGEP.
Ammonia piping mains, headers, and branches, including piping connected to compressors C-5 and C-6 and piping in the warehouse cooler, were not adequately identified and marked in accordance with Section 5.14.5 of IIAR 2 2014.
By not adequately identifying and marking ammonia piping, Respondent did not comply with RAGAGEP and violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2).
40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2) provides that the owner or operator shall document that equipment complies with RAGAGEP.
All machinery room entrance doors were not marked with a sign indicating that only authorized personnel are permitted to enter in accordance with Section 6.3.4 of IIAR 2 2014.
By not properly marking the machinery room entrance doors with proper signage, Respondent did not comply with RAGAGEP and violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2).
40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2) provides that the owner or operator shall document that equipment complies with RAGAGEP.
The two doors to the machinery room were not equipped with panic type hardware in accordance with Section 6.10.2 of IIAR 2 2014.
By not equipping the machinery room doors with panic-type hardware, Respondent did not comply with RAGAGEP and violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2).
40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2) provides that the owner or operator shall document that equipment complies with RAGAGEP.
The Low Pressure Accumulator (LPA) nameplate was not visible above the insulation and could not be inspected in accordance with Section 12.5.2 of IIAR 2 2014.
By not making the LPA nameplate visible, Respondent did not comply with RAGAGEP and violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2).
40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c)(2) provides that the process hazard analysis (PHA) shall address the identification of any previous incident which had a likely potential for catastrophic consequences.
Respondent failed to address the ammonia incident that occurred on January 5, 2009, when updating and revalidating the PHA in 2014.
By failing to address the previous ammonia incident in the 2014 PHA, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c)(2).
40 C.F.R. § 68.67(f) provides that at least every five years after the completion of the initial PHA, the PHA shall be updated and revalidated by a team meeting the requirements in paragraph (d) of this section, to assure that the PHA is consistent with the current process.
Respondent failed to update and revalidate the PHA at least every five years. The two most recent PHAs occurred on August 6, 2008 and June 14, 2014, five years and 10 months apart.
By failing to update and revalidate the PHA within that five-year period, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(f).
40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(l )(iv) provides that the owner or operator shall develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information and shall address at least the following elements:
Emergency shutdown including the conditions under which emergency shutdown is required, and the assignment of shutdown responsibility to qualified operators to ensure that emergency shutdown is executed in a safe and timely manner. Respondent failed to develop and implement written operating procedures for emergency shutdown.
By failing to develop and implement written operating procedures for emergency shutdown, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(l)(iv).
40 C.F.R. § 68.69(c) provides that the owner or operator shall certify annually that operating procedures are current and accurate.
Respondent provided documentation indicating that operating procedures were reviewed in 2010, 2013 and 2016.
By failing to certify annually that operating procedures are current and accurate, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(c).
40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(2) provides that inspection and testing procedures shall follow RAGAGEP.
Respondent failed to follow RAGAGEP for the inspection of the insulated ammonia piping in the warehouse cooler. One section of insulated piping was breached in the outer jacket and vapor retarder, and two sections of insulated piping had ice formation on the surface. Inspections on the insulated ammonia piping has not been performed in accordance with Section 6. 7.2 of IIAR Bulletin 110, Guidelines for Start-up, Inspection and Maintenance of Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems.
By failing to follow RAGAGEP for inspection of the insulated ammonia piping, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(2).
40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(3) provides that the frequency of inspections and tests of process equipment shall be consistent with applicable manufacturers’ recommendations and good engineering practices.
Respondent failed to provide documentation regarding the frequency of inspections and tests performed on the ammonia refrigeration process equipment.
By failing to provide documentation that the frequency and tests of the ammonia refrigeration equipment is consistent with applicable manufacturers’ recommendations and good engineering practices, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(3).
40 C.F.R. § 68.75(a) provides that the owner or operator shall establish and implement written procedures to manage changes to process chemicals, technology, equipment, and procedures; and, changes to stationary sources that affect a covered process.
Respondent failed to implement a management of change (MOC) procedure for the installation of a valve on a roof-top vent for the venting system connected to the four pressure vessels located in the machinery room. The purpose of this venting system is to allow for the isolation of a vessel as needed for maintenance.
The installation of this valve is discussed in the Near Miss Report dated 11/23/2014.
By failing to implement an MOC procedure for the installation of the valve described above, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(a).
40 C.F.R. § 68.75(d) provides that if a change covered by this paragraph results in a change in the process safety information required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.65, such information shall be updated accordingly.
Respondent failed to update the piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) related to the removal of evaporators E-503 and E-504 from the Bacon Room.
By failing to update the P&IDs related to removal of the evaporators, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(d).
40 C.F.R. § 68.79(a) provides that the owner or operator shall certify that they have evaluated compliance with the provisions of this subpart at least every three years to verify that procedures and practices developed under this subpart are adequate and are being followed.
Respondent did not conduct compliance audits for the entirety of the provisions of this subpart and thus failed to evaluate compliance with the RMP prevention program provisions at least every three years.
By failing to evaluate compliance with the RMP prevention program at least every three years, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(a).
40 C.F.R. § 68.195(b) provides that the owner or operator of a stationary source for which a RMP was submitted shall correct the RMP as follows:
Emergency contact information
Beginning June 21, 2004, within one month of any change in the emergency contact information required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.160(b)(6), the owner or operator shall submit a correction of that information. Respondent failed to correct the emergency contact information within one month. A previous emergency contact on the RMP retired on October 14, 2016, and the emergency contact information was corrected on December 21, 2016.
By failing to correct the emergency contact information within one month of the personnel change identified above, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.195(b).
Respondent agrees to pay the civil penalty of seventy-two thousand, five-hundred thirty dollars ($72,530.00)
Supplemental Environmental Projects
The Parties agree that the SEPs are intended to secure significant environmental and public health protection and benefits by enhancing the hazardous material incident response capabilities of first responders in the area by providing equipment and training that is necessary to respond to emergency releases of hazardous chemicals. Respondent has selected the Mandan Fire Department to be the SEP recipient for the emergency response equipment purchase.
Respondent has also selected the Mandan Fire Department, Morton County Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC), Bismarck Fire Department, local law enforcement agencies, and various private first responders to be the recipients of training paid for by the Respondent and given by an outside contractor with the expertise to conduct a specialized hazardous materials (HAZMAT) training course. This training will have an emphasis on responding to anhydrous ammonia incidents and, in addition to the entities referenced above, will be provided to other regulated entities in the area that store and use anhydrous ammonia in their processes.
Mandan Fire Department SEP:
Within 120 days of the Effective Date of this CCCA, Respondent shall purchase and provide the following new equipment to the Mandan Fire Department:
13 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatuses (SCBA);
13 SCBA Masks;
one MultiRae Pro Multi-Gas Monitor;
one MultiRae Charger Cradle;
14 Bunker Turnout Pants;
14 Bunker Turnout Coats;
16 Fire Attack Gloves;
one ToxicRae NH3 Single Monitor;
one Ammonia NH3 Calibration Gas; and
one 1,00PPM Isobutylene Calibration Gas
The purpose of this SEP is to enhance the emergency planning and chemical spill response capabilities, including those for an anhydrous ammonia, for local first responders. The Mandan Fire Department SEP is expected to cost $102,987.60.
HAZMAT Response Training SEP:
Within 180 days of the Effective Date of this CCCA, Respondent shall hire a certified contractor to offer and give two specialized HAZMA T response training sessions with a focus on ammonia systems. This training will be made available to the Mandan Fire Department, Mandan Rural Fire Department, Morton County LEPC associated entities, Mandan Fire’s emergency response partners including Bismarck Fire and local law enforcement agencies, as well as any facilities within the region who handle anhydrous ammonia and employ their own first response teams. The purpose of this SEP is to go beyond the advanced hazardous materials training that all first responders are required to go through. This specialized training, with a focus on ammonia, goes beyond the level of training currently maintained by local first responders. The Mandan Fire Department has noted that there is an increased number of ammonia refrigeration facilities in the area and this specialized training will allow for local first responders to be aware of the intricacies involved in that type of a response. The specialized HAZMAT Response Training SEP is expected to cost $11,400.
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