Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region 6 Inspector (1) and Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) Inspectors (3) arrived at the facility on May 1, 2018, for an announced inspection. On April 19, 2018, the facility received an announcement email, which outlined the directions for conducting an on-site inspection, as well as a list of documents to gather for review during the inspection. Inspectors met with several representatives from the facility during the inspection. This was an inspection to conduct a partial compliance evaluation of the facility’s Risk Management Program pursuant to 40 C.F.R. Part 68 – Chemical Accident Prevent Provisions of the Clean Air Act (CAA) 112(r)(7) and the General Duty Clause of the CAA 112(r)(1). All inspectors attended a facility safety briefing prior to the entrance conference. The union chairman attended the entrance conference and he was informed they could participate in the inspection.
FACILITY DESCRIPTION
The facility is a manufacturing facility that manufactures caustic soda, chlorine, and various chlorinated organic chemicals. The RMP submitted May 4, 2018, states that it employs 500 full-time employees on site. It has the following RMP-regulated toxic and flammable substances in quantities above the threshold: chlorine, chloroform, methyl chloride, and vinyl chloride.
OBSERVATIONS
40 C.F.R. Part 68 – CHEMICAL ACCIDENT PREVENTION PROVISIONS
Subpart A – General
40 C.F.R. § 68.10 Applicability
The facility is a stationary source that has more than a threshold quantity of regulated substances in multiple processes; therefore, the 40 C.F.R. Part 68 Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions are applicable. The most recent RMP submitted prior to the inspection was on December 23, 2013. The facility submitted an updated RMP during the inspection on Friday, May 4, 2018.
40 C.F.R. § 68.12 General requirements
The regulations require the owner or operator of a stationary source subject to this part to submit a single RMP, which should include a registration that reflects all covered processes. The RMP submitted contained all of the required elements, which will be discussed below. As a facility with Program 3 processes, the The facility facility must develop and implement a management system, conduct a hazard assessment, implement the prevention requirements of 68.65 through 68.67, develop and implement an emergency response program, and submit the data elements from 68.175 in their RMP.
40 C.F.R. § 68.15 Management
The facility has developed a management system to oversee the implementation of the Risk Management Program elements. The management system assigned positions the responsibility for the development, implementation, and integration of the Risk Management Program elements. While onsite, a chart was provided that identified the person responsible for each RMP element.
Subpart B – Hazard Assessment
40 C.F.R. § 68.20 Applicability
The facility prepared a WCS analysis and completed the five-year accident history. The facility determined their processes were Program 3; therefore, they must comply with all sections under this subpart.
40 C.F.R. § 68.22 Offsite consequence analysis parameters
The facility’s RMP states that they used EPA’s RMP*Comp to calculate the distance to the endpoint for all scenarios. For the December 23, 2013 RMP submission, The facility completed one toxic WCS and nine toxic ARS. During the inspection, the RMP was updated, which removed Propylene Oxide as a regulated chemical and also removed the corresponding ARS; therefore, the updated RMP has 8 ARS. The facility does have a flammable substance held above threshold quantities; therefore, a flammable WCS and ARS were also conducted using EPA’s RMP*Comp.
40 C.F.R. § 68.25 Worst‐case release scenario analysis
The facility performed the required WCS analysis for a toxic chemical and a flammable chemical. They used EPA’s RMP*Comp for both the toxic and flammable WCS analyses. The current RMP’s release scenario selection and evaluation does not reflect the updated chemical inventory and may need to be reevaluated and/or recalculated (see AOC 1, Appendix 2).
40 C.F.R. § 68.28 Alternative release scenario analysis
The facility analyzed and reported ARSs for all required toxic chemicals and one flammable chemical, for a total of 8 ARSs. The facility used EPA’s RMP*Comp for these analyses. The current RMP’s ARS selection and evaluation do not reflect the updated chemical inventory and may need to be reevaluated and/or recalculated (see AOC 2, Appendix 2).
40 C.F.R. § 68.30 Defining offsite impacts – Population
The facility confirmed onsite that the software used for population estimate rationale uses 2010 Census Data and added this information to their documentation. Circle maps from Marplot were provided for all scenarios; however, the Marplot screenshot was cropped and supporting information, such as population estimates, was not available from this screenshot.
40 C.F.R. § 68.33 Defining offsite impacts – Environment
The facility provided circle maps and other summary information for review. Environmental receptors were identified near the plant and noted in the RMP.
40 C.F.R. § 68.36 Review and update
The facility provided the release scenario documentation for all WCS and ARS. There were no dates on the documentation as to when the analysis was most recently evaluated. (Please refer AOC 1, AOC 2, and AOC 23 for possible updates pertaining to the offsite consequence reporting) The most recent RMP submitted prior to the inspection was on December 23, 2013. During the inspection, The facility discovered updates to the RMP were not being officially submitted due to not being certified by the approver. This lead to several AOCs identified in this report pertaining to timeliness of the information being reported.
40 C.F.R. § 68.39 Documentation
During the inspection, supporting documentation was provided for the OCA. This documentation described the vessel selected for review in the WCS and the assumptions and parameters used. The documentation also included a description of the scenarios identified, assumptions and parameters used, and the rationale for the selection of specific alternative scenarios. The facility’s analysis resulted in all processes being identified as Program 3. Therefore, the Hazard Assessment Subpart applies to The facility and they must comply with all sections of the Subpart.
40 C.F.R. § 68.42 Five-year accident history
The RMP that was reviewed prior to arriving onsite had one incident listed from 11/16/2010. As previously noted, RMP updates were not being submitted past December 2013, so subsequent incidents on 1/28/14, 8/28/14, and 3/29/17 were not submitted within the 6-month required timeframe in the regulation. These incidents were included on the 5/4/18 RMP submittal, which was submitted during the inspection (see AOC 29, Appendix 4, Appendix 5).
Subpart D – Program 3 Prevention Program
40 C.F.R. § 68.65 Process safety information
The facility provided documentation of PSI, which included information pertaining to hazards of the substances in the processes, the technology of the process, and the equipment in the process. The facility provided P&IDs, block diagrams, COD sheets, and process descriptions of the RMP processes, as requested. This information was reviewed primarily on the oxy.net intranet site. Several required pieces of information are found on the SDS sheets, which are located in an online database.
The regulation requires the maximum intended inventory to be calculated for regulated chemicals. The regulation defines a process as, “Any activity involving a regulated substance including any use, storage, manufacturing, handling, or on-site movement of such substances, or a combination of these activities.
For the purposes of this definition, any group of vessels that are interconnected, or separate vessels that are located such that a regulated substance could be involved in a potential release, shall be considered a single process.” Previous reported maximum intended inventories did not contain all storage vessels or piping. The current inventory of multiple regulated chemicals reported to be onsite on 5/1/18 exceeded the maximum inventory reported to EPA on the RMP submitted 12/23/13 (see AOC 3, Appendix 3, Appendix 4, Appendix 5). After discussion onsite between the facility, LDEQ and EPA, the facility re-calculated their inventory for all covered processes and a revised maximum intended inventory was discussed onsite and was reported in the updated RMP May 4, 2018.
The changes to the maximum inventories may affect several requirements under this subpart. I have addressed those areas of concern in the corresponding section to the regulation that may be affected.
40 C.F.R. § 68.67 Process hazard analysis
The facility provided PHAs and PHA revalidations for several processes while onsite. The initial PHA for the new unit onsite was reviewed in depth. For this PHA, The facility used a consultant who was trained in HAZOP to conduct the initial PHA and the exercise lasted about 2.5 weeks. We reviewed the distribution table and risk rankings of the recommendations. Of the 45 recommendations, only 3 were identified as being a risk. The facility tracks recommendations and completion of these recommendations in a separate spreadsheet. The regulation requires the owner or operator to “retain process hazards analyses and updates or revalidations for each process covered by this section, as well as, the documented resolution of recommendations… for the life of the process”. It also requires that the owner or operator “establish a system to promptly address the team’s findings and recommendations; assure that the recommendations are resolved in a timely manner and that the resolution is documented; document what actions are to be taken; complete actions as soon as possible; develop a written schedule of when these actions are to be completed; communicate the actions to operating, maintenance and other employees whose work assignments are in the process and who may be affected by the recommendations or actions.” The spreadsheet of recommendations provided onsite did not give enough information as to specific action items that were needing to be completed and was also missing due dates, a person responsible for the item, communication of changes, etc. Most of the items state that a topic/concern should be discussed, but there was not always information regarding the outcome of these discussions and actions to be taken, if any (see AOC 4, Appendix 6).
The regulation requires the owner or operator to retain PHAs and updates or revalidations for each process covered by this section, as well as, the documented resolution of recommendations for the life of the process. The facility PHAs are located either on the server or on a share drive. During staff interviews, I asked staff to find these PHAs and recommendations. Not all the documentation was available where staff could locate or contained consistent information on identification or resolution of findings. All the PHAs were provided before leaving the site.
40 C.F.R. § 68.69 Operating procedures
The facility provided an operator from two processes to review their operating procedures on the intranet. The regulation requires operating procedures to contain “precautions necessary to prevent exposure, including engineering controls, administrative controls, and personal protective equipment.” When reviewing SOPs, many relied on a link to an SDS database where employees have to search for the corresponding sheet that may apply. This SDS sheet contained the required information for the SOPs, such as safety and health considerations, hazards presented by the chemicals, and control measures to be taken if physical contact or airborne exposure occurs. The MSDS links were not working on the SOPs; therefore, this information was not accessible within the operating procedures.
Additionally, the SOPs do not always list the potential chemicals that employees may be exposed to while doing the task. This may make it unclear which MSDS sheet to refer to (see AOC 5, Appendix 7).
The regulation also requires the SOPs to contain precautions necessary to prevent exposure, including engineering controls, administrative controls, and personal protective equipment. For PPE, the SOPs link to a PPE Hazard assessment chart, where applicable PPE is identified by cross-referencing the SOP number. The link to this chart did not work on the majority of the SOPs.
Additionally, when reviewing the chart separately, the corresponding chart did not always have the SOP that was being reviewed listed; therefore, proper PPE could not be determined (see AOC 6, Appendix 7). There were some recently updated SOPS that include hazards, safety and health considerations, and PPE throughout the SOP, where it is applicable to the task.
These SOPs meet the requirements of the regulation.
The facility certifies operating procedures by responding to a true/false statement annually in their training system. The statement provided reads “To the best of my knowledge, the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in my respective unit are up to date.” The regulation requires the operating procedures to be reviewed as often as necessary to assure that they reflect current operating practice, including changes that result from changes in process chemicals, technology, and equipment, and changes to stationary sources. The owner or operator shall certify annually that these operating procedures are current and accurate. It is unclear which operating procedures were reviewed as part of the certification (see AOC 7, Appendix 7).
The regulation requires the owner or operator to develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities. After reviewing root cause analysis in the incident investigation documentation for the 1/28/14 and 8/28/14 chlorine inhalation incidents, I observed the corresponding SOPs did not have adequate detail for safely conducting the activity (see AOC 8, Appendix 8). Additionally, the PPE downgrade checklist was not properly implemented on 3/29/17, resulting in another chlorine gas inhalation incident (see AOC 9).
40 C.F.R. § 68.71 Training
The facility provided an overview of training and training tracking. The facility utilizes an online system for the majority of their training. Training records were provided for both recent hires and seasoned employees. I reviewed both initial training and refresher training. Subject Matter Coordinators track training of those who are hired into a unit. Qualification cross training documentation was seen in control rooms, although not reviewed in detail. Training records are still being uploaded to the new system and hard copies were provided in some situations.
40 C.F.R. § 68.73 Mechanical integrity
The facility provided several MI policies and procedures for review including:
- HESP-600.21 Unfired Pressure Vessels – Testing inspection and Repair,
- HESP -600.23 Piping and Piping Systems – Testing Inspection and Repair,
- HESP 600.27 Pumps and Compressors, and
- MG-CH02: Maintenance Guidelines Storage Tanks – Testing Inspection and Repairs
The facility references several API standards in their procedures, and inspection frequencies outlined in their procedures meet or exceed these standards.
While onsite, The facility provided mechanical integrity documentation showing internal and external inspections of fixed and rotated equipment for fourteen pieces of equipment that were chosen at random. The following pieces of equipment did not meet the intervals described in their procedures (see AOC 10, Appendix 9, Appendix 10):
- P6612: External inspection overdue. Last inspection 5/17/2010.
- P 8168: External inspection overdue. Last inspection 4/15/2010.
- C-700 A: Inspections did not meet 6-month frequency defined in their procedure 2/22/17 and 11/7/17.
- E 719: Internal inspection on 10/23/07.
- ST-1714B – Thickness testing not meeting the 24-month interval defined in the procedure. Dates of testing provided were: 8/10/04, 5/17/07 (35 mo), 8/30/10 (39 mo), 7/21/14 (47 mo).
- E 709 Did not have most recent external inspection onsite. Last external inspection provided was 4/2/15.
Additionally, EPA reviewed the overdue list of equipment inspections provided at the start of the inspection, which identified 19 overdue inspections.
The facility procedure HESP 600.21 6.3.3.a says, “Necessary mechanical integrity repairs shall be made within 6 months of identification.” Several deficiencies identified were not corrected according to this procedure, including (see AOC 11, Appendix 9, Appendix 10):
- E719: 4/5/2016 and 8/15/2017 external inspections have the same corrosion deficiencies noted. No record of repairs provided.
- ST1714B: Inspection on 4/6/17 stated that nozzle flanges needed to be replaced or machined. No back up documentation of this being done. 4/6/17 inspection, states that nozzle flanges needed to be replaced or machined.
- ST-709 Do not have most recent external inspection. 4/2/15 The facility explained onsite that the certified inspector’s findings are placed into an electronic system and facility engineers make final decision about the course of action. It was unclear when reviewing documentation as to why some recommendations were not completed.
40 C.F.R. § 68.75 Management of Change
MOCs are called PCRs at The facility. The PCR system was accessed several times, which referred to questions about other sections. A print out of the PCR system was reviewed, which related to the PHA validation.
The regulation requires the MOC procedure to consider impact of change on safety and health.
According to the investigation’s root cause analysis, the PCR process prior to this incident did not include a PPE hazard assessment (see AOC 12).
Additionally, the regulations require employees involved in operating a process and maintenance and contract employees whose job tasks will be affected by a change in the process to be informed of, and trained in, the change prior to start-up of the process or affected part of the process.
According to the investigation’s root cause analysis, the SOP changes related to this incident were conducted by notification not training (see AOC 13).
40 C.F.R. § 68.77 Pre‐startup review
The PSSR Procedure is part of the PCR Procedure. One PSSR was reviewed in depth and had a PCR Impact Checklist attached, along with associated training that was conducted prior to change being implemented. No issues were found with the PSSR reviewed.
40 C.F.R. § 68.79 Compliance audits
The two most recent compliance audits were reviewed onsite, which took place on Feb 1-23, 2015 and February 9-13, 2018. The 2015 audit team consisted of The facility personnel from other plants and their corporate office. No local personnel, including the PSM Superintendent, were listed as part of the audit team. The regulation requires that the compliance audit be conducted by at least one person knowledgeable in the process (see AOC 14, Appendix 11).
The 2015 audit provided onsite was an excerpt from a larger Privileged Corporate Compliance Audit report, which was not reviewed at the time of the inspection. The 2018 audit was conducted by a team from the local Plant.
The regulation states that the owner or operator shall promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audit and document that deficiencies have been corrected. The 2018 Audit did not have the appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audit or documentation that deficiencies have been corrected (see AOC 15).
Additionally, the 2018 Audit had four repeat findings that were identified in the 2015 audit (see AOC 16). The repeat findings are summarized below:
- Temporary Repair Procedure not being followed for all chemicals/repairs. Action item follow-up from 2015 audit showed date of MOC/PSSR procedure retraining completed 8/17/15.
- Required notifications of temporary repairs status not consistently followed. Action item followup from 2015 audit showed date of MOC/PSSR procedure retraining and procedure modification for notifications on 7/14/15.
- Hot work permits not filled out completely, including fire watch information. Action item followup from 2015 audit showed date of retraining of employees on required documentation and change to auditing process, completed on 5/19/15. Self-audit action item completed 11/19/15.
40 C.F.R. § 68.81 Incident investigation
The facility has two policies regarding incident investigations: HESP 101 HES&S Incident Reporting & Investigation (corporate policy) and PSM 501 Occurrence Investigation (local policy). These policies outline which incidents require investigation, the level of investigation required, and other documentation and reporting requirements. The procedures do appear to meet the regulation.
It was noted when reviewing the RMP that the most recent incident investigation date was not updated as frequently as incident investigations were being conducted. The facility stated onsite that they did not consider most of the investigations to meet the regulation criteria of “resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release.” Although these investigations are not being reported in the RMP, they appear to have been conducted. The facility policy states that a formal investigation is required for a “significant, potentially severe, major incident.”
The regulation requires that incident investigations be initiated as promptly as possible, but not later than 48 hours following the incident. Four incidents, occurring on 12/23/14, 1/29/15, 8/4/15, and 10/29/15, did not have an investigation start date within 48 hours (see AOC 17, Appendix 8).
EPA reviewed four sets of incident investigation documentation for injuries from regulated chemicals that were reported on the 2013-2017 OSHA 300 Log of Work-Related Injury and Illnesses. Areas of concern identified from this review are documented under the section that pertains to the specific concern.
Additional incidents were chosen from a list of incidents printed from their electronic tracking system. These investigations will be discussed with The facility subsequent to the release of this report and evaluated based on the regulation.
40 C.F.R. § 68.83 Employee participation
The facility’s Employee Participation Plan states: “A comprehensive audit is to be conducted at least every three years by a team consisting of at least one member who is knowledgeable in the process. A technician may be asked to be a member of this team” (see Appendix 11).
While onsite, EPA found that local staff knowledgeable of the process only participate on the audit team every other audit, which is every 6 years and does not match the employee participation plan (see AOC 18).
Regarding PHAs it also states, “PHA recommendations will be addressed and reviewed with plant personnel. Updates are made available to employees in a timely fashion.” When interviewing staff during process unit meetings, most employees said that the PHAs were on the intranet site; however, some had trouble finding all of the reports or corresponding recommendations. Some also could not recall discussing/reviewing the findings/recommendations (see AOC 19).
40 C.F.R. § 68.85 Hot work permit
LDEQ reviewed the hot work procedure and discussed the program with the HESS Manager. No issues were identified in the four safe work permits that were reviewed. LDEQ recommended that a fire watch time be recorded to be sure it meets the requirement. The facility does periodic field evaluations to document compliance with procedures as part of the OSHA VPP Stars Program. In 2017, thirty-six of these evaluations were performed.
40 C.F.R. § 68.87 Contractors
The facility has two procedures regarding contractors, a corporate and a local procedure. LDEQ discussed these procedures with multiple The facility staff. The policy reviewed was issued on 6/1/11, effective on 11/1/13, and revised on 12/21/15. The policy has duplicate/missing page numbers and references to re-named or numbered appendices, which may create confusion when following the policy (see Appendix 13).
There are two residential contractors nested at the facility, who can serve as both A-1 and A-2; therefore, these were the two contractors for which documentation was reviewed.
The regulation requires the owner or operator, when selecting a contractor, to obtain and evaluate information regarding the contract owner or operator’s safety performance and programs. The policy reviewed is not the procedure followed when evaluating contractors, according to staff interviews. The policy states that the contractor evaluation is done via a pre-qualification form, along with a review of other supporting documentation.
However, during interviews, it was found that the Avetta system is used for this evaluation. There is no mention of the Avetta system or what is acceptable to accept when evaluating contractors with this system. Additionally, if there is a variance required, the policy states that there should be written approval from the plant manager and/or the Director of Engineering, depending on the situation, and applies for a specific time period and may require additional controls. Through interviews, it was discovered that the current variance practice described was that a contractor that has been evaluated as “red” in the Avetta system is required to have a variance.
A-2 Contractors are given variance by HESS Manager via email but A-1 Contractors must have the variance from the Director of Safety in Dallas. There were no records or screenshots of the evaluation of the two contractors and no documentation as to whether a variance was needed or approved. The facility policy says that prequalification and re-qualification information must be retained for 7 years. The policy also states that requalification will be done annually (see AOC 20, Appendix 13, Appendix 14, Appendix 15).
The contractor training section of the procedure appears to be in line with the process described in interviews. It varies based on the type of contractor. The policy does appear to meet the requirements of this regulation. Contractors complete a Pre-Job Work Activity Checklist, which is discussed prior to work with the site representative, and work specific hazards should be discussed. Examples of these checklists were reviewed onsite. Entry to the site is managed by color-coded badges that are required to come in and out of the facility.
Contractors track the headcount of their employees in the case of an emergency.
The policy states that the facility personnel periodically/weekly audit the contractor’s work, either informally or formally with a standard document. There were no evaluations available for review during the inspection. Additional reviews are required if there is any substandard performance exhibited by a contractor. There was one evaluation reviewed from 2015. According to the policy, these forms should be retained for 3 years and must be reviewed prior to awarding the next contract. The regulation says that the owner or operator shall periodically evaluate the performance of the contract owner or operator in fulfilling their obligations. It could not be determined onsite if the facility is following their policy for these performance evaluations (see AOC 21).
Subpart E – Emergency Response
40 C.F.R. § 68.90 Applicability
The facility employees are first responders that respond to fires and releases onsite.
40 C.F.R. § 68.95 Emergency response program
While onsite, The facility provided their Emergency Control Manual (see Appendix 16). The regulation requires the plan to include the following, which were all missing from the
facility ECM:
- Procedures for informing the public and local emergency response agencies about accidental releases (see AOC 22).
- Documentation of proper first-aid and emergency medical treatment necessary to treat accidental human exposures to the chemicals onsite (see AOC 23).
Outside of the plan, EPA was provided a LEPC Notification Plan, medical protocols used by medical personnel, and a view of the list of training needed by responding personnel within the electronic training system.
As part of the Emergency Response Program, the regulation requires procedures for the use of emergency response equipment and for its inspection, testing, and maintenance. When asked for a list of emergency equipment with this information identified, I was told that the frequency of inspection is located within contracts for the work being done, but that they did not have a procedure with the information outlined in the regulation (see AOC 24).
The regulation requires the emergency response plan, which is maintained at the stationary source, include procedures and measures for emergency response after an accidental release of a regulated substance. While visiting two control rooms, I reviewed the emergency plan onsite, as well as emergency procedures. The emergency information for 4CPe had not yet been added to the manual, such as preplans and tactical information (see AOC 25).
Additionally, as procedures for this process were being updated, there was a lag with updates to CODs, PPE charts, etc.
While visiting the process control rooms, I also spot checked random pieces of safety equipment to ensure that they were being maintained. During this check, I noticed that several fire extinguishers were not marked as having their monthly inspection or having outdated inspection tags for over 6 months.
After comparing inspection tags to documentation from the contractor who conducts the inspections, some pieces of equipment were on the paper report as being inspected, although not indicated on the tag. However, fire extinguisher #47773127 in the Cl unit was found to have not been inspected, although the tags were punched. There does not seem to be a direct correlation between the contractor inspection sheets and the inspection tags in the field. This was seen across multiple control rooms.
Additionally, some SCBAs were found to be mislabeled and could not be confirmed as being hydrostatic tested. The inspection frequency described by The facility was not being followed or could not be verified for several pieces of emergency equipment. Additionally, the mislabeled SCBA tank is not on the critical items weekly checklist in the shipping control room (see AOC 26, Appendix 17, Appendix 18).
40 C.F.R. § 68.190 Updates
The regulation requires the RMP be updated no later than the date on which a new regulated substance is first present in an already covered process above a threshold quantity. It is unknown the date that vinyl chloride was introduced into the shipping process. The amount was recently updated on the 5/4/18 RMP as a new chemical in this process (see AOC 27).
The regulation requires the RMP to be updated within six months of a change that requires a revised offsite consequence analysis as provided in §68.36. It is unknown with the significant changes in the maximum inventories if offsite consequence data should have been updated in the RMP (see AOC 28).
40 C.F.R. § 68.195 Required corrections
The regulation requires new accident history information, for any accidental release meeting the five-year accident history reporting criteria of §68.42, to be submitted within six months of the release or by the time the RMP is updated under §68.190, whichever is earlier. Three incidents on 1/28/14, 8/28/14, and 3/29/17 were not reported within this time frame. Additionally, one incident resulting in an injury that was reported on the OSHA 300 Log of Work-Related Injury and Illnesses has not been reported as part of the 5-year accident history as of the date of this report (see AOC 29).
The next RMP re‐submission is due by December 23, 2018, unless an update or correction is required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.190 and § 68.195.
Section III – AREAS OF CONCERN
- 40 C.F.R. § 68.25 Worst‐case release scenario analysis – Current RMP’s WCS selection and evaluation does not reflect the updated chemical inventory, and may need to be reevaluated and/or recalculated.
- 40 C.F.R. § 68.28 Alternative release scenario analysis – Current RMP’s ARS selection and evaluation does not reflect the updated chemical inventory, and may need to be reevaluated and/or recalculated.
- 68.65 (c)(1)(3) Process safety information – Maximum Intended Inventory – Previous reported maximum intended inventories did not contain all storage vessels or piping. The current inventory of multiple regulated chemicals reported to be onsite on 5/1/18 exceeded the maximum inventory reported to EPA on the RMP submitted 12/23/13.
- 68.67 (e) Process hazard analysis – PHA findings and recommendations were not always documented and it could not be determined if actions were completed in a timely manner.
- 68.69 Operating procedures – The SDSs were not accessible from the SOP, and the applicable SDSs were not identified in the SOP. The SDS contains required information such as safety and health considerations, hazards presented by the chemicals, and control measures to be taken if physical contact or airborne exposure occurs.
- 68.69 (a)(3)(ii) Operating procedures – Link to PPE chart in SOPs did not work, or often did not contain the SOP number for cross-reference. Therefore, applicable PPE could not be determined.
- 68.69 Operating procedures – It is unclear which operating procedures were reviewed as part of the certification statement, and therefore, certification of all procedures cannot be verified.
- 68.69(a) Operating procedures – SOPs related to incidents on 1/28/14 and 8/28/14 did not have adequate detail for safely conducting the activity.
- 68.69(a) Operating procedures – PPE downgrade checklist was not properly implemented on 3/29/17, resulting in another chlorine gas inhalation incident.
- 68.73(d)(3) Mechanical integrity – The frequency inspections for twenty-five pieces of equipment did not follow required inspection intervals.
- 68.73 (e) Mechanical integrity – Equipment deficiencies were not correctly timely, according to the facility procedures.
- 68.75(b)(2) Management of change – The PCR process prior to this incident did not include a PPE hazard assessment. MOC procedure requires consideration of the impact of change on safety and health.
- 68.75(c) Management of change – SOP changes related to this incident were conducted by notification not training. Employees involved in the process were not adequately trained on the change.
- 68.79 (b) Compliance audits – A local employee, knowledgeable in the process, was not part of the 2015 Compliance Audit team.
- 68.79 (d) Compliance audits. The 2018 Audit did not have the appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audit or documentation that deficiencies have been corrected.
- 68.79 (d) Compliance audits – The 2018 Audit had four repeat findings that were identified in the 2015 audit.
- 68.81(b) Incident investigation – Four incidents, occurring on 12/23/14, 1/29/15, 8/4/15, and 10/29/15, did not have an investigation start date within 48 hours
- 68.83(b) Employee participation – The facility is not following their employee participation procedure regarding having a local employee who is knowledgeable of the process on the compliance audit team every three years.
- 68.83(c) Employee participation – PHA reports and recommendations with the resolution was not readily assessable to employees while onsite. There was also not a clear communication to the employees on updates, as stated in their plan.
- 68.87(b)(1) Contractors – The facility is not following procedures in policy for evaluating contractors.
- 68.87(b)(5) Contractors – The facility did not have documentation of contractor performance evaluations according to their procedure.
- 68.95(a)(1)(i) Emergency response program – The facility emergency response plan did not include procedures for informing the public and local emergency response agencies about accidental releases.
- 68.95 (a)(1)(ii) Emergency response program – The facility emergency response plan did not include documentation of proper first-aid and emergency medical treatment necessary to treat accidental human exposures to the chemicals onsite.
- 68.95(a)(2) Emergency response program – The facility does not have procedures for the use of emergency response equipment and for its inspection, testing, and maintenance.
- 68.95(a)(4) Emergency response program: Plan has not been updated to include emergency information for 4CPe process. Additionally, as procedures for this process were being updated, there was a lag with updates to CODs, PPE charts, etc.
- 68.95 (a)(1)(ii) Emergency response program – Inspection frequency for emergency equipment described by The facility was not being followed or could not be verified for several pieces of emergency equipment.
- 68.190(b)(3) Updates – The shipping process was updated to have a new regulated chemical over the regulated amount. This amount should have been reported in the RMP as of the date that it is first present.
- 68.190(b)(6) Updates – The maximum intended inventories were updated, and may have an impact on the offsite consequence analysis. This change should be reported in the RMP as of the within 6 months of the change that requires offsite consequence analysis.
- 68.195 Required corrections – Four accidental releases meeting the five-year accident history criteria were not updated and submitted within 6 months of the release.
CLICK HERE for the original report