Chemical Process Safety (PSM/RMP)

Minimum pressure for a sucessful “bubble test”

In some processes, there is ALWAYS a need to “leak test” before returning a segment of piping to service. These “leak test” pressures are done at NORMAL Operating pressures using a calibrated solution such as SNOOP. And every once in a while, I get a question about doing a “leak test” at some really low…...

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With this weeks highs below 10F, this needs to be said (Leak Testing)

There are limitations on even the best “bubble solutions” used for “leak testing. My favorite is SNOOPS, and as I indicated in the title, even it has limitations. There are two (2) different types of SNOOPS:… Membership Required You must be a member to access this content.View Membership LevelsAlready a member? Log in here...

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Natural Gas Code and testing piping after repairs and alterations

The old question… Do we need to pressure-test and leak-test our piping after we breach the pressure boundary? My response is always YES; however, the International Gas Code says something very different. Can we apply this approach to ASME B31.3 piping?… Membership Required You must be a member to access this content.View Membership LevelsAlready a...

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When the room design proves the PSV is not “discharging to a safe location”

This is a real-life story of Elimination vs. Engineering Control We see some odd designs in our work around the world, but recently we came across a setup that defied any logic for a relief valve design basis. For some reason, the OEM and Installer of this process equipment wanted it enclosed for “efficiency”; however,…...

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Ai agrees with me on “pressure decay” NOT being an acceptable leak test method

I fight this battle every year! It’s usually a learning experience for people unfamiliar with chemical processing and ASME B31.3. But I do my best to ensure they understand how the 10-minute Pressure Test is done, and then how the Leak Testing is done. So today I decided I need to “test” my practice that…...

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CSB’s Safety Bulletin – REMOVAL OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL FROM PIPING SYSTEMS (2004)

Chemical and refinery facility personnel open piping and equipment to perform routine maintenance, add/replace components, or modify pipe routing. The piping may contain hazardous material, such as flammable hydrocarbons, toxic chemicals, or thermally reactive chemicals. Safe work practices dictate the removal or mechanical isolation of hazardous material from piping and equipment (e.g., using valves or…...

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OPEN ended piping in Hazardous Materials process

In an earlier post tonight, I shared an OSHA Hazard Bulletin from 1993 titled: Chemical Exposures from Industrial Valve and Piping Systems. In that Bulletin OSHA, talks about the hazards and accidents related to workers opening processes. But there is another serious error we see often… Open Ended Piping. This is a serious NO-NO in…...

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OSHA’s 1993 Hazard Bulletin on Line/Equipment Openings

OSHA Hazard Information Bulletins – Chemical Exposures from Industrial Valve and Piping Systems May 14, 1996 MEMORANDUM FOR: REGIONAL ADMINISTRATORS FROM: MICHAEL CONNORSDEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SUBJECT: Hazard Information Bulletin – Chemical Exposures from Industrial Valve and Piping Systems The purpose of this Hazard Information Bulletin is to heighten public awareness of the potential for death,…...

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Sampling from a “Live Process”

The risks in sampling activities can be off the charts without engineering controls, Administrative Controls, and PPE. This post shares my sampling system. I learned this the hard way, and I hope some will take this advice and reduce the risks when we ask operators to collect a sample from a “live process”. As I…...

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A 5,200-gallon polyethylene storage tank ruptured fatally injuring an employee

On June 22, 2023, at about 9:10 p.m., a 5,200-gallon polyethylene storage tank (“tank”) ruptured. The rupture fatally injured one employee. At the time of the incident, the tank needed to be refilled with aluminum chloride; however, sulfuric acid was added instead. Approximately 80 gallons of 93 percent sulfuric acid were added to the 60…...

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Lack of ventilation, fixed gas detection, draining hazardous materials SOP, and personal gas monitor leads to asphyxiation fatality

During the morning of February 24, 2023, an unknown amount of hydrocarbons and hydrogen sulfide were released, fatally injuring an employee inside an enclosed building at an oil and gas facility in North Dakota. The hydrocarbons and hydrogen sulfide displaced the oxygen in the building, and the employee asphyxiated in the oxygen-deficient atmosphere. The employee…...

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Contractor’s Scissor Lift causes 22,000 pound fatal NH3 release

On December 19, 2022, at approximately 11:10 a.m., an accidental release of 22,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia occurred from the NH3 refrigeration process at a food processing facility in Norwood, Massachusetts. Exposure to the toxic ammonia vapor fatally injured one contract worker and seriously injured another contract worker. In addition, the release caused about $4…...

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