This one occurred in South America but due to the sheer power of this event, I am sharing with the SAFTENG membership. The worker was thrown over 650 feet and of course, perished in the accident. Its the same old story… tanker starts to leak – they take to a repair shop for repair – […]
We have had another catastrophic failure of a pressure vessel used in an ammonia refrigeration process and this time we caught it on camera. The event occurred last week and unfortunately, I have not heard of any causes or if anything special was happening within the process when this failure occurred. This picture shows us
For those of you who are SAFTENG members and manage a Respiratory Protection program, this is NOT news to you, as we have discussed this many times before, and if you have been to my 1.5 Day Respiratory Protection Administrator course, you got this beat into your head! But for those less fortunate, here is
We are all accustomed to labeling our process vessels/tanks with the contents; many of us that operate batch processes even use some specialized labeling and cross-referencing hazard data based on the batch being run. But one item too many of us fail to identify within a vessel is the use of an inert purging/blanketing gas
The call came in as a “vehicle fire”… Listen and Learn…
At all relevant times, Respondent owned and operated a refrigerated food distribution warehouse with an ammonia refrigerant system which contains approximately 9,617 pounds of ammonia. EPA inspected the facility on August 9, 2018. Prior to the August 9, 2018, inspection, Respondent had not performed a hazard analysis nor developed standard operating procedures for the ammonia
I am not sure where or quite when this vicious rumor began, but let’s make this clear: A Pre-startup Safety Review (PSSR) is an ENTIRELY separate exercise AND MUST be completed BEFORE the Initial Start-Up procedures are implemented. Granted it may be the same personnel doing both tasks, but the PSSR is FULLY COMPLETED BEFORE
Scenario: In an industrial setting, a ladder starts 100 feet above grade on the side of a tower. The base landing of the ladder is only there for ladder access, so it meets OSHA minimum dimensions and is equipped with standard guardrail. The length of climb above this base is no more than 24 feet.
Background Product parts are heated in the furnaces using natural gas to temperatures ranging from 700ºF to 2200ºF to facilitate material processing. The furnace doors are actuated remotely from either the cab of a forklift or a control panel. Parts are loaded and unloaded from the furnaces using forklifts during production runs. The furnaces range
Background: Multiple sections of off-set ladders are being designed to be installed on the outside of a grain silo that is 80 feet or more in height. Rest platforms will be installed at each off-set and will be provided with guardrail systems to meet OSHA’s requirements. The rest platforms measure 3 feet by 3 feet
Earlier this year I was asked to participate in an incident review involving a flashfire/explosion in a tote-filling process. (NOTE: the official term is an Intermediate Bulk Container or IBC) As I have written about many times, the #1 cause of these flash fires/explosions inside a container/vessel is the generation of static electricity; but this
At approximately 10:40 a.m. on April 2, 2019, the housing of a three-inch Y-strainer of an isobutylene line that fed into reactor K8 ruptured and isobutylene was released, forming a vapor cloud. Three employees responded to mitigate the isobutylene vapor in the reactor area. As Employee #1 was at an old control room area and
