EPA RMP Citations @ a chemical manufacturing, warehouse, and distribution facility (NH3, CL2, GDC; $114K)

This CAFO resolves the following CAA violations that Complainant alleges occurred in conjunction with Respondent’s storage and handling of hazardous substances at its facility:

1. Failure to prepare and submit a Risk Management Plan that includes all covered processes, in violation of 40 C.F.R. §68.12(a) and 68.150(a);
2. Failure to comply with process safety information requirements, including documentation of compliance with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices, in violation of 40 C.F.R.§ 68.65 and/or 68.48; 
3. Failure to comply with operating procedures requirements, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.69; and 
4. Failure to design and maintain a safe facility, in violation of the General Duty Clause, Section 112(r)(l) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1).

Respondent uses and/or stores anhydrous ammonia, ammonia (20 percent or greater), and chlorine, each an RMP Chemical, at the Facility.  Other chemicals found at the Facility, such as hydrochloric acid, nitric acid, sulfuric acid, acetic acid, phosphoric acid, polyphosphoric acid, potassium hydroxide, sodium hydroxide, sodium hypochlorite, hydrogen peroxide, potassium permanganate, ferric chloride, sodium bisulfite, sodium persulfate, sodium silicate, potassium fluoride, and copper sulfate, either alone or improperly co-located with at least one of the other chemicals listed, are chemicals that may, as a result of short-term exposures associated with releases to the air, cause death, injury, or property damage due to their toxicity, reactivity, flammability, volatility, or corrosivity. Accordingly, they are “extremely hazardous substances” subject to the General Duty Clause of the CAA. Additionally, chlorine, ammonia, nitric acid, and sulfuric acid are “extremely hazardous substances” by virtue of their inclusion on the list of extremely hazardous substances published under Section 112(r)(3) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(3), 40 C.F.R. § 68.130, and/or the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (“EPCRA”), 40 C.F.R. Part 355, Appendix A.

On May 1 and 2, 2012, EPA conducted an inspection at the Facility to determine its compliance with Section 112(r) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r), and EPCRA (the “Inspection”).

Applicability of RMP requirements to the sodium hypochlorite production process

At the time of the Inspection, the Facility housed approximately 160,000 pounds of chlorine in a railcar which was connected with other containers and mixing vessels that also contained chlorine in a bleach production process in and around what Respondent refers to as Room A in Building 17 at the Facility (“sodium hypochlorite production process”). One of the vessels attached to this process was a tank labeled only with the notation “P 765,” which was later identified as containing sodium hypochlorite. Chlorine is an RMP Chemical listed at 40 C.F.R.§ 68.130, having a threshold quantity of 2,500 pounds. The use of chlorine in an interconnected system is a “covered process” as that term is defined in 40 C.F.R. § 68.3.

In 2008, the Facility filed a Program 3 RMP in which it reported that it used 720,000 pounds of chlorine in the sodium hypochlorite production process. In 2013, the Facility filed a Program 3 RMP in which it reported that it used 800,000 pounds of chlorine in the sodium hypochlorite production process.

Chemical inventory reports submitted by the Facility pursuant to EPCRA indicate that it used chlorine in amounts over the threshold quantity in the sodium hypochlorite production process in 2009, 2010, 2011 , and 2012. Currently, Respondent uses more than the threshold quantity of chlorine in the sodium hypochlorite production process. Accordingly, from at least 2008 through the present, chlorine is or has been “used,” “stored,” and “handled” in a covered process at the Facility in amounts greater than the threshold amount under 40 C.F.R.§ 68.130. The distance to a toxic or flammable endpoint for a worst-case release assessment of chlorine from the sodium hypochlorite production process at the Facility is greater than the distance to a public receptor.

Chlorine in an amount over the threshold quantity of 1,500 pounds is subject to OSHA’s PSM requirements at 29 C.F.R.§ 1910.119.

As the operator of a stationary source that has more than the threshold amount of a regulated substance in a covered process, Respondent was, at all times relevant to the allegations herein, subject to the RMP requirements of Part 68. In accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.10(a)-(d), Respondent’s storage, use, and processing of chlorine in the sodium hypochlorite production process is subject to Program 3 because (1) the distance to a toxic or flammable endpoint for a worst-case release of chlorine is greater than the distance to a public receptor, making the process ineligible for Program 1; and (2) the process is subject to OSHA’s PSM regulations.

Applicability of RMP requirements to the ammonium hydroxide production process

At the time of the Inspection, the Facility housed approximately 160,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia in a railcar which was connected with other containers and mixing vessels that contained ammonia in an ammonium hydroxide production process located in the southwest comer of the Facility outdoors near several piers along Mount Hope Bay (“ammonium hydroxide production process”).

Anhydrous ammonia is an RMP Chemical listed at 40 C.F.R. § 68.130, having a threshold quantity of 10,000 pounds. Ammonia (20% or greater) is an RMP Chemical listed at 40 C.F.R. § 68.130, having a threshold quantity of 20,000 pounds.

The ammonium hydroxide production process also includes the manufacture, handling, and storage of ammonia (20% or greater) in interconnected containers and tanks in an amount greater than the threshold quantity. The use, storage, manufacture, and/or handling of anhydrous ammonia and ammonia (20% or greater) in the ammonium hydroxide production process is a “covered process” as that term is defined in 40 C.F.R. § 68.3.

In 2008, the Facility filed a Program 3 RMP in which it reported that it used 720,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia and 500,000 pounds of ammonia (20% or greater) in the ammonium hydroxide production process. In 2013, the Facility filed a Program 3 RMP in which it reported that it used 720,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia and 681,000 pounds of ammonia (20% or greater) in the ammonium hydroxide production process.

Chemical inventory reports submitted by the Facility pursuant to EPCRA indicate that it used and stored anhydrous ammonia in amounts over the threshold quantity in the ammonium hydroxide production process in 2009, 2010, 2011 , and 2012. Chemical inventory reports submitted by the Facility pursuant to EPCRA further indicate that it used and stored ammonia (20% or greater) in amounts over the threshold quantity in the ammonium hydroxide production process in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012.

Currently, Respondent uses more than the threshold quantity of anhydrous ammonia and ammonia (20% or greater) in the ammonium hydroxide production process. Accordingly, from at least 2008 through the present, anhydrous ammonia and ammonia (20% or greater) are or have been “used,” “stored,” and “handled” in a covered process at the Facility in amounts greater than the threshold amounts under 40 C.F.R. § 68.130. The distance to a toxic or flammable endpoint for a worst-case release assessment of anhydrous ammonia from the ammonium hydroxide production process at the Facility is greater than the distance to a public receptor.

Anhydrous ammonia in an amount over the threshold quantity of 10,000 pounds is subject to OSHA’s PSM requirements at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119.
As the operator of a stationary source that has more than the threshold amount of a regulated substance in a covered process, Respondent was, at all times relevant to the allegations herein, subject to the RMP requirements of Part 68. In accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.10(a)-(d), Respondent’s storage and processing of anhydrous ammonia and ammonia (20 percent or greater) is subject to Program 3 because (1) the distance to a toxic or flammable endpoint for a worst-case release of anhydrous ammonia is greater than the distance to a public receptor, making the process ineligible for Program 1; and (2) the process is subject to OSHA’s PSM regulations.

Applicability of RMP requirements to the Railcar Receiving, Storage, and Handling process

The Facility also regularly receives, stores, and handles more than the respective threshold quantities of chlorine and anhydrous ammonia in railcars for a period of time before connecting the railcars to the sodium hypochlorite production process or the ammonium hydroxide production process. The Facility regularly receives notification that railcars of chlorine and/or anhydrous ammonia it ordered have been delivered to a fenced rail yard located approximately 0.15 miles from the sodium hypochlorite production process and 0.25 miles from the ammonium hydroxide production process (the “Fenced Rail Yard”). Once these railcars are delivered to the Fenced Rail Yard, the railcars are disconnected from an engine and left in the Fenced Rail Yard for the Facility to pick up. The Facility employees use an onsite Track Mobile to move the railcars from the Fenced Rail Yard to the process areas or to other areas of the Facility for temporary storage before being hooked up to the sodium hypochlorite and ammonium hydroxide production processes. The storage and handling of chlorine and anhydrous ammonia prior to connection to the sodium hypochlorite or ammonium hydroxide production process (the “railcar receiving, storage, and handling process”) is a “covered process” as that term is defined in 40 C.F.R. § 68.3.

Chemical inventory reports submitted by the Facility pursuant to EPCRA indicate that it used, stored, and handled chlorine in amounts over the threshold quantity in the railcar receiving, storage, and handling process in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012.

Chemical inventory reports submitted by the Facility pursuant to EPCRA indicate that it also used, stored, and handled anhydrous ammonia in amounts over the threshold quantity in the railcar receiving, storage, and handling process in 2009, 2010, 2011 , and 2012.

Currently, Respondent uses more than the threshold quantity of anhydrous ammonia and chlorine in the railcar receiving, storage, and handling process. Accordingly, from at least 2008 through the present, anhydrous ammonia and chlorine are or have been “stored” and “handled” in a covered process at the Facility in amounts greater than the threshold amounts under 40 C.F.R. § 68.130. The distance to a toxic or flammable endpoint for a worst-case release assessment of chlorine or anhydrous ammonia from the railcar receiving, storage, and handling process at the Facility is greater than the distance to a public receptor.

Chlorine in an amount over the threshold quantity of 1,500 pounds and anhydrous ammonia in an amount over the threshold quantity of 10,000 pounds are subject to OSHA’s PSM requirements at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119. As the operator of a stationary source that has more than the threshold amount of a regulated substance in a covered process, Respondent was, at all times relevant to the allegations herein, subject to the RMP requirements of Part 68. In accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.1O(a)-( d), Respondent’s storage and handling of chlorine and anhydrous ammonia in the railcar receiving, storage, and handling process is subject to Program 3 because (1) the distance to a toxic or flammable endpoint for a worst-case release of chlorine or anhydrous ammonia is greater than the distance to a public receptor, making the process ineligible for Program 1; and (2) the process is subject to OSHA’s PSM regulations.

Applicability of RMP requirements to the ammonium hydroxide repackaging process

The Facility also regularly handles and stores more than the threshold quantity of ammonia (20 percent or greater) in a series of interconnected and/or separate vessels located such that it could be involved in a potential release, inside and immediately outside Building 17, where the Facility repackages ammonium hydroxide from tanker trucks into drums, totes, and other containers and stores them prior to distribution (the “repackaging process”).

The on-site movement, handling, and storage of ammonia (20 percent or greater) in the repackaging process is a “covered process” as that term is defined in 40 C.F.R. § 68.3. In 2008, the Facility filed a Program 3 RMP in which it reported that it used 50,000 pounds of ammonia (20% or greater) and 50,000 pounds of formaldehyde in the repackaging process. In 2013, the Facility filed a Program 3 RMP in which it reported that it used 120,000 pounds of ammonia (20% or greater) in the repackaging process. Chemical inventory reports submitted by the Facility pursuant to EPCRA also indicate that it handled and stored ammonia (20 percent or greater) in amounts over the threshold quantity in the repackaging process in 2011 and 2012. Currently, Respondent uses more than the threshold quantity of ammonia (20% or greater) in the repackaging process. Accordingly, from at least 2008 through the present, ammonia (20 percent or greater) is or has been “stored” and “handled” in the repackaging process at the Facility in amounts greater than the threshold amount under 40 C.F.R. § 68.130. Also, in 2008, formaldehyde was “stored” and “handled” in the repackaging process at the Facility in amounts greater than the threshold amount under 40 C.F.R. § 68.130.

The distance to a toxic or flammable endpoint for a worst-case release assessment of ammonia (20% or greater) from the repackaging process at the Facility is greater than the distance to a public receptor. Likewise, the distance to a toxic or flammable endpoint for a worst-case release assessment of formaldehyde from the repackaging process at the Facility was greater than the distance to a public receptor. As the operator of a stationary source that has more than the threshold amount of regulated substance in a covered process, Respondent was, at all times relevant to the allegations herein, subject to the RMP requirements of Part 68. The Facility’s storage and repackaging of ammonia (20% or greater) and formaldehyde was subject to the requirements of Program 3, in accordance with the requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.10(a) through (d), because

1. the distance to a toxic or flammable endpoint for a worst-case release of ammonia (20% or greater) or formaldehyde is or was greater than the distance to a public receptor, making the process ineligible for Program 1; and
2. the process was subject to OSHA’s PSM regulations.

Now that formaldehyde is no longer used in this process, it could be re-categorized as subject to the requirements of Program 2 instead. Respondent may also choose to continue to categorize the repackaging process as Program 3, for ease of administration.

Applicability of General Duty Clause to Facility

As the operator of a stationary source that processes, handles or stores extremely hazardous substances, Respondent is and has been, at all times relevant to the allegations herein, subject to the General Duty Clause found in Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(r)(1).

RMP Update History

In June 1999, the Facility submitted a Program 3 RMP, which it updated in January 2002, July 2003, December 2008, and December 2013.
The RMP updates filed by the Facility in 2008 and 2013 did not include or address the railcar receiving, storage, and handling process.

Potentially Dangerous Conditions Observed

During the Inspection, EPA inspectors observed some potentially dangerous conditions at the Facility including but not limited to:

• Potentially dangerous conditions in the storage and handling of chlorine and anhydrous ammonia in the railcar receiving, storage, and handling process. The following potentially dangerous conditions were observed during the Inspection:
  • Unprotected chlorine railcar on siding: A railcar containing chlorine that was not protected by concrete barriers, a sea wall, or any other form of protection, was observed sitting unattended on rail siding in an area where trucks and other vehicles regularly parked and drove over the rail siding to access other areas of the Facility and the waterfront docks. This was a high traffic area that was regularly accessed by employees, contractors, and guests of Respondent and other tenants, including fishing and tugboat companies who require access to the docks. Two trucks were observed parked approximately twenty feet from the unattended railcar on the day of the Inspection. The lack of adequate protection or isolation of the railcars from vehicular traffic created a significant risk of a collision that could result in an accidental release of chlorine.
  • Unprotected anhydrous ammonia railcar on siding: A railcar containing anhydrous ammonia that was not protected by concrete barriers, a sea wall, a derailer, chocks, or any other form of protection, was observed sitting unattended on rail siding in an area where trucks and other vehicles regularly parked and drove over the rail siding to access other areas of the Facility and the waterfront docks. This was a high traffic area that was regularly accessed by employees, contractors, and guests of Respondent and other tenants, including fishing and tugboat companies who require access to the docks. Two cars were observed parked less than fifteen feet from the unattended railcar on the day of the Inspection, and tanker trucks were observed nearby. The lack of adequate protection or isolation of the railcars from vehicular traffic created a significant risk of a collision that could result in an accidental release of anhydrous ammonia.

• Potentially dangerous conditions in the storage and processing of chlorine and other hazardous substances in the sodium hypochlorite production process. The sodium hypochlorite process, which is located inside and immediately outside Room A in Building 17, is where chlorine and sodium hydroxide are used to manufacture sodium hypochlorite. The following potentially dangerous conditions relating to the sodium hypochlorite production process were observed during the Inspection:
  • Tank not properly labeled: A large tank labeled “P 765” was not labeled with its contents or associated hazards. According to a Facility representative, the tank contained sodium hypochlorite. Adjacent tanks were labeled with the words “sodium hypochlorite,” but they were not labeled with a placard warning of the hazards of the contents. In the event of an accidental release, emergency responders might not know what was in tank “P 765” or the associated hazards and how that would determine the proper response. Tank “P 765” was interconnected with the chlorine reactor vessels such that a failure to label it might complicate an emergency response to a chlorine release. Quick identification of the contents of tank “P 765” would also be important in the event of an accidental release from that tank since formaldehyde, which is incompatible with sodium hypochlorite, was also stored in the same room.
  • Piping not properly labeled: Most of the piping used in the sodium hypochlorite production process was not labeled with the contents or direction of flow of the materials contained therein. In order to understand the hazards resulting from and minimize the likelihood of an accidental release, piping that contains hazardous materials should have been labeled with at minimum the identity of the contents and the direction of flow.
  • Deficient secondary containment/spill protection: The sodium hypochlorite production process includes a number of large tanks, reactors, and other vessels that contain hazardous and potentially reactive materials, including, among other things, chlorine, sodium hydroxide, and sodium hypochlorite. A small berm was placed around the entire process, but it was ineffective because it would not segregate accidental releases of incompatible chemicals in the process (such as sodium hypochlorite or chlorine and sodium hydroxide), large cracks in the flooring ran underneath the berm in several places, and it was only a few inches high and thus would not be able to contain the full volume of the large process vessels were they to rupture or otherwise release their contents. Proper berming was particularly important given that containers of formaldehyde, which is incompatible with sodium hypochlorite, were located in the same room.
  • Corroded electrical equipment and piping supports: Piping that carried chlorine from a railcar to the reactors was being supported by a severely corroded piping support system. An electrical pump and several support brackets for piping used in the process were also severely corroded, creating a heightened risk of a chlorine release.
  • Unprotected piping: PVC piping located near the ground that carried materials between tanks/reactors in the process had no physical protection, such as a metal covering, to prevent from breaking in the event that it was stepped on or something was dropped on it. Such protection would have minimized the chance of an accidental release.
• Potentially dangerous conditions in the storage and processing of anhydrous ammonia and ammonium hydroxide in the ammonium hydroxide production unit.
  • Corroded tanks and tank supports: Tanks and/or reactor vessels containing anhydrous ammonia and/or ammonium hydroxide and support systems for those vessels showed signs of corrosion, further increasing the likelihood of an ammonia release. For instance, EPA observed depressions on the back end of the anhydrous ammonia tank that suggested the tank had been hit by a vehicle or other object, and some portions of the tank surface showed signs of rusting and corrosion. In addition, the ammonium hydroxide tanks, the supports for those tanks, and associated piping showed signs of corrosion.
  • Piping not properly labeled: Most of the piping used in the ammonium hydroxide production process was not labeled with the contents or direction of flow of the materials contained therein. On the second day of the Inspection, EPA inspectors observed that some of the piping was labeled with arrows indicating the direction of flow, but not the contents of the piping. When asked when those labels were installed, a Facility representative stated that they were added the night before and earlier that morning, before EPA inspectors arrived for Day 2 of the Inspection. In order to understand the hazards resulting from and minimize the likelihood of an accidental release, piping that contains hazardous materials should have been labeled with at minimum the identity of the contents and the direction of flow.
• Potentially dangerous conditions in the storage and handling of ammonia (20% or greater) and other hazardous substances in the repackaging process.
  • Corroded electrical equipment: The electrical panels that supplied electricity to the process were heavily corroded. In the event of a fire, the ammonium hydroxide drums and other containers in the area could have released toxic ammonia vapors to the environment.
  • Piping not properly labeled: Most of the piping used in the repackaging process was not labeled with the contents or direction of flow of the materials contained therein. In order to understand the hazards resulting from and minimize the likelihood of an accidental release, piping that contains hazardous materials should have been labeled with at minimum the direction of flow.
• Potentially dangerous conditions arising from deficient chemical management practices in various areas throughout the Facility. During the Inspection, EPA inspectors observed the following examples of incompatible chemicals stored sufficiently close together such that a spill or release of one chemical could have resulted in a chemical reaction with other chemicals, creating toxic gases and/or causing a fire or explosion:
  • In Building 17, Room C, ammonium hydroxide was stored adjacent to sodium hydroxide and ferric chloride. The interaction of these substances could have caused an exothermic reaction liberating toxic gases, and the reaction products may be flammable and corrosive.
  • In Building 17, Room C, nitric acid was stored adjacent to hydrochloric acid and potassium hydroxide. The interaction of these substances could have caused an exothermic, violent reaction liberating toxic, flammable, and/or explosive byproducts. the Facility’s material safety data sheet (“MSDS”) for hydrochloric acid indicates that it is highly reactive with hydroxides.
  • In Building 17, Room C, hydrochloric acid was stored adjacent to ammonium hydroxide. The interaction of these substances could have caused an exothermic, violent reaction liberating corrosive gases and may cause pressurization. the Facility’s MSDS for ammonium hydroxide indicates that co-location with acids should be avoided due to their reactivity with this chemical.
  • In Building 17, Room B, acetic acid was stored adjacent to potassium hydroxide. The interaction of these substances could have caused an exothermic, violent reaction liberating corrosive, toxic, and/or flammable gases. the Facility’s MSDS for potassium hydroxide indicates that co-location with strong acids should be avoided due to their reactivity with this chemical.
  • In Building 17, Room B, sulfuric acid was stored adjacent to sodium hypochlorite and acetic acid. The interaction of these substances could have caused an exothermic, violent reaction liberating corrosive, toxic, explosive, and/or flammable gases. the Facility’s MSDS for sodium hypochlorite indicates that acids should be avoided due to their reactivity with this chemical.
  • In Building 17, Room B, copper sulfate was stored adjacent to sodium persulfate. The interaction of these substances could have caused a violent reaction n. In Building 17, Room C, nitric acid was stored adjacent to hydrochloric acid and potassium hydroxide. The interaction of these substances could have caused an exothermic, violent reaction liberating toxic, flammable, and/or explosive byproducts. the Facility’s material safety data sheet (“MSDS”) for hydrochloric acid indicates that it is highly reactive with hydroxides.
  • In Building 17, Room A, lime and glacial acetic acid were stored in large tanks with a capacity of approximately 6,000 gallons each, neither of which had any form of secondary containment, and which were located less than thirty feet apart. The interaction of these substances could have caused a violent reaction liberating corrosive, flammable, and toxic gases. the Facility ‘s MSDS for hydrated lime indicates that it reacts violently with strong acids.

COUNT I- FAILURE TO PREPARE AND SUBMIT RMP THAT INCLUDES ALL COVERED PROCESSES

The RMP updates filed in 2008 and 2013 did not include or address the railcar receiving, storage, and handling process. Accordingly, Respondent violated the requirement to prepare an RMP and submit an RMP registration that includes all covered processes in 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.12(a) and 68.150(a).

COUNT II- FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH PROCESS SAFETY INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

Respondent failed to document that equipment used in the railcar receiving, storage, and handling process, the sodium hypochlorite production process, the ammonium hydroxide production process, and the repackaging process complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices.

Respondent was not adequately protecting railcars containing chlorine from vehicles and other on-site traffic. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to place bulk containers of chlorine behind barriers or other protection and to ensure those containers are located in a position where that the possibility of damage by vehicles will be minimized. See, e.g.,

• The Chlorine Institute’s Pamphlet 6: Bulk Storage of Liquid Chlorine (June 2011) § 3.1.

Respondent was not adequately protecting railcars containing anhydrous ammonia from vehicles and other on-site traffic. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to place containers of anhydrous ammonia behind barriers or other protection and to ensure those containers are located in a position where that the possibility of damage by vehicles will be minimized. See, e.g. ,

• American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”) K61.1: Safety Requirements for the Storage and Handling of Anhydrous Ammonia (1999):
  • 5.3.1 (location for anhydrous ammonia storage should be selected considering the surroundings of the proposed site),
  • 6.7.1 (containers and appurtenances shall be located or protected by suitable barriers so as to avoid damage by trucks of other vehicles)

Respondent was not adequately labeling all tanks containing hazardous materials used in the RMP processes. Due to its high reactivity
and in order to avoid accidental mixing, the recommended industry practice and standard of care is to place signs that identify the contents as “sodium hypochlorite” on all vessels that contain it.  See, e.g.,

• The Chlorine Institute’s Pamphlet 96: Sodium Hypochlorite Manual (October 2011) § 5.1;
• the Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers’ (“CCPS”) Guidelines for Safe Warehousing of Chemicals §
  • 2.2 (“containerized and packaged chemicals should be readily identifiable through the container’ labels, shipping papers, or material safety data sheets”).

Moreover, the recommended industry practice and standard of care is to place a visible hazard identification signs as specified in the National Fire Prevention Association’s (“NFPA”) Standard 704 on all stationary containers and aboveground tanks containing hazardous materials. See, e.g.,

• NFPA 704: Standard System for the Identification of the Hazards of Materials for Emergency Response (2012);
• the International Fire Code (2009) (“IFC”) § 2703.5
  • (requiring visible hazard identification signs as specified in NFPA 704 on stationary containers and aboveground tanks and at entrances to locations where hazardous materials are stored); 
  • NFPA 1: Fire Code (2012) § 60.5.1.8.2.1 (same).

Failure to do so was particularly hazardous in an environment like this one where there were incompatible chemicals in close proximity and the tank is part of a covered process involving chlorine, an RMP chemical.

Respondent was not adequately labeling all piping containing hazardous materials used in the RMP processes. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to label all piping containing hazardous materials to indicate the contents, direction of flow, and any additional details necessary to identify hazards. See, e.g.,

• the American Society ofMechanical Engineers (“ASME”) A13.1-2007: Scheme for the Identification of Piping Systems;
• NFPA 400: Hazardous Materials Code (2010) § 6.1.6.2(2) (referencing ASME A13.1)

Respondent failed to provide adequate secondary containment for the tanks, reactors, and other vessels that make up the sodium hypochlorite production process. Given the hazardous nature of chlorine and other materials used in the production of sodium hypochlorite, the recommended industry practice and standard of care is to use secondary containment to mitigate the potential consequences of a release. See, e.g.,

• The Chlorine Institute’s Pamphlet 96: Sodium Hypochlorite Manual (October 2011) §§
  • 6.1.3 (storage locations should be selected “to allow containment in the event of accidental spillage”),
  • 7.12.4 (recommending precautionary use of containment structures for bulk or drum sodium hypochlorite storage);
• IFC §
  • 2704.2.2 (requiring secondary containment for vessels of corrosive liquids with an individual capacity over 55 gallons, or multiple vessels with a total capacity greater than 1,000 gallons);
• NFPA 400 (2013)
  • 6.2.1.9.3.1(1), 6.3.2.2.4.2, 6.3.2.3.3.2 (same).

Respondent was aware of the need for secondary containment for vessels in the sodium hypochlorite process. A process hazard analysis (“PHA”) for the sodium hypochlorite reactor dated January 2011 considered the consequences of a catastrophic rupture of the reactor, and resulted in the recommendation of installing a berm around the process area. Other portions of the PHA, considering potential hazards at different stages of the sodium hypochlorite process, resulted in twelve additional instances in which it was recommended that a berm should be installed around the process in order to contain potential releases.

Electrical equipment in the sodium hypochlorite production process and the repackaging process was heavily corroded. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to use electrical equipment identified for use in this type of damp environment with regular exposure to corrosive fumes, and to maintain electrical equipment in good condition, free from corrosive residues or other contaminants that might adversely affect the safe operation or mechanical strength of the equipment. See, e.g.,

• NFPA 70: National Electrical Code (2011)
  • 110.11 (unless identified for use in that environment, no equipment shall be located “in damp or wet locations [or] where exposed to gases, fumes, liquids, or other agents that have a deteriorating effect on the conductors or equipment”),
  • 110.12 (electrical equipment should be installed in a “neat and workmanlike manner” and should not be damaged or contaminated by foreign materials such as corrosive residues), and 300.6 (boxes, cabinets, and support hardware shall be of materials suitable for the environment in which they are installed).

The piping support systems in the sodium hypochlorite production process were severely corroded. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to maintain piping support systems in good condition, free from metal wear or corrosion. See, e.g.,

• The Chlorine Institute’s Pamphlet 6: Piping Systems for Dry Chlorine (May 2005)
  • 10.2 (chlorine piping should not be hung from other piping and should be adequately supported by a system that does not allow metal to metal ~ear or corrosion),
  • 10.9 (recommending painting or use of other protective coatings to limit corrosion),
  • 12.2 (recommending periodic checks of paint condition and condition of piping supports to maximize pipe life and minimize leaks due to corrosion);
• The Chlorine Institute’s Pamphlet 96: Sodium Hypochlorite Manual (April 2006)
  • 6.3.2 (factors to consider when selecting piping materials include structural strength and chemical resistance, noting that virtually all common metals will corrode rapidly on contact with sodium hypochlorite solutions).

PVC piping used in the sodium hypochlorite production process was not adequately protected from impact from foot or other traffic. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to provide protection and/or support systems for PVC piping used in chlorine and sodium hypochlorite service. See, e.g.,

• The Chlorine Institute’s Pamphlet 96: Sodium Hypochlorite Manual (October 2011)
  • 6.3.2 (recommending support systems for PVC piping systems if there is any risk of impact, including “foot/vehicle traffic” or “maintenance or operations activities”);
• The Chlorine Institute’s Pamphlet 6: Piping Systems for Dry Chlorine (May 2005)
  • 9 (recommends protection of PVC piping from impact).

Tanks and other vessels used in the ammonium hydroxide production process and support systems for those vessels were heavily corroded. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to maintain tanks that contain ammonia in good condition, free from corrosion, to minimize the risk of an accidental release. See, e.g.,

• ANSI K61.1: Safety Requirements for the Storage and Handling of Anhydrous Ammonia (1999)
  • 5.12 (containers should have a reflective surface maintained in good condition),
  • 6.4.2 (recommending a means for preventing corrosion on the portion of the container in contact with supports).

Respondent failed to ensure that its processes complied with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices, and thereby violated the process safety information requirements of 40 C.F.R.§§ 68.65 and/or 68.48.

COUNT III- F AlLURE TO COMPLY WITH OPERATING PROCEDURES REQUIREMENTS

Standard operating procedures (“SOPs”) for the ammonium hydroxide production process and for the hypochlorite production process that were submitted to EPA following the Inspection did not contain all of the elements required by 40 C.F.R.§ 68.69. For instance, the SOPs for unloading anhydrous ammonia and bulk loading of anhydrous ammonia did not include adequate information regarding operating limits (including consequences of deviation and steps required to correct or avoid deviation), nor did they include information regarding emergency operations or emergency shutdown (or an internal cross reference to any other SOP that addressed emergency operations or emergency shutdown).

Further, the SOP for the bleach plant start-up and shutdown did not include adequate information regarding operating limits (including consequences of deviation and steps required to correct or avoid deviation), nor did it reference the SOP for emergency shutdown
procedures for chlorine.

In addition, the SOP for emergency shutdown procedures for chlorine did not include the consequences of deviation or steps required to avoid deviation.

Accordingly, Respondent did not have adequate operating procedures and thereby violated the operating procedures requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.51 and/or 68.69.

COUNT IV -FAILURE TO DESIGN AND MAINTAIN A SAFE FACILITY

EPA’s inspector observed deficient storage practice associated with numerous chemicals that, alone or improperly co-located with at least one of the other chemicals are “extremely hazardous substances” subject to the requirements of the General Duty Clause. The storage of these incompatible chemicals in close proximity to one another created risk of explosion, liberation of toxic, corrosive, and flammable gases, and other violent reactions. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to segregate and separate incompatible chemicals by a distance of not less than 20 feet. See, e.g.,

• NFPA 400 (2013) § 6.1.12;
• NFPA 1 (2012) § 60.5.1.12;
• IFC § 2703.9.8;
• CCPS’s Guidelines for Safe Warehousing of Chemicals§ 2.6;
• see also the Facility’s MSDSs, available at XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

The deficient storage practices constituted a failure to design and maintain a safe facility, and take such steps as are necessary to prevent accidental releases. Accordingly, Respondent violated the requirement to design and maintain a safe facility, as required under the General Duty Clause, Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1).

EPA has determined that it is fair and proper to assess a civil penalty of one hundred fourteen thousand, one hundred eighteen dollars ($114,118) for the violations alleged in this matter.

CLICK HERE for the agreement