Chemical Process Safety (PSM/RMP)

Why I would never ask… “What if the RV has an incorrect set point” in my What-if Analysis

As I have stated already this week, I am a HAZOP kind of guy.  I have used just about every methodology under the sun over the past 25+ years, and I have come to a personal conclusion that in almost every occasion, a HAZOP would have been the best methodology to utilize for a correct…...

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What is my FIRST LAYER of protection?

Earlier this week I posted about how a PHA should document its consideration of the engineering controls and administrative controls failing. And I said back in the 2013 posting; this little requirement is intended to make facilities dig past a single layer of protection and maybe even identify a lack of engineering and/or administrative controls…...

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OSHA’s Potential Revisions to the Process Safety Management Standard

With all the recent attention being paid to EPA and it’s Risk Management Plan amendments and many of those amendments being rescinded by the new administration, I thought it would be a good time to remind those in the PSM/RMP world, that OSHA has their own wish list (my phrase – not theirs) and some of…...

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EPA’s Proposed Changes: Rescind Incident Investigation, Third-Party Audit, Safer Technology and Alternatives Analysis (STAA), and Other Prevention Program Amendments (May 2018)

In the RMP Amendments rule, EPA added three major provisions to the accident prevention program of Subparts C (for Program 2 processes)and D (for Program 3 processes). These included: A requirement in § 68.60 and § 68.81 for all facilities with Program 2 or 3 processes to conduct a root cause analysis using a recognized…...

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EPA’s estimated costs of chemical accidents with off-site impacts

EPA monetized both on-site and off-site damages. EPA estimated total average annual on-site damages of $265.8 million. The largest monetized average annual on-site damage was on-site property damage, which resulted in average annual damage of approximately $205.5 million. The next largest impact was on-site fatalities ($49.8 million) and injuries ($10.5 million).  EPA estimated total average…...

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Try to look at your next PHA in a different frame of mind

Over the years I have facilitated and participated in hundreds of PHAs from toxics to flammables and even some explosives (although not my thing!).  And in doing so, one thing that drives me crazy is the lack of structure in how process deviations are identified and studied/analyzed.  I love the HAZOP methodology and hate the…...

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Recommended improvements to EPA’s RMP inspection process (OIG 2018)

In the EPA Office of Inspector General’s Semiannual Report to Congress: Oct 1, 2017 – March 31, 2018 we see two “recommendations” regarding the manner in which EPA conducts their Risk Management Plan (RMP) audits and how the OIG feels the process could be improved upon.  These are a continuation of improvement from the 2013…...

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OSHA’s official interpretation and explanation of the phrase “on site in one location”

For some reason, we have seen a spike in questions and request to assess the applicability of PSM/RMP covered process(s), and this is beyond the typical “can use the Meer decision to get our flammable process out of PSM?” questions.  So I thought it would be helpful to publish OSHA’s official interpretation and explanation of…...

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Difference between Maximum Intended Inventory and “the charge” in an NH3 refrigeration process

This week I have been working with a new member who has become frustrated with all the different directions and “interpretations” regarding OSHA’s and EPA’s Maximum Intended Inventory requirements.  This is my e-mail response – names and titles have been changed to protect the innocent! (LOL) I feel your pain, this one small topic has…...

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CAL-OSHA’s Annual PSM Report

The PSM Unit enforces occupational safety and health standards applicable to 14 petroleum refineries and 1,940 chemical plants in California. The chemical plants handle or process 50 million to 120 million pounds of hazardous chemicals every year. Inspections target high-risk facilities and focus on timely, effective abatement. Table 1. Inspections completed during the calendar year…...

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RMP Reconsideration Proposed Rule Fact Sheet (May 2018)

EPA is proposing changes to a final rule, the Risk Management Program (RMP) Amendments (82 FR 4594, January 13, 2017) to better address potential security risks and reasonable consideration of costs. The proposed changes are intended to promote better emergency planning and public information about accidents and maintain the trend of fewer significant accidents involving…...

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Hot Work and an IMPAIRED SPRINKLER (and update FM HW Data Sheet)

In the PSM/RMP world, where Hot Work (HW) permits and all of 1910.252(a) are requirements, we tend to find HW programs, permits, and practices not meeting this critical requirement for SAFE HW.  This is caused by a wide array of errors, from the written program/permit omitting this requirement, training not covering this requirement, and/or personnel…...

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