EPA RMP citations @ controlled-temperature storage warehouse for food products (NH3 & $1K w/ $325K SEP)

UPDATED/CORRECTED on 9/14/15.  Many thanks to Chris Kim Kahn, Attorney at Law @ Frost Brown Todd LLC for her assistance in correct this posting.

Respondent owns and operates a controlled-temperature storage warehouse for food products.  The Facility is located on the banks of the Connecticut River, within a quarter mile of residences and other businesses, within a half mile of two Interstate Routes (1-91 and 1-395) and a large shopping center, and less than one mile from several schools, hospitals, and houses of worship. Facility uses anhydrous ammonia in two refrigeration processes, in two series of interconnected vessels at the Facility. The process located in Building Two was constructed sometime between 1996 and 1998 (“Building Two Process”), and the process located in Building Five was installed sometime between 2000 and 2004 (“Building Five Process” and collectively, “Processes”). Respondent’s use, storage, and handling of anhydrous ammonia in the Building Five Process and the Building Two Process is subject to the requirements of RMP Program 3.  On December 6, 2012, EPA inspectors visited the facility to assess Respondent’s compliance with Section 112(r) of the CAA and with Sections 302-312 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act.  Here is a breakdown of the citations:

Both Processes are separate “closed-loop” refrigeration systems, each with components and piping in four interconnected areas. For both Processes, this includes: a Machinery Room, where most of the refrigeration components are located; areas on the roof above each Machinery Room, where the condensers and piping are located; the freezer warehouse spaces, where the evaporators and associated piping are located; and the loading docks, which have additional evaporators and associated piping. The Building Five Process Machinery Room has four access doors: two from the exterior, one from the warehouse space, and an additional exterior roll-up service door.

The Building Two Process Machinery Room is located on the second floor and has two access doors: one at the top of a metal staircase in the Loading Dock and another that opens to a narrow stairway with a door at the base leading to office areas.

On November 22, 2013, Respondent provided EPA with a work plan and schedule for addressing the issues identified in the Final NOV/AO. The Inspection and EPA’s review of subsequently submitted information, including the Submission, revealed some potentially dangerous conditions relating to the Processes at the time of Inspection, including that Respondent:

1. Had not developed a system to adequately manage RMP compliance, in that the person assigned responsibility for RMP implementation (Mr. XXXXXX XXXXXXX) informed EPA that he did not have a good understanding of, had not been trained in, and did not manage all of the program elements. Of particular note, Mr. XXXXX did not realize that both Processes were subject to the RMP regulations.
2. Had not correctly analyzed the off-site consequences of its worst-case and alternative release scenarios, in that Respondent used an “urban” instead of a “rural” topography parameter in the air dispersion model, even though the area surrounding the Facility consists of a river and low-profile buildings. The selection of this parameter reduced the extent of the impacted area under each scenario from an estimated 1.4 miles to .75 miles, due to the assumption that increased obstructions would impede the spread of a release plume. As a result, the affected population was calculated to be less than 5,000 people while EPA estimates it would be close to 25,000 people using the correct parameter.
3. Had not developed a schedule for addressing the recommendations identified in Respondent’s 2009 update to its Process Hazard Analysis (“PHA”) nor documented that the actions were taken, and in a timely manner, by noting the date of completion for each. Additionally, with respect to the Building Two Process, Respondent had not identified, evaluated, and controlled the hazards posed by the lack of an ammonia detector in the main relief vent pipe and the positioning of the relief vent discharge, such that it was aimed downwards and thus not designed to avoid spraying on persons
4. in the vicinity and it was situated to vent within ten feet of the fresh air intake for the Building Two Process Machinery Room ventilation system.
5. Did not have, or have available for EPA review, all of the necessary information and documentation pertaining to the two Processes to allow Respondent to adequately identify hazards posed by and maintain the Processes. For example, Respondent did not have information and supporting calculations regarding the maximum ammonia inventory for either the Building Five Process or the Building Two Process.
6. Respondent did not have certain information relating to the equipment for the Building Five Process, including information regarding:
   1. materials of construction for the equipment (as distinct from the piping, which was addressed on the block flow diagram included in the Submission),
   2. relief system design and design basis,
   3. material and energy balances, and
   4. safety systems.
7. Respondent did not have any documentation pertaining to the Manning portable ammonia detector, which is a piece of safety system equipment that is identified as part of the Facility’s emergency response procedures in the EAP.
8. In the Submission, Respondent provided a sample of Standard Operating Procedures (“SOPs”) that included some general information regarding safety systems but lacked necessary information, including the set point(s) and actions taken by each element associated with the safety system. The safety system PSI should also identify all local and remote alarms and should document that the equipment complies with RAGAGEP. Respondent has Health and Safety Equipment that needs defining, as well as the following systems, which were identified in its 2009 RMP submission to the EPA Central Data Exchange System: Relief Valves, Check Valves, Manual Shutoffs, Automatic Shutoffs, Interlocks, Alarms and Procedures, Purge System, Fire Walls, Enclosure, and Process Area Detectors.
9. Had not equipped the ammonia detectors to actuate visual and audible alarms inside either the Building Five or Building Two Process Machinery Rooms nor outside of any of access doors to either Machinery Room.
10. Had not adequately installed and labeled switches controlling emergency ventilation and emergency shutdown immediately outside the principal access doors to either Machinery Room. The switches outside the principal exterior Building Five Process Machinery Room door were of the push-button variety and had no markings identifying their function or operational status. The Building Two Process switches were also of the push-button variety and were some distance away from the Building Two Process Machinery Room access door: they were inside a door leading from a general office space area that opened to a stairway ending at the east access door of the Machinery Room. These Building Two Process switches were labeled “emergency vent” and “king valve,” without providing any clarity as to whether the latter controlled shutdown of the entire the Building Two Process, and neither had a mechanism for indicating the operational status of the emergency systems,
11. Had not posted adequate ammonia warning signs and signs restricting entry to authorized personnel at each entrance to the Machinery Room for each Process, nor signs displaying information about each Process’s operation, alarms, or emergency shutdown procedure outside any of the access doors to either of the two Machinery Rooms. None of the four access doors to the Building Five Process Machinery Room had a sign restricting entry to authorized personnel, nor did any of them they have the other necessary signage. Only one of the access doors to the Building Two Process Machinery Room (the door just inside the office area at the base of the stairs leading to the east access door) had a sign restricting entry to authorized personnel, and neither of the two access doors had any of the other necessary signage.
12. Had not labeled or tagged many of the pipes and valves associated with both the Building Five Process and the Building Two Process, including within the Machinery Rooms, the warehouse rooms, and on the roof, and also including the King Valve for each Process, both of which were painted yellow but were not otherwise clearly identified.
13. Had not developed, drafted, implemented, and certified sufficient written practices and operating procedures for safely conducting various activities associated with both the Building Five Process and the Building Two Process. For example, while Respondent had some written operating procedures covering the Processes, it did not have written procedures to address all of the required safety and health considerations, including the control measures to be taken in case of physical contact or airborne exposure.  Respondent also had not certified in writing that the written operating procedures accurately reflected current operations at the Facility and had not implemented a lockout/tagout program for controlling hazards while servicing and maintaining equipment.
14. Had not conducted an adequate training program for Facility employees involved in operating the two Processes. During the Inspection, Mr. XXXXXX XXXXXXX informed EPA that he had not received initial training specific to his responsibilities when he began working as a refrigeration technician in 2009. Additionally, according to statements by Mr. XXXXXX at the Inspection, Respondent had not provided refresher training to any employees since 2006.
15. Had not developed and implemented written mechanical integrity (“MI”) procedures to maintain the on-going integrity of the equipment in the Building Five Process and the Building Two Process. Respondent had not established and implemented a schedule and procedures for inspecting and testing the equipment and for maintaining documentation thereof. Respondent also had not performed all the necessary inspections and tests of the Process equipment; for example, facility records indicate that Respondent had not tested or calibrated the ammonia detectors since 2010. Additionally, Respondent had no records of ever maintaining, calibrating, or testing the Manning portable detector, which is to be used in responding to emergencies, nor could it perform such tests according to the manufacturer’s recommendations because it did not have the operating manual for this device. Respondent also had not maintained complete documentation regarding inspections, tests, and other preventative maintenance of Process equipment, in that aside from notes regarding active equipment maintenance and repair in a daily log book, the only documentation of equipment testing was a partially completed annual inspection form from 2010.
16. Had not maintained the integrity of certain equipment by correcting deficiencies in a safe and timely manner. For example, at least two electrical boxes associated with the Building Five Process did not have their covers attached, leaving the wires of both exposed and ice accumulating among the wires inside of one. Additionally, some of the vapor barrier insulation on piping associated with both the Building Five and Building Two Processes was damaged, some of the piping was significantly rusted, and the roof lacked bridge crossovers to allow access to the roof and pipes thereon without stepping on the pipes and risking further damage to the insulation.
17. Had not ensured that all components and piping of the Building Two Process were protected from forklift traffic or other potential impact, in that the safety barriers around the evaporators had been moved to increase storage space.
18. Had not installed the main pressure-relief vent pipe for the Building Two Process in a safe manner. The vent pipe opening was less than fifteen feet above the roof surface, it was aimed downwards and thus not designed to avoid spraying on persons in the vicinity, it was not equipped with an ammonia detector, and it was situated to vent within ten feet of the fresh air intake for the Building Two Process Machinery Room ventilation system.
19. Had not documented that all deficiencies identified during compliance audits performed for the two Processes in 2007 and 2010 had been corrected. All of the items that were identified as issues in 2007 were still outstanding at the time of, and were again listed in, the 2010 compliance audit. Some of those issues identified for the second time in 2010 (including replacing failed insulation, protecting the Building Two Process evaporators from potential forklift damage, putting certain PSI in the file, and annually recertifying operating procedures) had still not been addressed by the time of the Inspection in December 2012.
20. Did not have documentation showing that Respondent had adequately evaluated the safety performance and programs of at least two of the contractors used at the Facility, in accordance with the Facility’s RMP procedures. Facility records and a 2012 facility evaluation identified “Mullaly Brothers” and “FES” as contractors who had performed work at the Facility. Respondent’s RMP identifies four forms relating to contractors that should be completed, but none were completed for either Mullaly Brothers or FES. Respondent’s RMP included a folder for Mullaly Brothers, which contained a single, uncompleted form identified as “CG-3,” and it had no folder at all for FES.
21. Had not developed an adequate emergency response program, including an up-to-date and accurate emergency action plan. For example, the EAP stated that the emergency coordinator will mobilize and direct an Emergency Response Team; however, facility representatives informed EPA at the Inspection that no such team currently existed.  Similarly, the plan directed employees look to wind socks to determine appropriate evacuation areas, but the Facility had no wind socks, and it referenced evacuation route maps that were not included with the EAP. The EAP also stated that the Facility’s ammonia detectors are set to alarm at 50 parts per million (“ppm”), but that was contradicted by statements by Facility representatives who reported different levels, including one as high as 150 ppm. This confusion was also noted in a report from a February 2012 facility evaluation, which included as action items: 1) “Verify ventilation fans are turned on at? ppm … ” and 2) “Verify the action taken when ammonia detectors hit 250 ppm.” There is no indication that these action items were ever completed. This problem is further compounded by the fact that, despite the EAP stating that facility employees should use a Manning portable ammonia detectors in their response to a release, the reliability and accuracy of this detector is unknown in that there is no indication that it has ever been maintained, calibrated, or tested, nor was the operating manual available on-site. Finally, the EAP called for annual emergency response drills, none of which have been conducted.

VIOLATIONS

Count 1: Failure to Comply with RMP Management Requirements

Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.15, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process is required, among other things, to assign a qualified person or position responsible for development, implementation, and integration of the RMP elements. If any of the individual requirements are assigned to anyone other than the person or position just described, those names or positions and lines of authority shall be documented.

As described above, at the time of Inspection, Respondent had not developed a system to adequately manage RMP compliance, in that Mr. XXXXXX XXXXXXX is responsible for overall RMP implementation but did not have a good understanding of all of the program elements or even that both of the Processes were subject to the RMP regulations. Additionally, even though Mr. XXXXXXX reportedly did not manage all RMP program elements, Respondent had not documented the names of, and lines of authority for, the employees who manage those elements that Mr. XXXXXXXX did not. Further, the Lockout/Tagout procedures
provided in the Submission identify a position that is not included in Respondent’s PSM/RM Program Management System document.

By failing to comply with RMP management requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.15.

 

Count 2: Failure to Accurately Evaluate Offsite Consequences in Release Scenarios

Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.20, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process is required, among other things, to analyze, document, and report on the off-site consequences of a worst-case and an alternative release scenario. Forty C.F.R. § 68.22(e) defines the surface roughness parameter to be used in this analysis and specifies that the “rural” parameter is to be used to define the surrounding terrain type if there are not many obstacles, such as buildings and trees, in the immediate area.

As described above, Respondent used an “urban” surface roughness parameter in its analysis of the off-site consequences of its worst-case and alternative release scenarios. This selection erroneously, and significantly, reduced the area of impact and affected population of such releases.

By failing to accurately evaluate offsite consequences in release scenarios, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.20.

 

Count 3: Failure to Adequately Identify, Evaluate, and Control Hazards

Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.67, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process is required, among other things, to perform an initial PHA on each covered process. The PHA must identify, evaluate, and control the hazards involved in the process. The owner or operator must update the PHA every five years and when a major change in the process occurs. Additionally, the owner or operator must establish a system for addressing the recommendations identified in the PHA, including by defining a schedule for completing the action items, taking the actions as soon as possible, and documenting the resolution of the recommendations.

As described above, Respondent performed an updated PHA in 2009 and identified recommended action items. However, Respondent did not establish a schedule for addressing those items and did not document that, or when, they were completed. Additionally, as also described in Paragraph 34(c), Respondent had not fully identified, evaluated, and controlled the hazards associated with the Building Two Process, including those posed by the location and positioning of the relief vent.

By failing to adequately identify, evaluate, and control hazards, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e).

 

Count 4: Failure to Comply with Safety Information Requirements

Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.65, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process is required, among other things, to compile written process safety information before completing the PHA, in order to perform an adequate PHA and to enable proper maintenance of process equipment. This includes documenting information pertaining to the hazards of the RMP chemical in the process; information pertaining to the technology and equipment of the process, including that the equipment complies with RAGAGEP; and information showing that any equipment that was designed according to outdated standards is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operated in a safe manner. This compilation enables appropriate identification and understanding of hazards posed by regulated substances in the process and the technology and equipment of the process.

As described above, at the time of Inspection, Respondent had not compiled all of the necessary process safety information pertaining to the technology and equipment of the Building Five Process or the Building Two Process. Additionally, as described above, Respondent also failed to document that the Building Five and Building Two Processes comply with RAGAGEP, as discussed below.

Respondent had not equipped the ammonia detectors to activate visual and audible alarms inside either Process’s Machinery Room nor just outside any of either of the Machinery Rooms’ access doors. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to equip the detectors to activate visual and audible alarms inside the Machinery Room and at each of its entrances. See. e.g., ANSI/ASHRAE Standard 15-2007: Safety Standard for Refrigeration Systems § 8.11.2. l (2007) [hereinafter “ASHRAE 15-2007”] ;6 Int’l Inst. of Ammonia Refrigeration, Bulletin No. 111: Ammonia Machinery Room Ventilation § 3.5.3 (2002) [hereinafter “HAR Bull. 111”].

Also, as described above, at the time of the Inspection, Respondent had not adequately provided and labeled emergency shutdown and ventilation switches for either Process immediately outside their respective principal Machinery Room doors. The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to provide clearly marked emergency shutdown and ventilation switches immediately outside the principal Machinery Room door (and, preferably, all access doors). See. e.g., Int’l Inst. of Ammonia Refrigeration, Standard 2-2008: Equipment. Design. and Installation of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems§ 13.3.1.6 (2008) [hereinafter “HAR 2-2008”] (immediately outside door); ASHRAE 15-2007, supra,§§ 8.12(i) (provide switches), 11.2.2 (identify switches).  The shutdown switch should be of the break-glass type and the ventilation switch should have “on/auto” settings. See. e.g., HAR Bull. 111, supra,§§ 3.5.1 & 3.5.2.

As described above in Paragraph 34(g), at the time of the Inspection, Respondent did not have sufficient signs on the doors to the Building Five Process and Building Two Process Machinery Rooms. The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to post signs warning of the presence of ammonia and restricting entry to authorized personnel at each entrance to the Machinery Room, see. e.g., ASHRAE 15-2007, supra,§§ 8.11.8, 11.2.4, and to post other signs with information about the operation of the process, including about the alarms and the emergency shutdown procedures, outside the principal Machinery Room door. See. e.g., id., supra, §§ 8.11.2.1 (meaning of alarms), 11.7 (emergency shutdown procedures and precautions).

Also, as described above, at the time of the Inspection, many of the Building Five Process and Building Two Process pipes were unlabeled and valves untagged, including the King Valve for each Process. The recommended industry practice and standard of care is to label all system pipes and valve systems. See. e.g., IIAR 2-2008, ™ § 10.5 (pipes need to be marked with physical state of refrigerant, relative pressure level, and direction of flow); ASHRAE 15-2007, supra,§§ 9.12.6 (stop valves), 11.2.2 (piping, valves, and switches for refrigerant flow, ventilation, and compressor); Int’l Inst. of Ammonia Refrigeration, Bulletin No. 109: IIAR Minimum Safety Criteria for a Safe Ammonia Refrigeration System. supra. § 4.7.6 (1997) [hereinafter “IIAR Bull. 109″] (all piping needs attached markers indicating the use of the pipe and direction of flow). See generally. IIAR, Bulletin No. 114: Guidelines for Identification of Ammonia Refrigeration Piping and System Components (1991) [hereinafter “IIAR Bull. 114″] (all piping should be identified with physical state of the refrigerant, the relative pressure level, and the direction of flow; all components of the system should be uniformly identified as to the name of the equipment and a pressure level designation).

As described above, at the time of the Inspection, Respondent had not protected all of the components and piping of the Building Two Process from forklift traffic or other potential impact. The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to safeguard piping, controls, and other refrigeration equipment to minimize the chance of accidental damage by external sources such as forklifts. See. e.g. ASHRAE 15-2007, supra.§ I I.I ; IIAR Bull. 109, supra.§§ 4.4.2, 4.7.3.

As described above, at the time of the Inspection, Respondent had not safely installed the main pressure-relief vent pipe for the Building Two Process. The recommended industry practice and standard of care for ammonia refrigeration systems is to raise the relief header pipe at least fifteen feet above the adjoining surface level, orient it to point up and away from where any people may be nearby, and locate it at least twenty feet from any ventilation intake or opening. See. e.g .. IIAR 2-2008; ASHRAE 15-2007; IIAR Bull. 109.

By failing to compile the necessary information about the technology and equipment of the Processes, including by documenting that the Processes comply with RAGAGEP, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65.

 

Count 5: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Operating Procedures Requirements

Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.69, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process is required to develop and implement written operating procedures that provide instructions or steps for safely conducting activities associated with the covered process. These operating procedures must address steps for each operating phase, operating limits, safety and health considerations, and safety systems. The owner or operator must make these procedures available to employees involved in the process, keep them up-to-date with current practices, and certify annually that they are current. The owner or operator must also develop and implement safe work practices to control hazards during specific operations, including by developing a “lockout/tagout” program for handling equipment during maintenance or bringing equipment in or out of service.

As described above, at the time of Inspection, Respondent did not have sufficient written operating procedures to address the required safety and health considerations for either Process, had not certified that the written operating procedures were current and accurate for operations at the Facility, and had not developed a lockout/tagout program for controlling hazards while servicing and maintaining equipment.

By failing to comply with the operating procedures requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69.

Count 6: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Training Requirements

Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.71, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process must train each employee involved in operating the process, provide those employees with refresher training at least every three years, and document such training and the employee’s understanding of it. Training documentation must record the date of the training and the means used to verify that employees understood the training.

As described above, at the time of Inspection, Respondent had not provided and documented adequate training for employees involved in operating the Processes, in that Respondent had not provided Mr. Russell Warren with initial training when he began work in 2009, and no employees had been provided refresher training since 2006.

By failing to adequately train and record compliance with training requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.71.

 

Count 7: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Mechanical Integrity Requirements

Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process must establish and implement written procedures to maintain the ongoing integrity of certain process equipment and train employees accordingly. The owner or operator must inspect and test the equipment either in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations and good engineering practices, or more frequently if needed based on prior operating experience. The owner or operator must also document the inspections or tests on process equipment, correct deficiencies, assure that any new equipment is suitable for the process application, perform checks to ensure that equipment is installed properly, and assure that maintenance materials and spare parts are suitable for the process application.

As described above, at the time of Inspection, Respondent had not developed and implemented written mechanical integrity schedules and procedures to maintain the on-going integrity of the equipment in the two Processes, had not performed all the necessary inspections and tests of the equipment in the two Processes, and had not maintained documentation thereof. The limited equipment inspection records indicated that, at the very least, the ammonia detectors had not been tested or calibrated since 2010 and the Manning portable detector had never been maintained, tested, or calibrated. Ammonia detectors should be tested in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations and good engineering practices, which require annual inspections where no manufacturer recommendations exist. See. e.g. IIAR 2-2008; Bulletin No. 110: Start-up, Inspection and Maintenance of Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems.

Also, Respondent had not maintained the mechanical integrity of the Processes by correcting deficiencies in equipment that are outside of acceptable bounds before continuing to use the equipment, or in a safe and timely manner when steps have been taken to ensure safe operation. Respondent had not maintained the vapor barrier insulation on piping in several places in both Processes, resulting in some significantly rusted piping, and had failed to provide mechanisms for preventing further damage.

By failing to establish and implement a sufficient mechanical integrity program and by not correcting equipment deficiencies before further use or in a safe and timely manner, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73.

 

Count 8: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Compliance Audit Requirements

Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.79, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process must evaluate compliance with the provisions of the prevention program at least every three years; document the audit findings; promptly determine and document a response to each of the findings of the audit; document that deficiencies have been corrected; and retain the two most recent compliance reports.

Respondent performed compliance audits in 2007 and 2010, but did not correct all of the identified deficiencies and/or did not document that all of the deficiencies identified in the audits had been corrected and when.

By failing to comply with the compliance audit requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.79.

 

Count 9: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Contractor Requirements

Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.87, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process must take certain steps to ensure that contractors who work on or adjacent to the covered process do not inadvertently cause a chemical release. Those steps include evaluating information regarding the contractor’s safety performance and programs when selecting a contractor; informing the contractor of known hazards relating to the contractor’s work and the process; explaining the emergency response program to the contractor; developing and implementing safe work practices to control the entrance, presence, and exit of the contractor in covered process areas; and periodically evaluating the contractor’s conformance with the contractor safety requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.87(c).

Respondent had not implemented an adequate contractor safety program, including by not obtaining and evaluating contractor safety performance information.

By failing to comply with the contractor requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.87 and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E).

 

Count 10: Failure to Have an Adequate Emergency Response Program

Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.90, the owner or operator of a stationary source of a Program 3 process must comply with the emergency response program requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.95 unless such owner or operator’s employees will not be responding to accidental releases and various other requirements are met. Forty C.F .R. § 68. 95 requires the owner or operator of a Program 3 process to develop and implement an emergency response program, including by:

• maintaining an emergency response plan;
• outlining procedures for using, inspecting, testing and maintaining response equipment;
• training employees on response procedures; and
• creating procedures to review and update the emergency response plan to reflect current conditions at the Facility and
• to inform employees accordingly.

EAP indicates that its employees will respond to accidental releases at the Facility. Accordingly, 40 C.F.R. § 68.95 applies. Respondent did not have an adequate emergency response program in place, in that the Facility’s EAP did not accurately reflect current conditions at the Facility, it referenced an Emergency Response Team that did not exist at that time, it directed employees to use untested and uncalibrated response equipment, and it called for annual emergency response drills that were not being conducted.

By failing to comply with the emergency response program requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.95.

Supplemental Environmental Projects

Respondent shall satisfactorily complete the pollution prevention and reduction SEPs described below.

 

Facility Safety Upgrades to Prevent and Minimize Ammonia Releases

Respondent shall make safety improvements to the Facility according to the requirements and deadlines described below. The purpose of this SEP is to protect workers, emergency responders, and the community by preventing ammonia releases at the Facility and by limiting the effects of any releases that do occur.

The Safety Upgrade SEP is anticipated to cost approximately $308,600.

 

Local Emergency Response Enhancements

Respondent shall provide emergency response equipment and a calibration contract to the Fire Department of the City of Chicopee, which Respondent has selected to be the SEP Recipient, according to the requirements and deadlines described in Exhibit A. The purpose of this SEP is to enhance the emergency planning and chemical spill response capabilities for local first responders. Hereinafter this SEP shall be referred to as the “Emergency Response SEP.” The SEP is anticipated to cost approximately $13,500. “Satisfactory completion” of the SEP shall mean: (a) providing the Chicopee Fire Department with emergency response equipment and an associated calibration contract.

If EPA determines that Respondent completely or substantially failed to implement the Safety Upgrade SEP in accordance with this CAFO, Respondent shall pay a stipulated penalty to the United States in the amount of $385,750, plus interest from the effective date of the CAF0.

If EPA determines that Respondent completely or substantially failed to implement the Equipment Purchase SEP in accordance with this CAFO, Respondent shall pay a stipulated penalty to the United States in the amount of $16,875, plus interest from the effective date of the CAF0.

Scope of Work for Supplemental Environmental Projects

1. Facility Safety Upgrades to Prevent and Minimize Ammonia Releases

Although ammonia is a very efficient refrigerant, it is toxic when released and at certain concentrations can be flammable. Accordingly, the refrigeration industry has taken steps to improve safety at ammonia refrigeration facilities by publishing industry standards and guidelines to help the refrigeration operators identify hazards at their facilities, avoid releases, and mitigate the effects of any releases that do occur. In Clean Air Act Section 112(r) cases, EPA often refers to these industry standards and guidelines when it is determining whether a particular refrigeration facility is meeting the standard of care that one would expect from such a facility. To prevent and limit the effects of releases of ammonia at Respondent’s cold storage facility at 149 Plainfield Street, Chicopee, Massachusetts, Respondent shall make the safety upgrades listed in the following chart and described in more detail below.

Safety Upgrade

1. Replace two ammonia liquid pumps with $34,980
2. Two hermetically-sealed pumps in Building Two
3. Replace six compressor panels with six $130,136
4. Install master computerized control system $143,502

a. Replace two ammonia liquid pumps with two hermetically sealed pumps to nearly eliminate the potential for ammonia releases from pump failure

By September 1, 2015, Respondent shall replace two open-drive style liquid ammonia pumps in Building Two at the Facility, with hermetically sealed pumps to nearly eliminate the potential for ammonia releases from pump failure. An ammonia refrigeration expert often used by EPA estimates that up to fifteen percent of the leaks to which he responds are attributable to pump failures. This upgrade involves the conversion and upgrade of the current ammonia liquid pumps from “open drive” pumps to canned, hermetically sealed pumps that have no mechanical seals and no shafts to penetrate the pressure containment area of the pumps. Installation of hermetically sealed pumps would eliminate the “weak link” on the open-drive pump, which is the shaft seal. The hermetically sealed pump operates with the motor and pump sealed within the ammonia system, which nearly eliminates the potential for the pump itself to be the cause of a leak. If the inner fluid containment system were to fail, the external stator shell still prevents the release of ammonia to the atmosphere. The technology being replaced, even when working properly, presents a greater risk of leak due to lubrication failures, physical degradation, and both normal and unanticipated wear and tear. Furthermore, this upgrade would improve worker safety by reducing the need for manual observation of the oil reservoir. The approximate cost for the replacement of the two ammonia pumps is $34,980, including purchase and installation costs.

b. Upgrade and replace six existing compressor panels with six GEA Omni computerized compressor control panels

By August 1, 2015, Respondent shall place a purchase order for six GEO Omni compressor control panels to replace four local MicroMASTER compressor panels and two local Micro III compressor panels. The new GEO Omni compressor panels, which are made-to-order and which may take up to 18 weeks for manufacture, shall be installed by Respondent in Building Two of the Facility within four (4) months of receiving them.  The upgraded panels will provide enhanced operational control of the six screw compressors. They will also allow for display of pre-loaded operating manuals and wiring diagrams at the site of the equipment, which provides improved access to this critical safety information. This will enhance preventative maintenance of the equipment so as to reduce the likelihood of an ammonia release. The compressor panels have safety cut-out switches that shut the compressors down in cases of excessively high pressure or temperature, reducing the likelihood of a catastrophic failure and release of ammonia. These upgraded panels are also a necessary first step to installing a systemwide master control panel (see next project). The approximate cost for the purchase, installation, and worker training of the six compressor control panels is $130,136.

c. Install GEA Omni master computerized control system

By June 15, 2016, Respondent shall install and operate a centralized, computerized control system to monitor and control the entire refrigeration system in Building Two of the Facility. The control system will be comprised of a system control panel that will tie into the upgraded compressor control panels described above, as well as various pressure, temperature, and ammonia probes and sensors system-wide. The installation of control system shall include approximately two weeks of startup supervision by a company technician. The approximate cost for the purchase, installation, and worker training of the master control panels is $143,502.

The entire system will be fully integrated to monitor and control all components for temperature, pressure, and ammonia and will provide immediate detection and notification (via alarms, text messages, or electronic mail) of any problematic reading or device failure. It can prevent or minimize ammonia releases by triggering automatic shutdown of certain components or refrigeration zones if readings hit specified set-points, and by providing for remote control and shutdown (by owner and authorized third parties, such as the company’s refrigeration consultant and/or its refrigeration contractor) more quickly than currently possible, and from any personal computer, without specialized software. The system tracks historical trends, aiding in predictive maintenance to avoid potential failures, and logs maintenance tasks, including when the next service action/inspection is due.

Emergency Response Enhancements

a. Provide emergency response equipment and calibration contract to local emergency responders

Respondent shall purchase and deliver, or shall ensure the purchase and delivery of, the following emergency response equipment to the Chicopee Fire Department, the response agency that operates in the vicinity of the Facility, by August 1 , 2015:

• Three (3) Biosystems 54-45-21 ToxiPro ammonia gas detectors, at an approximate cost of $1,527.33 ($509.11 each), and
• Two (2) RAE Systems MiniRAE 3000 photo ionization detectors and calibration kits, at an approximate cost of $8,298 ($4,149 each).

The equipment consists of gas detectors, which are needed during responses to emergencies involving chemicals that are regulated pursuant to Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act, including anhydrous ammonia.  Additionally, Respondent shall fund a five-year contract to provide for the necessary annual calibration of the above-listed ToxiPro detectors. The contract shall begin at the time of the equipment donation and extend for five years. The approximate cost of the calibration contract is $177.71 a year for each unit, for an approximate five-year total of $2,665.65. The total approximate cost for the emergency equipment and calibration contract is $12,491.

b. Develop and conduct a table-top emergency exercise to enhance planning and coordination between the facility and local emergency responders

By December 1, 2015, Respondent shall, through an ammonia refrigeration consultant, develop and conduct a table-top exercise program in which the facility and the Chicopee Fire Department personnel shall meet in an informal, classroom setting to discuss their roles during an emergency and their responses to particular emergency scenarios. Other nearby emergency response organizations shall be invited to participate.  Development of the exercise shall begin with an assessment of needs and current capabilities of the respective parties, and shall include risk assessment and program performance objectives. The exercise shall include a walkthrough or orientation session to familiarize team members with the preparedness plans, a review of roles and responsibilities, and ensure everyone is familiar with incident management. This process shall assist in identifying probable scenarios for emergencies and business disruption. The ammonia refrigeration consultant will then use these ammonia release scenarios as the basis for conducting a tabletop exercise in which the participants assess the incident(s), identify response objectives and necessary resources, discuss roles and responsibilities, and simulate responses to the emergency scenarios.  Following the exercise, a hot-wash debrief will be held to determine whether exercise objectives were met and to identify opportunities for program improvement. To complete the exercise process, the consultant will produce an after-action report that includes an improvement plan matrix, which will be provided to facility management as well as the Chicopee Fire Department.  The approximate cost for the emergency response exercise is $1,025.

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