Respondent operates a chemical manufacturing facility which has on-site for use, 25,299,678 pounds of anhydrous ammonia and 355,094 pounds of ammonia (concentration 20% or greater). Respondent has two RMProgram level 3 covered processes, that store or otherwise use anhydrous ammonia and ammonia (concentration 20% or greater) in amounts exceeding their applicable thresholds of 10,000 pounds and 20,000 pounds, respectively.
On August 30 through September 1, 2022, the EPA conducted an on-site inspection of the RMProgram related records and equipment for the purpose of assessing the Respondent’s compliance with the RMProgram requirements and the implemented recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP) for its covered process at its Facility.
At the time of the inspection, EPA observed the following:
The equipment in the field did not match the piping & instrument diagrams (P&IDs).
C-Grade storage: P&ID no. 32PD008 identified a 6-inch line from C-Grade storage tank 2123-F with a single 6-inch valve on the piping immediately leaving the tank to transfer pump 2120-JA. During the site walkthrough, an additional 6-inch valve and a sample line were observed that were not shown on the P&ID.
Urea plant: P&ID no. 42PD002 identified a ¾-inch line from 1201A-F Suction Pulsation Dampener to G1202-A Main Pump inlet with a single ½-inch hand valve. During the site walkthrough, two additional hand valves were observed in series, downstream of NEl 1593 that were not identified on the P&ID.
The anhydrous ammonia piping in the C-Grade storage area was not labeled to indicate contents, direction of flow, physical state (i.e., liquid or vapor), or pressure level (i.e., high or low). Section 3.1 of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) A13.1 (2015) states, “Positive identification of the contents of a piping system shall be by lettered legend, giving the name of the contents in full or abbreviated form … Arrows shall be used to indicate direction of flow. Where flow can be in both directions, arrows in both directions shall be displayed. Contents shall be identified by a legend with sufficient additional details such as temperature, pressure, etc., as are necessary to identify the hazard.”
The Facility’s process hazard analysis (PHA) did not address hazards relating to loss of power or extreme weather events. On July 1, 2020, the Facility experienced a power outage due to a severe thunderstorm, which resulted in a release due to the shutdown of certain equipment. Because of the severe nature of the thunderstorm and the location of the controls for the emergency scrubber (which were only accessible from certain external locations during a loss of power), Facility personnel were delayed for approximately one hour in starting the scrubber. Severe weather and loss of power are hazards of the process within the meaning of the RMP regulations, see 40 C.F.R. § 68.3, that should have been addressed in the PHA.
Action item #101057 from the 2014 Letdown Area PHA stated, “Consider automating compressor monitoring on DCS.” This action item had a deadline of July 1, 2022, and was still listed with open status at the time of the inspection.
The Facility did not revise its operating procedures to include required revisions until May 8, 2020, which was more than one year after the following incidents occurred:
i. An incident (2018-INC-0227) occurred on August 7, 2018, when an employee was burned by liquid ammonia after opening, rather than tightening, a valve on a liquid ammonia line. The employee was not wearing a respirator, chemical jacket, or gloves that were available nearby. The Facility identified “Incorrect or incomplete procedures” as a root cause and identified two related corrective actions: (1) “Issue memo stating that full chemical PPE including respirator, full chemical suit, and chemical gloves is required during connection, disconnect, and any activity on the railcar before the plugs have been inserted in the load/vapor lines;” and (2) “Revise all applicable procedures to clearly state PPE requirements and recommended tools. Remove language
from existing standard operating procedures (SOPs) that allow use of chemical apron.”
ii. An incident (2019-INC-0111) occurred March 11, 2019, when an employee was exposed to aqua ammonia. The employee was not wearing a respirator and had raised their face shield. The Facility identified “Incorrect or incomplete procedures” as a root cause and identified two related corrective actions: (1) “Revise SOP 32SP215 to clarify PPE requirements and to include detailed instructions on a bleeding load hose;” and (2) “Issue a department memo stating PPE requirements for disconnecting and bleeding ammonia trailers.”
The 2022 Compliance Audit identified two of the safeguards for the ammonia PHA that were not included in the Facility’s inspection program. Specifically, the inspection team reviewed the Facility’s inspection tracking system records and confirmed that the following safeguards for pressure vessels and storage tanks and controls (including monitoring devices and sensors, alarms, and interlocks) were not included in the Facility’s inspection program:
LSL-201 Low level overhead knockout drum CO2 Stripper, and 1i. DPIC-3310 Roots Blower DP Alarm.
Action item #105546 from the 2019 Compliance Audit had a target completion date of 12/31/2019 and was open at the time of the inspection. The 2022 Compliance Audit did not identify this open action item from the 2019 Compliance Audit as a finding or continued action item. The 2022 Compliance Audit’s description of the RMP programs and practices section states, “The audit team reviewed the findings and recommendations from the two previous audits. All the findings and recommendations are recorded in OE Suites. The plant resolved and implemented action items from previous compliance audit recommendations in a timely manner.”
2020-INC-0258 had three action items due in 2020 and two action items due in 2021 that were past due and open at the time of the inspection. The incident was related to a leak of aqua ammonia and potential corrosion issues associated with the C aqua tank.
2021-INC-0314 occurred on April 26, 2021, and the Facility indicated the incident investigation began on April 27, 2021. However, the Root Cause Analysis for the incident was not started until May 3, 2022, and finalized on May 12, 2022, over a year after the incident occurred.
Compliance audit findings related to hot work in both the 2019 and 2022 Compliance Audits found hot work permits were missing signatures, that firewatch assignments and continuous air monitoring were not performed, and that the issued and expired times on the permit were identical. These repeat issues indicate fire prevention and protection requirements in 29 C.F.R. 1910.252(a) were not being implemented adequately.
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
Based on EPA’s compliance monitoring investigation, the EPA alleges that the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. Part 68, the codified rules governing the Act’s Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions and Section 112(r) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r), when it:
a. Failed to complete a compilation of written process safety information before conducting any process hazard analysis required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(a). This process safety information shall include information pertaining to the equipment in the process, including P&ID’s, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(l)(ii);
b. Failed to document that equipment complies with RAGAGEP, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2);
c. Failed to adequately address in the PHA, the hazards of the process, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c);
d. Failed to establish a system to promptly address the PHA team’s findings and recommendations; assure that the recommendations are resolved in a timely manner and that the resolution is documented; document what actions are to be taken; complete actions as soon as possible; develop a written schedule of when these actions are to be completed; and communicate the actions to operating, maintenance and other employees whose work assignments are in the process and who may be affected by the recommendations or actions, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e);
e. Failed to timely develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information that included precautions necessary to prevent exposure, including engineering controls, administrative controls, and personal protective equipment, and to annually certify that those procedures were current and accurate, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.69;
f. Failed to perform inspections and tests on process equipment, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(l);
g. Failed to adequately certify that it evaluated compliance with the provisions of 40 C.F.R. Part 68, Subpart D at least every three years to verify that procedures and practices developed under Subpart D are adequate and are being followed, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(a);
h. Failed to establish a system to promptly address and resolve the incident report findings and recommendations, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.81(e); and
Failed to adequately document on hot work permits that the fire prevention and protection requirements in 29 C.F.R. 1910.252(a) had been implemented prior to beginning the hot work operations, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.85(b).
Respondent agrees to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $40,524.00.
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECT
Respondent shall complete an Emergency Planning and Preparedness SEP consisting of the purchase and donation of emergency response equipment to the Cherokee Volunteer Fire Department (CVFD). The SEP is more specifically described in Appendix A and incorporated herein by reference. Respondent shall spend no less than $157,736.80 on implementing the SEP.
Respondent has selected the CVFD to receive SEP donations of emergency response equipment.
Appendix A
The Respondent will purchase and donate the following equipment to the SEP Recipient no later than six months from the Effective Date of this CAFO:
36 hoses in 2 sizes Emergency Equipment Professionals, Inc.
24 x 4″ by 100 ft rubber hoses
12 x 2.5″ by 50 ft double jacket hoses
14 Turnout Protective Gear Sets
14 x V-Force Bi-Swing Coat w/ Crosstech Liner 14 x V-Force Belted Pant
H-Back Suspenders
Leather front pre-drilled Leather Boots
NFPA 14″ Particulate Blocking Hood
NFPA Leather Structural Firefighting Gloves
Helmet w/ Goggles-Bourkes
10 Radio and Battery Sets The Radio Shop, Inc. VHF Portable 260 Ch, SW with charger, battery, antenna and belt clip
Kenwood Replacement Battery VHF Mobile 174 MHz, SOW, 260 Ch
1 Air Compressor for SCBA Refilling Emergency Equipment Professionals, Inc. Stallion Air Centaur 2 compressor, 6,000 psi, 10 hp, Air control panel with four bank cascade control, four bottle cascade storage, and CO monitor
CLICK HERE for CAFO