Respondent owns and operates a petroleum product refinery. In May 2017 there was a refinery-wide power outage that resulted in flaring and a large release of sulfur dioxide and flammable materials from the Facility. In response to this incident, members of the public were evacuated, required to shelter in place, or visited the emergency room of local hospitals. In March 2019, the Facility experienced equipment failure that resulted in flaring and a large release of sulfur dioxide. In response to this incident, Solano County issued an advisory for residents with respiratory conditions. After these incidents, EPA performed several site visits as part of an inspection of the Facility between March 29, 2019, and July 30, 2019, to evaluate the Respondent’s implementation of and compliance with the requirements of Section 112(r) of the CAA, Sections 304-312 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (“EPCRA”), and Section 103 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”).
VIOLATIONS
COUNT I – Failure to Timely Report Releases of an Extremely Hazardous Substance
Between March 3, 2016, and May 7, 2019, the Facility did not immediately report eleven releases of sulfur dioxide, which were over the 500-pound RQ, to the SERC and LEPC.
Failure to immediately report the releases of sulfur dioxide in excess of the RQ violated EPCRA Section 304.
COUNT II – Failure to Properly Identify Anhydrous Ammonia in Annual Tier II Hazardous Materials Inventory Reporting
Respondent is required to submit an annual inventory form pursuant to Section 312 of EPCRA and 40 C.F.R. § 370.25. Respondent failed to properly identify anhydrous ammonia in its 2019 inventory form.
By failing to properly identify anhydrous ammonia in its annual inventory form, Respondent violated EPCRA Section 312 and implementing regulations at 40 C.F.R. §§ 370.40 and 370.42.
COUNT III – Failure To Immediately Report a Release of a Hazardous Substance
The Respondent did not immediately report a release of COS on January 12, 2016, which was over the 100-pound RQ, to the NRC.
The failure to immediately report the release of COS in excess of the RQ violated CERCLA Section 103 and 40 C.F.R. § 302.6.
COUNT IV – Failure to Report Release Exceeding Reportable Quantities
On 57 separate dates between January 1 and September 26, 2019, the Facility discharged benzene and xylene in exceedance of the RQs from a continuous atmospheric process vent.
This set of releases could properly have been reported as a continuous release pursuant to 40 C.F.R. §§ 302.8 and 355.32.
Respondent did not submit an initial report for the continuous process vent to atmosphere and did not report the 57 individual releases which exceeded the RQs in 2019. By failing to provide an initial report of the continuous release and failing to report the exceedances of reportable quantities, Respondent violated Section 103 of CERCLA, Section 304 of EPCRA, and 40 C.F.R. §§ 302.8, 355.30, 355.32 and 355.60.
COUNT V – Failure to Update Process Safety Information
Nine of the Respondent’s P&IDs were inconsistent between the drawings and in the field, including valve locations, valve sizes, and local gauges.
By failing to maintain current process safety information, Respondent violated CAA Section 112(r)(7) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(ii).
COUNT VI – Failure to Update Process Safety Information
Respondent failed to update data sheets for Pressure Relief Valves (“PRVs”) SV-107, SV- 126a, SV-126b, SV-318, SV-3052, and SV-10109 to reflect changes in equipment, operating conditions, and crude properties.
By failing to maintain current process safety information, Respondent violated CAA Section 112(r)(7) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(iv).
COUNT VII- Failure to Document Process Safety Information Relating to Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices
Respondent failed to adequately document the effect of fouling in the Crude Unit feed preheat system and associated PRVs.
By failing to document that the Crude Unit feed preheat system complies with RAGAGEP, Respondent violated CAA Section 112(r)(7) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2).
COUNT VIII – Failure to Adequately Address the Hazards and Complete Qualitative Analyses Within Process Hazard Analyses
The Respondent prepared PHAs for the Flare and Chemical Storage Utilities, Coker Unit, Fluidized Catalytic Cracking Unit (“FCCU”), and Crude Unit. Within the PHAs and related documents, the Respondent failed to adequately analyze multiple hazards, including those related to: power disruptions; effect of inadvertent activation of PRV 107 bypassing the Crude Unit feed preheat system and heater F-105; not considering the effect of partial unit shutdowns; effect of caustic fouling in the Crude Unit feed preheat system and the PRVs; and hydrocarbon carryover to a vent with possible ignition.
By failing to adequately analyze hazards of the process Respondent violated CAA Section 112(r)(7) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c)(1) and (c)(7).
COUNT IX – Failure to Address Engineering and Administrative Controls and Qualitative Evaluation in PHAs
The Flare and Chemical Storage Utilities PHA was not titled or described as including a LOPA or SPA, and used modifiers to reduce perceived risk. In addition, the Respondent’s policies provided no explicit restrictions on the number of modifiers used per scenario.
The Flare and Chemical Storage Utilities, Coker Unit and Crude Unit PHAs used generic engineering and administrative controls such as, but not limited to, “operator training” and “global mechanical integrity program.” Operator training and a mechanical integrity program are not engineering or administrative controls (also known as safeguards) and they do not apply to the specific scenario being analyzed but rather to the entire process.
Respondent used modifiers and generic, rather than specific, engineering and administrative controls in its PHAs. This likely affected the engineering and administrative controls analysis applicable to the hazards and their interrelationships, and the qualitative evaluation of a range of the possible safety and health effects of failure of controls.
By using these modifiers and generic engineering and administrative controls Respondent violated CAA Section 112(r)(7) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c)(3) and (c)(7).
COUNT X – Failure to Adequately Develop and Implement Written Operating Procedures
The Respondent’s operating procedures for the Coker Unit and Crude Unit did not adequately address: operation of a process heater in low flow conditions as a result of an inadvertent PSV lift; operation of a process heater beyond the temperature limits; temporary operation during a partial shutdown; temporary operation for on-line steam out process; and startup after a partial shutdown.
By failing to develop and/or implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for conducting certain operating activities applicable to Respondent’s Coker Unit and Crude Unit operations at the Facility, Respondent violated CAA Section 112(r)(7) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a).
COUNT XI – Failure to Develop and Implement Written Operating Procedures that Address the Consequences of Deviations and the Steps to Avoid or Correct the Deviation
In operating procedures such as but not limited to “APS Crude for Hot Restart,” “Pipestill Emergency Shutdown,” “Hydroblast Instrument Tap,” “Power Failure,” “Diesel Hydrotreater Unit Electrical Power Failure,” “Naphtha Reformer Loss of Electrical Power,” “Fluid Catalytic Power Failure,” and for units such as but not limited to the Crude Unit, Coker Unit, Alkylation Unit, Hydrotreating Units, Reformer Unit and FCCU, the consequences of deviation and steps required to correct or avoid the deviations were not addressed directly in the operating procedures, but rather were maintained as separate documents not referenced in the procedures.
By failing to develop and implement clear operating procedures that address the consequences of deviations and the steps to avoid or correct the deviation, Respondent violated CAA Section 112(r)(7) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(2).
COUNT XII – Failure to Develop and Implement Written Operating Procedures that Address the Hazards of the Materials, Control Measures to be Taken, and the Correct Personnel Protective Equipment Required
In operating procedures such as but not limited to “APS Crude for Hot Restart,” “Pipestill Emergency Shutdown,” “Hydroblast Instrument Tap,” “Power Failure,” “Diesel Hydrotreater Unit Electrical Power Failure,” “Naphtha Reformer Loss of Electrical Power,” “Fluid Catalytic Power Failure,” and for units such as but not limited to the Crude Unit, Coker Unit, Alkylation Unit, Hydrotreating Units, Reformer Unit and FCCU, the properties of, and hazards presented by, the chemicals used in the process; precautions necessary to prevent exposure, including engineering controls, administrative controls, and personal protective equipment; and control measures to be taken if physical contact or airborne exposure occurs were not addressed directly in the procedures but rather were maintained as separate documents not referenced in the procedures.
By failing to address properties of, and hazards presented by, the chemicals used in the process; precautions necessary to prevent exposure, including engineering controls, administrative controls, and personal protective equipment; and control measures to be taken if physical contact or airborne exposure occurs in the operating procedures, Respondent violated CAA Section 112(r)(7) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(3).
COUNT XIII – Failure to Make All Operating Procedures Accessible to Operators
Respondent’s practice of maintaining “controlled access” operating procedures limited employees’ access to some operating procedures, including normal startup and normal shutdown procedures.
By failing to make “controlled access” operating procedures readily available to employees who work in or maintain the process, Respondent violated CAA Section 112(r)(7) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(b).
COUNT XIV – Failure to Annually Certify that All Operating Procedures are Current and Accurate
Respondent did not annually certify controlled access operating procedures as current and accurate, including normal start up and shut down procedures.
By failing to annually certify that all of its operating procedures were current and accurate, Respondent violated CAA Section 112(r)(7) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(c).
COUNT XV – Failure to Conduct Frequent Inspections and Testing Related to Mechanical Integrity
Respondent failed to document inspection and testing of a process heater low pass flow shutdown system at the frequency required in its documentation.
By failing to perform inspection and testing at a frequency consistent with its own requirements, Respondent violated CAA Section 112(r)(7) and 40 C.F.R.§ 68.73(d)(3).
COUNT XVI – Failure to Correct Deficiencies in Equipment Related to Mechanical Integrity
Respondent failed to timely repair or replace malfunctioning thermowells/temperature monitoring locations in a process heater, prior to further use.
Respondent’s failure to repair or replace malfunctioning thermowells/temperature monitoring locations prior to further use is a violation of CAA Section 112(r)(7) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(e).
COUNT XVII – Failure to Address Critical Recommendations from a Compliance Audit
In 2014, Respondent performed a compliance audit of the Facility. Critical recommendations from this compliance audit, including recommendations to address outdated or missing PRV information, were not marked “closed” as of the time of EPA’s inspections in 2019, and for some time afterwards.
By failing to promptly address the recommendations from its 2014 compliance audit, Respondent violated CAA Section 112(r)(7) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(d).
COUNT XVIII – Failure to Perform an Incident Investigation and Failure to Perform an Adequate Incident Investigation
EPA found one instance where an investigation was not performed after an incident on or around November 5, 2018, when it was discovered that a PRV pilot line filter was installed upside-down since 2008, which, if failed open undetected for a long period of time could theoretically result in an environmental exceedance; and another incident on or around November 3, 2018, where an inadequate “five-why” investigation methodology was applied to an incident when a PRV malfunctioned, resulting in a failure to consider or document all factors that contributed to the incident.
By failing to perform an investigation of an incident and its failure to perform an adequate investigation of an incident, Respondent violated CAA Section 112(r)(7) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.81(a) and (d).
CIVIL ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTY
EPA proposes that Respondent be assessed, and Respondent agrees to pay ONE MILLION, TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS ($1,224,550), as the civil administrative penalty for the violations alleged herein.
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