Based on the feedback from other SAFTENG members, I have made this article public for the next 30 days. Much like the process safety debates around valve/equipment labeling, no RAGAGEP specifically requires a unique identifier on every valve or piece of equipment. Yet, labeling valves/equipment within the covered process is necessary to manage the process’s…...
HAZLOCs and Labeling Read More »
EPA has found that major chemical accidents continue to occur from facilities that are not adequately managing the risks they pose to ensure the safety of their facilities and protect surrounding communities. Many of these communities have environmental justice concerns or face climate change-related hazards or both. Thousands of facilities nationwide make, use, and store…...
National Enforcement and Compliance Initiative: Chemical Accident Risk Reduction (2024) Read More »
The Program 3 prevention program requirements under 40 CFR Part 68 are almost identical to the requirements of OSHA’s process safety management (PSM) standard. OSHA exempts certain industries from the PSM standard. Why does EPA not exempt those same industries from the CAA §112(r) risk management program requirements?… Membership Required You must be a member...
UPDATED: Why are industries exempt under OSHA’s PSM subject to RMP? Read More »
When selecting the worst-case release scenario for Program 2 and 3 processes as required by 40 CFR §68.25, a stationary source owner or operator must analyze the release scenario that results in the greatest distance to an endpoint. Does the “greatest distance to an endpoint” refer to the greatest total distance from the process (e.g.,…...
Does the distance to endpoint start at the process or stationary source boundary? Read More »
On Dec. 3, 2004, a 50,000-pound steel pressure vessel violently exploded at the southwest Houston Marcus Oil and Chemical facility. The pressure vessel contained flammable hydrocarbons such as hexane. The pressure vessel was a horizontal tank 12 feet in diameter, 50 feet long, and operated at a pressure of approximately 67 psi. Marcus Oil did…...
Not following National Board code for repairs to PVs can be very costly Read More »
On January 15, 2008, a pressure vessel at a New Jersey foundry exploded, killing one 60-year-old worker instantly while injuring eight other workers with shrapnel. The pressure vessel in question was used to pressurize/depressurize molten aluminum to prevent/eliminate porosity from the metal. The incident occurred while two (2) workers, including the one who was killed,…...
Leak Testing a PV kills worker Read More »
In June 2008, a cylinder was dropped, and its top valve hit a concrete platform. The impact of the cylinder valve on the concrete caused the threads on the screw connection, which held the valve on the cylinder, to fail, resulting in complete separation of the valve from the cylinder. The cylinder’s internal pressure was…...
Halon Cylinder is dropped and becomes projectile Read More »
At 11:30 p.m. on March 19, 2009, Solus Industrial Innovations LLC employees from the third shift had just come to work. Their employer is a manufacturer of plastic conveyor parts. One employee (Employee #1) pointed out to the on-shift supervisor that there was a pool of water near an 80-gallon water heater that was being…...
Hot Water Heater catastrophically fails, killing two (2) workers Read More »
In May 2009, a compressed air tank failed, blowing the bottom off of the tank and sending fragments flying into a concrete wall, puncturing the wall. The investigation following the incidentrevealed several serious problems with the condition of the tank, including severe corrosion and rust at the bottom of the tank, where it failed, and…...
Compressed Air Receiver Catastrophic Failure Read More »
On March 3, 2010, a Peoples Gas worker died, and another was seriously injured after they were struck by a pipe while pressure-testing an underground gas main…. Membership Required You must be a member to access this content.View Membership LevelsAlready a member? Log in here...
GAS MAIN acts as a PROJECTILE during PRESSURE-TESTING Read More »
Summary On the days leading to January 6, 2014, unusual weather conditions with high-temperature variations caused a large pressure rise inside the three storage vessels at the Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) compressed natural gas (CNG) fueling facility. The pressure increase reached the point where the relief valve on each vessel opened automatically and released gas…...
Relief valve system failure during unplanned CNG release Read More »
Worker Fatality During Attempted Removal of Blind Flange on Cell 14 Magnet Cooling Water System Summary On October 21, 2015, two National High Magnetic Field Laboratory (NHMFL) mechanical technicians were involved in an incident while attempting to remove a Victaulic blind flange from supply piping on a Magnet Cooling Water (MCW) System. The mechanical technicians…...
Line Break gone bad (pulling blind flange) Read More »
