Respondent owns and operates a cheese manufacturing facility. On March 22, 2022, EPA inspected the Facility to evaluate compliance with CERCLA Section 103, EPCRA Sections 304-312, and the GDC of CAA Section 112(r). Based upon the information gathered during the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent violated certain provisions of CERCLA, EPCRA, and the CAA.
At all times relevant to this CA/FO, Respondent has and had 10,000 pounds or more of anhydrous ammonia in one or more processes at the Facility.
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW
Count I
Failure to Immediately Report the March 31, 2021, Ammonia Release to the National Reporting Center
Based upon information obtained during EPA’s investigation, EPA determined that Respondent notified the NRC 59 minutes after the start of a release of 109 pounds of ammonia from the Facility on March 31, 2021.
By failing to notify the NRC immediately upon knowing that an RQ of a hazardous substance had been released at its Facility, Respondent violated CERCLA Section 103.
Count II
Failure to Immediately Report the March 31, 2021, Ammonia Release to the California Office of Emergency Services
Based upon the information obtained during EPA’s investigation, EPA determined that Respondent notified Cal OES, the SERC in California, 50 minutes after the start of a release of 109 pounds of ammonia from the Facility on March 31, 2021.
Respondent violated EPCRA Section 304 by failing to immediately notify the SERC of the release of an RQ of an EHS from the Facility.
Count III
Failure to Document the Alternative Release Scenario
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent only documented one alternative release scenario in its offsite consequence analyses and did not describe the scenario identified, assumptions and parameters used, or the rationale for selecting the specific scenario.
By failing to consider multiple alternative release scenarios and describe the assumptions, parameters, and rationale used for selecting the specific alternative release scenario that was considered, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.39(b0.
Count IV
Failure to Compile Design Codes and Standards and to Document that Existing Equipment Complies with Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices or Were Designed and Operating in a Safe Manner
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent failed to maintain a current and complete compilation of the design codes and standards employed for its ammonia refrigeration equipment in its written process safety information.
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA also determined that Respondent failed to document that various equipment complied with RAGAGEP or was otherwise designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operating in a safe manner, including pressure relief valves, audible and visual alarms, ventilation systems, emergency shutdown controls, exhaust fans, refrigeration piping and vessels, ammonia sensors, and labeling.
By failing to maintain a current and complete compilation of the design codes and standards and to document that various equipment complied with RAGAGEP or was otherwise designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operating in a safe manner, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(vi), (d)(2)-(3).
Count V
Failure to Address Hazards and Identify Adequate Engineering and Administrative Controls Related to the Horizontal, Curvilinear, and Recirculatory Door and to Promptly Respond to Process Hazard Analysis Findings and Recommendations
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that the Facility’s 2019 Horizontal, Curvilinear, and Recirculatory (“HCR”) Door PHA did not address the hazards associated with using an inadequate flange on the HCR doors, identified in a prior investigation.
In the same PHA, Respondent failed to address or list any adequate engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and their interrelationships by listing “Ammonia Detection” as both a safeguard and a recommendation. Respondent also had multiple PHA recommendations that remained unresolved up to nine (9) years past documented due dates.
By failing to address the hazards, discuss engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and their interrelationships, and establish a system to promptly address findings, Respondent violated CAA Section 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c)(1), (c)(3), (e).
Count VI
Failure to Complete Annual Certification of Operating Procedures and to Develop and Implement Safe Ice and Snow Removal Procedures for Freezer Roofs, Walls, and Racks
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent did not complete Its annual certification of all operating procedures for calendar years 2019 and 2021.
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent had not developed and implemented practices and procedures for safely removing ice and snow from the freezer roof, walls, and racks prior to a 2021 incident that occurred when contractors failed to isolate ammonia lines before removing ice from above the HCR Door. The contractors were not equipped with air-purifying respirators at the time of the incident.
By failing to complete the annual certification of all operating procedures for 2019 and 2021 and failing to develop and implement safe ice removal practices and procedures prior to the 2021 incident, Respondent violated CAA 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(c)-(d).
Count VII
Failure to Maintain Records that Ammonia Refrigeration System Operators Understood Trainings on Standard Operating Procedures
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent did not prepare training records between 2017 and 2022 documenting the means used to verify that the employees operating the ammonia refrigeration system understood trainings related to the standard operating procedures of the system.
By failing to maintain training records between 2017 and 2022 documenting that employees operating the ammonia refrigeration system understood the requisite trainings, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(c).
Count VIII
Failure to Correct Deficiencies in Equipment
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that at the Facility there were mechanical integrity deficiencies outside of acceptable limits for several pieces of equipment – including ammonia piping and equipment, vapor barriers, and electrical wiring – that should have been corrected prior to continued use. EPA also determined that Respondent did not repair or replace sections of severely corroded piping in a timely manner.
By failing to comply with the mechanical integrity requirements for correcting deficiencies in equipment, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(e).
Count IX
Failure to Properly Implement and Document the Management of Change Process for the Replacement of Horizontal, Curvilinear, and Recirculatory Door Gaskets
Based on EPA’s inspection and information gathered during EPA’s investigation, EPA determined that Respondent improperly documented the replacement of gaskets for the HCR doors as a “replacement in kind” when the replacement gaskets were made of a different material than the previous gaskets, thereby requiring a compatibility analysis pursuant to the corresponding management of change process due to the change in material of construction.
By failing to properly implement and document the management of change process for the replacement of gaskets for the HCR doors, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(a).
Count X
Failure to Include Contractors on the 2021 Incident Investigation Team, Recommend Documenting Safe Work Procedures and Promptly Respond to Recommendations in Incident Investigation Reports
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent’s contractors were not included in the incident investigation team for the 2021 Incident in which two contractors were involved and injured.
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA also determined that Respondent did not have safe work procedures in place for snow and ice removal from the freezer at the time of the 2021 Incident. Respondent’s incident investigation report for the 2021 Incident listed the lack of documentation of such procedures as a contributing cause of the incident but did not recommend documenting safe work procedures.
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA also determined that Respondent did not promptly address multiple recommendations made in incident investigation reports compiled between 2016 and 2021, including the incident investigation report for the 2021 Incident.
By failing to include contractors in the incident investigation team for the 2021 Incident, recommend documenting safe work procedures, and promptly respond to recommendations from incident investigation reports, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.81(c), (d)(5), (e).
Count XI
Failure to Adequately Evaluate Contractor Performance and Implement Safe Contractor Work Practices
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent did not adequately evaluate information regarding contractor safety performance and programs, nor did Respondent adequately implement safe work practices to control the presence of contract employees in covered process areas during the 2021Incident.
By failing to adequately evaluate contractor safety performance information and implement safe work practices to control the presence of contract employees in covered process areas, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.87(b)(1), (4).
Count XII
Failure to Coordinate with Local Authorities, Document Coordination, and Update the Worst Case Scenario Distance to Endpoint in Emergency Response Planning
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent did not coordinate with the LEPC between 2020 and 2022, nor did it document any coordination with local emergency planning and response organizations between 2017 and 2022.
EPA also determined that Respondent’s Emergency Response Plan procedures for informing the public and appropriate emergency response agencies about accidental releases from the Facility reported a different worst-case scenario distance to endpoint than was listed in the RMP, indicating that the Emergency Response Plan had not been updated and employees had not been informed of changes.
By failing to coordinate with local emergency planning and response organizations and document any coordination with such organizations, and failing to update its Emergency Response Plan to reflect the correct worst-case scenario distance to endpoint and ensure that employees had been informed of the change, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.93(a), (c), 68.95(a)(4).
Count XIII
General Duty Clause – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent’s Facility had pipes along a walkway on the roof that created a trip hazard. EPA also determined that the fire alarm in the storage freezer was not bolted to the wall.
By allowing pipes to persist in a walkway on the roof, thereby creating a trip hazard, and not bolting a fire alarm to the wall, Respondent failed to design and maintain a safe facility by taking such steps as necessary to prevent releases, in violation of CAA Section 112(r)(1).
CIVIL PENALTY
EPA proposes that Respondent be assessed, and Respondent agrees to pay, a civil penalty in the amount of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-NINE THOUSAND, SEVEN HUNDRED SEVEN DOLLARS ($229,707).
The CERCLA portion of the penalty totals ONE THOUSAND, NINE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN DOLLARS ($1,957}.
The EPCRA and CAA portions of the penalty total TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND, SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS ($227,750).
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECT
In response to the alleged violations of CERCLA, EPCRA, and the CAA, and in settlement of this matter, although not required by CERCLA, EPCRA, the CAA, or any other federal, state, or local law, Respondent agrees to implement a supplemental environmental project (“SEP”), as described below.
Respondent shall complete an equipment donation SEP, consisting of purchasing and donating equipment, as described in further detail below, to the XXXXXXXXXXXXXX County Fire Authority. SSJCFA is an all-risk fire service provider that has eighty (80) uniform personnel staff based out of seven fire stations and serves a population of over 120,000 residents in a 180 square mile service area that encompasses large industrial facilities that utilize hazardous materials, as well as freeways and railways across which hazardous materials are transported.
SSJCFA also has one of twelve (12) Type II HAZMAT Response Teams commissioned by Cal OES. Respondent shall purchase, for the SSJCFA’s fire training facility, the following equipment:
- One Matrice 300 RTK Public Safety Combo by Drone-Works: One drone with hazardous material sensing capabilities;
- Dual HazSim Pro 2.0 Handhelds by HazSim: Two portable control systems and software that simulate hazardous material incidents; and
- One “Custom Hazmat Instructor Series™” from Sourcewell: The system includes one Portable Control System hand-held tablet, one Bulk Processing Tank, and one Bulk Storage Tank. The Portable Control System allows the instructor to manage all operations of the Bulk Processing Tank and Bulk Storage Tank using emergency stops, pauses, and re-dos. The Bulk Processing Tank is an industrial processing tank used for caustic or acid materials that simulates uncontrolled reactions from processes causing fume clouds, spillage, and violent boil-overs. The Bulk Storage Tank simulates control system failures resulting in tank overfills and leak situations mitigated by valving, leak containment, and/or control system operation.
Respondent shall spend no less than ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE THOUSAND, THREE HUNDRED FORTY DOLLARS ($179,340) on implementing the SEP.
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