Respondent owns and operates a food oil products manufacturing and distribution facility which is engaged in packaging margarine, liquid oil and shortenings. Respondent operates a closed loop refrigeration system which utilizes or utilized anhydrous ammonia at the Facility. Respondent uses and stores 13,800 lbs. of anhydrous ammonia in the refrigeration system. The Facility is subject to the “Program 3” eligibility requirements because the process:
- does not meet the requirements of 40 C.F .R. § 68.10
- because the distance to a toxic or flammable endpoint for a worst-case release assessment conducted under 40 C.F.R. § 68.25 is greater than the distance to any public receptor; and
- is subject to the OSHA process safety management standard set forth at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119 and 40 C.F.R. § 68.10(d) because the process involves anhydrous ammonia above the threshold quantity of 10,000 pounds.
On August 11, 2011, U.S. EPA conducted an inspection to determine whether the Respondent was complying with Section 112(r) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r), and the regulations at 40 C.F.R. Part 68. Based on the inspection conducted on August 11, 2011, and a review of additional information received by EPA subsequent to that date in response to the information request, EPA determined that the Facility failed to comply with the Risk Management Program regulations at 40 C.F.R. Part 68 for Program 3 requirements as set forth below:
Worst-case release scenario analysis
Respondent reported in its April 27, 2009 and March 27, 2014 Risk Management Plans (RMPs), a worst-case release scenario from the anhydrous ammonia refrigeration system that assumed a release of anhydrous ammonia from the entire system.
Respondent’s failure to consider the greatest amount of anhydrous ammonia held in a single vessel to determine the worst-case release quantity in its RMPs, was a violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.25(b).
Process Hazard Analysis
Respondent conducted a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) from April 15 through June 16, 2011. The process hazard analysis failed to address the consequences of
Process Hazard Analysis
Respondent conducted a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) from April 15 through June 16, 2011. The process hazard analysis failed to address the consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls; engineering and administrative controls applicable to hazards and interrelationships; stationary source siting; and human factors as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(c).
Mechanical Integrity
Respondent did not establish and adequately implement written procedures to maintain the on-going integrity of the process equipment (have a written mechanical integrity program) by the date of the Inspection, violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b).
Respondent failed to demonstrate that it performed inspections and tests on the anhydrous ammonia refrigeration system, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(1).
Respondent failed to demonstrate that it followed recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices for inspections and testing procedures, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(2).
Respondent failed to demonstrate that it ensured that the frequency of inspections and tests of the anhydrous ammonia refrigeration system were consistent with applicable good engineering practices, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(3).
Respondent failed to document each inspection and test that had been performed on the ammonia refrigeration system, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(4).
Compliance Audit
On August 22, 2011, Respondent conducted a compliance audit. On August 18 through August 22, 2014, Respondent conducted another compliance audit. Respondent failed to promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each of the findings of the August 22, 2011 compliance audit, and document that the deficiencies found during the August 22, 2011 compliance audit had been corrected, as required 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(d).
Contractors
Respondent was required to obtain and evaluate its contractor’s safety performance prior to selecting the contractor to perform maintenance on the system. September 2010, a contractor was hired to performance maintenance on the refrigeration system but Respondent failed to evaluate the contractor’s safety performance prior to selecting the contractor for the job, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.87(b)(1).
Emergency Response Plan
Respondent failed to include procedures in its Emergency Response Plan for the use of the emergency response equipment and for its inspection, testing and maintenance, as required 40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a)(2).
Required Corrections
A respondent’s employee was identified during the Inspection as Plant Manager of the facility, and as the emergency contact for Risk Management Plan (RMP) purposes. Respondent represented during the Inspection that he became Plant Manager on June 1, 2010. As of the date of the Inspection on August 11, 2011, he was not listed in the RMP as emergency contact. Respondent’s failure to correct the emergency contact information (listing him as the emergency contact) in its RMP within one month of any change in the emergency contact information, was a violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.195(b).
Civil Penalty
Based on an analysis of the factors specified in Section 113(e) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e), the facts of this case, and other factors such as cooperation and prompt compliance, Complainant has determined that an appropriate civil penalty to settle this action is $43,500.
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