Respondent owns and operates a controlled-temperature storage warehouse for food products. The Facility is located adjacent to Interstate 91 and east of the Quinnipiac River, within a mile of numerous shops and business and approximately 1 mile from several schools. Respondent uses anhydrous ammonia in a refrigeration “process”. In 2009, Respondent filed a Program 3 RMP for the Process and reported that it used 22,600 pounds of anhydrous ammonia. Respondent’s most recent RMP re-submission, in 2013, again reported that one Program 3 process uses 22,600 pounds of ammonia. Accordingly, the Process is a “covered process” subject to the provisions of Part 68 because Respondent “uses,” “stores,” and “handles” the RMP chemical anhydrous ammonia at the Facility in an amount greater than 10,000 pounds. According to Respondent’s RMP, there are public receptors within the distance to the endpoint for a worst case release of the amount of anhydrous ammonia used in the Process. Likewise, modeling performed by EPA indicates that the endpoint for a worst case release from each Process is greater than the distance to a public receptor. Additionally, the Process is subject to OSHA’s PSM requirements at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119 because it uses anhydrous ammonia in an amount over the threshold quantity of 10,000 pounds. Therefore, in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.10(a}-(d), Respondent’s use, storage, and handling of anhydrous ammonia in its Process is subject to the requirements of RMP Program 3. On October 18, 2012, EPA inspectors visited the Facility (“Inspection”) to assess Respondent’s compliance with Section 112(r) of the CAA and with Sections 302-312 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. Here is a breakdown of the citations:
The Inspection and EPA’s review of subsequently submitted information, including the Submission, revealed some potentially dangerous conditions relating to the Processes at the time of Inspection, including that Respondent:
- Had not developed a process hazard analysis (PHA) that addressed all of the necessary information and documentation to allow Respondent to adequately identify hazards posed by and maintain the Process. For example, issues not addressed in the PHA include the hazards of the process, potential catastrophic consequences, failure of administrative controls, stationary source siting, human factors and safety and health concerns;
- Had not developed, drafted, implemented, and certified sufficient written practices and operating procedures for safely conducting various activities for the Process. For example, while Respondent had a written operating procedure for the Process, it did not include safety and health considerations or a description of available safety systems and their functions. During the inspection, a manager stated that he had not certified the operating procedures associated with the process until 2012, although Respondent had operated the covered process since at least 2009;
- Did not have documentation showing that Respondent had conducted an adequate training program for Facility employees involved in operating the Process. Although during the Inspection a manager stated that Respondent has conducted training, there are no records in the Facility’s files that document any process-related training;
- Had not developed and implemented written mechanical integrity (“MI”) procedures to maintain the ongoing integrity of the equipment in the Process. Respondent did not have a formal mechanical integrity program in place. During the Inspection, a manager stated that he had not developed written procedures to maintain process equipment. Respondent also had not tested or calibrated ammonia detectors since the process was restarted in 2009. Additionally, some of the vapor barriers on sections of the roof piping had been breached;
- Had not equipped the ammonia detectors to actuate visual and audible alarms outside of access doors to the Machinery Room;
- Had not labeled or tagged many of the pipes and valves associated with the process;
- Had not installed the main pressure-relief valve header in a safe manner. The header discharge point was less than fifteen feet above the roof surface and located almost directly above the primary egress door from the Machinery Room where the remote emergency shutdown switch is located;
- Had not installed an emergency ventilation override outside the machinery room. The emergency shutdown switch located outside the principle exterior machinery room door was not clearly identified by label or marking;
- Had not addressed all action items identified during the compliance audit for the Process in 2011. Some of the issues identified during the 2011 audit (including testing and calibrating ammonia detectors and addressing breaches in pipe insulation on the roof) had still not been addressed by the time of the Inspection in October 2012;
- Had not developed an adequate emergency response program. For example, the Emergency Response Plan (“ERP”) identified security personnel as emergency operators and assigned them multiple tasks. However, security staff had not been trained in the use of the ERP and Facility records indicated that the last training provided to security staff was in 2008. Additionally, several of the items in the ERP applied to Respondent’s Cheshire, CT facility rather than the North Haven facility. For example, the ERP referenced an emergency stop switch that was located in the security shed at the Cheshire facility and the hospital included in the plan was Bradley Memorial Hospital when the appropriate hospital for the North Haven facility is Yale New Haven Hospital. Also, there are several other actions included in the plan, including corporate responders performing fence-line monitoring to support corrective action decision making and personnel protective equipment guidelines for ammonia levels which appear to contradict the referenced MSDS. Finally, the ERP referenced document IIAR 106R, which is obsolete.
Count 1: Failure to Adequately Identify, Evaluate, and Control Hazards
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.67, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process is required, among other things, to perform an initial PHA on each covered process. The PHA must identify, evaluate and control the hazards involved in the process. The owner or operator must update the PHA every five years and when a major change in the process occurs. Additionally, the owner or operator must establish a system for addressing the recommendations identified in the PHA, including by defining a schedule for completing the action items, taking the actions as soon as possible, and documenting the resolution of the recommendations.
Respondent conducted an initial PHA in 2008. However, the 2008 PHA does not address all of the requirements, including the hazards of the process, potential catastrophic consequences, failure of administrative controls, stationary source siting, human factors and safety and health concerns. By failing to adequately identify, evaluate, and control hazards, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c) from at least August 19, 2011 to October 18, 2012.
Count 2: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Operating Procedures Requirements
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.69, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process is required to develop and implement written operating procedures that provide instructions or steps for safely conducting activities associated with the covered process. These operating procedures must address steps for each operating phase, operating limits, safety and health considerations, and safety systems. The owner or operator must make these procedures available to employees involved in the process, keep them up-to-date with current practices, and certify annually that they are current.
Respondent’s written operating procedures did not include safety and health considerations or a description of available safety systems and their functions and had not certified that the written operating procedures were current and accurate until 2012, although Respondent had operated the process since at least 2009. By failing to comply with the operating procedures requirements, from at least April 2009 to on or about October 18, 2012, Respondent violated 40 C.F .R. § 68.69.
Count 3: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Training Requirements
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.71, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process must train each employee involved in operating the process, provide those employees with refresher training at least every three years, and document such training and the employee’s understanding of it. Training documentation must record the date of the training and the means used to verify that employees understood the training.
Respondent had not documented adequate training for employees involved in operating the Process, in that there are no records in Respondent’s files that document process-related training and security staff, who are identified as emergency operators in Respondent’s ERP, had not been trained in their functions as required by the ERP. By failing to adequately train and record compliance with training requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.71 from at least August 19, 2011 through to October 18, 2012.
Count 4: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Mechanical Integrity Requirements
Pursuant to 40 C.F .R. § 68. 73, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process must establish and implement written procedures to maintain the ongoing integrity of certain process equipment and train employees accordingly. The owner or operator must inspect and test the equipment either in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations and good engineering practices, or more frequently if needed based on prior operating experience. The owner or operator must also document the inspections or tests on process equipment, correct deficiencies, assure than any new equipment is installed properly, and assure that maintenance materials and spare parts are suitable for the process application.
Respondent had not developed and implemented comprehensive written mechanical integrity schedules and procedures to maintain the on-going integrity of the equipment in the Process, had not performed all the necessary inspections and tests of the equipment in the Process, and had not maintained documentation thereof. Respondent had not tested or calibrated the ammonia detectors since 2009 and had no information on the age of the detectors or when they were last tested. Ammonia detectors should be tested in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations and good engineering practices, which require annual inspections where no manufacturer recommendations exist. See, e.g., Int’l Inst. Of Ammonia Refrigeration, Standard 2-2008: Equipment, Design, and Installation of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems§ 13.2.5 (2010) [hereinafter “IIAR 2-2008”].
Also, Respondent had not maintained the mechanical integrity of the Process by correcting deficiencies in equipment that are outside acceptable limits before continuing to use the equipment, or in a safe and timely manner when steps have been taken to ensure safe operation. For example, the vapor barrier on numerous sections of the roof piping had been breached such that sections of piping where insulation was compromised showed signs of visible corrosion. See IIAR Bulletin 109, IIAR Minimum Safety Criteria for Safe Ammonia Refrigeration Systems§§ 4.7.4 and 4.7.5. By failing to establish and implement a sufficient mechanical integrity program and by not correcting equipment deficiencies before further use or in a safe and timely manner, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73 from at least August 19, 2011 to October 18, 2012.
Count 5: Failure to Comply with Safety Information Requirements
Pursuant to 40 C.F .R. § 68.65, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process is required, among other things, to compile written process safety information before completing the PHA, in order to perform an adequate PHA and to enable proper maintenance of process equipment. This includes documenting information pertaining to the hazards of the RMP chemical in the process and information pertaining to the technology and equipment of the process. This compilation of process safety information enables appropriate identification and understanding of hazards posed by regulated substances in the process and the technology and equipment of the process. In addition, the owner or operator must document that equipment complies with RAGAGEP, and that the equipment that was designed according to outdated standards is designed, maintained, and inspected, tested, and operated in a safe manner.
Respondent failed to document that the Process complies with RAGAGEP, as discussed in greater detail below. Respondent had not equipped the ammonia detectors to activate visual and audible alarms at the entrances to the Machinery Room. See, e.g., Am. Nat’l Standards Inst./ Am. Soc’y of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Eng’rs, Standard 15-2010: Safety Standard for Refrigeration Systems § 8.11.2.1 (2010) [hereinafter “ASHRAE 15-2010”]; IIAR 2-2008 § 13.2 1
At the time of the Inspection, many of the Process pipes were unlabeled and valves untagged. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to label all system pipes and valve systems. See, e.g., ANSI Standard A13.1-2007: Pipe Labeling Requirements & Standards; See, e.g., IIAR 2-2008, supra,§ 10.5 (2008 and 2010 editions); llAR Bulletin 109, IIAR Minimum Safety Criteria/or Safe Ammonia Refrigeration Systems§ 4.7.6; IIAR Bulletin 114, Guidelines for Identification of Ammonia Refrigeration Piping and System Components.
At the time of the Inspection, Respondent had not safely installed the main pressure-relief valve header for the Process. The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to raise the relief header pipe at least fifteen feet above the adjoining surface level and oriented it to avoid spraying of refrigerant on persons in the vicinity. See, e.g., IIAR 2-2008, supra, § 11.3.6.4 (2008 and 2010 versions).
At the time of Inspection, Respondent had not adequately provided and labeled emergency shutdown and ventilation switches for the Process immediately outside the Machinery Room door. The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to provide clearly marked emergency shutdown and ventilation switches immediately outside the principle Machinery Room door (and preferably, all access doors). See, e.g., IIAR 2-2008, supra, §§ 13.3.11 and 13.1.132; ASHRAE 15-2010 § 8.12.1 (same citation in 2007 edition).
By failing to document that the process complies with RAGAGEP or that equipment designed to outdated standards is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operated in a safe manner, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65 from at least August 19, 2011 to October 18, 2012.
Count 6: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Compliance Audit Requirements
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.79, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process must evaluate compliance with the provisions of the prevention program at least every three years; document the audit findings; promptly determine and document a response to each of the findings of the audit; document that deficiencies have been corrected; and retain the two most recent compliance reports.
Respondent performed a compliance audit in 2011, but did not correct all of the identified deficiencies and/or did not document that all of the deficiencies identified in the audit had been corrected and when. By failing to comply with the audit requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.79 from at least August 19,2011 to October 18, 2012.
Count 7: Failure to Have an Adequate Emergency Response Program
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.90, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process must comply with the emergency response program requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.95 unless such owner or operator’s employees will not be responding to accidental releases and various other requirements are met. 40 C.F.R. §68.95 requires the owner or operator of a Program 3 process to develop and implement an emergency response program by: maintaining an emergency response plan; outlining procedures for using, inspecting, testing and maintaining response equipment; training employees on response procedures; and creating procedures to review and update the emergency response plan to reflect current conditions at the Facility and to inform employees accordingly.
Respondent’s EAP indicates that its employees will respond to accidental releases at the Facility. Accordingly, 40 C.F.R. §68.95 applies.
At the time of Inspection, Respondent did not have an adequate emergency response program in place, in that the Facility’s ERP did not accurately reflect current conditions at the Facility, the designated staff had not been trained in its use, and it referenced information and equipment that applied to a different facility. By failing to comply with the emergency response program requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.95 from August 19, 2011 to October 18, 2012.
Pursuant to Section 113(e) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e), and taking into account the relevant statutory penalty criteria, the facts alleged in this CAFO, and such other circumstances as justice may require, EPA has determined that it is fair and proper to assess a civil penalty of $124,181 for the violations alleged in this matter.
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