Throughout my career, I have been called “crazy,” “certifiable,” “unreasonable,” etc. I have worn those insults as a badge of honor, as in my professional opinion, there is nothing too crazy to protect the men and women doing the dirty and dangerous work! So buckle up, as this thought process may push you over the…...
Li Battery Storage ideas (compartmentalizing our risks) Read More »
Many safety pros struggle to get management to understand the “indirect costs” of accidents. This is a real cost to the business, but those outside our profession are so far outside that they struggle to grasp the “indirect cost.” Heck, many fail to grasp the “direct costs” since they do not come out of their…...
Accidents, their cost, and traffic jams caused by accidents Read More »
I was recently involved in a safety review at a client with two (2) separate LOTO failure events in a month. I know this client and the PM very well, and I was never more disappointed in their decisions about the discipline around these two (2) very different LOTO events. One event resulted in NO…...
Based on the feedback from other SAFTENG members, I have made this article public for the next 30 days. Much like the process safety debates around valve/equipment labeling, no RAGAGEP specifically requires a unique identifier on every valve or piece of equipment. Yet, labeling valves/equipment within the covered process is necessary to manage the process’s…...
HAZLOCs and Labeling Read More »
Scenario: In your letter, you state that an employee who does not have a fixed work site left his home and traveled approximately 300 miles to a customer site. After the employee arrived at the customer site, he checked into a hotel and conducted work activities for several days. Once the work activities at the…...
Recently, a client had two (2) heat-related incidents within one (1) week. This after, we forced a download of the OSHA/NIOSH Heat App to all company phones. I have used this technique to ensure front-line supervisors and managers have a TOOL to help them manage the Heat Prevention Plan requirements. I have used this forced…...
EPA has found that major chemical accidents continue to occur from facilities that are not adequately managing the risks they pose to ensure the safety of their facilities and protect surrounding communities. Many of these communities have environmental justice concerns or face climate change-related hazards or both. Thousands of facilities nationwide make, use, and store…...
National Enforcement and Compliance Initiative: Chemical Accident Risk Reduction (2024) Read More »
The Program 3 prevention program requirements under 40 CFR Part 68 are almost identical to the requirements of OSHA’s process safety management (PSM) standard. OSHA exempts certain industries from the PSM standard. Why does EPA not exempt those same industries from the CAA §112(r) risk management program requirements?… Membership Required You must be a member...
UPDATED: Why are industries exempt under OSHA’s PSM subject to RMP? Read More »
When selecting the worst-case release scenario for Program 2 and 3 processes as required by 40 CFR §68.25, a stationary source owner or operator must analyze the release scenario that results in the greatest distance to an endpoint. Does the “greatest distance to an endpoint” refer to the greatest total distance from the process (e.g.,…...
Does the distance to endpoint start at the process or stationary source boundary? Read More »
The alleged violations below have been grouped because they involve similar or related hazards that may increase the potential for injury or illness…. Membership Required You must be a member to access this content.View Membership LevelsAlready a member? Log in here...
OSHA PSM citations @ Food plant (NH3 & $64K) Read More »
For me, SIF is just using Process Safety Management (PSM) tools for lower-frequency, higher-severity events, whereas traditional “recordable injuries” can be managed with the traditional Safety Management System (SMS). But here is the catch… the consequence may be more severe (serious), but the failures that led to those consequences can all be traced back to…...
The SIF debate is alive and well in the EHS community Read More »
Heinrich did not blame workers for accidents—quite the opposite. He was more in the camp of Latent Organizational Failures, as James Reason taught us in the 1980s. In this passage from his 1928 article “The Origin of Accidents”, Travelers, we can see his position on accidents on full display… Remember, he said this 96 years…...
Safety Thought of the Week & more defending of H.W. Heinrich’s work Read More »
