Safety Thought of the Week

“… an attitude of frustration or an internal state of distress can certainly influence driving behaviors, and vice versa. Indeed, internal (unobserved) personal states of mind continually influence observable behaviors, while changes in observable behaviors continually affect changes in person states or attitudes. Thus, it is possible to “think a person into safe behaviors” (through…...

Safety should be an unwritten rule, a social norm, that workers follow regardless of the situation. It should become a value that is never questioned—never compromised. It is human nature to shift priorities, or behavioral hierarchies, according to situational demands or contingencies. But values remain constant. The early morning anecdote illustrates that the activity of…...

Catastrophe requires multiple failures – single-point failures are not enough The array of defenses works. System operations are generally successful. Overt catastrophic failure occurs when small, apparently innocuous failures join to create opportunity for a systemic accident. Each of these small failures is necessary to cause catastrophe but only the combination is sufficient to permit…...

Why do “lagging indicators” remain such a popular means of gauging/measuring the success of the safety effort?  We should measure the results and that these lagging indicators can/do play a role in measuring our success in all functions within a business. However, as I would like to point out to C-Suite executives, the company does…...

A bloody episode in a long war introduces the idea that defenses designed to protect against one kind of hazard can render their users prey to other kinds of danger, usually not foreseen by those who created them or even appreciated by those who use them. In short, defenses can be dangerous. This is no…...

It is suggested that LATENT ORGANIZATIONAL failures are analogous to the “resident pathogens” within the human body, which combine with external factors (stress, toxic agencies, etc.) to bring about disease. Like cancers and cardiovascular disorders, accidents in complex, defended systems do NOT arise from single causes. They occur through the unforeseen (and often unforeseeable) concatenation…...

So many want to accuse Heinrich of being too heavy on “unsafe acts” and claim that he held the workers too responsible for their injuries. This is just pure hogwash! I have shared many passages from Heinrich’s writings from the 1920s-1930, and each one clearly shows that he was more a fan of what we…...

These days, too many companies have short-circuited their “new employee safety orientation.” They have either substantially shortened the time employees are in “safety orientation” or, worse, changed the format from face-to-face to a CBT format using information that is NOT even specific to the site-specific safety programs/practices. And then they call me and ask, “Why…...

I have discussed this approach before but think it is worth repeating. In our SMS/Safety Process, we need to view the men and women who do our dirty and dangerous work as our “customers,” just like we view our business customers through the lens of our Quality Management System (QMS). Imagine the outcome if we…...

Imagine trying to build a house today without the proper tools, such as a hammer/nail gun, handsaw/power saw, and tape measure. These are obviously critical to the task being done WELL and EFFICENTLY. Sure, we could build a house without them, but would it be one we would buy and put our family in for…...

In a mature Safety Process/SMS these four (4) elements play a critical role in delivering VALIDATED data to management so that the data can be analyzed and properly responded to in order to INTERVENE in the conditions/actions/attitudes BEFORE an event delivers undesired consequences. The late great Trevor Kletz said it best three decades ago in…...

All this talk about “Sh_t That Can Kill You” (STCKY) and focusing on those Low-Frequency, High-Severity risks is just one of the current safety fads. I like SIF, and if you really think about it, SIF and Process Safety are very much aligned. But I have never understood why it needed to be its own…...