Ammonia release caused by a “recalled” solenoid valve not being addressed

UPDATE:  Earlier this year I posted a news account of an NH3 release in Cincinnati because of statements from a VP of the company stating an “explosion had occured”.  I have since learned that yes it was an “explosion”, but not one involving fire as so many think of when they hear that word.

From a preleiminary investigation, it is looking like the NH3 leak from a compressor was caused when the tube portion of a Liquid Injection Cooling (LIC) solenoid valve ruptured.  The recall notice for these solenoid valves is dated August 14, 2012 – more than five years ago. Safety Recall of certain Sporlan/Refrigeration Specialties MA17 solenoid valves

SAFTENG reported this recall to our members in 2010, eight years before this incident.  The alert linked above was a second recall alert.  SAFTENG Members who use these valves should consult the FIRST recall notice (2010) for more details and procedures involving this recall.

I do not have access to the internal investigation as to be able to understand how this recall was missed; however, this is not the first time a safety recall that was missed/not addressed led to a serious incident.  How does your PSM/RMP MI program address “recalls” of process components?

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