Respondent owned and operated a petroleum refinery with the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code 2911. The Facility produces, processes, stores, or handles more than the threshold quantities of flammable and toxic substances identified in 40 C.F.R. § 68.130. The regulated flammable substances that are held above the threshold quantities identified in 40 C.F.R. § 68.130 and associated with the Unit 47 Hydrocracker at the Facility are: ethane, n-butane, isopentane, methane, propane, isobutane, butene, n-pentane, hydrogen, propylene, I-butene, 2-butene, ethylene, 3-butadiene, 1-pentene, hexane (and heavier substance.s), and neopentane.
Respondent’s Effluent Condenser (47E09A) is part of Unit 47 Hydrocracker, a covered process under Program 3 of the RMP regulations.
On January 1, 2021, there was an incident at the Facility. At approximately 8:00 AM on January 1, 2021, the refinery discovered a loss of primary containment within the “A” bank of an Effluent Condenser (47E09A). A controlled unit shutdown was immediately commenced to isolate the fin fan for inspection, testing, and repairs. Approximately 52.83 pounds of hydrogen sulfide, 7.97 pounds of volatile organic compounds, and 7.935 pounds of benzene were released to the atmosphere during the incident.
An investigation of the incident by Respondent revealed that a single pinhole leak was found on a top tube wall, inspections of tube bundles indicated some tubes had detectable wall loss (45%), there was insufficient wash water mixing due to existing injection quills design, maldistribution of flow through the condenser associated with header box and effluent route, and there was corrosion resulting from ammonium chloride salt deposits in the fin fan tubes, which all contributed to the release.
Count 1:
40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b) – Failure to timely inspect and maintain the integrity of process equipment.
Respondent has written procedures to maintain on-going integrity of process equipment but failed to implement timely inspections and testing regarding the effluent condenser (47E09A) leading to the January 1, 2021 incident.
An investigation of the incident by Respondent revealed the following root causes:
(1) a pinhole leak was found on a top tube wall,
(2) inspections of tube bundles indicated some tubes had detectable wall loss (45%),
(3) there was insufficient wash water mixing due to existing injection quills design,
(4) there was maldistribution of flow through the effluent condenser (47E09A) associated with header box and effluent route, and
(5) there was corrosion resulting from ammonium chloride salt deposits in the fin fan tubes, which all contributed to the release.
The root cause of the January 1, 2021 incident, failure to inspect and maintain the integrity of process equipment, is a violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b).
CIVIL PENALTY AND TERMS OF SETTLEMENT
Taking into consideration the size of the business, the economic impact of the penalty on the business, the violator’s full compliance history and good faith efforts to comply, the duration of the violation, payment by the violator of penalties previously assessed for the same violation, the economic benefit of noncompliance, the seriousness of the violation, and other factors as justice may require, the parties agree that forty thousand dollars ($40,000) is an appropriate penalty to resolve this matter.
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