We don’t see these every day and to be honest, the incidents, the violations, and the compliance plan are too much for me to break down. I have broken out the incidents and the citations that EPA issued for each of these incidents, but you will have to go to the CAFO to get the full scoop. Here are the incidents that led to this:
May 2, 2013 Fire and Explosion
September 13, 2013 Fire
February 19, 2014 Propylene Release
July 17, 2014 Cycle Gas Release
October 7, 2014 Chlorine Release
October 12, 2014 Hydrogen Chloride Release
November 2, 2014 Chlorine Release
October 5, 2016 Chlorine Release
I should make a special note that EPA has developed a “compliance plan” that far exceeds “compliance” matters. For example, EPA is requiring the facility to develop key performance indicators (“KPIs” (i.e., metrics)) to evaluate Defendant’s implementation of 40 C.F.R. Part 68. The KPIs shall evaluate the implementation of the following procedures:
a. Management of change;
b. Energy isolation;
c. Lockout/tagout;
d. Line breaks;
e. Opening process equipment or piping;
f. Hot work permits;
g. General work permits;
h. Permit issuance; and
i. Confined space entry.
The defendant shall follow applicable recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (“RAGAGEP”) in developing and evaluating the KPIs. The defendant shall submit the KPIs to the United States within 120 Days of the Effective Date, in accordance with Section XV (Notices).
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF General Duty Clause – Failure to Identify Hazards
On May 2, 2013, during work to remove the EPU to make room for expansion equipment at HDPE 1, Defendant attempted to sample the inner vapor space of column C212B, which contained partially-regenerated pyrophoric catalyst, Puraspec 3450. Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery, as a result of the sampling activity, oxygen entered column C212B, beginning an exothermic reaction that heated the material in the column.
Defendant failed to prepare a work plan or conduct a hazard assessment for the removal of the EPU. The explosion and fire hazards associated with removing the EPU without a work plan or hazard assessment is a recognized hazard.
Defendant failed to identify, using appropriate hazard assessment techniques, the explosion and fire hazards associated with removing the EPU without a work plan. Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery, the failure to identify hazards associated with removing the EPU without a work plan continued from at least January 16, 2013 (the date Defendant completed a bid proposal for the removal of the EPU) through May 2, 2013 (the date of the fire and explosion).
The risk of a fire due to the ingress of air into a vessel containing Puraspec 3450 in its reduced or partially regenerated form is a recognized hazard. Defendant failed to identify, using appropriate hazard assessment techniques, the explosion and fire hazards associated with sampling column C212B, a vessel containing Puraspec 3450 in its partially regenerated form.
The risk of an explosion due to over pressurization from an exothermic reaction resulting from an ingress of air into a vessel containing reduced or partially regenerated Puraspec 3450 with no pressure relief alternative in place is a recognized hazard.
Defendant failed to identify, using appropriate hazard assessment techniques, the explosion hazard associated with isolating and blinding the pressure relief valves of columns with no pressure relief alternatives in place. Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery, the failure to identify the explosion hazard associated with isolating and blinding the pressure relief valves began in January 2011 (when the isolation and blinding occurred) and continued until May 2, 2013 (the day of the fire and explosion).
The fire and explosion hazard was likely to cause serious physical harm or death. There were technically and economically feasible means and methods of eliminating or mitigating the risks of fire or explosion associated with the removal of the EPU. Had Defendant performed a risk assessment or prepared a work plan for the removal the EPU, numerous hazards would have been identified.
Defendant violated Section 112(r)(1) of the Act by failing to identify hazards associated with the removal of the EPU.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF General Duty Clause – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1)
Defendant Failed to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility by Isolating and Blinding Pressure Relief Valves
On or about January 2011, Defendant isolated and blinded the pressure relief valves in columns C212A and C212B of the EPU.
Partially reduced Puraspec 3450 catalyst remained in the columns.
A pressure relief valve is used to limit or control the pressure that can build up in a system or vessel and cause an uncontrolled accidental release of hazardous materials, process upset, instrument or equipment failure, explosion, or fire. The pressure is relieved by allowing the pressurized fluid or gas to flow from the system or vessel through an orifice specifically designed for emergency duty.
The risk of pressure buildup in a system or vessel, which can result in a process upset, instrument or equipment failure, explosion, or fire, is a recognized hazard.
The hazard of over pressurization of a vessel or process can cause explosion or fire which is likely to cause death or serious injury. The hazard of over pressurization of a system or vessel can be prevented or mitigated through the use of pressure relief valves.
Leaving the C212A and C212B column pressure relief valves in service is a technically and economically feasible action that Defendant could be expected to take. The risk of fire or explosion due to the Defendant isolating and blinding the
pressure relief valves, leaving no alternative pressure relief in place, continued from January 2011 until May 2, 2013.
The isolation and blinding of the C212A and C212B column pressure relief valves disabled the pressure relief system, leading to a significant overpressure in the C212B column and to the failure of the top dome flange gasket, which resulted in the subsequent release, explosion, and fire on May 2, 2013. 168. Had Defendant left the pressure relief valves in service, the May 2, 2013 explosion, release, and fire could have been prevented, injuries and property damage could have
been minimized, and the threat to nearby operating processes could have been reduced.
Defendant failed to design and maintain a safe facility by isolating and blinding pressure relief valves in columns C212A and C212B.
Defendant Failed to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility by Failing to Follow Operating Procedures for the EPU – Hydrogen Injection
The manufacturer’s operating procedures for the EPU state that if the catalyst has been used for the purification of hydrocarbons it may contain residual hydrocarbons or deposited carbon, increasing the risk of combustion. Operating procedures for the EPU recommend using hydrogen to remove acetylene from the ethylene supply in the first stage. Allowing acetylene into the second stage columns can lead to the formation of copper acetylide, which is highly explosive. It can also form other polymer-like materials, which can exothermically react with reduced or partially regenerated catalyst, or cause carbon deposits to form on the catalyst.
Partially reduced catalyst containing copper acetylide, polymer-like material or carbon deposits may be capable of combustion. The EPU was used for the purification of ethylene, a hydrocarbon, in the HDPE 1 process. Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery, the EPU was operated without hydrogen injection in the first stage. Using hydrogen to remove acetylene from the ethylene supply is technically and economically feasible. As a result, the ethylene in the vessel had extended contact with the catalyst, potentially leading to the formation of copper acetylide, polymer-like material or carbon deposits in the catalyst which increased the risk of combustion. The increased risk of combustion due to the formation of copper acetylide, polymer-like material or carbon deposits in the catalyst was a recognized hazard. 178. The increased risk of combustion at the EPU is a hazard that is likely to cause serious physical harm or death. 179. Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery, the risk of fire or explosion due to Defendant’s failure to use a hydrogen injection in the first stage of the EPU began in September 1995 (the date the EPU was initially taken out of service) and continued until May 2, 2013 (the day of the fire and explosion). 180. Defendant failed to design and maintain a safe facility by failing to use a hydrogen injection in the first stage and by failing to maintain the EPU in a manner that would prevent releases of extremely hazardous substances so as to be safe and free of recognized hazards.
Defendant Failed to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility by Failing to Follow Operating Procedures for the EPU – Purging System with Nitrogen
Operating instructions for the EPU state that after taking the second stage out of service the column should be immediately purged and pressurized with nitrogen. Defendant did not immediately purge the system with nitrogen after taking the second stage columns of the EPU out of service.
The purpose of purging the second stage columns is to prevent the ethylene from having extended contact with the catalyst which can also lead to the formation of polymer-like material or carbon deposits on the catalyst. Pressurizing and purging the C212B reactor with nitrogen immediately after taking it out of service was technically and economically feasible.
As a result of these failures, the ethylene in the vessel had extended contact with the catalyst, leading to the formation of polymer like material or carbon deposits in the catalyst which increased the risk of combustion. The increased risk of combustion due to the formation of polymer like material or carbon deposits in the catalyst was a recognized hazard. The increased risk of combustion at the EPU is a hazard that is likely to cause serious physical harm or death. The risk of fire or explosion due to Defendant’s failure to immediately purge the system with nitrogen after taking the second stage columns of the EPU out of service or placing them in standby mode began in September 1995 (the date the EPU was taken out of service) and continued until May 2, 2013 (the day of the fire and explosion).
Defendant failed to design and maintain a safe facility by failing to immediately purge the system with nitrogen after taking the second stage columns of the EPU out of service or placing them in standby mode and failing to maintain the EPU in a manner that would prevent releases of extremely hazardous substances so as to be safe and free of recognized hazards.
Defendant Failed to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility by Failing to Adhere to Defendant’s Policy for Out of Service Equipment
In 2007, Defendant developed an “Inactive – Out of Service Equipment Storage Procedure” which requires that a work order be prepared in order to have equipment placed in an inactive status. Under this procedure, the work order must require that Maintenance and Operations personnel complete an inspection of the equipment and support systems to confirm that they have been properly and safely prepared for inactive status. Under the procedure, maintenance was permitted to isolate and prepare the equipment for inactive status only after completing the required inspection. The potential for fire or explosions from residual energy stored in equipment placed in standby mode or inactive status is a recognized hazard. Defendant did not implement its Inactive – Out of Service Equipment Storage Procedure for the first and second stages of the EPU. It was technically and economically feasible for Defendant to implement its Inactive – Out of Service Equipment Storage Procedure.
Had Defendant implemented the procedures set forth in the “Inactive – Out of Service Equipment Storage Procedure,” Defendant would have been able to eliminate or mitigate the potential for fire or explosions from residual energy stored in the EPU.
Defendant failed to design and maintain a safe facility by failing to properly place the first and second stages of the EPU in inactive status and by failing to maintain the EPU in a manner that would prevent releases of extremely hazardous substances so as to be safe and free of recognized hazards. Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery, this failure began in 2007 (when the Inactive – Out of Service Equipment Storage Procedure became effective) and continued until May 2, 2013 (the date of the fire and explosion).
As a result of Defendant’s failure to design and maintain a safe facility and failure to take such steps as necessary to prevent accidental releases of extremely hazardous substances, an accidental release of an extremely hazardous substance occurred at the Facility
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF Risk Management Program – Failure to Obtain Hot Work Permit 40 C.F.R. § 68.85
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.85, Defendant is required to issue a Hot Work Permit for hot work operations conducted on or near a covered process. 200. Defendant developed and implemented a Hot Work Permit Procedure, known as Procedure 06, which states that the use of equipment with an electric motor requires a Hot Work Permit. An electric chainsaw has an electric motor, which is potentially spark-producing, and therefore a Hot Work Permit is required for its use on or near a covered process.
On September 13, 2013, operations personnel did not secure a Hot Work Permit before attempting to cut the polymer chunk on column C-301 with an electric chainsaw.
As a result of these acts or omissions, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.85 and CAA Section 112(r)(7)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E).
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Risk Management Program – Failure to Implement Safe Work Practices 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d)
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d), Defendant was required to “develop and implement safe work practices to provide for the control of hazards during operations.” These safe work practices apply to employees and contractor employees.
Defendant developed and implemented a procedure governing Personal Protective Equipment known as Procedure 17. Procedure 17 requires that the following items be worn when using chainsaws: hard hats, hearing protection, face shields or full-face respirators, chainsaw resistant vests, pants, shirts, gloves, metatarsal boots or hard-toe boots with attachable metatarsal protection, and full-face respirator with dust cartridges where dust is present.
Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery, on September 13, 2013, all HDPE 2 operators working with or near the electric chainsaw were not wearing face shields or full-face respirators.
On September 13, 2013, Defendant failed to implement Procedure 17.
Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery, Defendant did not perform any additional LEL readings immediately preceding the installation of the blinds, in violation of Procedure 10. Flammable gases can build up over time, particularly when work activities require the opening of process vessels or lines, creating an explosive atmosphere.
Sampling conducted after the fire on the manway just above where the incident occurred showed 319 ppm of isobutane and 160 ppm of 1-hexene.
Sampling conducted after the fire on the manway just below where the incident occurred showed 191 ppm of isobutene and 298 ppm of 1-hexane.
Had Defendant properly implemented Procedure 10 and taken the LEL reading at the proper location and immediately prior to the commencing of work, the elevated levels of flammable vapors (isobutene and 1-hexane) in the atmosphere could have been detected.
Defendant’s incident report found that the electric chainsaw motor was the likely ignition source for the flash fire by igniting an explosive environment created from dust combined with flammable vapors.
On September 13, 2013, Defendant failed to implement Procedure 10.
As a result of these acts or omissions, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d)
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Risk Management Program – Failure to Implement Safe Work Practices 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d)
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d), Defendant was required to “develop and implement safe work practices to provide for the control of hazards during operations.” These safe work practices apply to employees and contractor employees.
Defendant developed and implemented a Line Break Permit Procedure, known as Procedure 10. Defendant defines a line break, subject to Procedure 10, to include the removal or installation of blinds as well as any penetration or opening created in a process or utility line by mechanical or other means that could release hazardous energy that presents a hazard to employees. Under Procedure 10, the removal or installation of blinds requires a line break permit. When a Line Break Permit is required, Procedure 10 requires the performance of atmospheric testing prior to commencing work.
On September 13, 2013, at or about 7:30 a.m., Defendant took a Lower Explosive Limit (“LEL”) reading (an atmospheric test) from the bottom of the manway and issued Line Break Permit No. 56790, pursuant to Procedure 10, in order to install blinds at column C-301. The installation of blinds at column C-301 started at 8:45 a.m.
Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery, Defendant did not perform any additional LEL readings immediately preceding the installation of the blinds, in violation of Procedure 10. Flammable gases can build up over time, particularly when work activities require the opening of process vessels or lines, creating an explosive atmosphere.
Sampling conducted after the fire on the manway just above where the incident occurred showed 319 ppm of isobutane and 160 ppm of 1-hexene. Sampling conducted after the fire on the manway just below where the incident occurred showed 191 ppm of isobutene and 298 ppm of 1-hexane.
Had Defendant properly implemented Procedure 10 and taken the LEL reading at the proper location and immediately prior to the commencing of work, the elevated levels of flammable vapors (isobutene and 1-hexane) in the atmosphere could have been detected. Defendant’s incident report found that the electric chainsaw motor was the likely ignition source for the flash fire by igniting an explosive environment created from dust combined with flammable vapors. On September 13, 2013, Defendant failed to implement Procedure 10.
As a result of these acts or omissions, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d)
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Risk Management Program – Failure to Conduct Mechanical Integrity Inspections 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d), Defendant is required to inspect and test process equipment. The inspection and testing procedures must follow recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices.
40 C.F.R. § 68.73(a)(2) provides that the requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d) apply to piping systems, including piping components such as valves.
Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery, the propylene line HC6116A-4″-9P1 (LLHC611A-4”-9P1) has been subject to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d) since at least 2010.
Defendant has no mechanical integrity inspection records for propylene line HC6116A-4″-9P1 (LL HC611A-4′′-9P1), which includes the ¾” valve, for any inspection conducted prior to February 19, 2014.
Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery, Defendant failed to conduct a mechanical integrity inspection of line HC6116A-4″-9P1 (LL HC611A-4″-9P1) which includes the ¾” valve, prior to the February 19, 2014 propylene release.
As a result of these acts or omissions, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)
Alternatively, if Defendant did conduct mechanical integrity inspections of line HC6116A-4″-9P1 (LL HC611A-4″-9P1) prior to the February 19, 2014 release, Defendant did not document the inspection, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(4)
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Risk Management Program – Failure to Conduct Mechanical Integrity Inspections 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d), Defendant is required to inspect and test process equipment. The inspection and testing procedures must follow recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices.
40 C.F.R. § 68.73(a)(2) provides that the requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d) apply to piping systems.
The Process Line and the HP Nitrogen Line are part of the LLDPE piping system. The LLDPE piping system, including the HP Nitrogen Line, has been subject to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d) since at least 1999.
Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery, Defendant failed to conduct mechanical integrity inspections of the HP Nitrogen Line, including the weld connecting the HP Nitrogen Line and the Process Line, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d). 244.
As a result of these acts or omissions, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)
Alternatively, subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery, if Defendant did conduct mechanical integrity inspections of the HP Nitrogen Line, Defendant did not follow recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices by failing to conduct the appropriate testing, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(2)
EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Risk Management Program – Failure to Conduct Mechanical Integrity Inspections 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d), Defendant is required to inspect and test process equipment. The inspection and testing procedures must follow recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices. The chemical sewer piping at the Chlor-Alkali Unit is process equipment and was required to be inspected and tested pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(a)(2).
The Chlor-Alkali piping system, including the chemical sewer piping, has been subject to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d) since at least 2012.
Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery, Defendant failed to conduct mechanical integrity inspections of the chemical sewer piping at the Chlor-Alkali Unit, in violation of 40 C.F.R § 68.73(d)
Alternatively, if Defendant did inspect the chemical sewer piping, Defendant failed to correct deficiencies in equipment that are outside acceptable limits before further use or in a safe and timely manner by failing to repair and replace the corroded blind and missing nuts and bolts on the chemical sewer piping, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(4).
NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Risk Management Program – Failure to Implement Safe Work Practices 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d)
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d), Defendant was required to develop and implement safe work practices to provide for the control of hazards during operations. These safe work practices apply to employees and contractor employees. Defendant developed and implemented Procedure 15 – Respiratory Protection Program. Procedure 15 – Respiratory Protection Program states that employees must use respiratory equipment when atmospheric hazards may exist. With regard to chlorine, Procedure 15 recommends the use of a full-face respirator with an acid gas cartridge when chlorine levels are above 1 ppm. The Chlorine Institute recommends that for tasks that have not been previously sampled and involve potential exposure to gaseous or liquid chlorine for initial line breaks, material sampling, or loading/unloading, that the worker wears a full-face air-purifying respirator approved for protection against chlorine.
Standard reference material for the industry states that “it is essential that each individual who may be exposed to chlorine carry, at all times, a respirator approved for chlorine use.” The Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (“OSHA’s”) Permissible Short Term Exposure Limit for chlorine is 1 ppm.
Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery, those performing maintenance on the sight glass at the Chlor-Alkali Unit have the potential to be exposed to chlorine levels above 1 ppm.
On October 7, 2014, Operator 1 did not use or carry a respirator when working on the sight glass system.
Defendant failed to develop and implement adequate safe work practices by failing to require the use of a full-face respirator where there was potential for exposure to chlorine above 1 ppm.
As a result of these acts or omissions, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d)
TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Risk Management Program – Failure to Provide Refresher Training 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(b)
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(b), Defendant is required to provide refresher training at least every three years to each employee involved in operating a process.
Operator 1 completed classroom training on November 6, 2010, passed the chlorine field qualifications test on April 5, 2011, and was approved by the Facility operations manager of the Chlor-Alkali Department on June 17, 2011.
Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery, over three years had passed from the date that Operator 1 was certified to work as a chlorine field operator (June 17, 2011) to the time of the October 7, 2014 incident and Defendant failed to conduct refresher training for Operator 1.
As a result of these acts or omissions, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(b)
ELEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Risk Management Program – Failure to Establish and Implement Written Procedures to Maintain the On-Going Integrity of Process Equipment 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b)
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b), Defendant is required to establish and implement written procedures to maintain the on-going integrity of process equipment. The sight glass is considered process equipment, as it is part of the Chlor-Alkali piping system.
Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery, the sight glass has been part of the Chlor-Alkali piping system since at least 2012. As of October 7, 2014, Defendant did not have a written procedure for the replacement of the seal leg sight glass. As a result of these acts or omissions, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b)
TWELFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF General Duty Clause – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility
Defendant used low-grade stainless steel bolts on pressure control valve PV-521 on the HCl system. The risk of corrosion to stainless steel bolts exposed to HCl is a recognized hazard.
Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery, the risk of corrosion to the stainless steel bolts exposed to HCl began on April 8, 2011 (the last date PV-521 was replaced prior to the release) and continued until October 12, 2014 (the date of the release).
Occidental Chemical Corporation’s Hydrochloric Acid Handbook (the “handbook”) is a recognized industry resource that provides information on safety, first-aid and the proper handling and storage of HCl. 284. The handbook was available to Defendant on October 12, 2014, and states that HCl is extremely corrosive to certain metals, including stainless steel. 285. Nickel-molybdenum-chromium alloy bolts are acceptable for use in HCl service. 286. The use of nickel-molybdenum-chromium alloy bolts is a technically and economically feasible action that Defendant could be expected to take. 287. Had Defendant used nickel-molybdenum-chromium alloy bolts in place of stainless steel bolts, the release of HCl into the ambient air on October 12, 2014 could have been prevented or mitigated.
Defendant failed to implement safe work practices and adhere to its Respiratory Protection Program by failing to ensure that Employee 1 responded to the chlorine gas release with respiratory equipment.
As a result of these acts or omissions, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d)
THIRTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Risk Management Program – Failure to Implement Safe Work Practices 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d)
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d), Defendant was required to develop and implement safe work practices to provide for the control of hazards during operations. These safe work practices apply to employees and contractor employees. Defendant developed and implemented Procedure 15 – Respiratory Protection Program. Defendant’s Respiratory Protection Program states that employees must use respiratory equipment when atmospheric hazards may exist. With regard to chlorine, Procedure 15 recommends the use of a full face respirator with acid gas cartridge when chlorine levels are above 1-ppm. 294. OSHA’s Permissible Short Term Exposure Limit for chlorine is 1 ppm. When the ambient air alarm for chlorine sounded on November 2, 2014, an atmospheric hazard existed. 296. Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery, the set point for the ambient air alarm is 1 ppm.
Defendant failed to implement safe work practices and adhere to its Respiratory Protection Program by failing to ensure that Employee 1 responded to the chlorine gas release with respiratory equipment.
As a result of these acts or omissions, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d)
FOURTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Risk Management Program – Failure to Develop and Implement Safe Work Practices 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d)
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d), Defendant was required to develop and implement safe work practices to provide for the control of hazards during operations. These safe work practices apply to employees and contractor employees. Defendant’s Chlor-Alkali Unit’s safety manual requires operators to respond to ambient air alarms with a handheld chlorine detector.
On November 2, 2014, handheld chlorine detectors were not available to the three employees responding to the chlorine alarm because they were located in the cell maintenance building, which was locked.
Defendant failed to implement safe work practices and adhere to the Chlor-Alkali Unit’s safety manual by failing to make available handheld chlorine detectors for the three employees responding to the chlorine alarm.
As a result of these acts or omissions, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d)
FIFTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Risk Management Program – Failure to Implement Safe Work Practices 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d)
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d), Defendant was required to develop and implement safe work practices to provide for the control of hazards during operations. These safe work practices apply to employees and contractor employees. Defendant developed and implemented “Procedure 8 – General Work Permits.” Procedure 8 requires operators to walk down the area covered by the General Work Permit with the workers to determine any hazards associated with the work activity.
On October 5, 2016, there was no operator walk down of the 500 A/B area with the contractors to determine any hazards that might be associated with the contractors’ work. Procedure 8 requires that Operations personnel ensure that those working under a “general permit” know and understand the hazards of the job and the chemicals involved. The “Hazards Involved” section on the general work permit issued to the contractors for work in the 500 C area was not updated to reflect additional hazards (chlorine and HCl) in the 500 A/B area.
Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery, the Defendant did not make the contractors aware of the chlorine and HCl hazards associated with working in the 500 A/B area.
Defendant’s Procedure 8 states that if necessary, atmospheric testing shall be performed prior to a general work permit being issued or modified. Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery, atmospheric tests were not taken or updated in 500 A/B area of the Chlor-Alkali Unit.
As a result of these acts or omissions, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d)
SIXTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Risk Management Program – Failure to Perform an Adequate Process Hazard Analysis 40 C.F.R. § 68.67
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.67, Defendant was required to perform a PHA on the HCl Synthesis process (the 500 Unit) that would identify, evaluate, and control the hazards involved in the process.
On October 5, 2016, the ½” black poly tubing at the HCl Synthesis was partially in the walkway and not protected from accidental contact.
Defendant’s PHA for the HCl Synthesis failed to identify the possible hazards associated with accidental contact with the ½” black poly tubing. The loss of water due to the disconnection of the ½” black poly tubing allowed chlorine gas to breach the seal and enter the sewer piping.
Defendant’s PHA failed to identify a scenario in which the loss of water results in the breach of the water seal and chlorine gas escapes through the sewer piping.
Defendant’s PHA failed to address the fact that the piping system is not completely sealed or vented but connects to open surface drain hubs from the scrubber and HCl feed pumps.
Defendant failed to identify, evaluate, and control all hazards in their PHA. As a result of these acts or omissions, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.67
SEVENTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Risk Management Program Failure to Timely Implement Compliance Audit Recommendations 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(d)
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(a), Defendant was required to certify that it had evaluated compliance with the provisions of 40 C.F.R. Part 68, Subpart D, at least every three years to verify that the procedures and practices developed under Subpart D are adequate and being followed. 331. Defendant conducted a Compliance Audit between March 2 and March 6, 2015. 332. Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(d), Defendant was required to promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audit, and document that deficiencies have been corrected.
Defendant documented the findings, recommendations, and resulting tasks generated from the compliance audit and scheduled deadlines for the completion of each task.
Defendant’s scheduled deadline for documenting the hazards and consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls, item 12.c, was December 31, 2015. Defendant did not complete this task until April 8, 2016.
Defendant’s scheduled deadline for documenting communication of PHA recommendations to operating, maintenance, and other associates, item 13, was June 30, 2015.
Defendant did not complete the task until September 19, 2016. Defendant did not promptly implement the compliance audit recommendations.
As a result of these acts or omissions, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(d)
EIGHTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Risk Management Program – Failure to Timely Implement PHA Recommendations 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e)
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(a), Defendant was required to perform a PHA on the Chlor-Alkali Unit that would identify, evaluate, and control the hazards involved in the process. The PHA is required to be updated and revalidated every five years. On May 30, 2014, Defendant completed a revalidation of the PHA for the Chlor-Alkali Unit.
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e), Defendant was required, among other things, to establish a system to promptly address the findings and recommendations of the team performing the PHA, assure that the recommendations are resolved in a timely manner, document what actions are to be taken, complete the actions as soon as possible, and develop a written schedule of when these actions are to be completed.
Defendant’s written deadline for the creation of a procedure to require sampling for excess chlorine was March 30, 2015. Defendant did not complete the task until July 29, 2016.
Defendant’s written deadline for adding a redundant temperature indicator (“TI”) for temperature compensation and updating the standard operating procedure’s troubleshooting guide to respond to the difference in TI was March 30, 2015. Defendant did not complete the task until July 29, 2016.
Defendant’s written deadline to consider adding a differential temperature alarm (an alarm that indicates the divergence of two temperature readings which should be the same) between redundant temperature indicators was March 30, 2015. Defendant did not complete the task until July 27, 2016
Defendant’s written deadline to consider adding a differential pressure alarm between two redundant Pressure Indicators (“PIs”) for pressure compensation, and updating the standard operating procedure’s troubleshooting guide to respond to the difference in PIs, was March 30, 2015. Defendant did not complete the task until July 28, 2016.
Defendant’s written deadline for updating the Reactor standard operating procedures for FTCA-0100 to add a step to make sure there is no liquid Ethylene Dichloride (“EDC”) in the C2H4 line prior to starting the C2H4 feed to the reactor was March 30, 2015. Defendant did not complete the task until July 27, 2016.
Defendant’s written deadline for completing the recommendations developed in a 2008 Low-Temperature Incident PHA was March 30, 2015. Defendant did not complete the task until July 28, 2016. 349. Defendant’s written deadline for implementing the preventive maintenance routine to inspect for corrosion under insulation was March 30, 2015. Defendant did not complete the task until July 28, 2016.
Defendant failed to meet deadlines that Defendant set to address the PHA findings and recommendations related to the 2014 Chlor-Alkali PHA revalidation.
Defendant failed to resolve the PHA recommendations in a timely manner. 352. As a result of these acts or omissions, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e)
NINETEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Risk Management Program – Inadequate Emergency Response Plan 40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a)(1)
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a)(1), Defendant was required to develop and implement an emergency response program that includes an emergency response plan, which must be maintained at the stationary source and contain
(i) procedures for informing the public and local emergency response agencies about accidental releases;
(ii) documentation of proper first-aid and emergency medical treatment necessary to treat accidental human exposures; and
(iii) procedures and measures for emergency response after an accidental release of regulated substances.
Defendant has been subject to 40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a)(1) since at least June 22, 1999.
On November 14, 2016, EPA sent an Information Request Letter to Defendant pursuant to CAA Section 114, 42 U.S.C. § 7414, that requested, among other things, Defendant’s emergency response plan which conforms to the requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a)(1)(ii).
Defendant produced documentation that failed to include proper first-aid and emergency medical treatment necessary to treat accidental human exposures.
Defendant failed to produce an adequate emergency response plan.
As a result of these acts or omissions, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a)(1)
TWENTIETH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Risk Management Program – Failure to Timely Conduct Mechanical Integrity Inspections 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d), Defendant was required to perform inspections and testing on process equipment. The frequency of the inspections and tests must be consistent with applicable manufacturers’ recommendations and good engineering practices. 364. EPA inspected the Facility from January 26, 2015 to January 29, 2015. During the EPA inspection, Defendant provided documents which listed numerous overdue mechanical integrity inspections. 365. On November 14, 2016, EPA sent an Information Request Letter to Defendant pursuant to CAA Section 114, 42 U.S.C. § 7414. 366. EPA requested that Defendant provide information for all “overdue mechanical integrity inspections required for 40 C.F.R. § 68.73.” 367. Defendant produced a document containing numerous entries of overdue mechanical integrity inspections. 368. Defendant failed to perform mechanical integrity inspections prior to their due date for certain process equipment. 369. As a result of these acts or omissions, Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)
Within 30 Days after the Effective Date, Defendant shall pay the sum of $2,850,000 as a civil penalty, together with interest accruing from the date on which the Consent Decree is lodged with the Court, at the rate specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1961 as of the date of lodging.
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