EPA RMP Citations @ controlled temperature laboratory (NH3 & $85K)

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

Respondent operates a controlled temperature laboratory, where it conducts research on the effect of cold temperatures on equipment, structures and technological systems, at its Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory.  The Facility is located approximately two miles north of the center of Hanover, New Hampshire. The 30-acre site is bordered on the north and south by small housing areas, to the west by a narrow buffer of undeveloped land and the Connecticut River, and on the east by a state highway and a public school. Within a half-mile radius of the Facility, there are additional housing complexes, office buildings, the Hanover Fire and Police Department, the Emergency Medical Response complex, a nursing home, and a few small businesses. Approximately 350 people work at the Facility, and there is a day-care center for young children on-site.

Respondent uses anhydrous ammonia within its Ice Engineering Facility (“IEF”). The IEF, constructed in 1977, is a unique hydraulic research facility, which houses three cold rooms for sophisticated modeling of hydraulic processes in cold regions. The IEF is a two-story building that includes an ammonia machinery room (“Machinery Room”) on the lower level and several refrigerated rooms where research is conducted. The Machinery Room has three access doors: an internal double-door, an internal single door, and a third door that leads to a vestibule with two other internal doors and a door that leads to the outside. In addition to typical refrigeration equipment, such as compressors, evaporators, and condensers, the Facility has an emergency ammonia dump system on the outside of the building from which ammonia can be discharged during an emergency to a storm water detention pond. This pond is located to the west of, and in close proximity to, the IEF building. The pond drains into the adjacent Connecticut River.  The Facility’s day care center is located on the eastern side of the IEF.

Respondent uses anhydrous ammonia in its “process,” as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 68.3, within the IEF. Within the IEF, the room air and test water are refrigerated using a 250-ton, two stage ammonia refrigeration system charged with 14,000 pounds of ammonia. The IEF is capable of producing cold temperatures as low as -20 degrees Fahrenheit.  Accordingly, the process conducted in the IEF (the “Process”) is a “covered process” subject to the RMP provisions of Part 68 because Respondent “uses,” “stores,” and “handles” the RMP chemical anhydrous ammonia in the Process in an amount greater than 10,000 pounds. According to Respondent’s Risk Management Plan completed in 2010, the endpoint for a worst case release of the amount of anhydrous ammonia used in the Process is greater than the distance to a public receptor. Additionally, the Process is subject to OSHA’s PSM requirements at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119 because it uses anhydrous ammonia in an amount over the threshold quantity of 10,000 pounds. Therefore, in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.1O(a)-(d), Respondent’s use, storage, and handling of anhydrous ammonia in the IEF Process is subject to the requirements of RMP Program 3.

On August 13, 2013, EPA inspectors visited CRREL (“Inspection”) to assess Respondent’s compliance with Section 112(r) of the CAA and with Sections 302-312 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act.

In light of the potential hazards posed by the mishandling of anhydrous ammonia, industry trade associations have issued standards outlining the recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (“RAGAGEP”) in the ammonia refrigeration industry. In collaboration with the American National Standards Institute, the International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (“IIAR”) has issued (and updates) “Standard 2: Equipment, Design, and Installation of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems,” along with other applicable standards and guidance. Also in collaboration with the American National Standards Institute, the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (“ASHRAE”) has issued (and updates) “Standard 15: Safety Standard for Refrigeration Systems.” These standards are consistently relied upon by refrigeration experts and are sometimes incorporated into state building and mechanical codes.

During the Inspection of CRREL, EPA requested and received certain documentation from Respondent pertaining to the Process, including the Facility’s emergency response plan (“ERP”).

The Inspection and EPA’s review of subsequently submitted information revealed some potentially dangerous conditions relating to the Process, including that Respondent:

1. Had incomplete, outdated documentation pertaining to the equipment used in the Process. Specifically, the piping and instrument diagram did not reflect a shut-off valve installed on the second floor of the IEF;
2. Had not adequately installed and labeled switches controlling emergency ventilation and emergency shutdown immediately outside the principal access doors to the Machinery Room. The only emergency shut-off and ventilation switches were near the outer door next to the ammonia dump station, but the position of the shut-off switch was not clearly identified, and the switches on the control box were not clearly marked. Respondent’s representatives were unable to explain the purpose of several of these switches. Further, there were no switches for shut-off or operation of an emergency ventilation system in the vicinity of any of the interior doors to the Machinery Room, including the double-door entry;
3. Had not configured ammonia detectors to actuate audible and visual alarms at each Machinery Room entrance;
4. Did not have signs warning of the presence of ammonia and restricting entry on any of the doors to the Machinery Room, and did not have any signage posted near the Machinery Room identifying emergency instructions, telephone numbers of emergency safety and operating personnel, or an evacuation plan;
5. Had not labeled or had inadequately labeled some of the piping for the ammonia refrigeration system in several locations throughout the IEF, including certain overhead pipes containing anhydrous ammonia and glycol fluids in the Machinery Room and certain pipes on the second floor;
6. In the largest IEF room, had not installed two ammonia detectors in areas where leaked ammonia, which would rise upward, would concentrate. Instead, two ammonia detectors were improperly mounted directly onto piping at shoulder level below some of the piping in the room;
7. Had not properly prevented corrosion on pipes. For example, heavily rusted conditions were observed on the anhydrous ammonia fill pipe inside the IEF building and on the lower portion of the header pipe on the roof of the IEF building;
8. Had not located discharge points for ammonia pressure relief at an adequate distance from a fire escape from the second level;
9. Had not labeled or tagged one of the three main shut-off valves, or King Valves, for anhydrous ammonia piping;
10. Had not located air intakes in proper locations to ensure adequate ventilation and air sweep of the room. Air intakes in the Machinery Room were located near the ceiling. Because the air intakes were near the ceiling and the exhaust fans were installed in the roof, the air circulation pattern in the Machinery Room would not provide adequate ventilation of lower elevations near the machinery located in this room;
11. Had not properly maintained the vestibule leading from the Machinery Room to the only door that opened directly to the outside of the building, in that the vestibule was being used for storage and the other two interior doors were not labeled “No Exit,” both of which could impede egress in an emergency;
12. Had two single doors to the Machinery Room that were not tight-fitting;
13. Had no safety eyewash/showers located in close proximity to the exits from the Machinery Room;
14. Had not maintained sufficient documentation to establish that Respondent’s practice of performing pieces of a Process Hazard Analyses (“PHA”) annually resulted in the preparation of a complete PHA within a five-year period, had not developed a schedule for addressing recommendations identified in the PHA, nor documented that recommended actions were taken in a timely manner. In addition, Respondent’s PHA (which its Risk Management Plan submission indicates was completed in 2010) failed to identify the hazards associated with the ammonia dump station discussed below in subparagraphs (s) and (t). Nor did it address hazards that exist at the Facility due to possible earthquakes, floods, tornadoes, and hurricanes, which are all credible threats at this Facility. CRREL is located in a Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) moderate intensity earthquake zone, and is located along the Connecticut River;
15. Had an inadequate standard operating procedures (“SOPs”), including for operating the ammonia dump station, in that CRREL’s SOPs did not include all RMP elements, like health and safety information for anhydrous ammonia and standards for responding to deviations from typical operations;
16. Had no windsocks that were visible from the street;
17. Had no documentation of any RMP compliance audits performed at the IEF;
18. Had not included the name of the proper RMP contact on the Facility’s emergency response call list;
19. Had inadequate emergency response equipment. Respondent’s emergency “ammonia dump station” had a dangerous piping system with an approximately one-half foot gap between the discharge pipe and the ground receiving pipe, which might result in a further release of ammonia through this gap during an emergency. This potentialrelease would likely be at knee level, which could result in serious injury because ammonia is lighter than air and rises in the event of a release;
20. Had inadequate, outdated procedures for emergency response in that the “ammonia dump station” relied on a pumper truck from the fire department to supply water in the event that municipal water was unavailable. However, the local fire department advised EPA that it was unaware of its potential role in an emergency at the Facility, and that it was not equipped to provide assistance of this nature in the event of an emergency. In addition, Respondent had failed to evaluate or update the “ammonia dump station” design, which called for the discharge of ammonia to the storm water detention pond located at the Facility, with drainage from the pond to the Connecticut River; and
21. Failed to report ten chemicals in use at the Facility, in addition to anhydrous ammonia, in its 2009, 2010, and 2012 Tier II reports. Among the chemicals not reported on these Tier II reports were sulfuric acid, lead-acid batteries (which contain sulfuric acid and lead), glycol, propane, fuel oil, and refrigerants other than anhydrous ammonia.

VIOLATIONS

Count 1: Failure to Comply with Safety Information Requirements

Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.65, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process is required, among other things, to compile written process safety information before completing the PHA, in order to perform an adequate PHA and to enable proper maintenance of process equipment. This requirement includes documenting information pertaining to the hazards of the RMP chemical in the process; information pertaining to the technology and equipment of the process, including that the equipment complies with RAGAGEP; and information showing that any equipment that was designed according to outdated standards is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operated in a safe manner. This compilation enables appropriate identification and understanding of hazards posed by regulated substances in the process and the technology and equipment of the process.

At the time of inspection,

1. Respondent had not compiled all of the necessary process safety information pertaining to the technology and equipment of the IEF because it did not have an up-to-date piping and instrument diagram, as required under 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(ii).
2. Respondent also failed to document that the Process complied with RAGAGEP.
3. Respondent did not have adequate, and adequately labeled, emergency shut-off and ventilation switches immediately outside of the principal Machinery Room doors. The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to provide clearly marked emergency shutdown and ventilation switches immediately outside the principal doors (and, preferably, all access doors). See, e.g., Int’l Inst. of Ammonia Refrigeration, Standard 2-2008: Equipment, Design, and Installation of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems§§ 13.3.1.6 (2008) [hereinafter “IIAR 2-2008”] 2 (emergency shutdown switches); 13.2.1.4 (emergency mechanical ventilation system switches); Am. Nat’l Standards Inst./ Am. Soc ‘y of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Eng’rs, Standard 15-2007: Safety Standard for Refrigeration Systems §§ 8.12(i) (2007) [hereinafter “ASHRAE 15-2007”] (provide switches), 11.2.2 (identify switches). The shutdown switch should be of the break-glass type and the ventilation switch should have “on/auto” settings. See, e.g., Int’l Inst. of Ammonia Refrigeration, Bulletin No. 111: Ammonia Machinery Room Ventilation§§ 3.5.1 & 3.5.2 (2002) [hereinafter “IIAR Bull. 111”].
4. Respondent had not equipped the ammonia detector to actuate audible and visual alarms outside of each of the Machinery Room entrances. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to equip the detectors to activate visual and audible alarms inside the Machinery Room and at each of its entrances. See, e.g., ASHRAE 15-2007, supra,§ 8.11.2.1; Bull. No. 111, supra,§ 3.5.3.
5. Respondent did not have sufficient signs on the doors to, or within, the Machinery Room. The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to post signs warning of the presence of ammonia and restricting entry to authorized personnel at each entrance to the Machinery Room, see, e.g., ASHRAE 15-2007, supra, §§ 8.11.8, 11.2.4, and to post other signs with information about the operation of the process, including about the alarms and the emergency shutdown procedures, outside the principal Machinery Room door. See, e.g., id., §§ 8.11.2.1 (meaning of alarms), 11.7 (emergency shutdown procedures and precautions).
6. Respondent had not labeled or had inadequately labeled the piping for the ammonia refrigeration system in several locations throughout the IEF. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to identify all piping as to physical state, relative pressure level, and direction of the flow, and to employ a standard identification system. See, e.g., IIAR 2-2008, supra,§ 10.5; ASHRAE 15-2007, supra, § 11.2.2; Int’l Inst. of Ammonia Refrigeration, Bulletin No. 109: IIAR Minimum Safety Criteria for a Safe Ammonia Refrigeration System,§ 4.7.6 (1997) [hereinafter “IIAR Bull. 109”]. See generally, Int’l Inst. of Ammonia Refrigeration, Bulletin No. 114: Guidelines for Identification of Ammonia Refrigeration Piping and System Components (1991).
7. In the largest IEF Room, Respondent had placed two ammonia detectors in an area where leaked ammonia is not likely to concentrate. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to locate detectors in an area where refrigerant from a leak is likely to concentrate. See, e.g., IIAR 2-2008, supra,§ 13.2.2.1.
8. Respondent had not properly prevented corrosion on piping. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to prevent corrosion on ammonia piping and insulate designated piping to prevent condensation and corrosion. See, e.g., Int’l Inst. of Ammonia Refrigeration, IIAR Bulletin No. 110, Startup, Inspection and Maintenance of Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems§ 6.7 (1993); IIAR Bull. 109, supra,§ 4.7.4.
9. Respondent had not located ammonia pressure relief device discharge points at an adequate distance from the fire escape on the second level. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to locate the pressure relief device discharge at least twenty feet from personnel exits. See, e.g., IIAR 2-2008, supra,§ 11.3.6.3; ASHRAE 15-2007, supra,§ 9.7.8.
10. There was an unlabeled untagged King Valve for the Process. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to label all system pipes and valve systems, including the main shut-off valve. See, e.g., ASHRAE 15-2007, supra,§§ 9.12.6, 11.2.2; IIAR Bull. 109, supra,§ 4.10.3 (the main shut-off valve should be readily accessible and identified with a prominent sign having letters sufficiently large to be easily read).
11. In the Machinery Room, Respondent had not located intakes for air in proper locations to ensure an adequate air sweep of the room. The recommended industry practice is to provide adequate ventilation and air sweep in Machinery Rooms. See, e.g., IIAR 2-2008, supra, §§ 13.2.3.8 (openings for inlet air shall be positioned to be near the machinery), 13.2.3.9 (openings for inlet air shall be positioned to avoid recirculation of exhaust air); ASHRAE 15-2007, supra, § 8.11.4 (opening for inlet air shall be positioned to avoid recirculation).
12. Respondent had not properly maintained the vestibule so as to provide a clear and unobstructed egress to the outdoors from the Machinery Room. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to allow unencumbered egress from any part of the room. See, e.g., IIAR 2-2008, supra, § 13.1.1; ASHRAE 15-2007, supra,§ 8.3.
13. Respondent had two doors to the Machinery Room that were not tight-fitting. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to ensure that each machinery room door is tight-fitting. See, e.g., IIAR 2-2008, supra, § 13.3.3.1; ASHRAE 15-2007, supra,§ 8.11.2.
14. Respondent had not installed personnel safety eyewash and showers just outside of the Machinery Room doors. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to locate an emergency eyewash station immediately outside the machine room exit door. See, e.g., IIAR 2-2008, supra,§ 13.3.1.4; IIAR Bull. 109, supra,§ 4.10.10.

By failing to compile the necessary information about the technology and equipment of the Processes, including by documenting that the Process complied with RAGAGEP, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65 and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA.

 

Count 2: Failure to Adequately Identify, Evaluate, and Control Hazards

Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.67, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process is required, among other things, to perform an initial PHA on each covered process. The PHA must identify, evaluate, and control the hazards involved in the process. The owner or operator must update the PHA every five years and when a major change in the process occurs. Additionally, the owner or operator must establish a system for addressing the recommendations identified in the PHA, including by defining a schedule for completing the action items, taking the actions as soon as possible, and documenting the resolution of the recommendations.

Respondent had performed a PHA in piecemeal fashion, ending in 2010 and identified recommended action items. However,

1. Respondent did not have a system for cross-referencing those PHA subparts so as to clearly comprise a complete PHA and did not establish a schedule for addressing the identified items not document that, or when, they were completed.
2. The PHAs did not identify or address hazards that exist at the Facility due to possible earthquakes, floods, tornadoes, and hurricanes, which are all credible threats at CRREL.
3. Respondent’s PHAs failed to identify the readily discernible hazards to personnel and the environment associated with operating the ammonia dump station. Current industry standards would prohibit dump systems that could cause ammonia to flow into surface water. See, e.g., ASHRAE 15-2007, supra, § 11.3 (with very limited exception, “no refrigerant shall be discharged to the atmosphere or to locations such as a sewer, river, stream, or lake”).

By failing to adequately identify, evaluate, and control hazards, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e) and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA.

 

Count 3: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Operating Procedures Requirements

Pursuant to 40 C.F .R. § 68.69, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process is required to develop and implement written operating procedures that provide instructions or steps for safely conducting activities associated with the covered process. These operating procedures must address steps for each operating phase, operating limits, safety and health considerations, and safety systems. The owner or operator must make these procedures available to employees involved in the process, keep them up-to-date with current practices, and certify annually that they are current. The owner or operator must also develop and implement safe work practices to control hazards during specific operations.

At the time of inspection,

1. Respondent did not have sufficient written RMP operating procedures, including for the ammonia dump station.

By failing to comply with the operating procedures requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69 and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA.

 

Count 4: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Mechanical Integrity Requirements

Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process must establish and implement written procedures to maintain the ongoing integrity of certain process equipment and train employees accordingly. The owner or operator must inspect and test the equipment either in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations and good engineering practices, or more frequently if needed based on prior operating experience. The owner or operator must also document the inspections or tests on process equipment, correct deficiencies, assure that any new equipment is suitable for the process application, perform checks to ensure that equipment is installed properly, and assure that maintenance materials and spare parts are suitable for the process application.

At the time of Inspection,

1. Respondent had not maintained the mechanical integrity of the Process, given that there were pipes at the IEF that were heavily corroded.

By failing to establish and implement a sufficient mechanical integrity program and by not correcting equipment deficiencies before further use or in a safe and timely manner, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73 and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA.

 

Count 5: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Compliance Audit Requirements

Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.79, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process must evaluate compliance with the provisions of the RMP prevention program at least every three years; document the audit findings; promptly determine and document a response to each of the findings of the audit; document that deficiencies have been corrected; and retain the two most recent compliance reports.

1. Respondent had no documentation showing any RMP compliance audits had been performed at the IEF.

By failing to comply with the compliance audit requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.79 and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA.

 

Count 6: Failure to Implement an Adequate Emergency Response Program

Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.90, the owner or operator of a stationary source of a Program 3 process must comply with the emergency response program requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.95 unless such owner or operator’s employees will not be responding to accidental releases and various other requirements are met. Forty C.F.R. § 68.95 requires the owner or operator of a Program 3 process to develop and implement an emergency response program, including by: maintaining an emergency response plan; having procedures and measures for emergency response after an accidental release; outlining procedures for using, inspecting, testing and maintaining response equipment; training employees on response procedures; and creating procedures to review and update the emergency response plan to reflect current conditions at the Facility and to inform employees accordingly.

Respondent indicates that its employees will respond to accidental releases at the Facility in certain circumstances (for example, the standard operating procedure for the ammonia dump system specifies that a Facility employee will don a respirator and operate the system).  Accordingly, 40 C.F.R. § 68.95 applies.

At the time of the Inspection,

1. Respondent had inadequate measures for emergency response after an accidental release. Respondent’s emergency “ammonia dump station” had an inadequate piping system with gap in piping that could release ammonia onto an operator during an emergency.
2. Respondent had no audio/visual alarms and inadequate emergency ventilation and shut-off controls.
3. Respondent had inadequate, outdated procedures for emergency response in that the “ammonia dump station” relied on a pumper truck from the fire department to supply water in the event that municipal water was unavailable but the fire department was not prepared to fulfill this role.
4. Respondent had failed to evaluate or update the “ammonia dump station” design, which called for the discharge of ammonia to the storm water detention pond located at the Facility, with drainage from the pond to the Connecticut River.
5. Respondent had no signage near the Machinery Room identifying emergency instructions, telephone numbers of emergency safety and operating personnel or an evacuation plan; nor had Responded included the name of the proper RMP contact on the Facility’s emergency response call list. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to post signs with emergency instructions and phone numbers and an evacuation plan. See, e.g., IIAR Bull. 109, supra,§§ 4.10.5; 4.10.6.

Accordingly, due to Respondent’s failure to have adequate measures and procedures for emergency response after an accidental release, adequate signage and instructions, and adequate procedures for use, testing, and maintenance of emergency response equipment, Respondent violated the emergency response program requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.95 and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA.

 

TERMS OF SETTLEMENT

EPA has determined that it is appropriate to assess a civil penalty of $85,059 for the violations alleged in this CAFO, and Respondent consents to payment of this penalty.

 

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