Apparently, they can and have. Here are some GDC citations for an NH3 refrigeration process. These were part of a large release inspection that included some HAZWOPER and HAZCOM citations. My only guess is that these GDC citations are tied directly to the NH3 release, but I have not yet seen the field notes, so I am not sure. Each GDC citation below had a $16,550 tacked onto it, but was negotiated down to $9,103. Total penalty was $111,126 and was negotiated down to $61,119. The GDCs focused on
- SOPs,
- Piping Insulation issues leading to premature degradation, and
- having never inspected vessel HTR01
(emphasis by me)
OSH ACT of 1970 Section (5)(a)(1): The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to anhydrous ammonia contact, asphyxiation, and explosion hazards related to potential release from the ammonia refrigeration system. On or about June 25, 2025, the employer failed to address and control anhydrous ammonia hazards by developing, implementing and maintaining operating procedures for employee use in activities involving the refrigeration system:
(a) The employer failed to ensure that all activities were addressed with operating procedures. Ammonia refrigeration system activities, such as but not limited to, normal shutdown for the thermosyphon, normal shutdown for the recirculating vessel and startup after power outage, and did not have operating procedures in place.
(b) The employer failed to ensure that operating procedures addressed refrigeration system with clear instructions for safely conducting activities, such as but not limited to temporary operations for pumps AP01 and AP02 and temporary operations for air handling units. The temporary operations procedures for the pumps read "the ammonia pump can be manually run from the starter panel" and the procedure for the air units read "the evaporator can be manually hot gas defrosted through the PLC" without any further instructions.
(c) The employer failed to ensure that operating procedures were reviewed and updated following equipment changes, such as but not limited to compressor removal, new compressor installation, evaporator/chiller removal and evaporator/chiller installation. Failing to provide and maintain operating procedures with clear instructions for safely conducting refrigeration system activities increases the risk for ammonia related hazards due to anhydrous ammonia release from the system.
OSH ACT of 1970 Section (5)(a)(1): The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to anhydrous ammonia contact, asphyxiation and explosion hazards related to potential release from the ammonia refrigeration system.
(a) On or about June 25, 2025, the employer had not removed the Armaflex insulations, and the dead ends of the HTRS line within the packaging area that connects UC-9 and UC-10. The insulation and dead ends created environments where degradation could occur more rapidly resulting in a release from the ammonia refrigeration system. Release of anhydrous ammonia refrigerant from the system exposes employees to chemical hazards such as chemical burns, over exposure and/or asphyxiation.
(b) On or about June 25, 2025, the employer had not removed the dead ends of the HGD line within the packaging area that connects UC-9 and UC-10. The dead ends created environments where degradation could occur more rapidly resulting in a release from the ammonia refrigeration system. Release of anhydrous ammonia refrigerant from the system exposes employees to chemical hazards such as chemical burns, over exposure and/or asphyxiation.
(c) On or about June 25, 2025, the employer had not corrected missing insulation on the HTRS line on the north side of roof at the elbow going towards UC-8 through UC-5. The pipe had rusting and pitting due to the missing insulation and weather exposure. Corrosion related pipe failure would result in release from the ammonia refrigeration system. Release of anhydrous ammonia refrigerant from the system exposes employees to chemical hazards such as chemical burns, over exposure and/or asphyxiation.
(d) On or about June 25, 2025, the employer had not corrected missing/ connected insulation on the HTRS line on the south side of roof at the elbow going towards UC-4 through UC-1. The pipe had rusting and pitting due to the missing insulation and weather exposure. Corrosion related pipe failure would result in release from the ammonia refrigeration system. Release of anhydrous ammonia refrigerant from the system exposes employees to chemical hazards such as chemical burns, over exposure and/or asphyxiation.
(e) On or about June 25, 2025, the employer had not corrected missing insulation on the HG line on the north side of roof at multiple elbows going towards UC-8 through UC-5. The pipe had rusting due to the missing insulation and weather exposure. Corrosion related pipe failure would result in release from the ammonia refrigeration system. Release of anhydrous ammonia refrigerant from the system exposes employees to chemical hazards such as chemical burns, over exposure and/or asphyxiation.
(f) On or about June 25, 2025, the employer had not corrected missing insulation on the HG line on the south side of roof at multiple elbows going towards UC-4 through UC-1. The pipe had rusting due to the missing insulation and weather exposure. Corrosion related pipe failure would result in release from the ammonia refrigeration system. Release of anhydrous ammonia refrigerant from the system exposes employees to chemical hazards such as chemical burns, over exposure and/or asphyxiation.
(g) On or about June 25, 2025, the employer had not corrected piping on the HG line on the south side of roof that had missing and broken insulation at multiple elbows UC-4 through UC-1. The pipe had rusting due to the missing insulation and weather exposure. Corrosion related pipe failure would result in release from the ammonia refrigeration system. Release of anhydrous ammonia refrigerant from the system exposes employees to chemical hazards such as chemical burns, over exposure and/or asphyxiation.
OSH ACT of 1970 Section (5)(a)(1): The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to anhydrous ammonia contact, asphyxiation and explosion hazards related to potential release from the ammonia refrigeration system.
(a) On or about June 25, 2025, the employer had not preformed frequent and periodic testing on vessel HTR01 (National Board NO: 11045, Serial NO:98206) to ensure that the vessel was maintained and operated within the design specifications. This pressure vessel, also known as the liquid receiver, had never been inspected to determine if under insulation exterior corrosion and pitting related deterioration exceeded minimum wall thickness. Failure to inspect critical process equipment, such as liquid receiver pressure vessels, increases the risk for loss of containment and release from the covered process and potential exposure for employees to ammonia contact, asphyxiation and explosion hazards.
29 CFR 1910.120(q)(6): Training shall be based on the duties and function to be performed by each responder of an emergency response organization. The skill and knowledge levels required for all new responders, those hired after the effective date of this standard, shall be conveyed to them through training before they are permitted to take part in actual emergency operations on an incident. Employees who participate, or are expected to participate, in emergency response, shall be given training in accordance with the following paragraphs:
(a) On or about June 25, 2025, and times prior, the employer failed to train employees on their emergency action plan for large and small releases of anhydrous ammonia. The employees did not know about the secondary rally point and did not receive training on specific procedures for large and small releases of anhydrous ammonia.
SAFTENG NOTE: Interesting they went with (q)(6) in the HAZWOPER standards rather than 1910.38 EAP.
Source: https://www.osha.gov/ords/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=1833122.015