Respondent is a Poultry Processor doing business in the States of Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi. On November 10, 2016, the EPA issued to Respondent a Notice of Concern letter which informed the Respondent that EPA had concerns that the Respondent was not in compliance with the CAA Section 112(r). The Respondent and EPA met on February 21, 2017, to discuss the Notice of Concern letter. On March 6, 2018, EPA issued a Notice of Potential Violation (NOPV), providing notice that the EPA found that Respondent potentially committed the alleged violations described in Section V of this Agreement and providing Respondent an opportunity to confer with the EPA. On May 3, 2018, representatives of Respondent and the EPA held a meeting to discuss the NOPV. Further discussions were held between July 2, 2018, and June 24, 2019.
For purposes of this Agreement, at the B Facility:
Respondent produces, processes, handles, and stores anhydrous ammonia (ammonia), an extremely hazardous substance within the meaning of Section 112(r)(l) and (3) of the Act. Respondent operates an ammonia refrigerant system which uses approximately 9,241 pounds of ammonia. EPA inspected the facility on October 3, 2016, and during the inspection, the EPA inspection team requested a hazard assessment of the Facility. The Representatives for the Facility were unable to produce a hazard assessment.
Pursuant to the General Duty Clause, Section 112(r)(1) of the Act, Respondent had a duty to identify hazards which may result from accidental releases of extremely hazardous substances listed pursuant to Section 112(r)(3), using appropriate hazard assessment techniques.
During the inspection, the EPA inspection team requested:
1) documents describing the design of the ammonia refrigeration system, including the piping and pressure-relief valves;
2) documentation of operating procedures;
3) documentation of training records;
4) documentation of maintenance reports and safety checks; and
5) documentation of safety features used at the Facility such as automatic shutoff machinery and ammonia alarms on doors entering the ammonia machine room. The Representatives for the Facility was unable to produce any of the requested documents; and
(g) Pursuant to the General Duty Clause, Section 112(r)(l) of the Act, Respondent had a duty to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases.
For purposes of this Agreement, at the B-S Facility:
Respondent operates an ammonia refrigeration system that uses ammonia. Ammonia is a regulated, extremely hazardous substance, under Section 112(r)(3) of the CAA and is listed at 40 C.F .R. § 68.130. Respondent uses approximately 62,025 pounds of ammonia in its process and has one RMProgram level 3 covered process, which stores or otherwise uses an extremely hazardous substance in an amount exceeding its applicable threshold of 10,000 pounds.
On October 4, 2016, the EPA conducted an on-site inspection of the RMProgram related records and equipment for the purpose of assessing the Respondent’s compliance with the RMProgram requirements, including implemented recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP) for its ammonia refrigeration process at its stationary source.
At the time of inspection, EPA asked the Respondent’s representatives for the Facility to provide records of the description of the vessels, rationale for the scenarios, and controls and mitigations used to limit the release quantity for the worst-case scenario. The Respondent’s representatives were unable to provide any of these records.
At the time of inspection, EPA asked the Respondent’s representatives for the Facility to provide records of the description of the vessels, rationale for the scenarios, and controls and mitigations used to limit the release quantity for the alternate release scenario. The Respondent’s representatives were unable to provide any of these records.
The Facility’s records did not include information about what the maximum intended inventory was for the refrigeration system.
The Respondents’ representatives stated that they had not updated the facility’s piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID) since 2005. They also stated that there had been design changes to the refrigeration system since 2005 and that these changes are not reflected on the 2005 P&IDs;
During a walk-through of the Respondent’s Facility, the EPA inspectors made the following observations:
(1) Some of the ammonia piping did not have labels indicating the pipe contents, the physical state of the refrigerant, the relative pressure level of the refrigerant or the direction of flow. The International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (IIAR) Bulletin 109: IIAR Minimum Safety Criteria for a Safe Ammonia Refrigeration System, Section 4.7.6, indicates, “All ammonia piping should have appropriate pipe markers attached to indicate the use of the pipe and arrows to indicate the direction of flow, such as in HAR Bulletin 114.” The facility could not provide documentation that the ammonia piping labeling complied with RAGAGEP.
(2) The thermosyphon vessel did not have a label indicating the identity of the component or its pressure level designation. The IIAR Bulletin 114: Identification of Ammonia Refrigeration Piping and System Components, Section 3.2 defines a thermosyphon vessel as a system component subject to this HAR Bulletin. Section 4.2 indicates, “component markers will bear the name of the equipment they identify …. e.g., RECEIVER, ACCUMULATOR, RECIRCULATOR, etc. In addition, component markers will be provided with a pressure level designation.” The facility could not provide documentation that the thermosyphon vessel labeling complied with RAGAGEP.
(3) Some sections of insulated ammonia piping were damaged. There were also some sections of insulation missing from the insulated piping. ANSI/IIAR 2-2014 states: “Insulation … 5.10.1 Condensation and Frost Control. Piping and equipment surfaces not intended for heat exchange shall be insulated, treated, or otherwise protected to mitigate condensation and excessive frost buildup where the surface temperature is below the dew point of the surrounding air during normal operation and in an area where condensation and frost could develop and become a hazard to occupants or cause damage to the structure, electrical equipment, or refrigeration system.” The facility could not provide documentation that the piping insulation complied with RAGAGEP.
(4) Some of the piping sections where insulation was missing contained large amounts of ice build-up. Bulletin 109: IIAR Minimum Safety Criteria for a Safe Ammonia Refrigeration System, Section 4.10. 7 indicates, “Ice formations that could endanger refrigerant piping or other components should be removed and the condition( s) that cause the ice buildup corrected.” The facility could not provide documentation that the icing on the piping complied with RAGAGEP.
(5) Some uninsulated ammonia piping on the roof was rusted. UAR Bulletin 109 indicates, ”Uninsulated refrigerant piping should be examined for signs of corrosion. If corrosion exists, the pipe should be cleaned down to bare metal and painted with a rust preventative paint. The badly corroded pipe should be replaced.” The facility could not provide documentation that the rusted piping complied with RAGAGEP.
(6) The Facility indicated that they have not done any ultrasonic measurements on piping or any ammonia refrigeration equipment at the facility. IIAR Bulletin 110: Guidelines for Start-UP, Inspection, and Maintenance of Ammonia Mechanical Refrigeration Systems, Section 6.7.1 Uninsulated Piping, indicates, “Areas affected by slight corrosion should be cleaned off and appropriately treated before reinstating the protective finish. Deeper pitting or loss of metal were considered by subjective assessment to be greater than 10% of the original wall thickness, should be checked accurately by using techniques such as ultrasonic measurements.”
(7) Some sections of piping were not secured to the pipe racks to protect against vibration and stress to the piping. IIAR 2-2014, Section 13.4.2 indicates, “Refrigerant piping shall be isolated and supported to prevent damage from vibration, stress, corrosion, and physical impact.” The facility could not provide documentation that the unsecured piping complied with RAGAGEP.
(8) There was an open-ended bleed line on ammonia piping on the roof. ASHRAE Standard 15, Section 11.6.1 indicates, “connections to refrigerant containing parts should be capped, plugged, blanked or locked closed when not in use.” The facility could not provide documentation that the bleed line connections complied with RAGAGEP.
(9) The king valve on the high-pressure receiver was not labeled. IIAR Bulletin 109, Section 4.10 contains the General Ammonia Refrigeration System Safety Requirements. Section 4.10.3 indicates The main shut off valve(s) (king valve(s)) should be identified with a prominent sign having letters sufficiently large to be easily read.” The facility could not provide documentation that the king valve contained labelling that complied with RAGAGEP.
(10) The entrances to the refrigeration machinery room did not contain remote control of the mechanical equipment in the refrigeration machinery room. ASHRAE Standard 15, Section 8.12(i) indicates, “remote control of the mechanical equipment in the refrigerating machinery room shall be provided immediately outside the machinery room door solely for the purpose of shutting down the equipment in an emergency.” The facility could not provide documentation that the entrances to the machinery room complied with RAGAGEP.
(11) A pressure relief valve header pipe on the roof was positioned so that it discharged at less than 15 feet above ground level. ASHRAE Standard 15, Section 9.7.8 indicates, “pressure relief devices and fusible plugs shall discharge to the atmosphere at a location not less than 15 feet above the adjoining ground level.” The facility could not provide documentation that the discharge for the relief valve complied with RAGAGEP.
(12) The EPA inspection team detected a strong smell of ammonia on ammonia equipment outside and inside the engine room. IIAR Bulletin 109, Section 4.10.8 indicates, “if an ammonia leak is observed, the source of the leak should be investigated, and the leak repaired”. The facility could not provide documentation that it complied with RAGAGEP by investigating the source of the leaks and repairing them;
(j) The Respondent’s representatives performed a process hazard analysis in October 2012, but this hazard analysis did not provide for control of the hazard of leaking ammonia at the Facility. The Facility’s process hazard analysis stated that the consequences of several fault scenarios would be an ammonia release. Even though Respondent recognized this hazard, the process hazard analysis did not provide ways or methods to control this hazard. The Respondent had evidence that ammonia leaks were occurring because it was recharging the ammonia process on an annual basis with amounts that exceeded at least 16 percent of the reported inventory. The RMPlan reported inventory of the ammonia system is 62,065 pounds. In 2012, the Facility added 12,920 pounds, indicating 21 percent of the ammonia was lost in the system; in 2013, the Facility added 18,140 pounds, indicating 29 percent of the ammonia was lost; in 2014, the Facility added. 17,960 pounds, of ammonia indicating 29 percent of the ammonia was lost; in 2015, the Facility added 13,905 pounds, indicating 22 percent of the ammonia was lost; and in 2016, the Facility added 10,000 pounds, indicating 16 percent of the ammonia was lost;
(k) The Respondent’s representatives could not provide operating procedures for general activities of the covered process; specifically, draining the oil pot, replacing relief valves, and charging the system;
(l) During the inspection, EPA asked the Respondent’s representatives at the Facility for copies of its operating procedures for control of hazardous chemical inventory levels. The Respondent’s representatives could not produce these procedures;
(m)At the time of the inspection, the Respondent’s representatives at the Facility provided documentation that the operating procedures had been certified on July 3, 2015, but had not been certified since that date;
(n) At the time of the inspection the Respondent’s representatives at the Facility could not provide evidence of site-specific process training; and
(o) During the inspection, EPA requested the ammonia sensor calibrations. The Respondent’s representatives at the Facility indicated that they calibrate their ammonia sensor every two years. ANSI/IIAR 2-2014, Section 17.3 identifies a minimum test frequency of annually or more often if according to the manufacturer’s recommendations.
C-1 Facility
Respondent operates an ammonia refrigeration system that uses ammonia. Ammonia is a regulated, extremely hazardous substance, under Section 112(r)(3) of the CAA and is listed at 40 C.F .R. §68.130. Respondent uses approximately 56,100 pounds of ammonia in its process and has one RMProgram level 3 covered process, which stores or otherwise uses an extremely hazardous substance in an amount exceeding its applicable threshold of 10,000 pounds;
On October 6, 2016, the EPA conducted an on-site inspection of the RMProgram related records and equipment for the purpose of assessing the Respondent’s compliance with the RMProgram requirements, including implemented RAGAGEP for its ammonia refrigeration process at its stationary source.
At the time of inspection, EPA asked the Respondent’s representatives for the C-1 Facility to provide records of the description of the vessels, rationale for the scenarios, and controls and mitigations used to limit the release quantity for the worst-case scenario. The Respondent’s representatives were unable to provide any of these records.
At the time of inspection, EPA asked the Respondent’s representatives for the C-1 Facility to provide records of the description of the vessels, rationale for the scenarios, and controls and mitigations used to limit the release quantity for the alternate release scenario. The respondent’s representatives were unable to provide any of these records. The C-1 Facility’s records did not include information about what the maximum intended inventory was for the refrigeration system.
During a walk-through of the Respondent’s C-1 Facility, the EPA inspectors made the following observations:
(1) Some of the ammonia piping did not have labels indicating the pipe contents, physical state of the refrigerant, the relative pressure level of the refrigerant or direction of flow. The IIAR Bulletin 109: IIAR Minimum Safety Criteria for a Safe Ammonia Refrigeration System, Section 4. 7.6, indicates, “All ammonia piping should have appropriate pipe markers attached to indicate the use of the pipe and arrows to indicate the direction of flow, such as in IIAR Bulletin 114.” The facility could not provide documentation that the ammonia piping labeling complied with RAGAGEP.
(2) Some sections of insulated ammonia piping were damaged. There were also some sections of insulation missing from the insulated piping. ANSI/IIAR 2-2014 states: “Insulation … 5.10.1 Condensation and Frost Control. Piping and equipment surfaces not intended for heat exchange shall be insulated, treated, or otherwise protected to mitigate condensation and excessive frost buildup where the surface temperature is below the dew point of the surrounding air during normal operation and in an area where condensation and frost could develop and become a hazard to occupants or cause damage to the structure, electrical equipment, or refrigeration system.” The facility could not provide documentation that the piping insulation complied with RAGAGEP.
(3) Some of the piping sections where insulation was missing contained large amounts of ice build-up. Bulletin 109: IIAR Minimum Safety Criteria for a Safe Ammonia Refrigeration System, Section 4.10. 7 indicates, “Ice formations that could endanger refrigerant piping or other components should be removed and the condition(s) that cause the ice buildup corrected.” The facility could not provide documentation that the icing on the piping complied with RAGAGEP.
(4) Some uninsulated ammonia piping on the roof was rusted. IIAR Bulletin 109 indicates, “Uninsulated refrigerant piping should be examined for signs of corrosion. If corrosion exists, the pipe should be cleaned down to bare metal and painted with a rust preventative paint. The badly corroded pipe should be replaced.” Additionally, IIAR Bulletin 110: Guidelines for Start-Up, Inspection, and Maintenance of Ammonia Mechanical Refrigeration Systems, Section 6.7.1 Uninsulated Piping, indicates, “Areas affected by slight corrosion should be cleaned off and appropriately treated before reinstating the protective finish. Deeper pitting or loss of metal, were considered by subjective assessment to be greater than 10% of the original wall thickness, should be checked accurately by using techniques such as ultrasonic measurements.” The representatives for the Facility indicated they had not done any wall thickness measurements on piping or any ammonia refrigeration equipment at the Facility. The
facility could not provide documentation that the rusted piping complied with RAGAGEP.
(5) Some sections of piping were not secured to the pipe racks to protect against vibration and stress to the piping. IIAR 2-2014, Section 13.4.2 indicates, “Refrigerant piping shall be isolated and supported to prevent damage from vibration, stress, corrosion, and physical impact.” The facility could not provide documentation that the pipe rack supports complied with RAGAGEP.
(6) A roll-up door to the ammonia refrigerating machine room was rolled up (open to the outside). ASHRAE Standard 15, Section 8.11.7, indicates, “There should be no airflow to or from an occupied space through a machinery room unless the air is ducted and sealed in such a manner as to prevent any refrigerant leakage from entering the airstream.” The facility could not provide documentation that the rolled-up doors complied with RAGAGEP.
(7) The piping leaving the high-pressure receiver which feeds into the engine room was clearly vibrating more intensely than other piping at the facility. The Respondent’s representatives for the Facility had not investigated why the pipe was experiencing excessive vibrations. IIAR Bulletin 109, Section 4.1.0.9 indicates abnormal sounds and/or vibrations of piping, fans, pumps, pressure actuate pumping systems and hydraulic pipe pressure surges should be investigated and corrected. The facility could not provide documentation that the vibrating piping off the high-pressure receiver complied with RAGAGEP.
(8) The EPA inspection team detected a strong smell of ammonia on ammonia equipment outside and inside the engine room. IIAR Bulletin 109, Section 4.10.8 indicates, “if an ammonia leak is observed, the source of the leak should be investigated and the leak repaired”. The facility could not provide documentation that it complied with RAGAGEP by investigating the source of the leaks and repairing them;
(i) The Respondent’s representatives at the Facility performed a process hazard analysis in October 2014, but this hazard analysis did not provide for control of the hazard of leaking ammonia at the Facility. The Facility’s ·process hazard analysis stated that the consequences of several fault scenarios would be an ammonia release. Even though Respondent recognized this hazard, the process hazard analysis did not provide ways or methods to control this hazard. The Respondent had evidence that ammonia leaks were occurring because it was recharging the ammonia process on an annual basis with amounts that exceeded at least 15 percent of the reported inventory. The RMPlan reported inventory of the ammonia system is 56,100 pounds. In 2012, the Facility added 8,202 pounds, indicating 15 percent of the ammonia was lost in the system; in 2013, the Facility added 8,465 pounds, indicating 15 percent of the ammonia was lost; in 2014, the Facility added 11,440 pounds, of ammonia indicating 20 percent of the ammonia was lost; in 2015, the Facility added 9,942 pounds, indicating 18 percent of the ammonia was lost; and in 2016, the Facility added 12,940 pounds, indicating 23 percent of the ammonia was lost;
(j) The Respondent’s representatives could not provide operating procedures for general activities of the covered process; specifically, draining the oil pot, replacing relief valves, and charging the system;
(k) During the inspection, EPA asked the Respondent’s representatives for copies of its operating procedures for control of hazardous chemical inventory levels. The Respondent’s representatives could not produce these procedures;
(l) At the time of the inspection, the Respondent’s representatives at the facility could not demonstrate that the operating procedures had been annually certified;
(m)The Respondent’s representatives could not demonstrate that they developed and implemented safe work practices for confined space entry and opening process equipment and piping;
(n) At the time of the inspection the Respondent’s representatives could not provide evidence of site-specific process training;
(o) During the inspection, EPA requested the ammonia sensor calibrations and the vibration analysis for the compressor conducted for the previous two years. The Respondent’s representatives at the facility could only provide a vibration analysis from April 2016. The manufacturer’s recommendation for the compressor at the facility indicates that vibration analysis should be done every 6000 hours of operation or once per the calendar year, whichever comes first. The Respondent’s representatives indicated that they calibrate their ammonia sensor every two years. ANSI/IIAR 2-2014, Section 17.3 identifies a minimum test frequency of annually or more often if according to manufacturer’s recommendations;
(p) The Facility’s April 2016 vibration analysis indicated that there was a problem detected with compressor HS-7. The recommendation was to “overhaul the motor during your next available opportunity. Perform the next vibration survey after maintenance is complete.” At the time of the inspection, the Respondent’s representatives could not confirm or provide information that the deficiency had been corrected;
(q) The EPA inspection team reviewed the Facility’s procedures for managing changes and observed that the procedures contained authorization requirements. The Facility’s Management of Change procedures requires that the plant manager approve the proposed change before any such change is implemented. A review of the Management of Change records indicated that the plant manager did not sign and approve MOC 2015-8, which was
completed on July 10, 2015, prior to the change being implemented; and
(r) The Respondent’s representatives provided compliance audits that were performed at the Facility in 2013 and in 2016. Items on the tracking form of the 2013 compliance audit had not been completed by the time the 2016 audit was conducted and were still listed as “open” on the 2016 audit.
S Facility
Respondent operates an ammonia refrigeration system that uses ammonia. Respondent uses approximately 52,350 pounds of ammonia in its process and has one RMProgram level 3 covered process, which stores or otherwise uses an extremely hazardous substance in an amount exceeding its applicable threshold of 10,000 pounds.
On October 5, 2016, the EPA conducted an on-site inspection of the RMProgram related records and equipment for the purpose of assessing the Respondent’s compliance with the RMProgram requirements, including implemented RAGAGEP for its ammonia refrigeration process at its stationary source. At the time of inspection, EPA asked the Respondent’s representatives for the Facility to provide records of the description of the vessels, rationale for the scenarios, and controls and mitigations used to limit the release quantity for the worst-case scenario. The
Respondent’s representatives were unable to provide any of these records.
At the time of inspection, EPA asked the Respondent’s representatives for the Facility to provide records of the description of the vessels, rationale for the scenarios, and controls and mitigations used to limit the release quantity for the alternate release scenario. The Respondent’s representatives were unable to provide any of these records.
The Facility’s records did not include information about what the maximum intended inventory was for the refrigeration system.
During a walk-through of the Facility, the EPA inspectors made the following observations:
(1) Some of the ammonia piping did not have labels indicating the pipe contents, the physical state of the refrigerant, the relative pressure level of the refrigerant or the direction of flow. IIAR Bulletin 109: HAR Minimum Safety Criteria for a Safe Ammonia Refrigeration System, Section 4.7.6, indicates, “All ammonia piping should have appropriate pipe markers attached to indicate the use of the pipe and arrows to indicate the direction of flow, such as in IIAR Bulletin 114.” The pipe labeling was an issue identified in both the July 2011 and July 2016 independent Mechanical Integrity Audits. The facility could not provide documentation that the ammonia piping labeling complied with RAGAGEP;
(2) Some sections of insulated ammonia piping were damaged. There were also some sections of insulation missing from the insulated piping. The Occupational Safety and Health Standards for Storing and Handling of Anhydrous Ammonia indicates at 1910.111(d)(15): “refrigerated containers and pipelines which are insulated shall be covered with a material of suitable quality and thickness for the temperatures encountered. Insulation shall be suitably supported and protected against the weather”. ANSI/IIAR 2-2014 states: “Insulation … 5.10.1 Condensation and Frost Control. Piping and equipment surfaces not intended for heat exchange shall be insulated, treated, or otherwise protected to mitigate condensation and excessive frost buildup where the surface temperature is below the dew point of the surrounding air during normal operation and in an area where condensation and frost could develop and become a hazard to occupants or cause damage to the structμre, electrical equipment, or refrigeration system.” The facility could not provide documentation that the piping insulation complied with RAGAGEP;
(3) Some of the piping sections where insulation was missing contained large amounts of ice build-up. IIAR Bulletin 109: IIAR Minimum Safety Criteria for a Safe Ammonia Refrigeration System, Section 4.10.7 indicates, “Ice formations that could endanger refrigerant piping or other components should be removed and the condition(s) that cause the ice buildup corrected.” The facility could not provide documentation that the icing on the piping complied with RAGAGEP;
(4) Some of the damaged insulated piping sections contained algae growth, an indication of moisture buildup. IIAR 2-2014 indicates, “Piping and equipment surfaces not intended for heat exchange shall be insulated, treated, or otherwise protected to mitigate condensation and excessive frost buildup where the surface temperature is below the dew point of the surrounding air during normal operation and in an area where condensation and frost could develop and become a hazard to occupants or cause damage to the structure, electrical equipment, or refrigeration system.” The facility could not provide documentation that the algae growth on the piping complied with RAGAGEP;
(5) Some uninsulated ammonia piping on the roof was rusted. IIAR Bulletin 109 indicates, “Uninsulated refrigerant piping should be examined for signs of corrosion. If corrosion exists, the pipe should be cleaned down to bare metal and painted with a rust preventative paint. The badly corroded pipe should be replaced.” The facility could not provide documentation that the rusted piping complied with RAGAGEP;
(6) The doors entering the ammonia engine room did not have visual or audible alarms to alert of an ammonia release. ASHRAE Standard 15, Section 8.11.2.1, indicates, “The [ammonia] alarm shall annunciate visual and audible alarms inside the refrigerating machinery room and outside each entrance to the refrigerating machinery room. The meaning of each alarm shall be clearly marked by signage near the annunciators.” The facility could not provide documentation that the non-alarming doors complied with RAGAGEP;
(7) Some sections of piping were not secured to the pipe racks to protect against vibration and stress to the piping. IIAR 2-2014, Section 13.4.2 indicates, “Refrigerant piping shall be isolated and supported to prevent damage from vibration, stress, corrosion, and physical impact.” The facility could not provide documentation that the unsecured piping complied with RAGAGEP;
(8) There was an open-ended bleed line on ammonia piping on the roof. ASHRAE Standard 15, Section 11.6.1 indicates, “connections to refrigerant containing parts should be capped, plugged, blanked or locked closed when not in use.” The facility could not provide documentation that the bleed line connections complied with RAGAGEP;
(9) The EPA inspection team detected a strong smell of ammonia on ammonia equipment outside and inside the engine room. HAR Bulletin 109; Section 4.10.8 indicates, “if an ammonia leak is observed, the source of the leak should be investigated and the leak repaired”. The facility could not provide documentation that it complied with RAGAGEP by investigating the source of the leak and repairing it;
(i) The Respondent’s representatives at the Facility performed a process hazard analysis in July 2016, but this hazard analysis did not provide for control of the hazard of leaking ammonia at the Facility. The Facility’s process hazard analysis stated that the consequences of several fault scenarios would be an ammonia release. Even though Respondent recognized this hazard, the process hazard analysis did not provide ways or methods to control this hazard. The Respondent had evidence that ammonia leaks were occurring because it was recharging the ammonia process on an annual basis with amounts that exceeded at least 17 percent of the reported inventory. The RMPlan reported inventory of the ammonia system is 52,250 pounds. In 2014, the Facility added 19,280 pounds, indicating 37 percent of the ammonia was lost in the system; in 2015, the Facility added 8,860 pounds, indicating 17 percent of the ammonia was lost; and in 2016, the Facility added 10,600 pounds, of ammonia indicating 20 percent of the ammonia was lost;
(j) The Respondent’s representatives at the Facility could not provide operating procedures for general activities of the covered process; specifically, draining the oil pot, replacing relief valves, and charging the system;
(k) During the inspection, EPA asked the Respondent’s representatives at the Facility for copies of its operating procedures for control of hazardous chemical inventory levels. The Respondent’s representatives could not produce these procedures;
(l) At the time of the inspection, the Respondent’s representatives at the Facility could not demonstrate that the operating procedures had been annually certified;
(m)The Respondent’s representatives at the Facility could not demonstrate that they developed and implemented safe work practices for confined space entry and opening process equipment and piping;
(n) At the time of the inspection the Respondent’s representatives at the Facility could not provide evidence of site-specific process training;
(o) During the inspection, EPA requested the ammonia sensor calibrations and the vibration analysis for the compressor conducted for the previous two years. The Respondent’s representatives at could only provide a vibration analysis from April 2016. The manufacturer’s recommendation for the compressor at the facility indicates that vibration analysis should be done every 6000 hours of operation or once per the calendar year, whichever comes first. The Respondent representatives at the Facility indicated that they calibrate their ammonia sensor every two years. ANSI/HAR 2-2014, Section 17.3 identifies a minimum test frequency of annually or more often if according to manufacturer’s recommendations; and
(p) The Respondent’s representatives provided compliance audits that were performed at the facility in 2012 and in 2015. Items on the tracking form of the 2012 compliance audit had not been completed by the time the 2015 audit was conducted and were still listed as “open” on the 2015 audit.
T Facility
Respondent operates an ammonia refrigeration system which uses ammonia. Ammonia is a regulated, extremely hazardous substance, under Section 112(r)(3) of the CAA and is listed at 40 C.F .R. §68.130. Respondent uses approximately 24,900 pounds of ammonia in its process and has one RMProgram level 3 covered process, which stores or otherwise uses an extremely hazardous substance in an amount exceeding its applicable threshold of 10,000 pounds.
On March 4, 2015, and August 24, 2016, the EPA conducted on-site inspections of the RMProgram related records and equipment for the purpose of assessing the Respondent’s compliance with the RMProgram requirements, including implemented RAGAGEP for its ammonia refrigeration process at its stationary source.
The facility’s records did not include information about what the maximum intended inventory was for the refrigeration system.
During a walk-through of the facility, the EPA inspectors made the following observations:
(1) Some of the ammonia piping did not have labels indicating the pipe contents, the physical state of the refrigerant, the relative pressure level of the refrigerant or direction of flow. The IIAR Bulletin 109: Minimum Safety Criteria for a Safe Ammonia Refrigeration System, Section 4.7.6, indicates, “All ammonia piping should have appropriate pipe markers attached to indicate the use of the pipe and arrows to indicate the direction of flow, such as in IIAR Bulletin 114.” The Facility could not provide documentation that the ammonia piping labeling complied with RAGAGEP.
(2) At the time of the inspection, the Respondent’s representatives for the Facility indicated there was no alarm if the ventilation system failed. IIAR 2 – 2014 Section 6.14 contains ventilation requirements for ammonia refrigeration systems. Section 6.14.3. provides, “machinery rooms shall be vented to the outdoors by means of a mechanical exhaust ventilation system” and Section 6.14.3.1 provides, “mechanical exhaust ventilation systems shall be automatically activated by leak detection … or temperature sensors and shall be manually operable.” The Facility could not provide documentation that its ventilation system complied with RAGAGEP.
(3) The EPA inspection team detected a strong smell of ammonia on ammonia equipment outside and inside the engine room. IIAR Bulletin 109, Section 4.10.8 indicates, “if an ammonia leak is observed, the source of the leak should be investigated and the leak repaired”. The Facility could not provide documentation that it complied with RAGAGEP by investigating the source of the leak and repairing it;
(g) The Respondent’s representatives could not provide operating procedures for general activities of the covered process; specifically, draining the oil pot, replacing relief valves, and charging the system;
(h) During the inspection, EPA asked the Respondent’s representatives for copies of its operating procedures for control of hazardous chemical inventory levels. The Respondent’s representatives could not produce these procedures
(i) At the time of the inspection, the Respondent’s representatives could not demonstrate that the operating procedures had been annually certified;
(j) The Respondent’s representatives produced training records which indicated that six operators received initial training more than six months after becoming an operator;
(k) During the inspection, the EPA inspection team requested a copy of annual ammonia system safety checks. The Respondent’s representatives stated that they had not conducted annual safety checks. IIAR Bulletin 109 contains a section discussing the frequency of safety inspections. The Bulletin provides in Section 5.2: “Each owner should ensure an ammonia system safety check is conducted annually”; and
(l) The Respondent’s representatives provided compliance audits that were performed at the Facility in 2012 and in 2015. Items on the tracking form of the 2012 compliance audit had not been completed by the time the 2015 audit was conducted and were still listed as “open” on the 2015 audit. Two audit recommendations were closed out on March 3, 2015, a few days after EPA announced its 2015 inspection. There were numerous deficiencies identified with both audits, but the follow-up action sheets for each did not include all the identified deficiencies.
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
Based on EPA’s compliance monitoring investigation at the B Facility, the EPA alleges that the Respondent violated the CAA General Duty Clause by failing to identify hazards associated with its ammonia refrigeration system and by failing to design and maintain a safe ammonia refrigeration facility.
Based on EPA’s compliance monitoring investigation at the B-S Facility, the EPA alleges that the Respondent violated 40 CF.R. Part 68, the codified rules governing the Act’s Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions and Section 112(r) of the Act, when it:
(a) Failed to maintain records pertaining to the worst-case scenario for the offsite consequence analyses, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.39(a);
(b) Failed to maintain records pertaining to alternative release scenarios, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.39(b);
(c) Failed to compile written process safety information documentation for the technology of the process which shall include the maximum intended inventory, as required by 40 C.F.R § 68.65(c)(1)(iii);
(d) Failed to compile written process safety information documentation for the equipment of the process which shall include a P&ID as required by 40 C.F.R § 68.65(d)(1)(ii);
(e) Failed to document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2);
(f) Failed to identify, evaluate and control the hazards involved in the process in the process hazard analysis, as required by 40 C.F.R § 68.67(a);
(g) Failed to develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information, as required by 40 C.F .R. § 68.69(a);
(h) Failed to develop and implement operating procedures that address quality control for raw materials and control of hazardous chemical inventory levels, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(3)(iv);
(i) Failed to review operating procedures as often as necessary to assure that they reflect current operating practice and to certify annually that these operating procedures are current and accurate, as required by 40 C.F .R. § 68.69(c);
(j) Failed to train each employee involved in operating a process in overview of the process and in the operating procedures as specified in§ 68.69, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(a); and
(k) Failed to conduct inspections and tests of process equipment at a frequency consistent with applicable manufacturer’s recommendations and good engineering practices, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(3).
Based on EPA’s compliance monitoring investigation at the C-1 Facility, the EPA alleges that the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. Part 68, the codified rules governing the Act’s Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions and Section 112(r) of the Act, when it:
(a) Failed to maintain records pertaining to the worst case scenario for the offsite consequence analyses, as required by 40 C.F.R.§ 68.39(a);
(b) Failed to maintain records pertaining to alternative release scenarios, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.39(b);
(c) Failed to compile written process safety information documentation for the technology of the process which shall include the maximum intended inventory information, as required by 40 C.F.R § 68.65(c)(1)(iii);
(d) Failed to document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2);
(e) Failed to identify, evaluate and control the hazards involved in the process in the process hazard analysis, as required by 40 C.F.R § 68.67(a);
(f) Failed to develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a);
(g) Failed to develop and implement operating procedures that address quality control for raw materials and control of hazardous chemical inventory levels, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(3)(iv);
(h) Failed to review operating procedures as often as necessary to assure that they reflect current operating practice and to certify annually that these operating procedures are current and accurate, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(c);
(i) Failed to develop and implement safe work practices to provide for control of hazards, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d);
(j) Failed to train each employee involved in operating a process in overview of the process and in the operating procedures as specified in§ 68.69, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(a);
(k) Failed to conduct inspections and tests of process equipment at a frequency consistent with applicable manufacturer’s recommendations and good engineering practices, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(3);
(l) Failed to correct deficiencies in equipment that are outside acceptable limits (defined by the process safety information in 68.65) before further use or in a safe and timely manner when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(e);
(m) Failed to establish and implement written procedures to manage change that assure the authorization requirements for the proposed change are addressed prior to the change as required by 40 C.F.R § 68.75(b)(5); and
(n) Failed to promptly determine and document responses to compliance audit findings and correct deficiencies as required by 40 C.F.R § 68.79(d)
Based on EPA’s compliance monitoring investigation at the S Facility, the EPA alleges that the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. Part 68, the codified rules governing the Act’s Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions and Section 112(r) of the Act, when it:
(a) Failed to maintain records pertaining to the worst case scenario for the offsite consequence analyses, as required by 40 C.F.R.§ 68.39(a);
(b) Failed to maintain records pertaining to alternative release scenarios, as required by 40 C.F .R. § 68.39(b);
(c) Failed to compile written process safety information documentation for the technology of the process which shall include the maximum intended inventory information, as required by 40 C.F.R § 68.65(c)(1)(iii);
(d) Failed to document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2);
(e) Failed to identify, evaluate and control the hazards involved in the process in the process hazard analysis, as required by 40 C.F.R § 68.67(a);
(f) Failed to develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a);
(g) Failed to develop and implement operating procedures that address quality control for raw materials and control of hazardous chemical inventory levels, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(3)(iv);
(h) Failed to review operating procedures as often as necessary to assure that they reflect current operating practice and to certify annually that these operating procedures are current and accurate, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(c);
(i) Failed to develop and implement safe work practices to provide for control of hazards, as required by 40 C.F.R § 68.69(d);
(j) Failed to train each employee involved in operating a process in overview of the process and in the operating procedures as specified in§ 68.69, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(a);
(k) Failed to conduct inspections and tests of process equipment at a frequency consistent with applicable manufacturer’s recommendations and good engineering practices, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(3); and
(l) Failed to promptly determine and document responses to compliance audit findings and correct deficiencies as required by 40 C.F.R §. 68.79(d).
Based on EPA’s compliance monitoring investigation at the T Facility, the EPA alleges that the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. Part 68, the codified rules governing the Act’s Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions and Section 112(r) of the Act, when it:
(a) Failed to compile written process safety information documentation for the technology of the process which shall include the maximum intended inventory information, as required by 40 C.F.R § 68.65(c)(1)(iii);
(b) Failed to document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2);
(c) Failed to develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a);
(d) Failed to develop and implement written operating procedures that address quality control for raw materials and control of hazardous chemical inventory levels, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(3)(iv);
(e) Failed to review operating procedures as often as necessary to assure that they reflect current operating practice and to certify annually that these operating procedures are current and accurate, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(c);
(f) Failed to train each employee involved in operating a process in overview of the process and in the operating procedures as specified in§ 68.69, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(a);
(g) Failed to conduct inspections and tests of process equipment at a frequency consistent with applicable manufacturer’s recommendations and good engineering practices, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(3); and
(h) Failed to promptly determine and document responses to compliance audit findings and correct deficiencies as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(d).
TERMS OF PAYMENT
Respondent consents to the payment of a civil penalty, which was calculated in accordance with the Act, in the amount of ONE HUNDRED-SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS ($106,250).
Supplemental Environmental Project
Respondent shall undertake and complete the following Emergency Planning and Preparedness project within 45 days of the effective date of this CAFO. Respondent shall expend no less than THREE HUNDRED NINETY-EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-EIGHT ($398,438.00). Respondent must purchase and donate the following to the recipient selected by the Respondent as identified below:
Recipient: B-S Fire Department
6 – Air cylinders for Self-contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA)
Recipient: S Fire Department
143 – Motorola APX900 Portable Radios
1 – MCC 7500E Radio Console
1 – Radio Console Installation, Configuration, Testing
Recipient: T Fire Department
2 – Remote wireless sensors for NH3, etc., AREARAE Pro, Wireless, Wi-Fi, Mesh 900MHz, 10.6e V PID, LEL, 02, H2S, CO, CL2, NH3, Gamma Sensor, Wind Sensor
2 – RAE S01-3000-000 ProRae Guardian; Licenses for Tier 3 Instruments
7 – MSA A-ALTSXANK0I00C0I0 Altair SX, Multigas Detectors for Methane, 02, CO, H2S
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