Respondent is the owner and/or operator of the Facility, which operates a coal gasification manufacturing plant. At this plant, Respondent uses a coal gasification process to produce industrial chemicals from coal. The reaction takes place at high temperatures and pressures in a series of process vessels and piping called process trains. The facility operates two process trains. When one train is taken offline for maintenance, the other is started up. The process involves the formation of hydrogen sulfide, which is a substance produced, processed, and handled by Respondent at the Facility.
Hydrogen Sulfide is regulated as an extremely hazardous substance under Section 112(r)(1) and (3) of the Act.
On October 4, 2017, Respondent’s Facility experienced a series of explosions that originated within the Facility’s coal gasification plant. The explosions caused damage to the Facility and released chemicals. The incident occurred while the Respondent was starting to switch one coal gasifier train to maintenance mode. The Facility’s coal gasification plant has two coal gasification trains. Switching from one train to the other (e.g., for maintenance, such as cleaning) requires complete isolation of the non-operating train prior to flushing the coal slurry lines with wash water.
The explosions resulted from the failure to isolate the process train due to an isolation valve failing to fully close. The failure to fully close the isolation valve allowed water to flow in the direction of the active process train preventing the flow of coal slurry and halting its normal reaction of coal to hydrogen and conversion chemicals. The buildup of hydrogen interacting with excess oxygen resulted in explosions. The explosions caused damage to the Facility and released chemicals.
The Respondent reported that 53 pounds (lbs) of hydrogen sulfide were released from the incident described in Paragraphs 15 and 16. Explosive hydrogen was generated in the incident; however, the Respondent stated that the hydrogen was consumed by the explosions.
Based on information obtained from the Respondent in response to the EPA’s November 26, 2019, information request letter and at, and following, the meetings referenced in Paragraph 19, the EPA determined that:
a. The isolation valve was put in service at the Facility in the 1980s;
b. Beginning at the time that the valve was put in service until January 18, 2018, which was after the incident, Respondent had not performed and prepared a hazard analysis assessing the risk of water intruding into the coal gasification train(s) and the risk of failure of isolation valves to prevent water from flowing into the gasifier process;
c. Beginning at the time when the valve was put in service until January 18, 2018, Respondent had not prepared written procedures for the operation of the isolation valve;
d. Prior to the incident, the open/closed indicator on the isolation valve was both misaligned and dirty, making it difficult or impossible to use the indicator to determine if the valve was closed, and no other indicators of valve closure (either mechanical or computerized) were in use; and
e. Prior to the incident, Respondent was operating the coal gasification system without safeguards such as software, hardware, and
physical preventive measures to prevent wash water from intruding into the hot process train.
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
Based on the above-referenced Findings of Facts, the EPA alleges that the Respondent violated the General Duty Clause under Section 112(r)(1) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1), by:
a. Failing to identify hazards associated with the isolation valves, using appropriate hazard assessment techniques; and,
b. Failing to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases by not developing written procedures for the isolation valve to ensure complete closure of the valve; relying on a valve closed/open indicator that was dirty and misaligned to determine closure of the valve; and not having safeguards in place such as software, hardware and physical measures to prevent wash water from intruding into the hot process train.
TERMS OF PAYMENT
Respondent consents to the payment of a civil penalty, which was calculated in accordance with the Act, in the amount of $62,547.00, which is to be paid within thirty (30) calendar days of the Effective Date of this CAFO.
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECT
In response to the alleged violations of CAA Section 112(r) and in settlement of this matter, although not required by CAA Section 112(r) or any other federal, state or local law, Respondent agrees to implement a supplemental environmental project (SEP), as described in Appendix A (“the SEP”).
Respondent shall complete an Emergency Planning and Preparedness SEP consisting of the purchase and donation of emergency response equipment to the Kingsport, Tennessee Fire Department. The SEP is more specifically described in Appendix A and incorporated herein by
reference.
Respondent shall spend no less than $64,620 on implementing the SEP. Respondent shall include documentation of the expenditures made in connection with the SEP as part of the SEP Completion Report. If Respondent’s implementation of the SEP as described in Appendix A
does not expend the full amount set forth in this paragraph, and if EPA determines that the amount remaining reasonably could be applied toward the purchase of additional emergency response equipment, Respondent will purchase the additional equipment and donate it to the
Kingsport, Tennessee Fire Department.
Appendix A – Supplemental Environmental Project
The Respondent will purchase the following equipment and donate this equipment to the SEP Recipient
1. Battery powered TNT Tools extrication tool sets (quantity two in total)
2. Battery powered Milwaukee K9 circular rescue saws (quantity six in total)
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