Respondent is a Water Works Department (HWWD or Respondent), a municipal owned utility organized under the laws of the State of Indiana. Beginning prior to 1999 Respondent used, stored, handled, and moved, multiple one ton containers of the regulated substance chlorine at the Facility in amounts over the chlorine threshold quantity of 2,500 pounds per year. At all times relevant to this CAPO, Respondent’s use, storage, handling, and movement of the chlorine containers at the Facility was a “process,” as that term is defined at 40 C.F.R. § 68.3. On May 21, 1999, Respondent submitted its initial RMP for the chlorine process at the Facility. On April 19, 2006, Respondent submitted its revised and updated RMP for the chlorine process at the Facility. On May 9, 2011, Respondent submitted to U.S. EPA its second revised and updated RMP for the chlorine storage process at the Facility (the 2011 RMP).
Count I
On July 12, 2011, Respondent had not documented the names or positions of the individuals responsible for the implementation of the RM Program elements and failed to
document the lines of authority between them. Respondent’s failure to document the names or positions of the individuals responsible for the implementation of the RM Program elements, and the lines of authority between them violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.15(c).
Count II
Respondent failed to analyze and report in its 2011 RMP one worst-case release scenario that was estimated to create the greatest distance in any direction to a specified endpoint resulting from an accidental release of regulated toxic substances from covered processes under worst-case conditions defined in 40 C.F.R. § 68.22. Respondent’s failure to analyze and report in its 2011 RMP one worst-case release scenario that was estimated to create the greatest distance in any direction to a specified endpoint resulting from an accidental release of regulated toxic substances from covered processes under worst-case conditions violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.25(a)(2)(i).
Count III
Respondent failed to estimate the population potentially affected by a chemical accident at the Facility to two significant digits in the 2011 RMP. Respondent’s failure to estimate the population potentially affected by a chemical accident at the Facility to two significant digits in the 2011 RMP violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.30(d).
Count IV
Respondent has not reviewed and updated the offsite consequence analysis for the Facility since it submitted its RMP in 1999. Respondent’s failure to review and update the offsite consequence analysis for the Facility at least once every five years violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.36(a).
Couut V
Respondent failed to maintain as part of its offsite consequence analysis for the Facility a description of the alternative release scenarios identified; the assumptions and parameters it used; and its rationale for selecting specific alternative release scenarios. Respondent’s failure to maintain as part of its offsite consequence analysis for the Facility a description of the alternative release scenarios identified; the assumptions and parameters used; and the rationale for the selection of specific alternative release scenarios violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.39(b).
Count VI
On or before July 11, 2011, Respondent failed to maintain up-to-date equipment safety information on the chlorine process at the Facility. Respondent’s failure to maintain up-to-date equipment safety information on the chlorine process at the Facility violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)
Count VII
On or before July 11, 2011, Respondent had not documented that the equipment in its chlorine process complied with recognized and good engineering practices. Respondent’s failure to document that the equipment in its chlorine process complied with recognized and good engineering practices violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2)
Count VIII
On or before July 11, 2011, Respondent had not updated its initial 1999 PHA for the chlorine process for the Facility. Respondent’s failure to update its 1999 PHA for the chlorine supply process for the Facility at least every five years violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(f).
Count IX
On or before July 11, 2011, Respondent did not have written operating procedures providing clear instructions for safely conducting all normal operations involved in the chlorine process at its Facility, the consequences of deviating from the operating limits, and the steps to avoid or correct a deviation in the written operating procedures. On or before July 11, 2011, Respondent had not performed annual certifications of the written operating procedures for the chlorine process at the Facility. Respondent’s failure to have all of the required elements in the Facility’s written operating procedures for the chlorine process, and its failure to perform annual certifications of the written operating procedures for the chlorine process violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a) and (c).
Count X
On or before July 11, 2011, Respondent had not:
- established and implemented written procedures for maintaining the integrity of the chlorine process equipment at the Facility;
- trained each employee involved in maintaining the on-going integrity of the chlorine process in the applicable procedures;
- performed inspections and tests on the chlorine process equipment at a frequency consistent with applicable manufacturers’ recommendations, industry standards or codes, good engineering practices, and prior operating experience; and
- properly documented the inspections and tests that Respondent performed on the chlorine process equipment.
Respondent’s failures to develop the required written procedures for the chlorine process equipment at the Facility, train each applicable employee, perform inspections at the required frequency, and document the inspections and tests, violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b)-(d).
Count XI
Respondent failed to establish and implement written procedures to manage changes that affect the chlorine process at the Facility. Respondent’s failure to establish and implement written procedures to manage changes that affect the chlorine process at the Facility violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(a)
Count XII
Respondent failed to certify at least every three years that it evaluated and determined that it was in compliance with the Program 3 Risk Management Program requirements set forth at 40 C.F.R §§ 68.65-68.95, and failed to verify that the procedures and practices developed under the Risk Management Program regulations for the Facility were adequate and being followed. Respondent’s failure to certify at least every three years its compliance with the Program 3 Risk Management Program requirements violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(a)
Couut XIII
Respondent retained a contractor to perform work at the Facility on January 10, 2012. Respondent failed to obtain and evaluate the contractor’s safety performance and programs when it selected the contractor to perform work on January 10, 2012. Respondent’s failure to obtain and evaluate the contractor’s safety performance and programs violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.87(b)
Based on the factors specified in Section 113(e) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e), U.S. EPA’s Combined Enforcement Policy for Clean Air Act Sections 112(r)(l), 112(r)(7), and
40 C.F.R. Part 68 (June 2012), the facts and circumstances of this case, other factors such as cooperation, promptly returning to compliance, and Respondent’s agreement to perform two supplemental environmental projects (SEP), as described below, Complainant has determined that an appropriate civil penalty to settle this action is $51,700.00.
Supplemental Environmental Projects
Respondent must complete two supplemental environmental projects (SEP1 and SEP2) designed to protect the environment and public health by preventing, and reducing the
risk of a release of chlorine.
- SEP 1 consists of Respondent installing emergency stop valves on the chlorine supply process for the Facility.
- SEP2 consists of Respondent making upgrades to the security system for the Facility.
SEP 1 is a preventative public health project that will decrease the risk of chlorine being released into the surrounding community and the environment. Respondent must not cause the unpermitted or unauthorized release to the environment of any chlorine, or any other toxic or hazardous chemical during the performance of the SEP. Respondent must spend at least $24,000 for the engineering design, project management, purchase and installation of SEP1. The $24,000 must not include any costs directed toward updating the Facility’s Risk Management Program.
SEP2 is a preventative public health project that will decrease the risk of chlorine being released into the surrounding community and the environment. Respondent must not cause the unpermitted or unauthorized release to the environment of any chlorine, or any other toxic or hazardous chemical during the performance of the SEP. Respondent must spend at least $53,000 for the engineering design, project management, purchase and installation ofSEP2. The $53,000 must not include any costs directed toward updating the Facility’s Risk Management Program.
Source: http://yosemite.epa.gov/oa/rhc/epaadmin.nsf/Filings/343B9A7EA7414CB485257D81001BC0E3/$File/CAA-05-2015-0003%2010-28-2014.PDF