EPA RMP citations @ combined-cycle cogeneration power plant (NH3 & $109K)

Respondent owns a combined-cycle cogeneration power plant facility. From approximately 1991 to December 2013, the Facility was operated as a combined-cycle cogeneration power plant. Beginning in April 2012, the Facility halted full-time operations and began operating one or two days per year in order to conduct ISO-New England capability tests; however, the ammonia refrigeration system at the Facility remained intact and continued to contain ammonia. According to Respondent, during the curtailed operations time period before and after the inspection, the ammonia was stored in the chiller building and not distributed throughout the full system. The associated piping and valves were drained and not in service.  On August 8, 2013, EPA performed an inspection to assess Respondent’s compliance with Section 112(r) of the CAA. At the time of the Inspection, the Facility was a building or structure from which an accidental release may occur and was therefore a “stationary source,” as defined at Section 112(r)(2)(C) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(2)(C), and 40 C.F.R. § 68.3. At the time of the Inspection, Respondent used anhydrous ammonia in a refrigeration process (“the Process”), as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 68.3.

On June 18, 1999, Respondent submitted the initial RMP submission for the Facility.

On June 18, 2009, Respondent submitted the most recent RMP submission for the Facility (“the 2009 RMP”). In the 2009 RMP, Respondent reported that the Facility had 13,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia in a Program Level 3 process and 28,000 pounds of aqueous ammonia in a Program Level 2 process at the Facility.

The most recent Process Hazard Analysis (“PHA”) for the Facility was completed on June 16, 2011 and June 22, 2011. In 2014, Respondent submitted a Tier 2 report pursuant to Sections 311 and 312 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (“EPCRA”), 42 U .S.C. §§ 11021 and 11022, reporting that the Facility used 13,000 pounds of ammonia in reportable year 2013.

Accordingly, at the time of the Inspection, the Process was a “covered process” subject to the provisions of Part 68 because Respondent “stored” and “handled” the RMP
chemical anhydrous ammonia at the Facility in a process in an amount greater than 10,000 pounds.

According to Respondent’s 2009 RMP, there were public receptors within the distance to the endpoint for a worst case release of the amount of anhydrous ammonia used in the Process. Likewise, modeling performed by EPA indicates that the endpoint for a worst case release from the Process was greater than the distance to a public receptor.

Additionally, at the time of the Inspection, the Process was subject to OSHA’s PSM requirements at 29 C.F .R. § 1910.119 because it used anhydrous ammonia in an amount over the threshold quantity of 10,000 pounds. Therefore, in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.1 0(a)-(d), at the time of the allegations herein, Respondent’s storage and handling of anhydrous ammonia in its Process at the Facility was subject to the requirements of RMP Program 3.

In light of the potential hazards posed by the mishandling of anhydrous ammonia, industry trade associations have issued standards outlining the recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (“RAGAGEP”) in the ammonia refrigeration industry. In collaboration with the American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”), the International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (“IIAR”) has issued (and updates) “Standard 2: Equipment, Design, and Installation of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems,” along with other applicable standards and guidance. Also in collaboration with the American National Standards Institute, the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (“ASHRAE”) has issued (and updates) “Standard 15: Safety Standard for Refrigeration Systems.” These standards are consistently relied upon by refrigeration experts and are sometimes incorporated into state building, fire, and mechanical codes.

VIOLATIONS

Count 1: Failure to comply with RMP management requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.15.

At the time of the Inspection in 2013, Respondent failed to provide an up-to-date defined on-site person responsible for the implementation of the RMP program elements for the Covered Process or an appropriate organizational chart document that defined the lines of authority over elements of the risk management program at the Facility.

Accordingly, Respondent failed to comply with RMP management requirements in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.15 and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E), from at least September 2012, the date Respondent’s assigned person with the overall responsibility for the Facility’s RMP program, stopped working at the Facility, to at least August 8, 2013, the date of EPA’s Inspection.

 

Count 2: Failure to Comply with Process Safety Information Requirements

Respondent failed to document that the Process equipment complied with applicable RAGAGEP or that any equipment that was designed according to outdated standards is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operated in a safe manner.

By failing to comply with process safety information requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65 and Section l 12(r)(7)(E) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E), from
at least June 22, 2011, the date of the PHA, to August 2013, the date of EPA’s Inspection.

 

Count 3: Failure to Perform and/or Maintain PHA Documents

Although a PHA was performed, the Facility’s operating records did not include any tracking documentation to address the recommendations made in the PHA. The PHA included a checklist of items for follow-up, but the Facility possessed no documentation of actions taken in response to these PHA recommendations. The effectiveness of the PHA was substantially limited because Respondent did not plan for and complete all of the identified action items associated with the covered Process. Further, Respondent failed to identify and/or correct significant and easily identifiable hazardous conditions.

Also, the PHA did not identify or address the hazard of having no hazardous material response capabilities available near the Facility to respond to a release.

By failing to adequately identify, evaluate, and control hazards, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c) and Section l 12(r)(7)(E) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E), from at least May 2012, the date the Facility’s operational status changed, to August 2013, the date of EPA’ s Inspection.

 

Count 4: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Operating Procedures Requirements

Respondent failed to comply with Program 3 operating procedure requirements, including failing to re-certify standard operating procedures on an annual basis. Respondent failed to re-certify standard operating procedures on an annual basis, including failing to certify annually that the operating procedures are current and accurate and that the procedures have been reviewed as often as necessary. As of the time of the Inspection, Respondent failed to certify operating procedures for the last few previous years.

By failing to comply with the operating procedures requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69 and Section l 12(r)(7)(E) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E), from at least May 2012, the date the Facility’s operational status changed, to August 2013, the date of EPA’s Inspection.

 

Count 5: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Training Requirements

Respondent failed to produce any records documenting initial or refresher training of employees to perform routine maintenance on the Covered Process or detailing what to look for during an inspection of the Process performed by Respondent’s employees. Respondent had no formal documentation or formal written program outlining any Facility-specific operating training.

Respondent failed to document in records that each employee involved in operating the Covered Process had received and understood required operations training. Respondent failed to prepare records containing the identity of the employee(s), the date of the training, and the means used to verify that the employee(s) understood the training.

By failing to adequately train and record compliance with training requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.71 and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E), from at least May 2012, the date the Facility’s operational status changed, to August 2013, the date of EPA’s Inspection.

 

Count 6: Failure to Comply with Mechanical Integrity Requirements for the Covered Process

Respondent failed to comply with the mechanical integrity requirements for the Process, including failing to establish a program to perform appropriate checks and inspections of the entire covered Process to ensure that equipment was installed properly and consistently with design specifications, the manufacturer’s instructions, and RAGAGEP, and failing to correct deficiencies in equipment that were outside acceptable limits. Also, after the 20 IO ammonia releases, Respondent could not show that the Facility’s ammonia detectors were recalibrated.

By failing to establish and implement a sufficient mechanical integrity program and by not correcting equipment deficiencies before further use or in a safe and timely manner, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73 and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E), from at least July 2010, after an ammonia release at the Facility, to August 2013, the date of EPA’s Inspection.

 

Count 7: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Compliance Audit Requirements

Respondent lacked records for the Facility’s 2008 audit, and the 2010 and 2011 audits for the Facility did not contain supporting documentation, including information necessary to determine appropriate responses to issues identified or to document completion or resolution of recommendations or corrections of deficiencies.

Respondent lacked any formal documentation of any responses or follow through on any audit findings or recommendations.

By failing to comply with the audit requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.79 and Section l 12(r)(7)(E) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E), from at least 2008 to August 2013, the date of EPA’s Inspection.

 

Count 8: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Incident Investigation Requirements

Respondent failed to document comprehensive assessments of how two incidents in 2010 occurred, what the root causes were, and how Respondent would make administrative and engineering changes to prevent recurrence and future injuries at the Facility. Nor did Respondent update the Facility’s RMP with updated accident information within six months of the 2010 incidents, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.195.

By failing to comply with the incident investigation requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.81 and 68.195 and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(r)(7)(E), from at least April 2010, the date of the first of two ammonia release incidents at the Facility, to August 2013, the date ofEPA’s Inspection.

 

Count 9: Failure to Have an Adequate Emergency Response Program

Respondent had not coordinated with the local fire department regarding the Facility and had not established appropriate mechanisms to notify emergency responders when there was a need for a response; therefore, 40 C.F.R. § 68.95 applied to Respondent’s covered Process at the Facility.

Pursuant to 40 C.F .R. § 68.95, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process must develop and implement an emergency response program by: maintaining an emergency response plan; outlining procedures for using, inspecting, testing and maintaining response equipment; training employees on response procedures; and creating procedures to review and update the emergency response plan to reflect current conditions at the Facility and to inform employees accordingly.

Respondent failed to develop and implement an adequate emergency response program for the Process at the Facility.

Respondent’s Emergency Response Plan and response protocols were not suitable for the Facility in several ways, including, but not limited to:

  • although Respondent listed the Facility as a “first responder” itself, staffing levels at the Facility made it impossible for the Facility to be a “first responder” in cases of accidental releases of regulated substances at the Facility; 
  • the Facility’s RMP did not reflect the then-current operating condition of the Facility in that the Facility was essentially unstaffed and that regional HAZMAT personnel would have to respond to all incidents at the Facility; 
  • Respondent did not coordinate with the local emergency response plan regarding the status of the Facility; 
  • the Facility’s emergency response program lacked procedures for how appropriately trained emergency responders would respond to an ammonia release at the Facility; and, 
  • Respondent failed to update the emergency contact information for the Facility after the departure of that person in September 2012, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.195.

By failing to develop and implement an adequate emergency response program for the Process at the Facility, Respondent violated 40 C.F .R. §§ 68.90, 68.95, and 68.195, and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E), from at least May 2012, the date the Facility’s operational status changed, to August 2013, the date of EPA’s Inspection.

 

TERMS OF SETTLEMENT

Respondent certifies that it is currently operating the Facility in compliance with 40 C.F.R. 68. Respondent further certifies that the Facility has been deregistered from the RMP Program, that there is no longer anhydrous ammonia at the Facility, and that the aqueous ammonia used for non-refrigeration purposes is not present at the Facility above RMP threshold levels. Respondent also certifies that it has decommissioned the refrigeration system or achieved the following bare minimum safety measures, which EPA has determined should be present at every facility with an ammonia refrigeration system, as specified below:

Identifying Hazards

  • Hazard Addressed: Releases or safety deficiencies that stem from a failure to identify hazards in design/operation of system
    • Facility has completed a process hazard analysis or review.

Operating Activities:

  • Hazard Addressed: High risk of release from operating or maintenance activity
    • System has self-closing/quick closing valves on oil pots.
    • Facility has written procedures for maintenance and operation activities.
    • Only authorized persons have access to machinery room and the ability to alter safety settings on equipment.

Maintenance/Mechanical Integrity:

  • Hazard Addressed: Leaks/releases from maintenance neglect
    • A preventative maintenance program is in place to, among other things, detect and control corrosion, deteriorated vapor barriers, ice buildup, and pipe hammering, and to inspect integrity of equipment/pipe supports.
    • All piping system openings except the relief header are plugged or capped, or valve is locked.
    • Equipment, piping, and emergency shutdown valves are labeled for easy identification, and pressure vessels have legible, accessible nameplates.
    • All atmospheric pressure relief valves have been replaced in the last five years with visible confirmation of accessible pressure relief valves.

Machinery Room and System Design

  • Hazard Addressed: Inability to isolate and properly vent releases
    • The System(s) has/have emergency shut-off and ventilation switches outside each machinery room.
    • The machinery room(s) has/have functional , tested, ventilation. Air inlets are positioned to avoid recirculation of exhaust air and ensure sufficient inlet air to replace exhausted air.
    • Documentation exists to show that pressure relief valves that have a common discharge header have adequately sized piping to prevent excessive backpressure on relief valves, or if built prior to 2000, have adequate diameter based on the sum of the relief valve cross sectional areas.

Emergency Actions

  • Hazard Addressed: Inability to regain control and reduce release impact
    • Critical shutoff valves are accessible, and a schematic is in place to show responders where to access them.
    • EPCRA Tier II reporting is up to date.

When calculating penalties under the Enforcement Policy, EPA takes into account the potential for harm for violating a particular Part 68 requirement and the extent of deviation of Respondent’s conduct from the particular Part 68 requirement.  EPA has determined that it is fair and proper to assess a civil penalty of one hundred nine thousand three hundred seventy-five dollars ($109,375) for the violations alleged in this matter.

 

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